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FOREWORD 
A technological innovation may be a new product, process, 
or device. It may be new "under the sun," or -- in the case of 
diffusion -- new only "under this roof." In either case, it may 
constitute a relatively minor improvement, or a major break-
through. Its economic and/or social impact may be negligible 
or quite significant -- and for the same innovation this impact 
may vary from one level of aggregation to another. Thus inno-
vations themselves admit of considerable diversity. 
To this diversity we add several dimensions of complexity 
when we consider the process by which innovations are conceived, 
developed, introduced, and diffused. In organizational terms, 
the process of technological innovation may be multi-phase and 
multi-year, requiring a substantial commitment of resources, 
and the cooperative interaction of diverse skills and functions 
-- or just the opposite. In economic terms, it may be a high 
or low risk venture. In social-psychological terms, it may be 
highly disruptive to the "culture" of the firm, or handled routine-
ly with little stress. Informationally it may require large 
"flows" from the outside, or the in-house information "pool" may 
be adequate to the task. 
To these several dimensions of complexity inherent in the 
innovation process we must add still other "indigenous" influences 
to be reckoned with. Among these are; the influences of corporate 
policy and strategy, organizational structure, location and func- 
tion of the R & D laboratory, supervisory attitudes and prac-
tices, work and social groups within the laboratory, the com-
petence, motivations, and mind-sets of research personnel, etc. 
All of these variables and influences in the immediate contexts 
to which the process is indigenous must be recognized as im-
pinging upon its conduct. 
In addition to these indigenous influences, there are 
others which form a part of the larger context of technological 
innovation. Among these "exogenous" impingments are: (1) in 
stitutions, such as industry and market structure, and the host 
of governmental policy, regulatory, and taxing agencies; (2) en 
dowments such as material and energy resources, labor, capital, 
and knowledge; and (3) values which serve to channel, facilitate 
and inhibit the innovative thrust. 
This degree of "natural" complexity inherent in the pro-
cess of technological innovation, is almost matched by the com-
plexity introduced by the "inquiring systems" that study it. 
Since the process itself -- at least in its increasingly domi-
nant form -- is relatively new, having experienced most of its 
growth since World War II, its study has only in the last two 
decades really emerged as an academic focus. As a result, it 
lacks the well-developed theoretical underpinning that character-
izes a more mature intellectual enterprise. But like the pro-
cess itself, its study has grown very rapidly -- especially in 
its analytic and empirical dimensions -- with research being 
conducted in an unusually large number of academic disciplines. 
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Researchers in each discipline have sought -- and found --
the variables with which they were most familiar and have studied 
their influence on the innovation process largely in isolation 
from their colleagues in other disciplines. Thus the-state-of-
the art knowledge is fragmented along disciplinary lines. As 
a direct result of this fragmentation, research results have 
become scattered throughout a very large number of professional 
journals. This makes it doubly difficult for even the conscien-
tious researcher to maintain a state-of-the-art awareness. 
As a result of such complexities -- inherent in both the 
process itself and its study -- there is a need to bring together, 
assess and integrate what is known. This need has two parts; 
first we need to see the whole picture in order to stimulate 
research on the interrelations among variables, and second we 
need to pull together what is known in order to see where the 
knowledge gaps and weaknesses are. 
This need to pull things together is made more pressing 
by a host of quite practical considerations. Technological inno-
vation has been -- and continues to be -- a dominant problem-
solving response in our society, and indeed, in much of the 
world. And while it may be argued that many of the societal 
problems we now face -- economic, environmental, social, etc. --
are in some measure the result of unforeseen and deleterious 
consequences of past technological achievements, this does not 
lessen our present dependence on this response. In fact it 
often increases it, while at the same time increasing our 
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responsibility to anticipate and avoid the undesirable spin-
off consequences. 
Thus our present knowledge of the technologically innova-
tive response to societal problems is such that integrative, 
cumulative research is difficult, management of the process is 
largely trial and error, and policy making is extremely "iffy." 
The needs of all three of these groups -- the scholars, the 
managers, and the policy makers -- require attention. We have 
tried to keep all three in mind in this critical review of cur-
rent knowledge. 
* 	,* 
The research and writing of this volume and the overall 
responsibility for the_project was shared by an interdisciplinary 
research team of six scholars. The members of this Georgia Tech 
Innovation Project group are: 
Dr. Patrick Kelly, Head of the Department of Social 
Sciences, whose special interests are the philosophy 
of technology and epistemology. 
Dr. Melvin Kranzberg, Callaway Professor of the 
History of Technology who is a pioneer in this field 
and editor of Technology and Culture. 
Dr. Frederick A. Rossini, Department of Social Sciences, 
whose background includes a doctorate in physics, post 
doctoral work in the philosophy of science, and involve 
ment in a NASA technology assessment program. 
Dr. Norman R. Baker, School of Industrial and Systems 
Engineering (now Chairman of the Department of Quanti- 
tative Analysis, Graduate School of Business Administra-
tion, University of Cincinnati), whose specialty is 
management science, especially R & D management. 
Dr. Fred A. Tarpley, College of Industrial Management, 
who is an economist specializing in the economics of 
regulation. 
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Dr. Morris Mitzner, Department of Social Sciences, who 
is a sociologist specializing in informal organizational 
behavior. 
This group began its work with a fairly clear-cut division 
of labor in the usual multi-disciplinary mode. As it turned out, 
however, the level of cooperation interaction was so high that 
credit for specific chapters of sections of this volume is im-
possible to assign, i.e., in the course.of things it became a 
truly interdisciplinary project. 
Because the innovation process is itself so complex and 
the literature concerning it so disparate and diffuse, it was 
apparent that additional expertise was needed. Hence, nine out-
standing research scholars were asked to prepare complementary 
state-of-the-art assessments of specialized aspects of the inno-
vation process. The second volume of the report consists of 
their commissioned papers prepared expressly for this project. 
These nine consultants include: 
Dr. James R. Bright (formerly Associate Dean of 
the Graduate School of Business, University of 
Texas-Austin, and now Head of the Industrial 
Management Center, Inc.), is a pioneer in the 
field of technological forecasting. 
Dr. Thomas P. Hughes (Department of the History 
and Sociology of Science, University of Pennsyl-
vania) is a well-known historian of technology, 
author of the prize-winning volume, Elmer Sperry: 
Inventor and Engineer. 
Dr. Simon Kuznets (emeritus professor of economics, 
Harvard University) is a Nobel laureate in economics. 
Dr. Edward Mansfield (Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania) is the author of many studies 
linking innovation with the economics of firms and 
industries. 
Dr. Everett Rogers (University of Michigan) is a 
sociologist and a specialist in communications 
who is the author of several classical studies on 
the diffusion of innovations. 
Dr. Nathan Rosenberg (Stanford University) is the 
editor of the Journal of Economic History and the 
author of works dealing with the application and 
transfer of technical innovations. 
Dr. Richard S. Rosenbloom (Sarnoff Professor, 
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration) 
is the author of studies dealing with the "spinoff" 
of technical innovations and of decision-making in 
business enterprises. 
Dr. Albert Rubenstein, (Head of the Program of Re-
search on the Management of Research and Develop-
ment at Northwestern University) has directed many 
investigations of R & D organization, stressing the 
flow of information. 
Dr. W. Paul Strassmann (Professor of economics at 
Michigan State University) is the author of books 
dealing with risks and innovation in 19th-and 20th-
century American industry, 
* 	t* 
Shortly after the project began, we recognized that our 
literature-based review and integration of current knowledge 
needed to be critiqued by those actively engaged in the innova-
tion process -- the "real world" doers, administrators, and users 
of scholarly output. We were fortunate to obtain the services 
of the following individuals on our Industry Advisory Panel: 
Dr. Herman Bieber (Senior Research Associate, Exxon Research 
and Engineering Company); Dr. W. Gale Cutler (Director of Cor-
porate Research, Whirlpool Corporation); Dr. Edward David (for-
mer Science Advisor to the President of the United States, now 
Vice-President of the Gould Corporation); Dr. Jacob E. Goldman 
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(Senior Vice-President, Research and Development, Xerox Cor-
poration); Dr. William E. Hanford (Vice-President, Research and 
Development, Chemicals, Olin Corporation); Dr. Walter R. 
Hibbard (formerly Vice-President, Technical Services, Owens-Cor-
ning Fiberglas Corporation; then Deputy Administrator of the 
Federal Energy Administration; and now Dean of Engineering at 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute), Dr. Roland W. Schmitt (Research 
and Development Manager, Physical Science and Engineering, Gener-
al Electric Company); Dr. Julian D. Tebo (Retired Director of 
Technical Information Services, Bell Telephone Laboratories). 
These men provided us with invaluable insights and correctives 
for a study which might have been over-academically oriented 
had it not been for this contact with the actualities of the inno-
vation process. 
The project had an analytic and an assessment/integration 
phase, each of which had two components. The analytic phase 
involved the reading, classification, and coding of a large body 
of the recent research literature on the innovation process, 
and an in-depth abstracting of the most significant subset of 
this literature. This involved the examination of some 4000 
literature items (books, technical reports, government documents, 
and articles from some 200 professional journals), a computerized 
coding of approximately 2000 of these, and the preparation of 
detailed abstracts of more than 300 of the most significaht ones. 
A detailed account of our search and coding procedures is provided 
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in the foreword to Volume III. 
The assessment and integration phase concerned the quality 
and adequacy of current knowledge of the process, on both the 
theoretical and empirical levels. As indicated above, the overall 
state-of-the-art assessment was conducted by the Georgia Tech 
Innovation Project group and the complementary assessment of 
selected aspects by the nine consultants. 
The final report thus consists of four volumes. Volume I is 
the overall assessment by the Georgia Tech Project Group, Volume II 
contains the commissioned papers by the outside consultants, deal-
ing with selected aspects of the innovation process; Volume III 
is the project bibliography, including cross-classifications by 
selected categories; and Volume IV, the abstracts of the major 
literature items in the field. - An Executive Summary is also 
provided. 
* 
Just as innovations must be applied and diffused if they 
are to have significant economic and social effects, so must 
knowledge of the innovation process be disseminated if it is to 
have any value. Great attention has therefore been paid to the 
dissemination of the results of this project. 
Preliminary results were presented at a symposium, entitled 
"Innovation: What We Know, Don't Know, and Should Know," at the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science annual meeting 
in San Francisco on February 25, 1974. This symposium, attended 
by some 100 individuals representing academia, industrial R & D 
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managers, and government administrators, was co-sponsored by 
Section M (Engineering), and Section P (Industrial Science) of 
the AAAS, and the Society for the History of Technology. Pre-
sentations of parts of our study have also been made at other 
scholarly meetings, including the American Society for Engineer-
ing Education and the International Studies Association. In 
addition, two presentations are scheduled for the Institute for 
Management Science, XXII International Meeting in Japan in 
July, 1975. 
In addition to the distribution of this final report by the 
National Science Foundation, dissemination will also be achieved 
by its publication in book form in the near future. This book, 
to be published jointly by the Society for the History of Tech-
nology and the University of Chicago Press, will consist of 
Volumes I and II of the present report (the Georgia Tech overall 
assessment, and the consultant papers), and is expected to be 
published in the Fall of 1975. 
A project of this scope involves many individuals beside 
those researchers who have actually participated in the project 
at Georgia Tech and the outside consultants who prepared the 
specialized assessment papers. In addition to our Industry Ad- 
visory Panel mentioned earlier, there are many others who provided 
advice and support, and whose contribution to the successful com-
pletion of the project must not be overlooked. Foremost among 
these are the program officers of the National Science Foundation's 
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National R & D Assessment Program: Mr. Leonard Lederman; Dr. 
Alden Bean; and, most importantly, Ms. Mary Ellen Mogee. In-
deed, Ms. Mogee shepherded this project through its many phases 
from inception to completion; she was inquiring but sympathetic, 
skeptical yet supportive, demanding but understanding. 
Other members of the National R & D Assessment Program pro-
vided help at various stages of the project. These include 
Dr. Andrew Pettifor, Dr. J. David Roessner, and Ms. Eleanor 
Thomas. 
We were also favored with assistance and advice from parti-
cipants in companion projects, including Dr. Charles Douds of 
Northwestern University, and Dr. Edward Wood of the Stanford 
Research Institute. 
* 	* 	* 
An essential requirement of any study of the magnitude of 
this one is the cooperation of conscientious and dedicated 
people. For their many and varied contributions we are deeply 
grateful: 
To Dr. Graham Roberts and the staff of the Georgia Tech 
Library who generously provided working space, continuous pro-
fessional assistance, and endured the clatter of our computer 
terminal: 
To Ms. Frances Kaiser, a first-rate professional, who 
served the project so ably while on "loan" from the Georgia Tech 
Library, and after; 
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To Mr. Charles Reed and his staff at the Georgia Tech Com-
puter Center who tell you they are there to serve, and mean 
it; 
To Jay Norman and Dave Howell who managed the day-to-day 
operation of the literature search so ably; 
To Russell Zimmerman, Taylor Little, Lu Ann Sims, Mary 
Martin, Mark Clark, Farah Eslami, Mary Nelson, Carlos Seminario, 
L. 0. Cox, and Duncan Wood, who searched and searched and searched 
-- with care and good results; 
To Dr. Michael McKinney of the Social Sciences Faculty and 
his assistant, Ross Herbert, who developed the computer program 
for the cross-classified displays of the literature base presented 
in Volume III, and saw the task through to completion; 
To Mrs. Anita Bryant, Mrs. Wynette Little, Mrs. Ann Single-
ton, Miss Frances Smith, and Mr. Paul Burkitt who typed countless 
drafts with accuracy, good humor, and patience; 
And finally, to the administrative offices of Georgia Tech 
for their help and understanding in the conduct of this complex 
and extended task. 
Above all, we are grateful to the many scholars who preceded 
us, and whose work provided us with the knowledge and information 
about the innovation process which served as the starting point 
and the source material for our own researches and studies. Just 
as most innovations build on previous innovations, so our study 
of the innovation process builds on a vast body of research by 
xi 
those who have gone before us. Our major contribution perhaps 
has been to sort out and juxtapose an enormous volume of litera-
ture, to integrate the maze of hitherto disparate investigations, 
and to offer hypotheses and guidelines for future research and 
action. In the course of this work, we have learned much about 
the process of innovation, and we hope that this knowledge will 
be useful to scholars, managers of innovative efforts, and policy 
makers concerned with stimulating the innovation process. 
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Chapter 1  
The Ecology of Innovation  
I. Popular Views of the Innovation Process  
Popular mythology presents only simplistic notions of the in-
novation process. Yet even this simplistic folklore manifests its 
complex nature. For instance, we get a half-truth, albeit a very 
important one, from the comic-strips. There the inventor -- a some-
what eccentric fellow (after all, he walks around with a symbolic 
electric bulb suspended over his head) -- receives a flash of in-
spiration (the electric bulb lights up), and lo and behold, an in-
vention has been born. True, because such cartoons depict the im-
portance of individual imagination and ingenuity in innovation, but 
only in part, because inventive insight is only one in a series of 
developments which are necessary for a successful innovation. 
"Necessity is the mother of invention" is another half-truth. 
As we shall see, demand is a strong motive force, but as a full ex-
planation it fails once we recognize how many felt needs have not 
yet given rise to inventions, and when we remember how many innova-
tions arose from other causes. I Besides, in many cases inventions 
require additional inventions in order to make the original one ef-
fective. Thus one could perhaps turn the adage around: "Invention 
is the mother of necessity." Yet there is also an important truth 
in the "necessity" explanation, for it forces us to consider those 
social needs and human wants which help formulate the problems to-
ward which inventors direct their attention. 
Another old saw which stresses the same point is the saying at-
tributed to Ralph Waldo Emerson, "If a man can....build a better 
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mousetrap than his neighbor, though he builds his house in the woods, 
the world will make a beaten path to his door." Although there are 
many "better mousetraps" which never became successful innovations, 
Emerson's reputed statement is important because it focuses atten-
tion upon the need to link together social needs with inventive 
activity. 
The "captain of industry" are also often extolled in popular 
folklore as the moving force in the innovation process -- linking 
social needs with technical responses in bold and imaginative syn-
theses. And, indeed, without the entrepreneurial contribution of 
organizational know-how, capital, production and marketing capabi-
lities, etc., an invention is still-born. The well-known "captains 
of industry," however, has been largely replaced today by the face-
less organization; the entrepreneur has become an entrepreneurial 
function. Further, an idea -- an invention -- must exist before the 
entrepreneur can develop it into an innovation. A half-truth "writ 
large" in folklore is still a half-truth. 
Another notion popular since the days of Sir Francis Bacon's 
New Atlantis, is that technological innovations derive from scienti-
fic discoveries. If this generalization can be said to have validity, 
it would hold only for relatively modern times -- and even then, as 
we will see, the situation is much too complicated to admit of a sim-
ple causal relationship between science and technology. Nevertheless, 
this concept exerts great power, underlying for instance, the argu-
ment for government support of basic research on the grounds that 
such research ultimately achieves utility. 
Still another popular idea is that innovation can come about on 
command. This idea is based on the myth of technological virtuosity 
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and the "men-money" syndrome. Nurtured on a diet of "success" 
stories, the public retains great faith in the ability of technology 
to meet every challenge put to it. Although some recent scoffers 
might doubt that technology always triumphs, and although some hu-
manists might decry it (they plaintively, but properly, ask to what 
human ends and purposes), the general public seems, on balance, to 
regard technology as beneficient or at least are not willing to live 
without it (Taviss 1972; Metlay 1971, 1972). To that is added the 
belief that "throwing money at problems" will induce technological 
innovation by the simple expedient of investing men (talent) and 
money. Crash programs, such as the atomic bomb project and synthe-
tic rubber during World War II and the space program, provide his-
torical examples. 
This idea of innovation induced through the application of men 
and money has come to the fore during the current "energy crisis." 
"Project Independence," which, in its original form, postulated an 
investment in technological development to make the United States 
independent of outside energy sources by 1980, is based on a combina-
tion of several myths: Necessity is the mother of invention; the 
invincibility of technology; and the efficacy of governmental finan-
cial support. 
While it can rightly be argued that such problems will not be 
solved without an investment in men and money and that technology 
has responded on command in the past with some spectacular success, 
the simplistic cause-effect relationship implicit in these notions 
wilts before the complexities they fail to address. Which technical 
approach (or combination of approaches) should the money be thrown 
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at? What kinds of talents are needed and at which points of the 
process? Will just any organizational structure do? What social 
environmental, political, and human price will there be? Are all 
the second-and later-order consequences also desirable, and, if not 
are the undesirable ones acceptable? What, in face, is the "track 
record" of "command innovation," i.e., have the failures as well as 
the successes been recorded? In brief, these apparently simple no-
tions turn out to hide a maze of complex questions. 
Yet, such popular views of innovation turn out to be extraordi-
narily influential because there seems to be something inherently 
attractive about simple explanations for complex phenomena. Even 
scholars engaged in innovation research are not entirely immune to 
this tendency. To serve as a corrective for the half-truths which 
might emerge from such one-sided approaches, we must endeavor to 
investigate the innovation process in all its ramifications. We 
are thus brought squarely to face with the question: What do we 
know about innovation? 
II. Definitions, Distinctions, and Usages  
Researchers concerned with the process of technological inno-
vation belong to a wide variety of discipline-oriented communities 
and typically view the process from these diverse perspectives. As 
a result there is little uniformity in their definitions and conce-
ptual distinctions of the innovation process. For example, some 
economists reserve the word "innovation" for the application of an 
"invention," that is, its entrance on the marketplace. Thus the 
economist Joseph Schumpeter (1939) regarded invention, the dis-
covery of a new tool or technique, as the initial event; innovation 
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is the final event, when the new tool or technique is generally 
implemented and brought into use. Mansfield (1968,p. 83) too 
defines an innovation as the first application of an invention. 
To the Patent Office, the interest is in the initial event -- when 
rights are assigned to an individual -- and there is no concern with 
the eventual application. As we shall see, cultural anthropologists, 
management scientists, and other specialists have different notions 
of what constitutes innovation and the various elements comprising 
it. 
Scholars also differ in their use of the terms "invention" and 
"discovery." According to R.J. Forbes (1958, p. 5), this is tied to 
a distinction between science and technology: scientific discovery 
usually recognizes or observes some new natural object or phenomenon, 
while an invention is the creation of something technologically new 
which had not existed before in nature. For example, man "discovered" 
fire, but had to "invent" means to start fire and use it for lighting 
and heating. But such a distinction can be misleading, for sometimes 
what we call inventions might also be classified as discoveries, such 
as Charles Perkin's "discovery" of aniline dye -- which was at the 
same time the "invention" of synthetic dyes. 
In order to accomodate this wide range of specialized concerns 
we have interpreted the term "process of technological innovation" 
very broadly -- as embracing the full range of activities from the 
initial problem definition and idea generation through research and 
development, engineering, production, and diffusion of new technical 
devices, processes, and products. It is tempting to identify these 
elements as phases in a linear sequential process. But, as we shall 
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see later, this proves to be a speciously attractive but unworkable 
view which simply does not fit the facts. 
Implicit in both the popular myths and the scholarly litera-
ture which we studied are three major points concerning the inno-
vation process: (1) innovation is a response to either a need or 
opportunity, i.e., it is context dependent; (2) it is dependent 
upon creative effort, and if successful, results in the introduc-
tion of novelty; and (3) it brings about or induces the need for 
further change. 
Although most innovations are need-induced, such needs do not 
necessarily express themselves specifically. For example, there 
might be a general need for quicker transportation, but that does 
not necessarily dictate that this need be met by supersonic planes. 
Furthermore, sometimes wants do not make themselves felt until after 
the innovation appears; for example, there is a general desire to 
make oneself attractive to members of the opposite sex, and the 
makers of underarm deodorants try to persuade consumers that their 
product fills this general want, and does it better than alterna-
tive means, such as perfumes or soap and water. The "social inno-
vators" of Madison Avenue have proved especially skillful in turn-
ing generalized human desires into demand for specific products. 
In any case, an innovation promises to be in some way "better" than 
existing means to the same end, say, by offering better quality at 
the same cost, the same quality at lower cost, faster production, 
etc. 
In other cases the stimulus-event for an innovative effort may 
be a newly developed technical capability for which applications 
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are then sought. The development of the transistor, for instance, 
with the potential for miniaturization it represented, led to a 
whole "family" of innovations. There are some data which suggest 
that major advances in the state of the art are more likely to 
arise from a new technical capability, while smaller, incremental 
improvements are more likely to be need-induced. In either case 
the innovation process is environmentally dependent from its very 
outset, i.e., it is a response. 
It should be noted that innovation is not the only response to 
felt needs or wants. Another response is simply to ignore the pro-
blem, to "make do"; that is, allow the problem to remain unresolved 
or the need unmet, in brief, a "non-response" (Schmookler 1966, p. 
214). Much of our cultural heritage rebels against such a "non-
response"; we tend to seek a way -- often technical (the "techno-
logical fix") -- to solve a problem or fulfill a want. Some tradi-
tional Eastern religions and cultural systems however, sometimes 
prefer to deny or dismiss such problems or needs rather than resolve 
them. A possible explanation is that those cultures view reality as 
primarily spiritual in nature and hence deny the importance or neces-
sity of changing the material conditions of life. 
Another type of response is to do more of the same, that is, not 
to innovate but simply to apply more of the technology which is al-
ready employed. A typical example in 20th-century America has been 
to build more freeways to resolve the problem of already-clogged 
freeways. 
Even when the response to a perceived need or want is to innovate, 
the innovation may not be a technological one. There are, for example, 
social innovations -- "new methods of inducing human beings to compete 
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and cooperate in the social process" (Kuznets 1962, p. 19) -- such 
as the Peace Corps or advertising; these are primarily social in 
nature and only incidentally technological. There are also economic 
innovations which do not necessarily have technology as their ma-
jor component, such as the introduction of double-entry bookkeeping 
in Renaissance Italy; or marketing innovations, such as the super-
market or installment buying. Political innovations would include 
new types of bureaucratic organization or new political systems, 
such as the corporate state and "people's democracies." Our investi-
gation, however, is restricted to technological innovations, and 
will consider other forms only as this focus requires. 
The elements of creativity and novelty also require comment. 
Whether the initial stimulus is a need or technical opportunity, 
creativity is required, both in the initial idea for a response that 
might work, and at many steps in developing that response along the 
way to a successful innovation. A host of contextual variables can 
facilitate or inhibit creative responses, or guide them along certain 
lines. Especially important in this regard is the fact that those 
from whom new ideas for technical innovations are typically expected 
to come -- those in the R&D laboratory -- are usually engaged, at the 
same time, in projects which are already underway. It is not at all 
clear that the environments most conducive to each are identical. 
An innovative effort, if successful results in the introduction 
of novelty. The Patent Law has something to say about novelty, but 
that is for determining legal priority of invention, not for defining 
the nature of innovation. To the Patent Office, an invention must 
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be new and useful, and it must represent something more than a tri-
vial improvement; it usually means "a contribution over and above 
the exercise of mechanical skill," and in 1880, the Supreme Court 
used the expression, "a flash of thought," to describe an essential 
attribute of invention, thereby stressing the role of creativity. 
For our purposes, the notion of novelty requires further expli-
cation so as to avoid a semantic confusion that often appears in 
the literature. Something can be new only in relation to some frame 
of reference. In the innovation phase, the frame of reference is 
the current state of the art. In the diffusion phase, however, an 
innovation is new relative to the particular unit which is adopting 
it. It is this latter frame of reference to which Hodgen (1952, p. 
45) refers when he speaks of a technical innovation "as having taken 
place when a tool, a device, a skill or a technique, however unknown 
or well-known elsewhere, is adopted by an individual in a particular 
community and is regarded as new by the members of that community." 
Novelty, therefore characterizes an innovation not only upon its 
first introduction into use anywhere but repeatedly as it is subse-
quently adopted for use in other contexts. The one refers to "new 
under the sun," the other to "new under this roof." 
Finally, while the social impact of technological innovation, 
i.e., induced change, is only tangential to the scope of our inves-
tigation -- our focus being on the process itself -- some thinkers 
single out a purposive element in the process, that of effecting 
physical-environmental and social change through innovation. Morris 
Tanenbaum (1970) has stated, "Technological innovation is the novel 
application of physical knowledge and technique to make premeditated 
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changes in the physical aspects of the environment," and Peter 
Drucker (1967) regards innovation as a conscious attempt to bring 
about, through technology, a change in the way man lives. 
Although such statements implying the larger impact of innova-
tion are correct, they neglect two major points in stressing its 
purposive nature. The first is that most innovations do not come 
about by such transcendental considerations of social change, but 
rather through more mundane calculations on the part of businessmen 
regarding profits, resource factors, costs, etc., or by technologists 
pursuing their own visions of technical efficiency, or by govern-
ments responding to various pressures, and the like. Second -- and 
this is a point of major social concern today -- innovations may 
bring about changes other than those envisaged by the innovators. 
Indeed, the unforeseen changes brought about by the application on 
a great scale of such innovations as the automobile or DDT have given 
rise to the new art of Technology Assessment, which attempts to study 
the second or third-order effects of technological applications be-
fore they are applied (Heiman 1973). 
Nevertheless, whether motivated by narrow or broad considerations, 
whether a new mix of elements or the insertion of something old into 
a new context, the fact is that innovation brings about changes in 
varying measure of what things men make and do, how they make and do 
them, and how they work and live -- and ultimately in how they think 
and act. Is it any wonder that we seek to understand the innovative 
process, both in theory and practice, in order to help us comprehend 
the present and, indeed, in order to make the future? 
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III. Classical Theories of Innovation  
If we attempt to categorize the classical theories of innovation 
we find that they polarize around two positions; deterministic and 
individualistic ("heroic," or "great-man") theories (Rae 1967, p. 
326). The determinist explanation holds that the innovation occurs 
when the conditions are "right," and it stresses the role of social 
and other forces, principally military and economic, in bringing 
about technological change. The "heroic" theory stresses the role 
of the individual and plays down the influence of external pressures. 
These two major theses are not mutually exclusive; they are really 
matters of emphasis. No scholar has ever claimed that the individual 
innovator runs his own race entirely unbridled by any external pres-
sures, and even the most ardent adherent of the deterministic school 
has recognized that the manifold and diverse forces operate through 
individuals. This accounts for the development of sophisticated, 
composite theories, embodying elements of both the deterministic and 
individualistic schools of thought. 
A wide variety of exogenous elements -- human wants, social needs, 
economic demands, military requirements, geographical and climatic 
constraints, and the like -- can help determine the rate and nature 
of innovative activity, and these can express themselves in many dif-
ferent ways. For example, economic requirements might differ in re- 
lation to different resource factors, depending on labor costs, capital, 
fuel, materials, and the like. Such other external factors as geo-
graphy and climate have been employed to explain why certain civiliza-
tions seem to be more innovative than others, and there are not lack- 
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ing those who would ascribe technological creativity only to certain 
ethnic groups. 2 
The importance of exogenous sociocultural factors is evident 
from the fact that different societies seem to be especially fruit-
ful in innovations at different times in history. For example, only 
by reference to sociocultural elements can we explain why China in 
the Middle Ages displayed technological genius which far outshone 
that of the contemporaneous medieval West; similarly, we must rely 
on a sociocultural explanation to account for China's failure to un-
dergo an Industrial Revolution, and why the West took the leadership 
in both science and technology from the 17th century onwards. 
Sociocultural factors are also held to be responsible for mul-
tiple inventions. Given the widespread diffusion of technological 
knowledge in the modern world, the similarity of technical problems, 
and the apparently universal potentialities of the human mind, it is 
not surprising that many inventors hit upon the same or similar solu-
tions of technological problems at about the same time. 4 Indeed, 
the great amount of patent litigation over priorities would be proof 
of that. Further, the number of patent applications which are turned 
down because they lack "novelty" would indicate how often the human 
mind arrives at solutions for technical problems which others have 
already thought of -- and already patented. 
Yet, despite the importance of exogenous social factors, we 
cannot do without the human element in innovation. Human beings 
define the problems, have the ideas, perform the creative act of 
producing a device, do the research and development, and decide upon 
the application and diffusion of innovations. 
13 
Although the heroic theory of innovation does not deny the 
stimulus of economic needs and the influence of sociocultural con-
ditions, it emphasizes the role of the individual hero in bringing 
about innovation. For example, scholars of the deterministic school 
would argue that 18th-century Britain was "ready" for the steam en-
gine, both in terms of economic need and the level of technology, 
so that if James Watt had not invented the steam engine, someone 
else would have. Proponents of the heroic school, however, would 
claim that the characteristics and personality of Watt were primarily 
responsible for the steam engine as it actually came into being. 
In his Lives of the Engineers, a mid-19th century collection of 
biographies, Samuel Smiles attributed the landmark inventions and 
great engineering feats of the Industrial Revolution to heroic indi-
viduals. Not surprisingly, he found these men possessed of the 
standard Victorian virtues of his time: self-discipline, self-help, 
devotion to duty, integrity, and dogged perserverance. But such an 
enumeration of traits, like later and more scientific studies of 
technical creativity, merely transfers to another level the argument 
of individualism versus social determinism. After all, it can be 
argued, these virtues of the heroic Victorian inventors derived from 
the sociocultural forces of the time -- and we are back to the old 
"nature versus nurture" argument still waged by psychologists, edu-
cators, and sociologists on such new battlegrounds as the efficacy 
of school bussing or the validity of IQ tests for ghetto children. 
Both the individualistic and social deterministic theories of 
innovation may be introduced at yet another level, namely the entre- 
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preneurial function, which was so greatly stressed by Joseph Schum-
peter (1939, vol. 1, pp. 85-86). It is the energetic entrepreneur 
who is willing to take risks, who amasses capital to finance the 
invention, who sees the idea through to actual production and in-
troduction to the marketplace. He is the man who links together 
the social needs, frequently expressed in terms of profit potential-
ities, with the creative ideas of the inventor, thereby coupling 
the marketplace with the invention. 
Sometimes the inventor and the entrepreneur are combined in the 
same individual, as in the case of Edison (Josephson 1959) or Elmer 
Sperry (Hughes 1971), but more often they are different persons. 
For example, James Watt possessed remarkable technical ability but 
he lacked capital and business acumen; these were supplied by Matthew 
Boulton, who became the driving force making for the successful in-
troduction of Watt's steam engine. In contemporary business organi-
zations, some of the entrepreneurial functions are carried on by the 
R&D manager, who brings together scientific knowledge, technical ex-
pertise, and knowledge of the marketplace and of economic constraints 
in an effort to produce profitable innovations (Morton 1971). Other 
entrepreneurial functions might be carried out by different people 
or parts of a large modern corporation. Whether or not the inventor 
and the entrepreneur are the same man or different men, research 
teams or corporations, it is the entrepreneurial function which mar-
shalls the resources -- ideas, men technology, money -- thus trans-
forming the invention into a utilizable innovation. 
In addition to stressing the importance of both individuals and 
the social environment in innovation, much is often made of the role 
of happenstance in history. In the case of technical innovations, 
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th, intervention of chance is called "serendipity" (derived from the 
name of the Persian god of chance), which means that sometimes one 
unexpectedly discovers something valuable. Two famous historical 
incidents illustrate serendipity at work; Charles Goodyear's in-
vention of the vulcanization process, and W.H. Perkin's discovery 
of aniline dye. 
These and other cases of "accidental" discoveries or inventions 
are not quite so accidental as they might seem. On closer inspection 
they provide proof that innovation does not occur in haphazard 
fashion. In virtually every case of serendipitous invention, we 
find that the inventors were aware of the needs and problems, that 
they had already conducted persistent and careful searches for what 
they wanted, and that they were acute and perceptive enough to re-
cognize when a happy accident gave them their answer. In other words, 
they could appreciate the significance of a chance occurrence and 
utilize it for practical purposes. Most innovative advances come as 
a cumulative result of answers to a series of closely directed ques-
tions; chance or accidental observations come as a bonus to the per-
ceptive researcher who had already done his "homework." As Louis 
Pasteur observed; "Chance favors the prepared mind." 
From what has been said above, it is obvious that no monistic 
theory -- social-deterministic, individualistic-heroic, or even 
blind chance -- can serve by itself to explain the complexities of 
the innovative process. It is not begging the question but simply 
stating a fact that innovation, like virtually every other creative 
activity of man, derives from the interaction between individuals 
and the sociocultural environment. 
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In his pioneer study of the organization of cultures, the an-
thropologist R.B. Dixon (1928) postulated a triad of factors in the 
background of every cultural innovation: opportunity, need, and 
genius. Almost four decades later, a study of the conditions foster-
ing successful R&D, conducted by the Arthur D. Little Company for 
the Department of Defense (1965), found a similar triad behind inno-
vatory weapon systems: a clearly understood need; relevant ideas, 
information, insight, and experience; and the men and money to push 
through the job. Here were Dixon's anthropological factors trans-
lated into the context of the modern R&D laboratory. 
One of the most influential theories of innovation, comprehend-
ing both the individualistic and sociological points of view, was 
first presented by Abbott Payson Usher in the 1920s. Usher's theory, 
drawn from Gestalt psychology, regards innovation as a social pro-
cess consisting of acts of insight of different degrees of importance 
and at many levels of perception and thought. This theory considers 
innovation as a four-step sequence: (1) the perception of a problem, 
meaning the recognition of a social need and of the problems in-
volved in its fulfillment; (2) the setting of the stage, involving 
the existence of a body of technical knowledge and of technological 
and financial capabilities; (3) the act of insight by which the es-
sential solution of the problem is found; and (4) critical revision, 
in which the newly perceived relations are thoroughly mastered and 
effectively worked into the entire context of which they are a part. 
Today, we would comprehend Usher's "critical revision" step in the 
"development" part of modern "research and development" (R&D), and 
we would realize that Usher's four steps do not always occur in so 
neat a linear pattern. 
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Even so, Usher's theory is by no means complete. He was pri-
marily concerned with the "act of insight" in the inventive phase, 
probably because of the emphasis which Gestalt psychology places 
on the "Eureka" or "Aha!" phenomenon. Usher helps tell us how some 
inventions occur, but not how inventions are translated into true 
innovations. He neglects the risky economic decisions involved in 
the application of inventions and their diffusion, the feedback among 
his different steps, and above all, he failed to provide a detailed 
analysis of his crucial fourth stage of critical revision. 
More recently, investigators have concentrated on this develop-
mental stage neglected by Usher and other early theorists. At the 
same time, the development of a science-based technology during the 
past half century has enabled them to augment the earlier phases of 
Usher's sequence by reference to the contributions of science to the 
innovation process. As a result, terms such as "basic research" and 
"applied science" enter increasingly into the literature. Indeed, 
in the popular mind the model of innovation emerges as a direct line 
from basic scientific discovery through applied research and develop-
ment to the innovation -- and even some scholars view the innovative 
process in those terms. Yet, as we will see (Chapter 2), the relations 
between science and technological innovation are too varying and com-
plex to admit of such a simplistic model. 
Of major significance to our understanding of the innovative 
process has been the detailed analysis of the crucial developmental 
stage to which early models had merely given passing attention. In 
analyzing successful product innovations, Edwin Mansfield (1971, pp. 
114-18) employed the following categories: applied research; pre- 
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paration of project requirements and basic specifications proto-
type or pilot-plant design, construction, and testing; production 
planning, tooling, construction and installation of manufacturing 
facilities; manufacturing startup; and marketing startup. These 
categories were similar to those derived from their industrial ex-
perience by the members of the Charpie panel: 5 research-advanced 
development-basic invention; engineering and designing the project; 
tooling-manufacturing-engineering; manufacturing startup; and mar-
keting startup. In these and similar studies, Usher's final stage 
has been extended and broken down into four or more separate cate-
gories of activities. 
Such sophisticated and variegated investigations by later 
scholars have provided us with a finer-grained analysis and sharpened 
our insights into selected elements of the innovation process. Never-
theless, these studies, primarily because of their concentration on 
certain aspects, suffer from defects which seriously inhibit their 
ability to provide us with an over-all model and complete understand-
ing of the entire process of innovation. 
IV. Deficiencies in Innovation Studies  
It is tempting to compare the literature on innovation to 
Aesop's fable of the blind men examining the elephant: Each scholar 
concentrates on investigating but one aspect of the problem's ele-
phantine proportions and believes that his limited knowledge describes 
the entire animal. But that analogy is overdrawn. For the most part 
the scholars who have written about innovation are not Aesopian blind-
men; almost without exception, they have recognized the major con- 
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tours of the giant with which they are dealing. They choose to con-
centrate upon selected aspects because of their own research predis-
positions, which are in turn directed by their disciplinary interests. 
A truer analogy would be scholars working on a gigantic jig-
saw puzzle depicting individual figures moving about in a scene in-
volving other people, houses, and a larger landscape. All of those 
fitting together this puzzle are aware of the general picture; but 
the puzzle is divided into many different-sized pieces, so some re- 
searchers are piecing together the lineaments of the individual faces 
comprising it, others are more concerned with putting together the 
houses in which the people live and work, while still others are en-
gaged in sketching in the background of the trees, hills, roads, sky, 
and clouds. To carry the metaphor further, the problem confronting 
a state-of-the-art study is to fit the individual pieces into the 
framework of a single picture, and in the process to determine what 
pieces of the puzzle might still be missing. Making the puzzle more 
difficult, however, is the fact that its contours are constantly 
changing over time and that changes in one element of the picture 
bring about changes in other elements, which in turn transform the 
original elements. One doesn't have to be the king of Siam to say, 
"Tis a puzzlement." 
Although some of the puzzle-solvers have been scholars of great 
breadth -- for example, Joseph Schumpeter -- it is inevitable that 
they view the innovation process through the lens of the specialized 
discipline in which they have been trained or that it correspond to 
their particular enthusiasms. Usher's contact with the Gestalt psy-
chologists is one example; Schumpeter's emphasis on the role of the 
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entrepreneur reflects his economic concerns. Sociologists, anthro-
pologists, organization theorists, etc., all exhibit their own 
special predispositions in studying innovation. 
The most active investigators of innovation have been econo-
mists. But economics is not a monolithic field, and all its practi-
tioners do not focus their attention upon the same problems. Some 
economists are concerned primarily with microeconomics -- what goes 
on within the individual firm or a single industry -- but the pro-
cess of innovation might differ from firm to firm or from industry 
to industry. Others are macroeconomists, involved with the impact 
of innovation on the national or world economies. Still others special 
ize in different factor endowments -- labor, raw materials, trans-
portation, capital, and the like -- and their relations to innovation. 
And there are those who are fascinated by the changing role of the 
marketplace in the motivation and acceptance of innovation. 
Despite the diversity of approaches, economics alone cannot give 
a comprehensive picture of the innovation process. Economists such 
as Solow (1957, p. 312) and Myers (1965, p. 91) naturally think of 
an innovation in terms of its economic function and impact. Indeed, 
Simon Kuznets insists that unless an invention proves useful economi-
cally speaking, it will never become an innovation. To Kuznets, as 
to most other economists, economic elements are the major external 
and internal factors affecting innovative activity, although, as 
might be expected, the economists differ among themselves about the 
significance of the various economic parameters. Furthermore, even 
their excellent empirical studies on certain innovations in specific 
21 
industries -- machine tools, transportation, and agriculture --
might be too limited to provide generalizations which are common 
to innovative activity in all fields. 
When it comes to a subject like the diffusion of innovation, 
economists naturally focus on the economic variables, talking in 
terms of return on investment, labor or capital intensiveness, re-
source endowments, and the like. These are only part of the story, 
however. 6 Anthropologists and sociologists treating the same topic 
focus on elements of sociocultural resistance to change and the in-
teractions of different cultures, while geographers might concentrate 
upon spatial patterns of diffusion (see ch. 4). 
The concerns of sociologists are as broad -- and as restrictive --
as those of the economists dealing with innovations. In his now-
classic study of The Sociology of Invention, S.C. Gilfillan lists 
"38 social principles of invention" under such rubrics as the nature 
of invention; changes evoking invention; the rate of growth and life 
cycle of an invention; factors fostering, retarding, and locating in-
vention; principles of change; inventors and other classes; tendencies 
in the craft; and effects of invention. Interestingly enough, those 
same categories might serve equally for a book entitled The Economics  
of Invention; while an economist would deal with the economic para-
meters of the topics, Gilfillan and other sociologists perforce focus 
on the social elements. 
Social psychologists may also be concerned with the impact of 
behavioral patterns upon inventiveness within research and develop-
ment laboratories, and interpersonal dynamics within the innovating 
organization. 
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Management scientists concentrate upon the role of management in 
decision-making processes within the organization, especially as these 
relate to innovation. Organizational structure may also be studied 
in relation to the diffusion of innovations, as are the social net-
works of scientists and engineers. 7 
Such narrow disciplinary approaches should not be denigrated. 
They partake of the specialization and reductionism which have led 
to major advances in the physical sciences, and they provide much data 
and perceptive insights on many aspects of the innovation process. 
But there comes a time in the history of the sciences when a holistic 
approach is necessary. This necessity arises from the accumulation 
of vast amounts of data whose relationships are not yet clearly under-
stood, and -- as we would urge in the case of innovation -- cannot 
be understood apart from an integration of the specialized contribu-
tions of the several disciplines. 
One criticism that is usually levelled at theoretical models in 
other fields of study -- namely, that they do not have an adequate 
data base from real events -- also seems to apply in the case of theo-
ries and models of the innovation process. Although virtually all 
the theoretical works investigated in our literature survey make re-
ference to some empirical data, the theories and models differ, not 
only because their authors view the data from the vantage point of 
different specialities, but also because the vantage point determines, 
in part, what counts as data. 
Another kind of selectivity -- i.e., data drawn from a single 
technical field -- might skew the model as was the case with Usher, 
whose theory is based on mechanical inventions. Hence the resultant 
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model might be inapplicable to innovations occurring, say, in chemi-
cal or electrical fields. 
Not only might the data base be restrictive in terms of the 
technological field being considered, it can also be misleading if 
it rests upon limited historical experience. An example of misinter-
pretation derived from too narrow a historical perspective can be 
seen in the Charpie Report of 1967, whose implicit model of the inno-
vative process -- based upon historical case studies, to be sure --
elevated the importance of the individual inventor and recommended 
measures by the Federal Government designed to improve and favor his 
lot (see below, Chapter 2). By looking upon the innovatory environ-
ment as static rather than dynamic, the Charpie panel neglected well 
established, long-term changes in the pattern of innovation and hence 
over-emphasized the significance of the independent inventor. 
Another difficulty emerges when utilizing quantitative data to 
bolster theories of innovation. Because patent statistics are easily 
available, they have long been used, sometimes providing important 
insights, as in Jacob Schmookler's theory (1966) of the predominance 
of the "demand" factor in stimulating inventions. But, as we will see 
later (Appendix), a host of questions arise about both the validity 
and interpretation of patent data. Measuring the efficacy of R&D lab-
oratories in the innovation process is similarly muddled as are the 
numerous problems of measurement associated with the economic vari-
ables in the innovation process (Mansfield 1972). Despite a plethora 
of statistics, we are not always certain that we are measuring the 
right thing nor that we are correlating the most meaningful variables. 
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Another major deficiency in studies of innovation lies in those 
elements which are not measured or considered at all. These include 
the failures, the innovations that did not "make it." Sometimes they 
never got beyond the idea state, or the patenting stage, or the R&D 
phase, and were never applied. Sometimes they actually were applied, 
but never succeeded in achieving a measurable economic or technolo-
gical impact. One reason for the paucity of evidence on unsuccessful 
innovations might be the reluctance of corporations to chronicle 
their failures. 
Yet, if our understanding of the innovation process is to be at 
all complete, we must take into consideration failures as well as 
successes, as did Project Sappho (1971). In order to learn how vari-
ous factors can add up to a successful innovation, we must also learn 
what factors brought about the failure of an innovative effort. Un-
fortunately, the preoccupation with success has obscured and limited 
our study by not providing us with sufficient empirical data regarding 
unsuccessful innovations. 
Indeed, we are so bemused by some of the spectacular successes 
of recent times -- such as the transistor, nylon, the atom bomb --
that we tend to draw our lessons from these, even though these may 
not be typical of the innovation process as a whole. The transistor, 
for example, might represent a rare combination of scientific dis-
coveries and technological advancements occurring in a particularly 
favorable environment: Bell Labs had ample money, equipment, and 
personnel to link together many different aspects of the innovation 
process, and its management had sufficient foresight and understanding 
to couple these needs together with scientific-technical knowledge 
25 
and to define its problems properly (Weiner 1973). Not all innova-
tions are conducted under such favorable circumstances, and perhaps 
in other fields the pattern of interaction among the different phases 
of innovation might he quite different. 
Even the proliferation of case studies of successful inventions 
does not always add a great deal to our knowledge, for these tend to 
be non-cumulative in nature. For example, the recent (1973) study on 
"Science, Technology, and Innovation," prepared by Battelle Columbus 
Laboratories for the National Science Foundation, goes over almost the 
same ground as TRACES, merely adding more case studies. These cases 
reinforce the argument for the importance of basic science in techno-
logical innovation but they make few generalizations regarding the 
actual innovative process itself (although the implications of some of 
the Battelle studies are carried through in the following chapters). 
Lack of empirical data about unsuccessful innovations and the 
non-cumulative nature of case studies mean that we are deprived of 
information which might highlight the special conditions making for 
success as compared with those leading to failure. In a sense we are 
deprived of "control groups," which might help us prove or disprove 
the validity of generalizations or theoretical assumptions. The spon-
sors of Project Sappho have pointed out, "It is not possible to dis-
criminate between alternative hypotheses (to explain successful inno-
vation) unless failure in innovation is also taken into account," and 
they have attempted to do this in their studies. We need such studies 
of aborted and unsuccessful innovations in order to help us pinpoint 
specific factors making for success or failure; these might form the 
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basis for testing generalizations about the innovative process in 
different fields of technology or different levels of industry. 
Even if the study of successes were sufficient to provide us 
with a valid view of the innovation process, without resort to in-
depth studies of the unsuccessful ones, our view might still be dis-
torted because most of our concepts have arisen from consideration 
either of the great mechanical inventions dating from the Industrial 
Revolution or of today's science-based developments arising from 
physics and chemistry. In either case, we have concentrated upon phy-
sical technology, and, by and large, have neglected revolutionary in-
novations in the life sciences, including agriculture -- which might 
represent different parameters altogether. 
Indeed, as W. Paul Strassmann points out (see below Chapter 11) 
entire sectors have been neglected in the literature on innovation. 
It is not because these sectors have been lacking in technological 
advance, but because change in them has been difficult to codify and 
to measure, and "therefore to analyze at an abstract level. They will 
be those sectors where advances are qualitative, indirect, and some-
what intangible, making it difficult to aggregate and even to compare 
one case with another." These sectors tend to be those which have a 
large ingredient of social as well as technical innovation, and Strass-
man complains that they are "poorly understood in their non-techno-
logical aspects as well." 
Strassmann's complaint is justified, of course, but it might also 
be pointed out that we are equally at a loss in explaining many inno-
vations whose technical aspects are extremely well documented and 
where a wealth of quantitative data exists. Furthermore, the ignorance 
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of which Strassmann complains might not be due to the subject matter 
of the innovations themselves in those neglected sectors (he uses 
housing as his example) but rather to the diffuse nature of the in-
dustry which he seeks to investigate. In other words, it might be 
the difficulty of gathering technical data for an industry which is 
typically small-scale and dispersed, rather than our inability to 
link together the qualitative with the quantitative aspects, which 
has prevented researchers from devoting full attention to such sectors. 
Although we have mentioned several major deficiencies in extant 
studies of the innovation process -- the dependency upon the investi-
gators's discipline, training, and special field of concern; the de-
velopment of theories of models based upon skewed selections or empi-
rical data; the emphasis on successful innovations and the paucity of 
information on or consideration of unsuccessful innovations or of neg-
lected sectors -- we have not yet mentioned the gravest shortcoming 
of most of the traditional models: their reliance, implicit or expli-
cit, upon a linear-sequential analysis of the innovative process. This 
shortcoming probably derives from the deficiencies discussed above as 
well as our propensity to organize our thoughts in logical (linear) 
categories and to view matters in historical (sequential) patterns. 
As we were to discover in the course of our investigations, a linear-
sequential analysis does not correspond to what goes on in a complex 
and dynamic ecological system, which seems to provide the best means 
for describing the congeries of activities which go to make up inno-
vation. 
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V. Breakdown of the Linear-Sequential Approach 
When we first began our survey of the innovation literature it 
seemed that the process could best be analyzed in terms of phases in 
a linear and unidirectional sequence. This assumption was derived 
from a synthesis of the work of Usher, Schumpeter, Machlup, Gilfillan, 
etc., and our own initial propensities. Such a scheme, we thought, 
would allow us to focus on the key decision and/or leverage points in 
the process. Hence, we distinguished five separate functional phases; 
(1) problem definition and idea generation; (2) invention (i.e., the 
prototype device or process); (3) research and development; (4) appli-
cation (meaning first use); and (5) diffusion (introduction into a 
context other than original application). A simple block diagram 
would show a linear and unidirectional process, going successively 
from phase one through phase five. The totality constituted the pro-
cess of innovation. 
We were disabused of this linear sequential notion rather quickly, 
however. That is, as we moved more deeply into our study, its in-
adequacy as an analytical framework became more and more obvious. It 
was a poor representation of the complexities we found. 
Nevertheless, the concept of process phases is valuable and valid 
structuring device which we will use -- not as identifying discrete 
elements in a fixed sequence -- but as loosely delineated clusters of 
activities which may be temporally and organizationally overlapping 
and which exhibit complex interrelationships. 
The most basic distinction is between those phases of the process 
that consists of the development of a technological device, process, 
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or product -- from the initial conception of its possibility to the 
point of its first introduction -- and the subsequent actions which 
result in the spread of that innovation to other contexts. The former, 
referred to as the innovation phase is the focus of Chapter 3; while 
the latter or diffusion phase is treated in Chapter 4. While it is 
somewhat awkward to use the same term, "innovation," both generically 
to refer to the whole process and to one of its phases, or elements, 
it is such a common practice in the literature that we must perforce 
follow it, lest the hairline distinctions of meaning to the special-
ist prove confusing to the general reader. 
The relationship between even these broad phases of innovation 
and diffusion is complex. Logically, innovation is prior to diffusion, 
i.e., that which does not yet exist cannot be diffused. Logical 
priority is not the whole story, however. It is not always possible 
simply to adopt an innovation; oftentimes it must also be adapted to 
its new context of use. Such adaptation, while a form of diffusion, 
also involves the process of innovation, since modifications are re-
quired. Thus diffusion may precede and bring into being new innova-
tions, as well as the other way around. 
The innovation and diffusion phases themselves have similar or 
sub-phase distinctions. Innovation, for instance, would include 
problem definition and idea generation, research and development, en-
gineering, and production. There is not widespread agreement on these 
distinctions. Some authors, as we have seen, identify a separate 
"invention" phase. This term, however, is fraught with difficulties, 
e.g., it requires a distinction between invention and discovery. For 
example, Charles Goodyear "discovered" that rubber when sprinkled with 
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sulphur and heated would not melt and would retain its resiliency; 
but this accidental discovery is also regarded as the "invention" of 
the vulcanization process. 
It is likely that such difficulties are semantic rather than 
substantive, but the more basic question is whether or not the identi-
fication of an invention phase, even if cleanly drawn and widely 
agreed on, is of much value in understanding the innovation process. 
We think not, for several reasons. First, for many people the term 
"invention" carries the connotation of an "event," when it is really 
part of a "process." Even if invention is disassociated from this 
"event" connotation and is viewed as a phase of a larger process, it 
is still not a very convenient distinction except in the legal, patent 
application, sense. In terms of the way in which organized innova-
tive efforts are structured (and as we shall see the innovation pro- 
cess has become increasingly institutionalized), the significant bench-
marks lie elsewhere than at the point of patent application. A more 
important decision point, for example, lies at the point at which an 
idea has been submitted to management for their consideration and 
funding; the process leading up to such submission is an important 
phase but only a part of what might be called invention. 
The process by which ideas thus submitted are reviewed by manage-
ment and funded, rejected, shelved, or referred elsewhere in the or-
ganization, is likewise a significant process phase, but one that would 
be lost or at least blurred by the choice of "invention" as a phase 
concept. Finally, as we shall see, research and development is an ex-
tremely important and equally complex phase distinction, both concep-
tually and organizationally, only a part of which could be treated by 
a phase labelled "invention." 
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Besides the problem of dividing innovation into process phases, 
there was also the difficulty, which confronted us in our early at-
tempts to apply the linear five-phase model, of picking out a start-
ing point in the process. On the linear view, needs or opportunities 
in some portion of the exogenous world come to be recognized and 
trigger a problem-definition-and-idea-generation effort. But in many 
of the cases cited in the literature, the need, opportunity, or even 
clearly defined technical problem arises from what the linear view 
treats as a "later" phase, e.g., R&D, engineering, production, or 
even diffusion. That is, while problem definition and idea genera-
tion is at times a "front end" or logically prior activity, it may 
also be triggered by later phase developments. Problems are defined 
and ideas are generated in every phase, not just in the initial one. 
Examples of major innovations arising from an ongoing R&D effort 
rather than "beginning at the beginning" are nylon deriving from 
Carother's basic research in polymers at Dupont (Jewkes et al 1969; 
Mueller 1962), and the transistor by Schockley and his associates at 
Bell Labs (Weiner 1973; Jewkes et al 1969; Nelson 1962). 
True, some innovations followed the linear model, such as tet-
raethyl lead invented by Thomas Midgley at General Motors in the 
1920s (Jewkes et al 1969, pp. 312-14). Furthermore, some of the most 
thoroughly documented case studies -- Hindsight, TRACES, Battelle 
(1973) -- had implied a linear development by utilizing "events" as 
their chief analytical tool, breaking down each innovation into a 
series of sequential, and sometimes concomitant, occurrences. Even 
Myers and Marquis (1969, pp. 3-4), who treated innovation as an in- 
formation-flow process and who recognized explicitly that the "events" 
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do not always occur in a linear sequence, still found it convenient 
to identify five "stages" in the process of technical innovation: 
recognition (of technical feasibility and demand); idea generation 
(creative act of fusing demand and feasibility into a design con-
cept); problem solving; solution; and utilization and diffusion. 
Such functional analyses, although more sophisticated and fine-
grained than Usher's classical four-step model, did not link func-
tions to the organizational structures and thus did not succeed in 
showing the actual operation of the innovation process. 
Thus, in the relationship between invention and R&D, we encounter-
ed a problem which has frequently troubled scholars: when is some-
thing invented? 8 When, for example, was nylon invented: When Caro-
thers's assistant first noticed the fibers or when the properties of 
nylon were verified, or when a first sample in the form that it would 
be used was produced? (Jewkes et al. 1969, pp. 25ff). 
The question of when an invention actually takes place becomes 
more difficult when we recognize the increasing complexity of techni-
cal devices and processes in our own times. For example, many people 
claim credit for the "invention" of radar. How can honest men dis-
agree on this question, particularly when radar is so recent and when 
we have ample evidence from those who actually participated in its 
development? The answer must be that radar, like a good many other 
modern innovations, is a highly complex aggregate of a series of in-
novations. It is foolish to argue over who added the last little bit 
from "pre-radar" or "almost-radar" to create radar, because all of 
the increments, or the sub-inventions, were essential to the creation 
of radar -- and even when applied and diffused, radar was going through 
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further refinement and development requiring whole new groups of 
innovations (Kranzberg 1963, p. 137). It is clear that innovation 
is not a singular event but a congeries of events, or, more cor-
rectly, a process. 
As we reviewed the various theories and models, we began to 
realize that in virtually every major innovation of recent times 
each functional phase is linked in some way to the others: every 
phase in our block diagram had lines connecting it to and from every 
other block in the diagram. Instead of a linear-sequential picture 
of a neat flow chart with single lines going from one block to another, 
we had a graphic portrayal of a plate of spaghetti and meatballs: 
This same kind of scrambled model also appeared when a systems 
approach was applied to the innovative process and an attempt was 
made to illustrate it by means of a diagram. Mottur, for example, 
found it necessary to use no less than ten charts to show the systems 
and subsystems "in constructing a single systems model of the pro-
cesses of technological innovation" and to link together "the sixty-
one interrelated major functions or steps of the model, together 
with the more than two-hundred sub-functions and problem areas" 
(1968, p. 237). Gellman encountered similar complications and was 
forced to develop three separate innovation models -- one for pro-
ducer's goods, one for consumer's goods, and one for the public 
sector -- and he wound up with three plates of spaghetti and meat-
balls: 9 Mandavi employing a "systems technology" approach in his 
"efficiency investigation" of innovation, found so "many complicated 
socioeconomic problems which cannot be formulated in a model" that 
he did not even attempt to develop one, instead, he deplored "wasting 
money on model building and philosophizing" (1972, p. 83). 
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The complexity of the process patterns we encountered led us 
finally to the acceptance of the fact that the linear sequential 
view was descriptive of only a few cases. For the rest, the arrows 
led "every which way," with the starting points being various and 
with each phase being linked to some, many, or all of the others. 
It was then that we began to consider innovation as a complex, highly 
interactive ecological system. This ecological view or "picture pre-
ference," made the interactions between phases easier to conceptualize 
and deal with. 
VI. Innovation as an Ecological Process  
From its literal Greek roots, ecology would be the study of 
"houses," just as Xenophon entitled his study of the management of 
households the Oeconomicus. Since the household is regarded as a 
living environment, ecology gradually came to mean "the study of the 
structure and function of nature," with the further understanding 
that "nature" includes man and the entire living world (Odum 1963, p.3) 
Like many other sciences, in the first stages of its history --
in the late 1800s and early 1900s -- ecology was primarily descriptive 
and taxonomic. Early ecologists looked for patterns in the appearance 
and structure of organisms coming from different environments, and 
they developed detailed systems for naming and classifying such com-
munities of organisms. But just as the scientific study of biology 
outgrew its Linnaean taxonomic phase and began studying the functions 
and evolution of organisms, so did ecology advance beyond naming * 
 classification, and description, to a study of function and to un er-
stand the reciprocal relationships between structure and function. 
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From a descriptive science, ecology became a science concerned with 
the dynamics of interrelationships -- the interrelationships of 
structure and function (Collier et al 1973). Indeed, this stress 
upon dynamic systems and the variations among and within them re-
veals the applicability of the ecological approach to study of the 
innovation process. 
In order to assist their analysis, ecologists conceptualize 
levels of organization among biological organisms. Beyond the in-
dividual organism are populations, groups of individuals of one kind 
of organism; biotic communities, including the populations of a given 
area; ecosystems, where the community and the non-living environment 
function together as an ecological system; and the biosphere, the 
portion of the earth in which ecosystems can operate. These might 
correspond to the various levels involved in innovation, from the in-
dividual inventor and the indigenous system of R&D lab and the firm 
through the exogenous system of the industry, national economy, and 
society to the global level. Most important to the ecologist -- and 
to the student of innovation -- is to regard the environment as a com-
plex system of interacting components. 
In order to understand both the distribution and abundance of 
organisms through space and time, ecologists learned that the diver-
sity of phenomena and factors affecting a population meant that any 
fragmented view would be misleading; a population and its environment 
must be studied as a single system. Major emphasis would be on the 
relationship of function to structure. The history of biology shows 
how misleading it is to separate the two. The ancient Greeks were 
familiar with the anatomy -- the structure -- of the human heart and 
circulatory system, but this provided little real comprehension until, 
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many centuries later, Harvey worked out the function of the heart and 
circulatory system. By analogy, study of the structure of an R&D 
team is meaningless without an investigation of how it functions; 
similarly, a study of an industry's structure provide us with little 
information regarding the innovation process within that industry un-
less we can tie that structure to functioning and, ultimately, to the 
innovation process. 
The importance which the ecologists attach to the relationships 
of the environment to biological organisms and populations highlights 
the role of social, cultural, economic, and political factors in af-
fecting innovation. Like the social-deterministic view of innovation, 
at one time ecologists believed that the interactions or organisms 
with the physical "abiotic" parts of the environment were mainly one 
way: the physical influencing the biological (Watt 1956). They have 
since learned that these are interactive, feedback processes -- just 
as in the case of innovation. Equally pregnant analogies lie in the 
ecologist's interest in the factors leading to change, particularly 
such items as adaptive strategy for survival, much as corporations 
might seek to innovate for competitive reasons rather than for con-
siderations of immediate profit. Indeed, in an even larger sense, 
innovation might be regarded as a unique social means devised by man 
in the process of natural selection and adaptation to his environ-
ment -- a social and physical environment which previous innovative 
mutations had helped to create! 
Equally stimulating to a study of innovation is the ecological 
emphasis upon trophic structure and dynamics, which deals with the 
transfer and conversion of energy in various forms through the food, 
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or nutritive process. In innovation, nutrition comes from new in-
formation, or new perceptions or combinations of existing informa-
tion. This information is varied in nature; it includes knowledge 
of technical capabilities, scientific theories, economic elements, 
social needs, legal requirements, and the like. And, sometimes the 
information is incomplete or the conclusions derived from it prove 
faulty: the result is a stillborn invention or an unsuccessful in-
novation. 
Ecological analysis thus points up the diffuse nature of the 
decisionmaking process in innovations. Even before an innovation 
reaches the market, where economic success or failure awaits it, 
there are many points in the innovation process where decisions might 
be taken which would stop, inhibit, or stimulate its progress.
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The quantity of information, the quality of the knowledge contained 
therein and its flowpath might dictate, at several points within the 
innovation process, whether or not the process continues or is nipped 
in the bud. 
In short, recognition of its ecological nature provides us with 
a powerful intellectual construct for analyzing the process of inno-
vation. It makes us aware of the interrelatedness and interactive-
ness of its elements, and thus forces us to seek a holistic view. 
Given the fragmentation of the innovation research literature along 
disciplinary lines, it is not the easiest task to undertake, but in 
the long run it should prove the most fruitful. 
VII. Scope and Plan of the Study  
Although conceptualization of the process of innovation as an 
ecological system evokes parallels and analogies which can assist in 
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comprehending the innovation process, it has one serious drawback: 
the universe which it describes is so large and so varied in its 
interactions that it would be virtually impossible to describe the 
whole and still derive some thematic and working principles. Hence 
we must narrow our focus to the most relevant forces, to a manage-
able set of working information -- although we must be constantly 
aware of the universal context in which these operate. 
Even a cursory examination of the research literature dealing 
with the process of technological innovation leads one to realize 
that it is badly fragmented along three dimensions: 
1. The complexity of the process has led investigators to 
seek out manageable pieces -- the R&D laboratory, cor-
porate strategy, patent policy, firm size, adopter chara-
cteristics, etc. -- with the result that we know something 
about the pieces, but little or nothing of their inter-
relationships and mutual influence; 
2. The pieces themselves admit of such complexity that there 
is a strong tendency to deal with only a few (typically 
two) of the relevant variables -- e.g., the influence of 
supervisory behavior on the performance of scientists and 
engineers in the R&D lab, or the relationship between ed-
ucation and early adoption of an innovation -- with the 
result that we often don't understand how the "pieces of 
the pieces" are related; 
3. Studies of the pieces, or of the "pieces of the pieces," 
are almost always conducted from some single disciplinary 
perspective and in terms of those few variables with which 
that discipline is preoccupied. Since the number of dis-
ciplines so involved is quite large and their cooperative 
interaction minimal, the result is yet another fragmentation 
of the overall effort and largely non-cumulative results. 
One might respond to this fragmentation -- with some justification --
by saying, "How could it be otherwise?" As it turns out, quite nar-
row foci partitioned from the rest of the process -- even if artifi-
cially -- are all that we can handle with methodological rigor. In 
addition, while it is true that the academic disciplines specialize 
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in certain variables, to the exclusion of the rest, that is their 
strength -- for which no equally fecund alternative has been found. 
This response, while speciously damning to the ecological pers-
pective we have adopted, in fact underscores the need for it, since 
it points out that the fragmentation cannot be eliminated. Its stul-
tifying effect can, however, be overcome, i.e., the pieces and the 
perspectives can be integrated. Such integration is required if un-
derstanding of the process is to be advanced much beyond the present 
state of the art. 
The ecological model, however, implies a level of integration 
that is beyond the scope of this investigation, for we are not equally 
interested in every aspect of the larger systems which embrace the 
innovation process, or even in every aspect of those immediate con-
texts to which it is indigenous. With rare exception, those factors 
which influence the process, in both the immediate and remote environ-
ments, exist for reasons and perform functions other than the inno-
vation-specific ones with which we are concerned. 
In defining how wide or narrow the scope of an inquiry should be, 
Paul Samuelson (1947) gave this advice: "(F)unctional requirements 
hold as of a given environment and milieu. Of course, to designate 
this environment completely would require specification of the whole 
universe; therefore, we assume implicitly a matrix of conditions with-
in which our analysis is to take place....A system may be as broad or 
narrow as we please, depending upon the purpose at hand....The fruit-
fulness of any theory will hinge upon the degree to which factors 
relevant to the particular investigation at hand are brought into 
sharp focus," We shall try to make the boundaries of our study ex-
plicit. 
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It became clear in the course of our investigation that to in-
tegrate what is known about the innovation process would require a 
conceptual framework of at least three dimensions. The first of 
these dimensions involves the various levels of aggregation at which 
the process may be studied. In our survey of the literature we 
found it useful to partition levels of aggregation into those which 
constitute the immediate context in which the process takes place 
("indigenous system"), and those which comprise the larger context 
("exogenous system"). The former we take to include the individual 
researcher, his work and social groups, the R&D laboratory, and the 
firm or organization. The latter, or exogenous system, includes the 
industry of which the firm is a part, and the myriad of societal and 
international influences, economic, social, political, institutional, 
organizational, intellectual, cultural, etc. These levels of aggre-
gation, thus partitioned, constitute one of the three structural di-
mensions of our study. 
The second dimension of our conceptual framework involves a 
juxtaposition -- within and across the above levels of aggregation --
of the wide range of variables operative in the innovative process. 
These variables -- typically treated in isolation by the several dis-
ciplines -- range from the prevailing value system of society to the 
competence and ingenuity of the individual researcher; from the abund-
ance or scarcity of certain material resources to the attitudes, mo-
rale, and cooperation with an R&D project team; from governmental tax, 
patent, and regulatory policies to the organizational structure and 
managerial support of the R&D laboratory, or the leadership style, 
policies, and competence of the R&D manager; from the nature, size, 
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concentration and competitive stance of the industry to the financial 
condition, policies, and strategies of the firm; etc. 
By relating structure and function, we counteract the tendency 
to treat these variables solely along disciplinary lines. In addi-
tion to juxtaposing these variables, we shall also offer a number of 
hypotheses as to the nature and effect of their integration. Such 
hypotheses cannot be tested in our literature-based study, of course, 
but are offered as research agendas for future empirical studies. 
The third dimension of our ecological framework lies in the con-
cept of process phases. As was noted above, a distinction between 
the innovation and diffusion phases is the most basic. The former, 
which is the process leading to the first introduction of a new pro-
duct, device, or process, itself admits of phase (or sub-phase) dis-
tinctions. As it turns out, there are two well-established models 
of these sub-phases, one reflecting a management science orientation 
(with emphasis upon idea flow), with the other reflecting an economics 
orientation (hence emphasizing economic factors). We attempt to in-
tegrate these two models, showing how differing organizational con-
figurations have affected the nature of the innovations which emerge. 
For example, one type of organizational structure may be more con-
ducive to incremental innovations, while another may favor innovative 
breakthroughs. 
In the case of the diffusion stage, there are a multiplicity of 
research traditions. Here our efforts have been directed at inte-
grating them in such a way as to delineate the dimensions that a gen-
eral model or theory of diffusion would have to embrace. 
Using our ecological orientation and the three structural dimen-
sions outlined above, we have assessed the empirical and theoretical 
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literature -- and attempted to gauge their correspondence -- by 
asking the following four major questions: 
1. What is the current state of the art? 
2. How good is our current understanding? 
3. What are the major gaps and weaknesses in our knowledge, 
and what further research is needed to fill them? 
4. How adequate are the various commonly employed methodologies 
to the needs of future research? 
As will become apparent in the following chapters, a host of sub-
questions are implied in these major ones. 
Chapter 2 deals with those elements of the external system --
values, endowments, and institutions -- affecting innovation and in-
novators. It discusses aspects of the total social system, entire 
industries, sectors of the economy, and governmental functions. Fin-
ally, it considers the functions and structures of these elements as 
they interact with one another, with business firms and individuals, 
and with the innovation system itself. 
In Chapter 3, we turn to those levels of aggregation and con-
texts to which the innovation is indigenous -- the firm, the R&D lab-
oratory, the work group, and the individual researchers. We treat 
the role of the individual inventor-entrepreneur, but our primary 
focus is on the institutionalized process. The structure/function 
relationship, emphasized by our ecological approach, turns out to be 
an especially important integrative mechanism. 
Although we consider innovations arising outside the R&D context, 
most of our study at this point is concerned with the laboratory, its 
internal dynamics and linkages to the rest of the organization. Among 
the behavioral variables and focusing mechanisms that are examined 
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are: individual mind sets and traits, supervisory attitudes and 
leadership styles, the influence of the individual's primary work 
and social groups, organizational control and coordination mechanisms, 
patterns of communication and information flow, etc. This chapter 
ends with the extremely important -- but poorly understood -- area 
of interface between R&D and the operating units within the organi-
zation. 
Chapter 4 deals with the diffusion of technological innovations. 
Here we again encounter a fragmented picture, in terms of both the 
disciplines involved (one source identified seven major and six minor 
diffusion-research traditions) and an overwhelming preoccupation with 
quite narrow studies relating only two variables (perhaps as high as 
950 of the studies fall in this category). Perhaps as a result, the 
state of the art in diffusion research is not as advanced as in inno-
vation studies. 
Chapter 4 first surveys the three basic diffusion-research tradi-
tions (the geographical, the economic, and the social-psychological), 
noting both their differences and their implicitly complementary 
findings. We then examine the so-called classical diffusion model, 
which represents the best effort to date to see the process as a whole 
and identify its basic elements. Finally, on the basis of our survey 
of the empirical research traditions and the classical model, we des-
cribe the four dimensions which a general theory of diffusion should 
embrace. These dimensions or major categories of influence, are: 
(1) the characteristics of sectors of which adopter units are a part; 
(2) the characteristics of adopters themselves (both individuals and 
organizations); (3) the characteristics of the innovations being dif- 
fused; and (4) the propagation mechanisms for diffusion. 
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Chapter 5, the final chapter in Part I of our study, summarizes 
our findings, both methodological and substantive, and highlights 
our recommendations for future research. The chapter thus forms, in 
part, a kind of research agenda, emphasizing what we don't -- but 
should -- know. As such, our study has to do with the future as much 
as the present. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 1 
1. There are many inventions which, to an outside observer, 
seem to have arisen from trivial motives -- although the 
inventors undoubtedly had strong and serious reasons. 
Stacy V. Jones, patent editor of the New York Times, has 
published an amusing collection, Inventions Necessity Is  
Not the Mother Of, containing such patented items as a cough-
ing cigarette package (an audible warning of the health ha-
zards of the contents), a bicycle seat with needles (to dis-
courage thieves), snoring preventers, parakeet diapers, dimple 
grinders (for beautification), and a secret communication 
device for torpedo control (co-invented by composer George 
Antheil and movie star Hedy Lamarr). 
2. For example, Lambert (1971, p. 34) claims that certain para-
sites, which enervate the human mind and body, were prevalent 
in tropical climes and inhibited technological advance in those 
areas; Gilfillan (1969, p. 129; 1971, pp. 73-87) provides a 
racial explanation of inventiveness. 
3. Lynn White (1962) points out the great innovativeness of 
Western medieval technology compared with the Chinese of the 
same era. See the dispute on this point between White and 
Joseph Needham at the Symposium on the History of Science 
(Oxford University, July 1961), in A.C. Crombie, ed., Scien-
tific Change (N.Y., 1963), parts 2 and 3. 
4. The international diffusion of the capability for invention is 
remarked on by Alden Whitman ("Inventors Invent, But the Ques-
tion is, How?" N.Y. Times, February 24, 1974). Merton and 
Barber (1961) have made a study of multiple scientific discov-
eries, but there is no similar study for technical inventions. 
5. U.S. Department of Commerce, Technological Innovation: Its 
Environment and Management (Washington, 1967). 
6. See Kranzberg (1967, pp. 30-31); Rosenberg (1970). 
7. E.g., Ben-David (1971); Schon (1967); Marcson (1960); 
Dubin (1958); Burns and Stalker (1961); Etzioni (1961); 
Kornhauser (1962); Crane (1972). 
8. This problem also affects the history of scientific discovery, 
and is exemplified by Thomas Kuhn's discussion of when did 
Roentgen discover N-rays. Kuhn (1970, pp. 57ff.) concluded 
that the discovery occurred sometime between Roentgen's first 
observation, which he later interpreted as X-rays, and the 
time when he had completed his observations and analyses for 
publication. 
9. Aaron Gellman, "Innovation as a Process," paper delivered at 
NATO-Advanced Study Institute on Technology Transfer (Evry, 
France, June 24-July 6, 1973). 
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10. 	Gold (1969) points to weaknesses in current models of decision- 
forming and decision-implementing processes in matters of inno-
vation. Because of the changing nature of the factors entering 
into managerial decision-making, he stresses the need for new 
analytical perspectives and for more data on specific case 
studies in different fields. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE WORLD OUTSIDE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2 we begin to partition the world into the various 
systems relevant to innovation. Our concern in this chapter is 
with the exogenous system, i.e., that part of the total world system 
not directly involved with innovation. Since innovation is only one 
of a number of responses to societally generated needs and opportuni-
ties, the elements of the exogenous system are not exclusively or 
primarily involved with innovation. Our treatment of these elements 
focuses on these aspects which couple with the innovation system and 
whose study increases our knowledge of that activity. 
On the basis of the available literature, we will treat three 
classes of entities in the exogenous system: values, endowments, and 
institutions. 
For our purposes, values may be defined as individual or group 
preferences. Our concern is with two functions of values. First, 
traditional values serve as legitimizing justifications for existing 
institutions and procedures, including the innovation system. Second, 
value changes can either lead to or legitimate modifications in the 
ongoing system. 
The societal value structure is extremely complex, touching on 
almost every aspect of men's relationship to one another and to society. 
But only a limited set of human values is concerned directly with in-
novation. Because of the complexity of the value system, there can be 
conflicts between values involved in innovation and other values in 
society such as religious, social, and economic. Values interact with 
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other elements of the system as well as with innovation itself. They 
interact with endowments, for example, by placing a premium on the de-
velopment and diffusion of scientific and technical knowledge; they 
interact with institutions in their role as legitimators or modifiers 
of institutions. 
We define endowments as factors which serve as inputs to inno-
vation. Among these are scientific and technical knowledge, capital, 
human labor, and energy and material resources. Endowments are not 
necessarily fixed stocks depleted by use. We can consider them as 
elements which serve a function or satisfy a set of requirements. 
Thus one endowment can be substituted for another. Substitutions can 
be made between elements of the same sort as when plastic replaces 
steel in automobile construction or when relativity theory replaces 
Newtonian dynamics in mechanics. Likewise, substitutions can be made 
between endowments of different sorts, as when technical knowledge is 
substituted for labor. Endowments couple with other elements of the 
exogenous system. For instance, scientific and technical knowledge 
is a key element in stimulating value changes, and talented people 
enable institutions to function effectively. 
The institutions we will consider in this chapter are those formal 
and informal human organizations which serve as external determinants 
and modifiers of the innovation system. We will deal with economic, 
market related institutions such as firm and industry; we also treat 
political institutions which we subdivide into those which are directly 
innovative, and those which regulate and control innovation. Insti-
tutions couple strongly with one another as, for example, do the re-
gulated firm and regulatory commission. They also couple with other 
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elements of the exogenous system, as do research establishments with 
scientific and technical knowledge. 
Our treatment of these elements cuts across all levels of analy-
sis and aggregation. In the case of values for instance, we will 
consider the relationship of some broadly held social values to inno-
vation. On the societal level, values legitimate innovation as a 
response to needs and opportunities. Institutions such as industry, 
government department, and firm also have values associated with 
them. Finally, at the lowest level of aggregation, we consider 
studies dealing with the preferences of individuals relating to speci-
fic innovations. Thus, Chapter 2 will include a range of information 
from "wisdom," "common knowledge," and speculation, usually found on 
the higher levels of analysis, through comparative studies and statis-
tical material, to tightly designed cross-sectional studies on the 
lower levels. 
Our treatment of the exogenous system will stress the linkages 
of the elements with one another and with those of the innovation 
system. We will move from traditional values as legitimations of the 
innovation system to specific data which indicate current directions 
of value changes. Then we will deal with endowments as important in-
puts to innovation. Finally, we will consider how, why, and to what 
extent economic and political institutions serve as key determinants 
and modifiers of innovation. 
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II. VALUES 
A. TRADITIONAL VALUES 
A complex constellation of values serves to legitimate inno-
vation as a response to societal needs and opportunities as well as 
to affect the particular institutions and procedures involved in the 
innovation system. 
At the societal level we can contrast the valuation of tech-
nological innovation held by various societies. Classical Greek 
civilization accorded high value to the development of theoretical 
knowledge for its own sake and the cultivation of the body for ath-
letic and military feats. Although there were some technical innova-
tions in antiquity, the practitioners of the mechanical arts were not 
generally held in high esteem; indeed, some authorities claim that 
slavery inhibited innovation (Farrington 1946, pp. 8-9, 166-7). 
Although medieval Europe developed and utilized significant in-
novations such as the stirrup, heavy-wheeled plow, water wheel, 
windmill, and mechanical clock (White 1962), religious values were of 
the utmost importance and oriented the society toward the "heavenly 
city." Innovation, as well as everything else in the society, was 
valued, in great measure, as a means for reaching God. Such a set 
of choices put spiritual needs above material needs and gave techno-
logical innovation a peripheral place in the scheme of things. 
Systematic development and utilization of technology was thus not 
consistently pursued. 
A more recent illustration of the role of values in shaping social 
behavior is Max Weber's global hypothesis of the dependence of the 
rise of capitalism on the Protestant ethic (Weber 1930). Although 
this hypothesis is not readily testable, it has stimulated much re- 
search and informed speculation. If offers a classic example of putatj 
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value-institution linkage in the exogenous system, and is germane to 
our study because capitalism played a crucial role in the development 
of technological innovation as a central activity of western society. 
In contemporary society, those global values which affect in-
novation include beliefs in the beneficience of material progress, 
the importance of satisfying material needs, the desirability of in-
novation as a response to social needs and opportunities, and man's 
lordship over creation (White 1967) which legitimates his exploiting 
nature at will. 
Affecting innovation at lower levels of analysis are those values 
which stress the benefits of profit maximization and competition, which 
encourage firms and industries to innovate or to adopt innovations. 
Protection of private property serves as a value legitimating the pat-
ent system. Also the high valuation placed on scientific and techni-
cal knowledge has led to considerable government support for research 
and development (see below). 
Societal preferences have institutional effects. Education is 
such a societal value. Incarnated in public policy, this value has 
led to the development of educational institutions and to raising the 
level of popular education. Scientific and technological education 
can affect the rate and type of innovative activity. Also educational 
level is a factor in the rate of adoption of innovation; evidence ex-
ists both for industrial innovations (Mansfield 1971) and agricultural 
innovations (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971, p. 7; Hayami and Ruttan 1971) 
which indicates on balance that the early adopters of innovations have 
more education than later adopters. 
One of the truisms of social science is that a social system seeks 
to maintain itself by resisting certain kinds of change. Yet at the 
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same time major changes do occur. Technological innovations can func-
tion either to facilitate or resist major social change. 
Often major changes in a society are directly caused by the wide-
spread adoption of innovations such as the automobile and television. 
A number of researchers explain these changes in terms of the relative 
advantage of the novelty over the existent as perceived by the adopting 
person or group (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971, pp. 142, 350 ff.). Addi-
tionally, when an alien innovation is brought into a social system, 
it is most readily adopted if it is compatible with that system (Bar-
nett 1953). Introducing the innovation through agencies already 
existing in that system is also a help in its adoption (Spicer 1953; 
Bright 1964, p. 130). For example, radio networks and many owners of 
local radio stations became owners of TV stations. Yet, it took much 
longer for motion picture firms to become television program producers. 
Working in the area of industrial innovations, Mansfield (1971) 
found that the most important component of relative advantage is econo-
mic gain (see also Griliches 1957). Low initial economic uncertainty 
or a high rate of reduction of the initial economic uncertainty con-
stitute advantages as does a low level of economic commitment in 
adopting the innovation (Mansfield 1968, p. 88). Mansfield's work 
deals with economic factors, and in the organized industrial context 
these are central. However, in any context relative advantage might 
be dominated by political, social, and psychological factors as well 
as economic (See Chapter 4). 
Technological innovations also function to resist social change. 
Thus innovations dealing with the production and distribution of en-
ergy are currently being stimulated in order to maintain our present 
system of values and institutions related to automobile transportation. 
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Since values involve the preferences and choices affecting what 
will be invented and whether and how it will be applied and accepted, 
they are one of the most important factors involved in the study of 
innovation. Unfortunately, there does not exist a well-developed 
value research methodology (see for example, Williams 1967). On the 
societal level, there exists only wisdom and speculation. However, 
values can be approached through the study of behavioral preferences. 
Thus, we may reconstruct the values of the development and trans-
mission of scientific and technical knowledge by reference to the de-
gree and nature of societal support for research and education. In 
the next section we will find that values concerning innovation can 
be investigated by surveying the preferences of individuals regarding 
the role of technology in society. 
B. CURRENT VALUES AND VALUE CHANGES  
Current societal values relating to the desirability of technolo-
gical change and innovation are influenced by recent experiences with 
the positive and negative consequences of existing innovations. Trends 
in values, as seen in current evaluations of innovation, are thus par-
tial indicators of the future nature and direction of innovation. 
Until 1970 there was apparently little systematic non-marketing 
research on public reaction to technological innovation in general 
and to specific innovations. Since then, at least four studies have 
been undertaken to remedy this lack; three confined to local areas 
(Taviss 1972; Metlay 1971; Metlay 1972), and one on a national basis 
(Science Indicators 1972 1973). 
The purposes and designs of the studies varied considerably. By 
integrating their results with the values underlying innovation, we 
can see some directions of value change in this area. And, importantly, 
we can see how these value changes might impact on institutions af-
fecting innovation. 
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Interestingly enough, both Metlay studies (1971; 1972 pp. 82-3) 
showed that attitudes toward technology bore little relationship to 
the variables of occupation, education, sex, race. However, there 
was some correlation with political attitude and age (Metlay 1972, 
pp. 82-3; LaPorte and Metlay 1974, p. 13ff.). Despite this lack of 
strong correlation with the usual social variables, the public gave 
technology a generally high evaluation. 
Metlay claimed that these results "indicate that while the pop-
ulation as a whole holds strong positive evaluations of the social 
effects of technology, we can isolate a minority who believe that 
presently employed technologies have not made life better, but in 
fact, reduced the quality of life" (Metlay 1972, p. 85; see also 
LaPorte and Metlay 1974, p. 10). Although technology generally was 
perceived as being able to solve many or most of the problems facing 
our society, at the same time there was a strong public perception 
that some technologies, such as nuclear weapons, were harmful (Metlay 
1971). Likewise other technologies, though not primarily harmful, 
were believed to have had some bad effects. 
These public perceptions indicate an awareness of an ongoing cy-
cle of innovation. An innovation takes place to meet a need, but it 
produces, along with the intended effects, some harmful side effects. 
Even though the initial problem is solved, additional problems arise 
from this latest innovation. Resolving social problems by technical 
means or alleviating the harmful consequences of technologies by furthe 
technical innovation is called a "technological fix." For example, 
industrialization creates pollution. Pollution control technology re-
duces the level of pollution, but at the same time raises energy re-
quirements. The increased demand for energy causes additional pressure 
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on our energy resources, thereby creating a demand for further inno-
vation to meet the need, and so on, ad infinitum. 
One result that comes through very forcefully in this group of 
opinion surveys is a desire by the public for an important voice in 
the control of technology. For example, when asked who controls de-
cisions in a variety of technologies such as mass rapid transit and 
space exploration (Netlay 1972, pp. 117-123) the respondents said in 
each case that the public has the least say in decision making. And 
in each case they claimed that the public should have the greatest 
say. Clearly people feel that their role vis-W-vis technological in-
novations affecting them has been too passive; they believe that both 
the good and harmful aspects of technological innovations affect them 
sufficiently to be directly concerned. This public concern for "parti-
cipatory technology" manifests itself in public interest groups such 
as "Nader's Raiders." Changing values toward innovation are beginning 
to be institutionalized, for example, in recent environmental legis-
lation such as the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). Re-
strictions are beginning to be placed on innovations which increase 
pollution while at the same time innovations in pollution control are 
being encouraged. The technology assessment movement (Hetman 1973; 
Teich 1972, part 4), a crucial aspect of which is to understand and 
head off in advance the undesirable consequence of technologies, seems 
a response to the perception of the harmful side effects of past in- 
novations and technological fixes. The Environmental Protection Agency, 
established by NEPA, and the New Office of Technology Assessment are 
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themselves social innovations designed to control technological in-
novations. 1 This relationship is illustrative of the importance of 
social innovations, and their interaction with innovations in physical 
technology in our society. It is also an example of "fixing" social 
problems caused by innovations with other innovations. 
While such developments offer no positive alternatives to inno-
vation, they will have a directive effect on the innovation system. 
They tend to encourage innovation designed to alleviate certain harm-
ful side effects of technology, as in pollution control. At the same 
time they may attempt to direct innovation toward implementation of 
those systems which minimize social cost. 
The current "energy crisis" is illustrative of the hierarchy of 
social preferences. With the impending and actual scarcity of certain 
forms of energy, especially crude petroleum, a conflict in preferences 
arose between having almost unlimited quantities of cheap energy and 
having a relatively pollution-free environment. The Alaska pipeline, 
almost killed earlier by environmentalists, was resurrected when the 
"energy crisis" proved to be a greater threat to cherished values and 
habits. Society, it would seem, prefers cheap energy rather than clean 
environment, but environmental considerations are at least examined 
before the tradeoff is made. 
There has been change, as witnessed by the growing numbers of 
technology assessments, in the direction of wishing to appraise tech-
nology more closely and not necessarily preferring an immediate "quick 
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and dirty" technological fix. This seems to indicate a sophisticated 
public perception of technology which will continue in the future as 
we rely on technological innovation as a primary response to societally 
generated needs and opportunities. Technology assessments, together 
with the desire to minimize harmful side effects of innovations, may 
change the pace and the manner in which innovation takes place in our 
society. The initial thrust may be to slow the rate at which inno-
vations with harmful side effects are introduced - some opponents have 
called it "technology arrestment" - and to direct innovative activity 
to minimizing these harmful side effects. This is a way in which the 
value system, working through institutions, places limits on certain 
innovations while stimulating others. 
But present actions affecting the future ideally should be based 
on the values which hold when the results of these actions occur, not 
on today's values. Unfortunately, the methodology of value forecast-
ing scarcely exists (Taviss 1973; Rescher 1969). Thus the continued 
development of value research methodology, including value forecast-
ing, is quite important in charting the future course of innovations 
in various fields. 
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III. ENDOWMENTS  
A. Scientific and Technical Knowledge  
The high value placed upon scientific and technological know-
ledge in American society is manifest in public policy. We seek to 
institutionalize diffusion of existing knowledge through public edu-
cation and the development of new knowledge by federal sponsorship 
of research and development. Knowledge exists both disembodied in 
the scientific and technical literature and in other information 
systems, and embodied in the members of society and in technological 
artifacts. A large portion of disembodied scientific and technical 
knowledge is public and can be freely accessed by anyone who has the 
capacity to understand and use it. Scientific and technological know-
ledge, both embodied and disembodied, serves as a necessary and crucial 
cognitive input to innovation. Its substitution for other endowments 
such as labor has enabled the pace of innovation to increase dramati-
cally. 
1. Relationship Between Scientific and Technical Knowledge and Inno-
vation 
While it is clear that some technical knowledge is necessary as a 
starting point for innovation, the role of scientific knowledge is less 
certain. There is a widespread belief that basic scientific discoverie 
lead eventually to technological application. Alan Watermann (1965), 
the first head of the National Science Foundation, claimed that "stat-
istical evidence" [which he did not adduce] existed "that most of the 
body of science ultimately achieves practical utility." Since this 
claim plays a central role in decisions relating to public support of 
basic scientific research and to other aspects of innovation, we must 
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try to determine, insofar as we can, the relationship between scien-
tific knowledge and technological innovation. 
These relationships have varied from absolute independence to 
strong interdependence, depending on a variety of factors. In classi-
cal Greece there was a deep interest in theoretical science without a 
corresponding interest in the application of that knowledge to further 
technological innovation (Farrington 1946). This is the prototype of 
science without technology. 
On the other extreme lie some of the mechanical inventions of the 
early Industrial Revolution. Inventors such as Hargreaves and Ark-
wright were primarily tinkerers with no systematic scientific background. 
Although the science of mechanics had recently emerged with basic con-
tributions by Newton and refinements by other English and continental 
scientists, this body of knowledge was not explicitly used in the de-
velopment of these early textile machines. Here we have technology 
with no direct link to science. 
Indeed, many historians claim that as a general rule the tech-
nological system generates much of its own knowledge, without recourse 
to science. Price has pointed out that science and technology each have 
their own separate cumulating structures, and that "only in special and 
traumatic cases involving the breaking of a paradigm can there be a 
direct flow from the research front of science to that of technology and 
vice versa" (Price 1965; See also Wertime 1962; Smith 1960; Gille 1967). 
At the same time there are some recent historical examples of 
technologies firmly rooted in and developed from science, the outstand-
ing one being 20th-century nuclear technologies. It is extremely un-
likely that the technologies for production of nuclear energy could 
have been developed without the basic scientific framework originating 
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in Einstein's theory of relativity. However, some caution is appro-
priate here. While the idea that matter could be converted into en-
ergy and the precise relationship between matter and energy came from 
Einstein's theory of 1905, the material devices which allow the actual 
transformation of matter into energy are not a product of that theory. 
Although these devices are based on other scientific theories, (e.g., 
the use of liquid metal coolants in nuclear reactors requires know-
ledge of the properties of liquid metals), they are also based on ex-
isting technological knowledge not derived from scientific theory. 
As well as initially generating technologies, science may also 
assist a technology which is already partially developed. A good ex-
ample of this mode of interaction is the development of crease resis-
tant fabrics in the cotton textile industry (Jewkes et al. 1969, p. 245 
This development was the result of the establishment of a research 
group in a firm and in an industry which had hitherto conducted very 
little scientific research. 
Just as science can generate technology, so can technological im-
provements stimulate scientific discoveries. An excellent example of 
this is the development of the science of thermodynamics arising dir-
ectly from the interest in the relationships among heat, work, and 
energy aroused by Watt's steam engine (Cardwell 1971). Another examplE 
is the development of the cyclotron and its effect on physics research. 
Invented by E. 0. Lawrence in the 1930s at Berkeley, the cyclotron was 
the first of a long series of machines developed for the acceleration 
of elementary particles. The use of particle accelerators led to the 
discovery of many elementary particles and the transuranium elements 
as well as other important properties of matter (Jewkes et al. 1969, 
p. 248). 
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At present there exists no comprehensive theory to account for 
the complex range of relationships between science and technology. 
This broad spectrum includes, at one end, scientists who pursue in-
vestigations of their own choosing with little technical apparatus 
and no concern about eventual applications. At the other end are 
those engineers who are unconcerned about the latest scientific find-
ings and use only the textbook science they learned in school. Then 
there is a large middle ground where science and technology come to-
gether in a variety of relationships, with scientists using techno- 
logy in order to do their scientific experiments and engineers putting 
the latest scientific findings to work in the most sophisticated fields 
of technology (Kranzberg 1967a; 1967b; 1968; Molella and Reingold 
1973). 
From what has been said, it should be obvious that any simple 
linear cause and effect model of science-technology relationships sim-
ply does not fit the facts (Price and Bass 1969). Yet there remain 
serious students of innovation who cling to the view that technologi-
cal innovation proceeds linearly from basic science (Peck and Scherer 
1962; Ilarshack 1967). The complexity of the situation is present in 
the historical dispute about how much and in what way the conceptual 
science of the 17th century Scientific Revolution was shaped by the 
contemporaneous technology (Zilsel 1954; Merton 1938; Hall 1963), just 
as there are arguments about the degree of science involved in James 
Watt's steam engine and many other of the landmark inventions of the 
Industrial Revolution (Bernal 1953; Kerker 1961; Musson and Robinson 
1969). Complicating our understanding of these matters was the de-
velopment of engineering science in the 19th century which employed 
the instruments, experimentation, and measurement adopted by science 
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during the Scientific Revolution, but carried on by a different com-
munity with its own social system (Layton 1971). 
We are still at an early stage in our understanding of these 
intricate interrelationships between science and innovation. Research-
ers such as Jewkes, et al. (1969) claim that "It is not known whether 
there is a necessary connection between the growth of scientific 
knowledge and the growth of technology and invention, or, if there is 
a connection." 
However, useful beginnings have been made to model the process. 
Kranzberg has suggested (1971) that major technological breakthroughs 
(e.g., nuclear energy, transistors) derive directly from non-mission 
directed scientific discoveries, while mission-directed research is 
in response to specific technical needs and tends to incremental in-
novations. 
He also advanced (Ibid.) a push-pull scenario wherein a scien-
tific discovery attracts the attention of an engineer who can visua-
lize its application (or an entrepreneur who can foresee its profit-
ability). In the course of the technological development of the 
basic science, it proves necessary to obtain some additional basic 
knowledge if any workable items are to result. The result is a push 
from technology directed toward science to obtain basic knowledge to 
further development process. But developing one item of knowledge 
pushes toward some other mission-directed research. In this way sci-
ence and technology interact, pulling and pushing one another into 
new discoveries and innovations. 
Empirical studies have also been undertaken in an effort to 
understand these connections. Project Hindsight (Sherwin and Isenson 
1966; Isenson 1967), which examined the relationship between science 
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and technology utilized in weapons systems, was initiated in 1964 to 
establish the effectiveness of the $10 billion invested by the DOD 
in basic and applied research since 1945, and to determine which, if - 
any, management practices were conducive to high payoffs. Researchers 
"dissected" each of 20 weapons systems to identify each contribution 
from post-1945 science and technology which was important to improve 
system performance or reduce cost; each significant contributions was 
termed an "Event." Events were divided into Science Events or Techno-
logy Events, with Science Events being subdivided into Undirected 
Science and Applied Science. Of the 710 Events identified, only 9% 
were classified as Science Events, 3.7% as Applied Science, and only 
0.3% as Undirected Science. 
After the publication of this result, so contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom that technology depended upon science, the National 
Science Foundation, the agency responsible for funding basic science, 
reacted in 1967 by sponsoring an investigation by the IIT Research 
Institute to study systematically the role of basic scientific re-
search in technological innovation. That report,TRACES (Technology 
in Retrospect and Critical Events in Science 1968) ) identified the 
geneology of key events which led to five major technological innova-
tions of social and economic significance: birth control pills, the 
electron microscope, videotape recording, ceramic metallic materials, 
and matrix isolation. Instead of setting a backward timelimit of 1945, 
TRACES went back more than a century in studying the scientific roots 
of certain innovations. Dividing its key events into non-mission 
oriented research, mission-oriented research, and development and ap-
plication, TRACES attributed 70% to non-mission research,20% to mis-
sion-oriented research, and 10% to development and application. The 
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number of non-mission research events peaked significantly between 
the twentieth and thirtieth year prior to an innovation. 
Interactions of Science and Technology in the Innovative Pro-
cess (1973), a study by Batelle, Columbus for the National Science 
Foundation, was a lineal descendent of TRACES. Considering three of 
the TRACES cases as well as five others such as hybrid grains and 
the heart pacemaker, it attempted to identify important common fac-
tors in these innovations such as need, opportunity, technical gate-
keepers, and political factors. Of the "significant" events identi-
fied in the development of each innovation, 70% were considered re-
search events, divided about evenly between non-mission and mission-
oriented research. The remaining 30% were termed development and 
non-technical events. In addition, the researchers designated the 
most important of the significant events as "decisive" and found 
that 15% of these were non-mission oriented research and 45% were 
mission-oriented research while 40% were developmental and non-techni-
cal. This was a somewhat different mix from TRACES. The decisive 
events tended to be closer in time to the point of innovation than 
those which were only classified as significant. 
These three studies -- Hindsight, TRACES and Batelle -- are not 
so contradictory as they might seem on first reading. Had Project 
Hindsight looked further back in time or investigated a wider field 
than weapon systems, its conclusions dealing with scientific events 
might have been closer to those of TRACES. On the other hand, TRACES 
might have come up with a different mix of significant events had it 
chosen a different set of innovations, particularly some involving 
mechanical rather than chemical, biological, and electronic techno-
logies. Designating as "decisive" those events usually specific to a 
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single innovation might account for the difference between TRACES 
and the Batelle Study. 
Importantly, all three studies indicate a role for scientific 
research in technological innovation, with mission-oriented research 
becoming increasingly important as the final innovation approaches. 
The difficulties in finding direct connections between science and 
innovations in these studies accentuate the important finding that 
most innovations do not arise from the direct application of basic 
scientific knowledge (Achiadelis et al. 1971; Myers and Marquis 1969; 
Langrish et al. 1972). 
Because of this, some studies have concentrated on the indirect  
contributions of science to innovation or contributions occuring in 
conjunction with other factors. Thus, Gibbons and Johnston (1970) 
and Rosenberg (1974) claim that scientific knowledge acts in conjunc-
tion with market demands. Gibbons and Johnston also found that sci-
entific knowledge played an important role in the solution of tech- 
nical problems arising in the course of innovation directed activities. 
These studies, together with the work of Langrish et al. (1972), in-
dicate that scientific knowledge makes up a part of the environment 
in which innovation takes place and that the scientific state-of-the-
art may facilitate or impede innovation. Langrish et al. (1972) point 
out three ways in which science acts indirectly to facilitate innovation: 
First, curiosity oriented science, practiced largely 
in academic institutions, provides techniques of in-
vestigation. Second, it also provides people trained 
in using these techniques as well as in scientific 
ways of thought in general....Third, science enters 
innovation already embodied in technological form. 
It may be relatively rare for a piece of curiosity 
oriented research to generate a piece of new tech-
nology, but once this process has occurred, the tech-
nology can be used over and over again and developed 
into more advanced technology. (P. 40) 
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Further research on the role of scientific knowledge in techno-
logical innovation is obviously needed. In order to indicate and 
justify the kinds of research we feel appropriate, we present two 
brief,suggestive sketches. 
The principal alternative to applying scientific knowledge to 
innovation is a combination of rules of thumb, personal experience, 
and trial and error. What does scientific knowledge offer the tech-
nologist? Science provides a theory, model, or picture cast in terms 
of intellectual constructs of how a certain part of the world works. 
It also provides experimental results couched in terms of theory, 
which is usually highly abstract and says nothing about any specific 
device. If the technologist can get the scientific theory into a 
workable form, he can use it to provide knowledge of processes to be 
incorporated in an innovation. In the case of mechanical technologies, 
for example, the workings of devices can be immediately evident to 
the senses and thus usually require no intermediate picture. On the 
other hand, the internal workings of the nucleus are not immediately 
accessible, so theory enables the technologist to grasp them. A cur-
sory inspection of the case studies in mechanical innovations in The 
Sources of Invention (Jewkes et al., 1969) indicates that a high pro-
portion of them had no scientific component. On the other hand the 
critical role of science in electronics innovations, such as the tran-
sistor (Nelson 1962; Weiner 1973), and chemical innovations, such as 
nylon (Mueller, 1962), is well documented. Therefore, possible system-
atic differences in the relationship between scientific knowledge and 
technological innovation in different fields of science and technology 
should be investigated. 
One of the findings of TRACES which was supported by Interactions  
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of Science and Technolog in the Innovation Process (Batelle) was 
that most basic scientific events important to an innovation took 
place well before applied science and development events, which may 
in part explain the absence of significant basic science in Hindsight's 
relatively brief 20-year time frame. Such a conclusion implies a 
progressive articulation of basic scientific theories and experimental 
findings into forms easily accessible to the technologist. It would 
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u i seem useful to study this translation process n order to learn about 
the mechanisms used in reshaping and diffusing scientific results to 
the technological community. Brittain (1970) has shown how it re-
quired a science-engineer intermediary, Oliver Heaviside, to "trans-
late" James Clerk naxwell's theories of electrodynamics into a form 
in which they could be used by engineers. Similar investigations 
could provide a variety of case studies dealing with the process of 
technology's use of science and might thus serve as the basis for 
framing hypotheses about the translation process. 
The question of the role of scientific knowledge in technological 
innovation is of extreme importance, for society supports basic science 
generously in part because it believes that science eventually leads 
to innovation. Our theoretical understanding of the connection is 
virtually nil, for the research bearing on this question consists al-
most exclusively of case studies at varying levels of detail. Further 
studies, of the kind we indicated above, are necessary to lay the 
groundwork which may lead to a deeper theoretical understanding of 
the role of science in innovation. 
2. Configurations of Technological Knowledge  
From the consideration of the role of scientific knowledge in 
technological innovation, we now turn to configurations of technolog- 
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ical knowledge which can facilitate or impede innovation. 
"Technological readiness" refers to the availability of neces-
sary support technologies in order that an innovation be developed 
and utilized. For example, the Russian Polzunov invented a steam 
engine in 1766. After a few months of operation, his boiler sprang 
a leak. Unfortunately, the level of technological knowledge in 18th 
century Russia was so low that no one could repair it. Thus, Polzunov' 
invention never became an innovation (Zvorikine et al. 1962, pp. 138-
39), and we rightly attribute the steam engine to James Watt, not to 
Polzunov. 
Technical skill is only one element in "readiness." Another 
element, support technologies, is especially important in the case of 
large and complex technological systems. Introducing a V/STOL air-
craft system requires not only innovation in aircraft technology, but 
also adequate technical support in airport design, pollution abate-
ment, and ground traffic flow technologies, to name'only a few. In 
fact, considerable innovation may be necessary to design the support 
system and make it operational. With only the aircraft, there can be 
no system and hence no innovation. As we will see, "readiness," in 
the form of support systems, is also essential for diffusion of inno-
vations; e.g., the "Green Revolution" is dependent not only upon the 
creation of new hybrid grains, but also upon transportation and stor-
age facilities, fertilizer supplies, etc. 
As well as requiring support to be effective, technological in-
novations create pressures which stimulate further innovation. Be-
cause technologies are so interdependent, changes in one element of 
a group of coupled technologies can create "imbalances" or "bottle-
necks" which necessitate changes in other technologies. For example, 
69 
more powerful automobile engines required more powerful braking sys-
tems. Improvements in the cutting tools in lathes, with the use of 
high-speed alloy steels, required accommodations in other parts of 
the machine for control, lubrication, and disposal of waste material. 
Hughes (Chapter 6; 1971) refers to these as "reverse salients," using 
the military image of technology advancing on a broad front with a 
certain sector, the "reverse salient," lagging. 
The concept of imbalance is not confined to changes induced in 
a single kind of tool or device. Important imbalances can exist be-
tween different elements of related technologies. 
A sequence of imbalances of this kind is to be found in the tex-
tile industry in the 18th century. Richard Ray's invention of the 
"flying shuttle" speeded up the weaving process, upsetting the usual 
ratio of four spinners to one weaver; either there had to be many 
more spinners to supply a weaver with sufficient thread or yarn, or 
else spinning had to be similarly quickened by innovations in that 
field. A series of inventions by James Hargreaves, Richard Cart-
wright, and Samuel Crompton speeded up the spinning process. Then 
Cartwright set about mechanizing the weaving operation in order to 
take full advantage of the now-abundant yarn produced by the new mach-
ines. The result was the power loom. These machines lowered the 
price, and hence created a large new market for cotton textiles. An-
other bottleneck developed in the supply of raw cotton, where the 
chief difficulty lay in the amount of labor involved in picking the 
seeds from the bolls. This problem was solved by Eli Whitney's in-
vention of the cotton gin, which more than tripled the amount of seed-
free cotton which could be produced per man per day. Thus, innova-
tions in one field produced a need for inventions in other related 
fields (Mantoux 1961, part II, Chapter 1-2). 
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Our knowledge of technical opportunities and bottlenecks can be 
used as a valuable indicator of what future technical developments 
may and/or should take place. That is, they may serve as inputs to 
technological forecasts. Technological forecasts (Bright 1972; Chap-
ter 13 below) are of two main types: descriptive forecasts predict 
what will be the case; normative forecasts are goal directed (i.e., 
what should take place). The perspective and interests of the fore-
caster determine which type of forecast will be used. Although tech-
nology forecasting is becoming widely used, it is important to note 
that its methodology at present consists in great part of a "bag of 
tricks," such as Delphi and trend extrapolation, whose ultimate justi-
fication awaits further research (Bright 1972; Chapter 8 below). 
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B. RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS  
Besides scientific and technical knowledge, innovation requires 
other inputs. These include capital, labor, with its embodied know-
ledge and talent, and material resources and energy. The economics 
literature refers to these as "factors." Most scientific and much 
technical knowledge is public and can be used freely and without dim-
inution by anyone who can access it. The resource endowments consid-
ered here must be obtained for innovation and production from what 
are called "factor markets." In this section we shall consider how 
changes in factors and factor markets affect innovation. 
1. Capital  
Because the innovative process is often quite costly, the ability 
to secure adequate funds is an important determinant of whether a new 
product or process will be introduced. Financing an innovation is in 
some ways similar to the financing of any capital improvement. There 
are, however, essential differences. New products and processes of-
ten involve a degree of uncertainty which is not associated with du-
plicating existing facilities. For firms with adequate internal 
sources of cash flow (retained profits and depreciation) investment in 
new products and processes can be made with little or no recourse to 
the market. The situation is different for firms without strong in-
ternal cash flow. They need access to external sources of capital, 
so they must persuade these sources of the soundness of their invest-
ing in an innovative product or process. 
The literature on venture capital in respect to innovation is 
scattered and mostly of the "wisdom" or "how to do it" variety (for 
a useful treatment see Mueller 1971). The Charpie Report (1967), 
while emphasizing the importance of venture capital for small firms, 
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recognized that there were insufficient published data even to answer 
the question of whether there was an adequacy of venture capital. 
This report could only estimate that $3 billion of potentially avail-
able funds existed in 1967. Mansfield (Chapter 8 below) also recog-
nizes this lack of information and calls for the development of data 
regarding the extent of the venture capital available, the terms of 
availability, investment criteria, and the experience of innovators in 
obtaining capital backing. 
2. Labor  
Innovation itself is usually not labor intensive, for the quality, 
or expertise, of the labor involved is more important than the quantitl 
The personal qualities and institutional forms which lead to effective 
performance in organized research and development will be discussed 
in Chapter 3. As mentioned above, education, resulting in the embodi-
ment of scientific and technical knowledge, is an important factor in 
the development and utilization of innovations. Thus it is under-
standable why almost all R&D personnel have some formal education in 
science and technology, often extending to graduate degrees. 
3. Material Resources and Energy. 
Although material resources and energy are necessary inputs to 
innovation, the innovation process itself uses only a small amount of 
them. Of course, once an innovation becomes widespread, it can result 
in vast changes in material and energy supplies. 
There are two ways to view these resources: (1) as depletable 
stocks of particular entities (Meadows et al. 1972); or (2) as entities 
possessing certain specified properties or performing definite functiol 
(Chapter 7 below; Scott 1962). The latter view is based on what may 
be one of the most significant forms of technological innovation, name] 
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the substitution of one entity for another when the other is no longer 
physically obtainable or too costly. Not only does substitutibility 
allow production to continue, but it also offers potential for im-
provement because of different properties of the new substance. Chemi-
cal developments in plastics and polymers, for example, have vastly 
increased the number and variation of substances available for use 
while reducing dependence on specific naturally occurring substances 
such as cotton and rubber. Innovation in extractive industries has 
developed technologies to tap resources which were previously inac-
cessible or extremely expensive. This helps explain why the unit cost 
of extractive products in the United States fell from 1870 to 1957. 
Of the four main extractive areas, agriculture, fishing, forestry, and 
mining, only forest products have increased in cost, and even this in-
crease was accompanied by large scale substitution of non-forest pro-
ducts (Barnett and Morse 1963, Chapter 8; Chapter 7 below). Over the 
same period, output of resources as a percentage of the U.S. Gross 
National Product has declined from 36% in 1870 to 12% in 1954 (Rosen-
berg 1973, p. 112). Technology, through substitutibility, has de-
creased man's relative dependence on specific resources -- although 
not, of course, on resources as a whole. 
C. Endowments - Supply and Demand  
1. Demand  
Endowments such as capital, labor, and resources affect innova-
tion through both supply and demand. Demand operates on the side of 
the product market, the market in which the innovation is to be sold. 
Surveying eight studies dealing with the relative roles of supply and 
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demand in generating innovations, 2 Utterback (1973) found that between 
60 and 90 percent of the innovations considered were generated in 
response to market needs and demands. The others were generated as 
response to scientific and technical opportunities, a supply factor. 
On the industry level, at least in capital goods industries, 
Schmookler (1966, Ch. 6) found after extensive research that changes 
in investment in an industry were correlated with changes in numbers 
of capital goods patents. This approach tells us nothing about spe-
cific innovations, only about the aggregate of innovations in an in-
dustry, for he relied on the number of patents as a surrogate measure 
of innovation. (The problem with this assumption is discussed below; 
see the Appendix on measurement.) Both time series and cross sec-
tional data were advanced in support of his conclusion. 
Schmookler's most complete time series study covered the rail-
road industry for a period of over a century. He found that railroad 
• 
investments and railroad capital goods patents exhibited great simi-
larities both in long term trends and long swings. The difference 
,between these two curves was that at the lower turning points in major 
cycles, the upturn in investment occurred earlier than in capital goods 
patents. Using somewhat less complete data, he obtained similar re-
sults in the petroleum refining and building industries. In brief, 
demand induced or stimulated invention. 
His cross section work consisted in comparisons of capital goods 
patents and investment in over 20 industries. He compared the logarith 
of investment in 1939 and 1947 with capital goods patents in the three 
subsequent years. Very high correlations were obtained between the 
logarithm of investment and capital goods patents (Schmookler 1966, ch. 
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Schmookler also argued for the demand hypothesis in the case of 
consumer goods (1966, ch. 9). In doing so he relied on consumer pre-
ference as generating the demand. However, generating a demand arti-
ficially by advertising an existing supply does not constitute de-
mand but supply. Lacking any firm data in the consumer goods area, 
his results are inconclusive. 
2. Supply  
Looking at the other side of supply-demand, we find that a num-
ber of important inventions, such as the transistor (Nelson 1962) and 
nylon (Mueller 1962), have come out of programs in basic scientific 
and technical research undertaken by firms in areas of their interest. 
It is at least arguable that in some cases initial key inventions 
marked the beginning of the sort of demand cycle that Schmookler stu-
died. Supply of crucial scientific and technical information leads to 
the innovation, as in the case of the transistor, and this creates an 
investment opportunity which stimulates further innovative activity. 
Analogously Hollander (1965; see also Chapter 3 below) found in 
studying DuPont viscose-rayon plants that subsequent to a major tech-
nical improvement generated by corporate R&D effects, a host of minor 
improvements by production personnel and suppliers took place. He 
observed that these improvements tended to decrease in time, i.e., the 
potential for improvement became saturated. 
In a recent paper, Rosenberg (1974) analyzed Schmookler's demand 
hypothesis (1966) with great care. Schmookler, he pointed out, assumed 
it is possible to get as many inventions as wanted in any industry any-
time at a constant price. However, neither this case, nor the case 
where no inventions are possible at any price, is significant. 
1U 
The perspective which I am suggesting, therefore, 
states that, as scientific knowledge grows, the 
cost of successfully undertaking any given, science 
based invention declines...Thus, the growth of sci-
entific knowledge means a gradual reduction in the 
cost of specific categories of science based in-
ventions. The timing of inventions therefore needs 
to be understood in terms of such shifting supply 
curves for individual industries, depending upon the 
knowledge bases upon which inventive activity in 
that industry can draw. (Ibid., p. 107). 
To Rosenberg the important economic question is: Given the state of 
the sciences, at what cost can a technological end be attained? This 
view considers the importance of both supply and demand together with 
their interaction. It would be interesting to take the matter one steI 
further back to see how, if at all, economic demand acts to generate 
basic scientific knowledge. 
Markets for factors other than knowledge also affect the supply 
of resource endowments. The firm must, in the appropriate factor 
market, pay for the labor, capital, and material it uses. Changes in 
factor prices and price ratios may be a stimulus to . innovation by de-
veloping substitutes for costly factors. The factors most frequently 
considered in the literature have been capital and labor, but it 
would appear from our earlier consideration that material resources 
and scientific and technical knowledge are equally significant. 
Hicks (1963) drew the distinction between innovations designed 
to offset changes in factor prices, which he referred to as induced, 
and all other innovations, which he referred to as autonomous. In-
duced innovation, he claimed, was biased toward labor—saving innova-
tions as opposed to capital-saving innovations. The reason for this 
was that the cost of labor in industrial societies was rising faster 
than the cost of capital. His findings indicated that no such bias 
existed in autonomous innovation. 
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This finding contrasts with Salter's (1960) argument that there 
was no bias toward innovations which saved in any particular factor. 
"When labor costs rise, any advance that reduces the total cost is 
welcome, and whether this is achieved by labor saving or capital 
saving is irrelevant. There is no reason to assume that attention 
should be concentrated on labor saving techniques unless because of 
some inherent characteristics of technology, labor saving knowledge 
is easier to acquire than capital saving knowledge." Indeed a single 
firm innovating to lower its costs in the face of changing factor 
prices would only be concerned with minimizing total cost. Whichever 
path of innovation it chose could not significantly affect the factor 
markets because of the small size of the single firm relative to the 
economy. And because of the lack of bias of the innovating firm, an 
aggregate of innovating firms would not tend to create a macrolevel 
scarcity in one factor rather than another because the different firms 
would tend to make savings in different factors. 
The basis of induced innovation is that substitutibility which 
we mentioned previously in connection with resources and energy. It 
is possible to substitute some combination of endowments (knowledge, 
capital, labor and talent, resources and energy) for another. Al-
though the economic literature on innovations centers on capital and 
labor, all the endowments are involved. In the next section we move 
considerations of substitution to the societal level. 
D. The Limits to Substitutibility  
Historically the pace of technological innovation in western 
societies has been stimulated by the ability of the innovation system 
to substitute one sort of endowment for another or one material or 
form of energy for another (Chapter 7). This pattern has persisted 
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for at least two hundred years. The modes of substitution involved 
include the following (Rosenberg 1973, p. 116): 
1. Raising output per unit input of resources, 
2. Development of totally new materials, 
3. Raising the productivity of the extractive process, 
4. Raising the productivity of the process of exploration 
and resource discovery, 
5. Development of techniques for the reuse of scrap and 
waste material, and 
6. Development of techniques for the exploitation of lower 
grade or other more abundant resources. 
In this optimistic point of view promulgated by technological 
growth economists, resources take on a dynamic character. Rather 
than finite and irreplenishable stocks of particular entities, re-
sources are substances which perform a certain function or meet a 
particular set of specifications (Chapter 7 below; Scott 1962). Sub-
stitution possibilities are extensive. These possibilities are con-
sidered for a single substitution in isolation rather than for the 
aggregate of all substitutions or an interacting set of substitutions. 
For example, substitution of plastic for metal in the construction of 
automobiles would be considered largely in its immediate effects on 
the production of automobiles without adequate consideration for ef-
fects on the plastic and metals industries and on macro-parameters of 
the world system such as employment, pollution, level of education, 
etc. This point of view does not explicitly consider possible boundary 
conditions on substitutibility in a finite system. However, as Rosen-
berg is quick to point out (Chapter 7 below), past trends are not ne-
cessarily an indication of what will take place in the future. 
An alternative point of view has been developed by students of 
systems dynamics (Forester 1971; Meadows, et al. 1972) who look at 
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future of the world on a global level. The model of The Limits to  
Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) regards resources as finite and irre-
plenishable stocks of particular substances, so that no additional 
input is possible in these closed categories. At the present level 
of development of this model, technology is dealt with only indirectly 
and particular substitutions cannot .be dealt with explicitly (see 
Kranzberg 1973). This model therefore does not allow for the possi-
bility of important breakthroughs in system balance such as Haber's 
discovery of nitrogen fixing bacteria in the early part of the 20th 
century. Nor does it allow for flexible responses to particular 
trouble spots. Thus, no matter what happens, the model predicts dis-
aster. Either food production will plummet, pollution will rise to 
unacceptable Ave's, or some other calamity will overtake the world. 
One key reason for this is that certain important initial parameters 
of the model, which are variable in the normal course of events, can-
not be changed as the system develops over time (Meadows et al. 1972). 
Boyd (1972) argued that the Forester (1971) World Dynamics model, 
on which The Limits to Growth model is based, is sensitive to changes 
in assumptions, and he added a variable representing technology to 
the model. He assumed, for example, that a four-fold increase in tech-
nology over the 1970 level would decrease pollution output and natural 
resource input per unit of material standard of living to zero. His 
revision of the model along these lines led to a catastrophe free 
future. Damon (1973) pointed out that such assumptions are inappro-
priate because of thermodynamic considerations, and thus that the 
Forester model's applicability has not been challenged. 
We doubt if either the perspective of the growth economists or 
that of the world system modelers can adequately represent by itself 
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the future of innovation in our world with its potentials and pitfalls. 
The economists' model finds its confirmation in a period of history 
when the innovation system involved only a small fraction of the 
earth's population. Exploitation of the earth's resource potential 
was limited both in the amount of environmental disruption and in 
the number of people benefitting from this exploitation. However, 
with a greater fraction of the earth's population coming within the 
pale of industrialization and desiring its share of material goods, 
the implicit assumption that each substitution process is independent 
of every other begins to lose its realism. The substitutibility pro-
cess would be treated most realistically in a finite world model with 
interactions among various substitutibility processes. Thus, the in-
teresting question becomes not "What are the limits to growth?" but 
"What are the limits to substitutibility?" 
Let us now consider some of the areas where these limits may oc-
cur. The population of the earth is rapidly increasing. Addition-
ally, the percentage of that population involved in industrialization, 
and hence in the innovation system, is increasing as well. As a re-
sult the per capita use of resources throughout the globe is accele-
rating. At the same time, because of depletion and substitution of 
resources, the industrial process is becoming more intensive in matter 
and energy usage. There are constraints on the total supply and ex-
traction of particular resources; there are also problems in recycling 
enormous quantities of materials, and in dealing with large amounts 
of waste and pollution when these involve a significant part of the 
entire system. The rate of social change should, as a minimum, be 
such as to satisfy widespread expectations, and as a maximum be such 
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that social disruption is not created by the rapid learning of new 
techniques and the loss of jobs by persons affected by the changes. 
A very crucial area where limits to substitutibility arise is 
the sphere of human values. Values of one sort or another can both 
encourage and hinder innovations and substitutions. Thus, there ap-
pear to be both upper and lower limits to the rate at which substitu-
tion, the mechanism for innovation, can take place. 
While we certainly cannot at this time answer the question "What 
are the limits to substitutibility?" we have framed the question and 
have indicated some areas which can be searched to provide whatever 
answer is available. An understanding of the future of innovation 
on the societal levels depends on a realistic and fruitful integration 
of the perspectives of the technological growth economists and the 
world systems modelers. Both have contributed to our understanding, 
but neither provides a complete or adequate description of the com-
plex system we inhabit. 
82 
IV. INSTITUTIONS 
Along with values and endowments, institutions are an important 
exogenous force acting on the innovation system. Institutions are 
social organizations which have been developed to secure the goals 
shown by societal preferences l utilizing the endowments available. 
They receive their legitimization from societal goals, and their 
efficiency is judged in terms of how well they meet these goals. 
As a pluralistic society the United States possesses a variety 
of institutions. Economic questions are influenced by two basic 
sets of institutions: one primarily economic and the other basically 
political. In terms of the percentage of output the predominant set 
is the economic. Firms receive signals through the market mechanism, 
and then decide what to produce and how to produce it. Such deci-
sions involve the allocation of resources for R&D, introduction of 
new products, or the adoption of a new technique. As was explained 
above, innovation is stimulated in general by market demand rather 
than by the availability of scientific and technical knowledge. The 
market mechanism provides the incentive and legitimizes the decisions 
made. 
The second set of institutions serving as determinants and modi-
fiers of the innovation process is political. Political institutions 
impinge upon the economic in many ways. For one thing, the percentage 
of goods and services produced by or for the government or regulated 
by it is increasing. Furthermore, the government as a major pur-
chaser of goods, especially high technology goods, influences the in-
novation process by what it decides to buy and the way it procures 
these goods. Additionally, the government has underwritten directly 
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and through its purchases of goods a large portion, in some years a 
majority, of the country's organized R&D effort. 
The Government's impact on innovation can be indirect as well 
as specific. In carrying out its regulatory, fiscal, and other func-
tions the government can either encourage or discourage innovation 
in one field and act as a powerful disincentive in another, as with 
standards lowering automobile engine emissions. 
A. Economic Institutions  
1. Technological Progressiveness  
Most economic institutions, and especially the market, are not 
judged solely or even primarily by how they impact on the innovation 
process. The basic criterion has been the efficiency with which the 
economy, utilizing existing technology, translates its given stock 
of resources (endowments) into products and services. This criterion 
has received central attention for at least two major reasons. The 
more important has been that society values highly the current pro-
duction of existing goods and services produced with existing tech-
nology. Increasing the efficiency of this process will allow more 
goods to be produced with the present endowments. Allocation of 
resources to innovative activity may have the short-run effect of re-
ducing the current level of output although the effect on long-run 
output may be very salutary. 
The second major reason is that the basic economic models for 
judging efficacy of market structures have reflected an almost single-
minded interest in the efficiency of resource allocation under condi-
tions where technology, consumer preferences, and resources are as-
sumed as given and therefore constants (for an extended discussion 
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see Schmookler 1965 and the works he references). Utilizing such 
models, economists have judged the relative efficiency of various 
forms of market structure in terms of resource allocation. Given 
these comparative-statics models where technology is treated as a 
constant, the competitive market structure proved to be beneficial 
in terms of efficiency and equity with its large number of buyers 
and sellers, no barriers to entry, and a standardized product. Un-
der this type of market structure resources were allocated in re-
lation to consumer preferences, and goods were produced in an "effi-
cient manner." Imperfectly competitive market structures, including 
oligopoly, with its small number of relatively large firms control-
ling most of the output and with barriers to entry, provided firms 
with the power necessary to control supply and thus the price they 
received for their product. Oligopolistic firms could use their econ-
omic power to short-circuit the process whereby resources are allo-
cated in relation to consumer preferences. 
The use of models which treated technology, preferences, and en-
dowments as constants meant that the dynamic nature of technological 
change could not be dealt with by existing tools. To the extent that 
it was treated at all, technology was regarded as something exogenous 
to the basic models. Many economists either explicitly or implicitly 
extended their faith in the competitive market structure to include 
technological progressiveness (Stigler 1952, p. 1; Adelman 1954, p. 15; 
2. Schumpeter and Galbraith  
A group of economists led initially by Joseph Schumpeter and 
later by J.K. Galbraith strongly assailed this preoccupation with 
judging market structure by the measuring rod of static efficiency. 
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Schumpeter vigorously attacked the proposition that the competitively 
organized market provided the best impetus for innovative activity. 
In developing his non-Marxian dialectic of "creative destruction," 
he argued strongly and lucidly for the technological progressiveness 
of the large corporation in oligopolistically organized industries. 
For example, Schumpeter (1943, p. 28) stated: 
As soon as we go into details and inquire into the 
individual items in which progress was most con-
spicious, the trail leads not to the doors of the 
firms that work under conditions of comparatively 
free competition but precisely to the doors of the 
large concerns -- which, as in the case of agricul-
tural machinery, also account for much of the pro-
gress in the competitive sector -- and a shocking 
suspicion dawns upon us that hig business may have 
had more to do with creating that standard of life 
than with keeping it down. 
Schumpeter's disciples, such as Kaplan (1954) and Villard (1958), 
have expounded on his ideas. 
It was left to John Kenneth Galbraith, in his book American  
Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (1952, p. 861), to 
add heat if not light to the debate when he too challenged the conven- 
tional wisdom, throwing down the gauntlet with the following statement: 
Moreover, a benign Providence who, so far, has 
loved us for our worries, has made the modern 
industry of a few large firms an excellent in-
strument for inducing technical change. It is 
admirably equipped for financing technical de-
velopment. Its organization provides strong 
incentives for undertaking development and for 
putting it into use. 
The Schumpeter-Galbraith hypothesis is first and foremost a chal-
lenge to judge the efficiency of economic institutions in terms of how 
well they perform in providing goods and services through time, not at 
a single point of time. Under this standard, technology ceases to be 
a constant and become one of the critical variables. 
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This hypothesis raises a series of questions concerning the re-
lation between the firm as the innovating unit and the market as a 
determiner and modifier of innovative activity. First, questions 
arise about the effect of the size of the firm itself. Is the inno-
vative process subject to economies of scale due to the "lumpiness" 
of capital, the advantages of specialized personnel and equipment, 
and the ability to spread risk over a larger set of activities? Addi-
tional questions naturally follow. Is a certain minimum size needed 
to engage effectively in innovative activity? Do economies of scale, 
if they exist, continue for all scales of output, or do diseconomies 
of scale appear after a certain size is reached? 
A second set of questions relates to the effect of market struc-
ture on innovation. For example, how does an oligopolistic market 
structure affect both the firm's ability and willingness to engage in 
innovation? Since an oligopolistic market structure presupposes bar-
riers to entry into the industry, do these barriers retard or encour-
age innovative activity? In the discussion below we examine attempts 
to answer these questions. 
3. Firm Size and Innovation  
The Schumpeter-Galbraith challenge encouraged economists to ex-
amine the relationship between firm size and innovation. Unfortun-
ately, reliable measures of innovation do not exist (See Appendix be-
low). For one thing, it is often difficult to distinguish between 
major innovations and minor improvements in products and processes. 
In addition, most of the cost and demand data needed for any measure 
of the cost and impact of particular innovations are considered pro-
prietary information by the firm. Furthermore, at present the metho- 
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dology does not exist to classify and measure all the direct and in-
direct effects of an innovation. This has led researchers to rely 
on the data on R&D expenditure or employment as a proxy for the rate 
of innovation. Hence, the debate concerning firm size and innovation 
has thus been carried on primarily in terms of the relation between 
firm size and organized R&D activity. But such measures of innova-
tive output suffer from the fundamental difficulty that inputs are 
being used when what one should like to measure is output. Only to 
the extent that organized R&D and innovation vary together can the 
results be used without qualification. This correlation is, of course, 
unknown. 
After the renewed challenge of Galbraith and his disciplines in 
the 1950s and early 1960s a series of studies appeared dealing with 
various aspects of firm size and market structure and their effects 
of innovation. Public attention was focused on the relationship when 
the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly held hearings on 
"Concentration, Invention, and Innovation" in May and June of 1965. 
Commenting on the empirical material appearing around that time, Mark-
ham (1965) proposed a "threshold" relationship between firm size and 
innovation. He suggested (p. 329): 
Up to a certain size, innovational effort increases 
more than proportional to size; at that size, which 
varies from industry to industry, the fitted curve 
has an inflection point and among the largest few 
firms innovational effort generally does not increase 
and may decrease with size. 
There appears to be some threshold size necessary for effectively en-
gaging in organized R&D which has found support in several studies.3 
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For example, Freeman has presented evidence that the threshold for 
effective R&D may be quite high in the electrical equipment industry 
(1965). Additional empirical work aimed at documenting the existence 
and size of this threshold for various industries would be extremely 
useful. 
The idea of a threshold is certainly in accord with data col-
lected on organized research. In the National Science Foundation's 
annual survey on "Research and Development in Industry" (1973), these 
data show that large firms are responsible for the expenditure of most 
of the R&D funds. In 1971, the 298 firms with over 10,000 employees 
performed over four-fifths of all industrial research and development. 
The twenty largest companies in terms of R&D expenditures accounted 
for 54% of all industrially performed R&D and received 72% of all fed-
eral R&D funds for 1971. Indeed, five industry groups accounted for 
81% of all expenditures in 1971 (NSF 1973). 
The National Science Foundation (1973, p. 61) data also show that 
on the average the larger firms, those with over 10,000 employees, have 
a much higher ratio of R&D funds to net sales (4.2%) than do smaller 
sized firms (1.6 - 2.1%). Despite this general tendency, there is 
wide variation among industries in terms of R&D expenditures as a per-
centage of net sales -- ranging from .4% for "textiles and apparel" 
to 16.6% for "aircraft and missiles." 
Hamberg (1966, pp. 45-49) has shown that this generally positive 
relationship between firm size and R&D expenditures varies greatly 
between industries and is sensitive to the size variable used; it 
appears stronger when number of employees rather than assets or sales 
is used as the size variable. 
Granted that large firms do more R&D than small firms and that 
in general a positive relationship between firm size and expenditures 
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on R&D exists, does this mean that continued growth in a firm's size 
will bring an even greater growth in R&D activity? Markham (1965, 
p. 329) suggested that there was a leveling-off and even a reduction 
in activity as size increased beyond some point. This idea of a 
crossover point finds support in the literature. Scherer found that 
when he divided the economy into four large industry groups` that 
R&D employment per dollar of sales decreased in three out of the four 
groups after firm sales reached $200 million. (The exception was 
basic chemicals and drugs.) When individual industries were examined, 
the same relationship obtained, although there was considerable vari-
ation between industries (Scherer 1965, pp. 1195-98). Indeed, there 
is evidence that in the primary metals industry there may well be a 
negative relationship between R&D expenditures and firm size beyond 
a very small size (Hamberg 1966, p. 59). The evidence tends to sup-
port the proposition that there is a generally positive relationship 
between firm size and R&D expenditure, but that beyond some size this 
relationship weakens and may actually decline. 
Another attempt at measuring the relationship between firm size 
and innovative activity has been to relate the patents secured to 
measures of firm size. At first glance this does seem superior to 
the method previously discussed in that one would be measuring an 
output, a patented invention, rather than inputs, R&D expenditures 
or employment. There are, however, certain grave difficulties en-
countered in using patent statistics. There is some indication 
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that the number of patents may be a better measure of research 
expenditure than a measure of the number of investions (Comanor and 
Scherer 1969). There is also great variability both in terms of 
the importance and the quality of patents issued. The latter is 
confirmed by the amazingly high rate of successful challenges to 
patents, which some have asserted is as high as 70% (Kauper 1973). 
Scherer found that for the economy as a whole, sales were 
more concentrated than patents. When he divided the economy into 
the same four industry groups discussed above, he found that the 
number of patents per dollar of sales declined after $200 million 
of sales in three out of four groups, the exception again being 
chemicals and drugs. The same pattern was present when individual 
industries were examined one by one. These data show that large 
firms do not obtain a disproportionate share of patents, given 
their sales (Scherer 1965, pp. 1195-96). They also indicate that 
the cost per patent pending is higher for larger firms (Sanders, 
Rossman, and Harris 1959, p. 238). What is missing, however, is 
some measure of the relative importance of the patents obtained 
by various sized firms. 
Given the difficulties associated with patent statistics as 
measures of innovative activity, definitive statements cannot be 
made. Patent studies do, however, tend to support some of the 
conclusions arrived at in studies utilizing R&D expenditures and 
employment. It does appear that a crossover point exists in terms 
of firm size and R&D activity and that beyond this point larger 
firms do not account for a disproportionate share of patents. 
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Indeed, if anything, the contrary may be true. 
Hence, there is no unambiguous answer to that part of the 
Schumpeter-Galbraith hypothesis that argues that large firm size 
is needed for innovation. Instead, we are left with four basic 
observations: 
(1) There is a minimum size in terms of sales needed 
to engage effectively in organized research. 
(2) There is a generally positive relationship between 
firm size and R&D activity. 
(3) There is a point beyond which increases in sales 
do not bring forth proportional increases in either 
R&D activity or patents. 
(4) There is a great deal of variation among industries. 
This last point argues against continued attempts to secure 
a completely general answer to the relationship between firm size 
and innovation and argues for industry level studies. It would 
appear that the returns would be higher for research which at-
tempted to identify threshold and crossover points for various 
industries and types of innovations within particular industries 
than for work at a more aggregated level. 
4. Concentration and Innovation  
The structure of the market in which a firm sells its product 
will affect the signals that the firm receives and thus will in-
fluence both its willingness and its need to innovate. Schumpeter 
and Galbraith in their challenge to "conventional wisdom" not only 
claimed that large firms were conductive to innovation, but also 
stated that large firms in industries characterized by a small 
number of firms were more innovative. Here we discuss the effect 
of these two aspects of market structure on innovation. 
Unfortunately, economic theory is of little help in providing 
a priori models for dealing with the effect of concentration of 
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output on innovation. The reason for this lack is readily apparent. 
A comprehensive theory would have to integrate the complexity of 
oligopoly theory, where there is mutual interdependence between the 
firms in the industry, with the complexity associated with the dynamics 
of technological change. 
Attempts to treat this problem theoretically have most often ended 
simply in lists of influences which affect the willingness of firms 
to innovate. For example, Scherer (1970) has developed a model to id-
entify the factors determining whether the speed and amount of innova-
tion will be greater for more concentrated or less concentrated in-
dustries. He identifies (p. 369) two basic factors. The stimulus 
factor relates to "the marginal conditions for profit maximization, an 
increase in the number or sellers...being conductive to rapid innova- 
tion," The second factor, the 0  lebensraum factor, relates to the re-
quirement that adequate profits must exist, and that beyond some point 
a large number of firms may discourage innovation. In an industry 
with a large number of relatively small firms, the desire to innovate 
may be strong, but the financial and organizational capacity may be 
lacking. In industries dominated by a small number of large firms, the 
capacity may exist but the stimulus may be lacking. Thus in any parti-
cular industry, the result will depend upon the interaction among se-
veral variables, such as the size of the overall profit potential, 
the number of actual or potential competitors, the speed with which 
rivals are expected to imitate, the degree of benefit that being first 
confers on the firm in terms of permanent product differentiation, the 
effect on the profits of present products and processes, and the mag-
niture of anticipated R&D cost (Scherer 1967b). 
Although additional theoretical work is needed, the basic ques- 
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tion of the relationship between market structure and innovation 
is an empirical one. The device used to measure the presence of 
oligopoly is the concentration ratio which is the percentage of total 
output controlled by the largest firms in the industry. A four-firm 
concentration ratio of sixty percent means that the four largest firms 
control sixty percent of the output of the industry. Unfortunately, 
concentration ratios as a measure of market power are subject to de-
ficiencies such as arbitrary industry classification, failure to in-
clude the competitive effects of substitutes or foreign goods, etc. 
They do, however, remain a good first approximation of the degree of 
oligopoly power that exists in the market (Scherer 1970, pp. 52-57). 
Attempts to answer the question of whether more concentrated in-
dustries are more or less innovative than less concentrated industries 
have encountered continual problems. For example, in the late 1950s 
both Stigler and Phillips attempted to measure the relation between 
concentration and innovative progress in terms of productivity, i.e., 
output per worker. Stigler (1956) used firm concentration and found 
a negative correlation between concentration data and productivity; 
Phillips (1956) used plant concentration data and found a positive 
correlation. While Stigler's choice of data was more appropriate for 
answering the question of the relation between firm size and technical 
process, the seemingly contradictory results do illustrate the diffi-
culty in securing unambiguous answers. 
In several empirical studies employment of scientists and engin-
eers in R&D has been used as a proxy for innovation and has been re-
lated to concentration. These studies have shown that the ratio of 
scientists and engineers employed to total employment is generally 
higher when significant amounts of concentration exists (Scherer 1967a). 
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Indeed, in Comanor's study (1967, pp. 645-52) the employment of scien-
tists and engineers in R&D was found to be twice as high in concen-
trated industries than in unconcentrated industries even when the re-
sults were adjusted to take care of the relationship between firm size 
and R&D employment. When four-firm concentration was low, ten to four-
teen percent, firms were found to hire very few scientists and engin-
eers. The maximum percentage occurred with four-firm ratios of fifty-
five percent, and at both lower and higher ratios the percentage of 
scientists and engineers was less (Scherer 1967a). 
The results of this type of study must be evaluated with care, fot 
the nature of the technology in a particular industry may mean that the 
cost of hiring large numbers of R&D scientists and engineers may he a 
barrier to entry rather than concentration facilitating a large R&D 
effort. When variables representing opportunity for technological pro-
gress in an industry were introduced explicitly into the analysis, the 
importance of concentration in explaining differences in the percentage 
of scientists and engineers employed in R&D to total employment was re-
duced significantly (Comanor 1967). It appears that R&D activity is 
correlated with both concentration and opportunity, that is, with the 
"supply" or possibility •pf an innovation that promises profit. 
A few very excellent studies on the relation between market struc-
ture and innovation have been conducted at the industry level. Mans-
field's 1963 study is especially noteworthy and deserves treatment in 
some detail. In it, he related firm size and industry structure to the 
number and importance of innovations in three basic industries; iron 
and steel, petroleum refining, and bituminous coal. He began by sur-
veying officials of trade associations and trade journals and asking 
them to identify and rank in importance the most important processes 
and product innovations in their fields for the period 1918 to 
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1958. Using these same "experts" plus company records and trade 
publications, Mansfield was able to identify where the first comm-
ercial application occurred in 80% of the innovations, or 150 in 
toto. His basic question was whether the number and importance of 
the innovations carried out by the four largest firms exceeded their 
relative share of the market. He received a positive answer for the 
coal and petroleum refining industries, but not for iron and steel, 
where smaller firms tended to do more than their relative share of 
innovation. He further found that: 
the largest four firms seemed to account for 
a relatively large share of the innovating in 
cases where (1) the investment required to in-
novate was large relative to the size of the 
potential users (2) the minimum size of firm 
required to use the innovations profitably 
was relatively large, and (3) the average 
size of the largest four firms was much 
greater than the average size of all poten-
tial users of the innovations (p. 573). 
The ethical (prescription) drug industry has also received attention. 
In this industry the largest firms are not responsible for a dispro-
portionate share of innovations; indeed their share of innovations 
is less than their share of market sales (Mansfield et al. 1971, p. 
167). Substantial diseconomies of scale in R&D seem to exist in the 
industry, so that "the marginal productivity of professional research 
staff is inversely related to the size of the firm" (Comanor 1965). 
It does appear, however, that the economic impact of innovations by 
the larger firms tends to be greater than for smaller firms (Comanor 
1965; Mansfield et al. 1971). 
Industry level studies such as that by Mansfield and those deal-
ing with the drug industry offer useful insights into the interaction 
between market structure and innovative activity. As this body of 
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literature grows, the aspects of the relationship between industry 
structure and innovation which are susceptible to generalized state-
ments and those aspects which are industry specific should emerge 
more clearly. 
5. Entry and Innovation  
A second component of market structure which affects signals re-
ceived by the firm is difficulty or ease of entry into the industry. 
Where entry barriers are high, existing firms may feel insulated from 
innovative pressures of potential market entrants. If entry into an 
industry is easy, this may discourage existing firms from investing 
in innovative projects, especially if the projects are expensive, 
risky, and/or easily imitated. Barriers which retard entry include 
the need for expensive facilities, the lack of basic patents, and 
difficulty in competing with market-dominating firms. In many cases 
a new or existing firm entering an industry for the first time faces 
a large investment and a significant amount of risk and uncertainty. 
An inadequate rate of innovation by existing firms in an indus-
try can be overcome by the entrance of new innovating organizations 
into the industry if the barriers to entry are not too high. Schon 
(1967) calls this "innovation by invasion." The invaders can be 
small, independent firms just coming into existence, or established, 
technologically sophisticated firms well entrenched in other indus-
tries, or even foreign firms. For example, the chemical industry "in-
vaded" the textile industry with both finishes and new materials, and 
the aircraft industry "invaded" the machine tool industry with numerica 
control devices (Markham 1965, pp. 139-171). It was Westinghouse and 
General Electric which developed jet engines, not the existing firms 
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in the aircraft engine business (Nelson et al. 1967, p. 72). Brown 
(1957), in a study of new firms developed in the post-war period in 
the Connecticut Valley, found that many were established by former 
employees of larger companies that were not interesting in applying 
and developing the inventions made under their auspices. 
Ease of entry influences the innovativeness of an industry in 
at least two ways. First, new firms often bring innovation into the 
industry. Second, the existence of potential competitors and espec-
ially potential innovators may cause, and in many cases require, 
existing firms either to innovate or to imitate quickly in order to 
protect a dominant market position. For example, Gillette imitated 
rather quickly upon the introduction of stainless steel blades in 
the U.S. market in the 1960s. Sperry-Rand's introduction of Univac 
digital computers was quickly followed by a set of innovations from 
IBM. There is some indication that whereas dominant firms in some in-
dustries may be slow innovators, they are very quick imitators once 
their position is threatened (Scherer 1970, p. 371). 
Comanor found that moderate barriers to entry, in the form of 
optimal plant size being four to seven percent of industry output and/ 
or capital investment being from $20 to $70 million produced a higher 
percentage of R&D employment relative to size than did either higher 
or lower concentration ratios. He attributed this phenomenon to the 
fact that lower concentration ratios might represent too easy entry, 
and profits from innovation could be too rapidly competed away, where-
as higher concentration ratios represented situations where the firm 
felt itself insulated from pressures to innovate (1967, pp. 652-561). 
The answer to the question of which industry structure is more 
conductive to innovation is far from clear. It would appear from the 
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fragmentary evidence available that, as Markham suggests (1965, 
p. 325): 
Some departure from the state of perfect com-
petition (or the presence of some monopoly) is 
a necessary concomitant of innovation, but it 
does not follow that twice this volume of de 
partures, somehow measured, should lead to twice 
the volume of innovation. 
It would also appear that the degree of concentration needed to 
secure an "adequate" innovative performance depends on the interaction 
of a number of variables and may differ widely from industry to in-
dustry. The identification of these variables and how they interact 
in particular industries deserves increased research attention. Hope-
fully, patterns will emerge from these studies which will allow cross-
industry comparison. 
6. Unanswered Questions  
It is apparent from the previous discussion that the effects of 
economic institutions as determinants and modifiers is incompletely 
understood. The Schumpeter-Galbraith hypothesis proposed a general-
ized relationship among firm size, market structure, and innovation. 
As the studies detailed above show, a great deal of variation in the 
magnitude, and in some cases even the sign, exists between these vari-
ables and the rate of innovation in various industries. Disaggrega-
tion, i.e., dealing with smaller units, would appear to be a wise 
course to pursue. 
This disaggregation can take several general forms. One would 
be industry-level research which identifies the existence of economies 
and diseconomies of scale in the various phases of the innovation pro-
cess for particular industries. Another might be determination of 
the existence and size of the threshold necessary to engage effect- 
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ively in R&D and the determination of "cross-over" points where in-
creases in size bring less than proportional increases in organized 
R&D effort. Also needed, is additional work on the relationship 
between the scientific and technological base of an industry and in-
novation. Are firm size and market structure functions of technology 
or are they based on financial, marketing and other considerations? 
Sub-industry level studies would also appear to be in order. In-
novations within the confines of a given industry differ in terms of 
the technologies they use and the endowments they require. It may well 
be that smaller firms have economic and organizational advantages in 
innovations requiring sophistication and flexibility or catering to 
specialized needs. Larger firms may do best in areas requiring large 
production, marketing, and capital resources. Rather than assuming 
that a market with a large number of small firms or a market with a 
small number of large firms is optimal for encouraging innovation, it 
may well be that we need both size firms -- each to innovate where it 
has an advantage. This in turn requires that we examine mechanisms 
relating to barriers to entry and economic power relationships within 
an industry, and how they may be modified to allow for the continued 
viability of small firms while not adversely affecting the incentives 
for innovation by larger firms. 
At the heart of the discussion are the concepts of an "industry" 
and a "firm." In many cases the formal definition of an industry is 
arbitrary and does not capture the essence of how the market operates 
to carry out the goals of society. For example, industries are often 
defined in terms of a particular technology, product, or even material. 
Since innovation has the effect of changing the technology, introducing 
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new products, and changing the materials used for certain functions, 
industry definitions are a product of previous, sometimes obsolete, 
technology and as such tend to be static, Additionally, too little 
attention may be given to the effect of interproduct competition 
among goods performing the same basic functions which are produced 
in different industries or countries. For example, structural steel 
has encountered competition from extruded aluminum, laminated wood, 
and special types of reinforced concrete. Measuring the effect of 
industry structure when the concept of an industry is itself subject 
to change and may be inappropriate for the question at hand can only 
lead to confusion or error. 
Along with the concept of an industry, most studies use the con-
cept of a firm as a point of departure. A firm is basically a legal 
concept, which may or may not be functional. Many large, highly di-
versified, and decentralized firms operate in a number of markets, 
producing a wide variety of goods, utilizing a number of different 
technologies. For example, Textron was originally in the textile busi-
ness. Between 1943 and 1964, it acquired 70 different companies out-
side the textile industry. By 1964, Textron was out of the textile 
industry and in 37 other industrial product areas from helicopters to 
watch bands (Harris 1965). Perforce its R&D and other innovative acti-
vities reflect the diversified and decentralized nature of its opera-
tions. To classify this firm as belonging to the industry wherein its 
sales are highest -- as is currently done -- is clearly inappropriate. 
As an important first step in gathering information about firms from 
a functional point of view, the Federal Trade Commission is beginning 
to collect product line information from large conglomerate firms. 
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B. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS -- DIRECTLY INNOVATIVE 
The United States has been traditionally a free enterprise econ-
omy. Theoretically in such an economic environment the government 
plays a secondary role in fostering technological innovation. In 
practice, however, throughout American history, the government has 
developed and fostered institutions, part of whose activity has been 
technological innovation. These institutions either involve areas of 
direct constitutional concern to the United States government such as 
defense, or areas of public concern wherein the private sector lacked 
the resources or the will to make privately funded R&D feasible, such 
as agriculture. 
These governmental institutions follow three organizational pat-
terns. First are organizations doing in-house research and develop-
ment, such as the National Bureau of Standards. Then there are in-
stitutions which fund research in the educational, non-profit, and 
private sectors through a system of contracts and grants, exemplified 
by the National Science Foundation. The third type is a mixture of 
inhouse and outside research funded by grants and contracts, with the 
institution coordinating all components; NASA, AEC, and DOD pursue this 
mode, which perhaps provides the most operating flexibility of the 
three types. 
Before World War II the private sector was the main supporter 
of R&D. As in 1930 for example, private sector expenditures for R&D 
were six times those of the federal government (Markham 1962, p. 592). 
Before World War II government R&D expenses were concentrated in ag-
riculture and defense in that order (Mansfield 1968, p. 118). 
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However by 1972 the federal government accounted for over half 
the national expenditures for R&D (Science Indicators 1972 1973, p. 22: 
while the total national outlay for R&D had grown from $166 million 
in 1930 (Markham 1962, p. 592) to about $30 billion in 1972 (Science  
Indicators 1972, 1973, p. 22). By 1960 most of the federal R&D money 
went to DOD, NASA, and AEC (Mansfield 1968, p. 48), a byproduct of 
concern for defense and the cold war. In 1966 these agencies took up 
over 80% of the federal R&D budget, although a report in the February 
15, 1974 issue of Science indicates that this has since declined to 
just under 75% in the budget estimate for fiscal year 1975. Since 
most of the enormous increases in this budget have been in defense 
and defense-related areas, the justification for these expenditures 
has been that of national security. 
In 1967 the proportion of research and development funded by the 
federal government varied from 80% in the aircraft industry and 61% 
in electrical equipment and communications to 0% in some industries 
(Mansfield 1968, pp. 52-54). Mansfield noted that the industries re-
ceiving the greatest proportion of federal support for their R&D ef- 
forts are among those having the highest ratio of R&D expenses to sales  
Over the decade from 1963-1972 there was an increase in federal 
R&D support for civilian technologies in the areas of health, trans-
portation, energy and environmental protection (Science Indicators 
 1972 1973, p. 25). Since the justification for government R&D fu ds 
in the civilian sector cannot normally be national security, a new 
justification is called upon; the "general welfare," mentioned in the 
preamble to the constitution, seems to be emerging. Because health, 
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transportation, energy, and environment involve us all, many R&D pro-
jects in these areas which carry too high a risk for private venture 
capital are justified in the name of the "general welfare." 
With the federal government contributing over half of the nation's 
total R&D funds, it is a very important factor in determining those 
areas of technology where innovative activity will take place (Markham 
1962). Similarly, the government directs the training of scientists 
and technologists to areas of its interest; the research training of 
graduate students is determined, in part, by where the money is. Thus 
the direction of federal research support is a determinant of areas 
of training for participants in the innovation process and determines 
in a broad sense those areas in which scientific and technical know-
ledge will be developed as well as the level of activity undertaken. 
Governmental institutions are involved in the diffusion of inno-
vations as well as their development. A primary example is the agri-
cultural extension service through which information about innovations 
is brought to farmers. This program provides a two-way channel be-
tween the agricultural researcher and the farmer (Baker et al. 1963; 
Knoblauch et al. 1962). This kind of effective feedback mechanism 
does not exist in NASA's Technology Utilization Program in which tech-
nologies developed in the course of NASA's missions spill over into 
other sectors of the economy (Doctors 1969). Despite user needs, NASA's 
innovative activity is perforce constrained by its missions directed 
at space exploration and aeronautics. 
Although education is not usually thought of as an institutional 
medium for diffusing innovations, information about technological in- 
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novations is spread in the classroom. To the extent that this im-
presses student scientists and engineers with the desirability of in-
novation, it has the long-range effect of developing an innovative 
frame of mind. Of course education also imparts to the student know-
ledge and techniques subsequently useful in innovation -- and, where 
the emphasis is on scientific research and engineering design, it 
might be said to "teach" innovation. 
Thus we see that the federal government has financially supported 
innovative activity by others, and has actually undertaken such ac-
tivity itself. While its greatest direct participation will likely 
continue to be in defense and space related areas, "general welfare" 
areas such as health, transportation, and energy will probably increas4 
their share of federal R&D expenditures. We shall deal with its se-
cond role, regulating and controlling innovation, in the next section. 
C. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS - REGULATORY AND CONTROL 
In addition to governmental institutions directly involved in the 
process of innovation there are others which regulate, control, and 
guide the process by both direct and indirect means. These institu-
tions are primarily of two sorts. Institutions such as the patent 
system and tax structure directly control aspects of innovation; re-
gulatory bodies such as the FCC and the ICC and institutions involved 
in anti-trust policy influence innovation indirectly by their control 
of firm and industry structure, rates, and accounting practices. Al-
though the primary concern of the latter is not innovation, such con-
trols act to modify the economic institutions involved in innovation. 
Other government policies not explicitly related to innovation, such 
as environmental protection, also influence innovation. 
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The existence of such institutions derives from social and poli-
tical values which, while preferring the free enterprise system as 
a vehicle for economic development, insist that it be regulated for 
the general welfare. 
1. The Patent System 
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives 
Congress the power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts 
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries." In this view 
the invention is the property of the inventor, and the protection of 
his property provides an economic stimulus to innovation. 5 
The first Federal Patent Act became law in 1790. All patents 
granted before 1836 were awarded on application without examination 
into the merits or novelty of the inventions. By 1836 the patent sys-
tem was reformed, and patent examiners were appointed to compare the 
applications with the prior art to determine novelty and usefulness. 
Over the years the United States Patent Office has issued over 3- 11 
million patents and continues to issue them at the rate of about 
1,250 a week. 
A patent can be obtained from the United States Patent Office by 
filing an application, disclosing the invention, paying the requisite 
fees, and then waiting an average of 2 years for it to go through the 
process of examination and approval. To receive a patent the inven- 
tion must represent something more than a trivial improvement. The 
search for novelty by the patent examiners must be made through all 
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existing patents. In order to expedite the search, the patents are 
filed by subject in some 85,000 subclasses. When awarded, the patent 
grants to the inventor a 17 year monopoly on his invention which he 
must be prepared to defend in court at his own expense against in-
fringments. 
Since 1836 there have been minor improvements but few major 
changes in the patent system. 6 Yet during this period the social and 
economic conditions in the United States altered tremendously, and so 
did the process of innovation. The agent of invention changed, in the 
majority of cases, from an independent inventor to an employee of a 
corporate R&D department. Beginning late in the 19th century the 
United States embarked on a course of limiting monopoly through anti-
trust legislation, eventually forcing, in some cases, licensing ar-
rangements which weakened the monopoly position of the patentee. In 
the mid 20th century the federal government became the country's lar-
gest spender on R&D - both at government facilities and by contracts 
and grants to the private sector. Because of such changes it is not 
surprising that problems have arisen in the operation of the patent 
system. These include not only the factors mentioned above, but also 
such elements in the operation of the patent office as the long period 
between the patent application and its disposition, and the fact that 
every invention regardless of field or magnitude is treated the same. 
In its beginnings, the patent system was designed for the indivi-
dual inventor. It protects his property while he seeks ways of deve-; 
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loping it. The firm, on the other hand, does not need patent protec-
tion as much, and in some cases may find it a liability. For example, 
a company which develops an invention often has the technical capa-
bility to bring it to commercial application before any competitor 
can. Provided the innovation is properly marketed, this head-start 
may more than compensate for the lack of patent protection. The rea-
son for this is that if the firm discloses its invention in a patent 
application, it allows its competitors an information base on which 
to "invent around" its patent by developing a patentable invention 
which performs a function similar to the original invention. "Invent-
ing around" is common practice, for example, in the ethical drug in-
dustry. 
Government financed research also presents problems. What should 
be done with an invention produced in a government research laboratory 
by a civil servant? Policy varies from agency to agency. NASA makes 
a cash award to the inventor with the amount depending on the "import-
ance" of the invention, and licenses the invention for private use. 
NASA's view is that "NASA-owned inventions will best serve the inter-
ests of the United States when they are brought to practical applica- 
tion in the shortest time possible....It is the policy of NASA to grant 
exclusive licenses when such licenses will provide the necessary in-
centive to the licensee to achieve early practical application of the 
invention." 7 The licensee is also required to make a substantial capi-
tal investment (specified in detail) and to use his best efforts in 
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achieving early practical application of the invention. Inventions 
made on government contracts require the same sort of policy deci-
sion by the contracting agency, with different agencies pursuing dif-
ferent policies. 
Because of the great change in organizational, economic and so-
cial contexts of the institutions affected by the patent system,•vari-
ous proposals have been advanced for changing it to accord more closell 
with these transformations in its context. 
Polanyi (1944) observed that using knowledge benefits the user, 
but the patent system operates to restrict the use of knowledge and 
hence decreases the social benefit arising from innovation. His solu-
tion was to have all inventors make public disclosures of their in-
ventions which could be freely used as long as the user submits to the 
patent regulatory body the information necessary to determine the so-
cial value of the invention. The inventor is then given a monetary 
reward from public money based on the social value of his invention. 
Of course, the difficulty with this proposal is the problem of arriv-
ing at an effective way of measuring the social value of an invention. 
Markham (1962) considered that a crucial difficulty with the 
patent system was that it treated all inventions, whether major break-
throughs or incremental improvements, equally. His solution was to 
divide inventions into two categories. The first, consisting of a 
major technological breakthrough, such as catalytic cracking, the tran-
sistor, and float glass, would receive monopoly protection for a long 
period of time; the second category, consisting of incremental improve-
ments, would receive protection for a relatively short time span. The 
problem in applying this suggestion is drawing the line between the tw( 
categories. 
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Hamberg (1966, Ch. 2) saw two problems with the patent system 
from the firm's point of view: 1) industry typically performs R&D 
not under the stimulus of the patent system but under the stimulus 
of competition, and 2) government-sponsored R&D results in patents 
granted for "no risk" activity. He offered four alternatives to the 
present patent system: 1) abolish the patent system; 2) substitute 
a system of awards, but allow free use of the technologies; 3) issue 
patents which have terms of protection varying according to the risk 
of the R&D activity involved; and 4) issue no patents for government-
sponsored R&D. 
These suggested solutions seem to have little likelihood of 
adoption. Proposed changes in the patent law have in the past been 
aimed largely at the mechanics of the patenting process rather than 
at bringing about fundamental changes in its philosophy. 
2. Anti-Trust Policy 
The first substantive federal anti-trust legislation was the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890. Since then United States anti-trust 
policy has become a complex of statutory law, court decisions, and in-
ternal policies by several divisons of the federal government. The 
goals of this policy are many and varied, and in practice sometimes 
conflicting. Among them are the following: 1) a preference for dif-
fusion of economic power; 2) the prohibition of certain types of busi-
ness activities either by statute, federal agencies (e.g., the Federal 
Trade Commission), or by case law; 3) a continuing belief in the effi-
cacy of free competition in serving the common good; 4) a similar be-
lief concerning the efficacy of competition as a means of securing 
technological progress; and 5) a belief that ease of entry into indus- 
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tries must be maintained and that barriers which restrict entry must 
be torn down. 
In the attainment of any one of these goals, conflict may arise 
with another. For example, maximum diffusion of economic power might 
lead to a less progressive economy because the small economic units 
may not possess adequate resources to innovate. The two goals bearing 
most closely on the relationship between anti-trust policy and the 
innovation process are those of progressiveness and ease of entry (see 
above). 
Anti-trust policy influences some of the important properties of 
market institutions, strongly affecting firm size and market struc-
ture by limiting the position of any single firm in an entire industry 
and by insuring competition. For example, anti-trust action destroyed 
Alcoa's monopoly of the primary aluminum industry in the United States 
which resulted in an oligopoly more conducive to innovation than the 
Alcoa monopoly (Peck 1962). 
Realizing the potential conflict between the policies of main-
taining competition and insuring rapid innovation, the Charpie Report 
(1967, p. 52) recommended that in the interpretation and administra-
tion of the Anti-Trust Laws the effect on innovation as well as com-
petition be taken into account and that there should be clearer anti-
trust guidelines for activities affecting innovation. However, to 
date there exists no adequate data base on the interaction of innovatio 
and competition. 
Anti-trust policy and the patent system interact. Patent policy 
encourages the granting of monopolies to inventions while anti-trust 
policy is designed to break up industrial monopolies which may or may 
not be based on patent protection. Thus these two policies can con- 
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flict. Beginning in the 1930s courts have tended rather strongly 
to resolve this conflict in favor of the anti-monopoly policy. For 
example, Oppenheim (1957) found that between 1941 and 1957 over 100 
judgments involving more than 300 anti-trust defendants, provided for 
compulsory licensing or the outright assignment of up to 35,000 pa-
tents. The judgments indicated that the compulsory, licensing of 
patents was regarded as a means of reducing the monopoly power of a 
firm. If the firm chose not to patent, relying on superior techni-
cal and marketing capabilities to profit from its innovations, then 
the option of compulsory licensing would not be available. Indeed 
Scherer et al (1958, pp. 124-34) found that those firms subjected to 
licensing decrees were the leaders in curtailing patenting. Like-
wide, Schmookler (1966, p. 32-33) found that large firms concerned 
with possible antitrust proceedings by the U.S. Department of Justice 
have curtailed their patenting practices. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that they discourage innovation, only that they were 
reluctant to seek patent protection which might eventually result in 
their having to share their innovations with competitors through li-
censing arrangements. 
From the evidence in the literature it is obvious that the patent 
system and anti-trust policy are strongly coupled. Investigations 
dealing with either of these sets of institutions should deal explicitly 
with the other when areas of overlap are treated. 
3. Tax Policy  
Tax policy affects innovation in two ways. First, taxation pro-
vides the funds used by the federal government in direct support of 
research and development. Second, tax policy may stimulate or impede 
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the availability of private funds for the innovation process. At 
present, industrial research and development can be treated as a busi-
ness expense. If the firm is profitable, the government effectively 
pays half the cost simply by not taxing that portion of the profits 
plowed back into R&D. If the firm is not profitable, there is a five-
year loss carry forward provision. 
The Charpie Report (1967, pp. 30-41) dealt with the problems of 
increasing innovativeness by appropriate tax policy. Unfortunately, 
this report is biased in considering the inventor-entrepeneur and the 
small firm as being the prime agents of innovation in our society. 
While these play a significant role, they are no longer the main fac-
tors in technological innovation nor is their role increasing. How-
ever, while the panel's recommendations are suspect, they did indicate 
some very important considerations involving tax policy. From these 
considerations we have developed a brief list of questions suggesting 
areas in tax policy affecting innovation which should be studied. 
a. Should companies of different size, in different 
industries, and with different commitments to in-
novation receive the same or different tax treat-
ment in areas of operating affecting innovation? 
b. How large should be the tax credit on R&D expendi-
tures? 
C. How long should be the carry forward period for 
losses incurred in R&D? 
d. What should be the tax treatment for exploratory 
expense for innovations not related to present 
business? 
e. Should innovative activities with different levels 
of technological and business risks be treated dif-
ferently? 
It may be possible to determine satisfactory range of tax treatment 
for promoting innovation. Special attention should be given to the 
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effects of differential treatment of various undertakings involving 
innovation, as indicated in questions a and e. 
4. Regulation and Regulatory Agencies  
Over the years, Congress has established various bodies to regu-
late certain areas of the economy. The first of these, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC), was established in 1887 to regulate the 
railroads. Later its authority was extended to interstate trucking. 
The commission form has been extended to the regulation of transpor-
tation, communication, and energy. 
While the roles and duties of the regulatory bodies vary, they 
share common practices: 
a. A firm must be licensed by the regulatory agency con-
trolling the activity in which it wishes to engage. 
b. The prices charged, profit received, and investments 
made by regulated firms are subject to approval by the 
appropriate regulatory commission. 
c. The firms regulated by the federal government in their 
interstate business are also subject to state and local 
regulation for intrastate activities. 
Two interesting questions can be raised about the effect of regu-
lation on innovation. First, how has regulation of various forms af-
fected innovation in various industries? Any answer to this question 
is complex, for the type of regulation varies considerably from indus-
try to industry. Second, what kinds of regulations, if any, are most 
effective in fostering technological innovation? The answers to both 
questions are muddied further because regulation is only one of many 
factors affecting technological innovation. 
Regulation is at times a means of inducing innovation. For ex-
ample the enforcement of pollution control regulations by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency has the effect of inducing innovations in pol- 
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lution control technologies such as the production of "cleaner" in-
ternal combustion engines. Also the Atomic Energy Commission has 
developed devices and processes to insure the operating safety of nu-
clear reactors. 
A number of effects of regulation on innovation have been noted 
which seem to affect various regulated industries. The Averch-Johnson 
Effect (Averch and Johnson 1962) is the propensity of regulated firms 
to develop capital-intensive innovations when regulation is based on 
return on investment. The firms are allowed a profit equal to total 
depreciated investment multiplied by allowed rate of return. By in-
creasing total investment, total profits also may be allowed to rise. 
For example, in 1968 AT & T built an underwater cable to Southern 
Europe rather than use satellite relays at lower cost because the 
former, but not the latter, would contribute to its rate base (Kahn 
1971, pp. 76-77). 
Regulatory lag results from the tendency of a regulatory commis-
sion to respond slowly to changes in the operating situation of a reg-
ulated firm. Any cost-cutting innovation can produce added profits 
until the regulatory body acts to adjust the rate structure. Regula-
tory lag thus acts as an incentive to cost-cutting innovations (Capron 
1971, pp. 6-7). However, it can also have the opposite effect for 
regulatory commissions are usually slow to allow additional firms to 
compete unless need for additional service can be shown. Thus es-
tablished firms are sometimes protected from cost-cutting innovators, 
thereby effectively screening technological change from that industry; 
for instance, until 1968 (see below) telephone-line attachments not 
owned by the phone company were forbidden by the regulatory agency. 
However, once change enters a regulated industry, it diffuses very 
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rapidly so that the firms may keep up with the profit and service 
potentials offered by the innovation (Capron 1971, pp. 9-10). 
Differently regulated industries behave differently. For example, 
innovation in common carrier telecommunications has been uneven. The 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT & T) has maintained a 
virtual monopoly by having the Federal Communications Commission acqui-
esce to the "integrity" of its system. For example, until 1968, "for-
eign," i.e., not AT & T owned,attachruents were prohibited from the tele-
phone network. Competition in microwave service was beaten off until 
recently by AT & T's offering the service at non-renumerative rates 
which were offset by the profits from its other operations, (Capron 
1971, p. 206; Shepherd 1971). However, AT & T's research arm, Bell 
Labs, is efficient and has produced many significant innovations, the 
transistor being the outstanding example. Thus while retaining its 
monopoly and stifling competition, AT & T has innovated. The question --
unanswerable -- is whether there would have been more and "better" 
innovation in telecommunications if there had been freer competition. 
It is generally thought that the ICC has had an inhibiting effect 
on innovations in those industries which it regulates. Gellman (1971) 
found that the ICC especially inhibited railroad innovation. Indeed, 
it provided a disincentive to innovate by denying carriers lower rates, 
even though justified by cost-cutting innovations, because of possible 
ill effects on other carriers. In addition, the ICC's rate structure 
does *not encourage innovation because it is not cost based. Instead 
it follows the "value of service" principle whereby high rates are 
charged for carrying commodities of high value on the ground that such 
rates will not discourage their shipment. Thus cost-cutting innova-
tions do not lead to lower rates. 
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nany students of regulation (Capron 1971, p. 221) feel that the 
innovative activities of regulated industries fall below what could 
be reasonably expected. Indeed a recent cross-national literature 
survey on economic regulation and technological innovation came to 
the same conclusion (Gellman Research Associates 1974). Regulation 
is usually "technology specific," which means that the regulatory 
commission may have vested interests in a particular technology and 
thus erect barriers to innovations affecting that technology. Yet 
no evidence exists on how a firm or industry could be more innovative 
if unhampered by regulation, for there are no cases of no regulation 
or alternative forms of regulation to compare with existing practice 
in the case of any industry. In this regard it might be fruitful to 
consider social experiments in regulation by removing or altering re-
gulation from some firms in a regulated industry and using the others 
as a control group. However, both monopoly (as AT & T) and cross sy-
stem compatibility (as in the railroad industry) may stand in the way 
of such an approach. 
The conference on Technological Change in Regulated Industries 
held as the Brookings Institution in 1969 offered some useful sugges-
tions for research in this area. We have adapted some of the more 
important in order to apply these to the effect of regulation on inno-
vation (See Capron 1971, pp. 222ff.). 
a. Are regulators more effective in fostering innovation 
by regulating profits, prices, or qualitative perfor-
mances? 
b. How is regulation affected by the organization and tech-
nological characteristics of the industry being regulated? 
c. Does the behavior of a regulatory commission toward inno-
vations differ according to its size and composition? 
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d. Does the actual innovative performance of the industry 
affect the goals and policies of the regulatory agency? 
If so, do the interactions between industry and agency 
also vary systematically with the structure of the re-
gulatory system? 
What emerges from our consideration of the effect of political 
institutions on innovation is the truism that many institutions af-
fect innovation. The effects are overlapping and varied, and often, 
as in the case of patent and anti-trust institutions, in conflict. 
As a first step in understanding the effect of political institutions 
on innovation, we feel it appropriate that a "map" of institutions 
and public policies affecting innovation be made. This map would in-
dicate the effect of each institution and policy on innovation and 
the overlaps and conflicts among them. Such information would help 
locate specific areas where information is lacking and which need 
further study. Based on the literature we have surveyed, regulation 
would appear to be one of these. The "map" would also be useful in 
coordinating and putting into perspective individual studies dealing 
with particular policies and institutions as they impact innovation. 
V. OUTSIDE THE "BLACK BOX"  
In this chapter we have highlighted the exogenous factors which 
affect innovation. Dividing these factors into values, endowments, 
and institutions, we discovered, of course, that these elements in-
teracted with one another as well as with the innovation process. 
Their interactions with innovation were both indirect and direct, gen-
eral and specific, long-range and immediate, as well as changing over 
time. In other words, these are dynamic interactions, typical of any 
ecological system. 
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Mostly, values make themselves felt indirectly -- through in-
stitutionalized mechanisms, such as the marketplace or government 
policies. These institutions too can provide both generalized and 
specific "signals." The government, for example, can provide in-
direct incentives to innovation through tax or anti-trust policy, and 
direct incentives through the funding of research and development 
programs designed to produce innovations meeting specific needs. 
Changing supplies of endowments such as knowledge, material resources, 
energy capital, and talented labor modulate the signals which values 
give institutions as well as providing direct signals to political and 
economic institutions as in the recent oil shortage. 
If some rough generalizations are called for, we might say that 
by and large the exogenous factors affect, in a general sense, what  
will be innovated and where (that is, in what institutional context 
it will become an innovation). However, the exogenous factors have 
much less to say about how something will he invented, innovated, and 
diffused. The "how" question is chiefly dependent upon the indigenous 
(or endogenous) world of innovation -- that is, the actual locale and 
operation of the innovation process itself. 
From the perspective of this chapter, the world of innovation 
might be considered a "black box." Our consideration of the exogenous 
system in this chapter represents a view of the world outside the black 
box, especially the external wires which lead into the black box and 
those leading from it. 
However, we have not yet looked to see what is inside the black' 
box itself. How is the actual process of innovation carried on, and 
how does the outside world look from within the black box? That is 
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the task of the next chapter, where we investigate the indigenous 
elements of the innovation process, or the internal environment of 
innovation, just as we have studied the external environment of inno-
vation in this chapter. 
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Footnotes 
1. Technology assessments are being funded by a number of federal 
agencies. During fiscal year 1974, the National Science Founda-
tion spent over $2 million on assessments mainly in the energy 
and health areas. The Department of Transportation is spending 
$10 million studying "climatic implication of atmospheric pollu-
tion." Finally the Office of Technology Assessment has $1.4 mil-
lion for assessments in fiscal year 1974 and is asking about $5 
million for fiscal year 1975. OTA's interest is in the areas of 
food, energy, the oceans, health, transportation, and materials. 
2. Baker et al. 1967; Carter and Williams 1957; Goldhar 1970; Sherwin 
and Isenson 1967; Langrish 1971; Myers and Marquis 1969; Tannenbaum 
et al. 1966; Utterback 1969. 
3. Scherer 1965, pp. 1195-1196; Freeman 1965, p. 67; Chapter 8 below. 
4. Electrical Equipment and communication; basic chemicals and 
drugs; petroleum, stone-clay-glass, fabricated metal products, 
machinery, and transportation equipment; and food, tabacco, tex-
tiles, apparel, paper, and primary metals. 
5. For a thorough treatment of the patent system see Vaughan 1956. 
6. Recently introduced legislation, however, will make significant 
alterations in the patent system if it becomes law (Patent Law 
Revision 1973). 
7. Taken from "An Exclusive License Agreement Between NASA and Con-
sultants Unlimited for Vision Examination Apparatus, U.S. Patent 
No. 3,737,217," June 5, 1973. 
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Chapter 3  
The Process of Innovation: The  
Organizational and Individual Contexts  
I. Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed the environment exogenous to 
the innovation process in terms of three pervasive elements: val-
ues, institutions and endowments. Discussion of these exogenous 
influences anticipated the basic unit of analysis of this chapter, 
which in the private sector is the firm, and in the public, vari-
ous governmental laboratories. Within these organizational contexts 
are three other levels of aggregation or analysis -- the R&D labora- 
tory, various work and social groups, and the individual researcher --
which scholars have identified as especially important in understanding 
the innovation process. Social, political, economic, and informational 
signals from the external environment are picked up by one or more 
of these levels; interpreted in light of the needs, goals, and capa-
bilities of the organization; and answered by efforts to achieve new 
technological syntheses. 
In the second chapter, the environmental signals were emphasized. 
The patterns of response to these signals that characterize organized 
innovation efforts are the focus of the present chapter. In particular, 
we will here be concerned with the organizational, social-psychological, 
and informational variables that facilitate or inhibit the process 
within the firm. 
Several points should be noted in connection with the empha-
sis we will be placing on organized innovation activities. First, 
technological innovation has come to be thought of in terms of the 
R & D laboratory. and with good reason. Yet this should not be 
taken to mean that all innovations come about as a result of 
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the planned efforts of research personnel. As we shall see, ideas 
leading to new innovations also arise from organizational units 
other than the R & D lab. Likewise, we should not lose sight of 
the individual inventor/entrepreneur whose present role, while 
perhaps not as "heroic" in the public mind as that of Edison or 
Sperry, is riot without its significance. We shall try to capture 
the flavor of these "independents" both historically and in their 
modern form, i.e., the "spinoff firm" phenomenon. 
Our primary concern, however, will be with the innovation 
process in its institutionalized form, for that is clearly the 
dominant shape of technological advance in the present age. 
A. The Development of Institutio.alized Innovation  
In Wealth from Knowledge, Langrish, et al. (p. 14) have noted 
that "while it does undeniably still make sense in the twentieth 
century to talk about the 'independent inventor,'...'independent 
innovator' is almost a contradiction in terms." The point here 
is that bringing an invention to the point of use requires organ-
izational resources. As Langrish and his colleagues state: 
For technological innovation to occur, there must 
be some interaction between a set of ideas and an 
institution; the ideas must be interpreted in 
terms of a need of the institution and put into 
effect by it. Innovation is almost by definition 
a corporate and collaborative effort, and it is 
correspondingly difficult to disentangle the roles 
played by particular individuals. (Langrish 1972, 
p. 14) 
Related to this point is a second and more basic one, which gets 
to the heart of the matter of the institutionalization of the in-
novation process. To innovate is to introduce something new. But 
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before novelty can be introduced it must be created. It is tempt-
ing, therefore, to view creative activities which produce novelty 
as preceding, and distinct from, subsequent activities which bring 
such novelty to the point of use. 
Such a compartmentalized and linear picture, however, is of-
ten a misleading simplification. Problems are defined and ideas 
generated throughout the process as well as at the "front end." 
In fact, if the ecological perspective is taken seriously, as in- 
deed we think it should be, it is difficult to point to the begin-
ning of an innovation. Thus, to speak of the institutionalization 
of the innovation process is to speak of the institutionalization 
of creativity as well. That this is possible is itself a bold 
and novel assumption, at least in the extent to which it is cur-
rently accepted and its actualization sought. As one writer has 
remarked: 
The historians of the future may well select the 
development of deliberate creativeness as the most 
important development of this century. We have 
passed through the age of random creativeness and 
are entering an age of deliberate creativeness 
(Rossman 1964, p. 
That the creation and introduction of novelty is now recog-
nized and accepted as a part of the mission of so many organiza-
tions reflects the extent to which this assumption of deliberate 
creativeness has taken root. It is reflected also in most of the 
scholarly literature dealing with the innovation process. It is, 
however, an assumption at this point, and the state of the art 
knowledge is presently insufficient for full realization of its 
potential implications. 
The process of technological innovation, like all other human 
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endeavors, does not take place in a vacuum, but is always embed-
ded in an environment with particular and describable character-
istics. Once this fact is recognized, there follows the question; 
"Might not some environments be more conducive to innovative activ-
ities than others?" The answer is "yes," though the reasons may 
escape our grasp more often than not. Nevertheless, once the ques- 
tion is posed, there can begin a process of specification, with both 
speculative-theoretical and empirical-pragmatic elements. If some 
environments are more conducive to innovation than others, what are 
the relevant variables? What are their relative degrees of in-
fluence, and how in concert do they facilitate or inhibit innovative 
tendencies? How may these influences be altered, and what are the 
results of such changes? 
Implicit in the above questions is the assumption that a 
complex environment can be deliberately altered with the predict-
able result of becoming more conducive to the emergence of novelty 
that can in turn lead to new innovations. That such environments 
may arise by chance is an historically safe assumption with a 
fatalistic addendum that is equally safe. That a more fecund 
environment can be produced by trial and error is the half-way sta-
tion where we now reside, but it is not what the literature, cur-
rent practice, or this assessment assumes as the ultimate state. 
The assumption is that the deliberate creation and introduction of 
novelty is possible. 
The date of birth of this assumption is not agreed on. In 
the Rossman quotation above, the 20th century is suggested. Alfred 
North Whitehead (1925, p. 91) placed it earlier when he said, "The 
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greatest invention of the nineteenth century was the method of 
invention." Langrish et al would place it, at least in its 
speculative form, much earlier -- in Francis Bacon's vision of 
Salomon's House in his New Atlantis. 
Here was a national research institute in proto-
type, lavishly equipped by Bacon's imagination 
with all the equipment and facilities he could 
think of that might conceivably be of use. Among 
the thirty-six fellows of the foundation, there 
was well-defined division of labor and alloca- 
tion of tasks. The program was clearly intended 
to be a corporate one. All the principal in-
ventors were, it is true to be commemorated by 
statues - 'some of iron, some of silver, some of 
gold'; but Bacon does seem to have placed his 
trust more in his system than in exceptional in-
dividuals. 	(Langrish, et al 1972, p. 12). 
Bacon thus dreamed of a movement beyond the fortuitous and seem-
ingly random acts of individual creative genius, and beyond the 
happenstance development of such novelty to the point of introduc-
tion and use. 
But the large-scale effort to actualize Bacon's vision of 
deliberate creativeness and deliberate introduction had to await 
the development of the R & D laboratory. Even now, with some years 
of experience behind us, it is clearly a transition still in pro-
gress. And even our view of the progress achieved may be dis-
torted by the nature of case studies, which continue to be the 
dominant scholarly approach. "The retrospective nature...(of these) 
sources probably means that the process has been viewed as much 
more rational and well-ordered than it is in fact" (Utterback 1974, 
p. 625). The important point is that the transition from random to 
deliberate creativity is far from complete, and even farther from be-
ing completely understood. Nevertheless the assumption is present in 
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the literature and, more importantly in the institutionalization 
of the process of innovation. The question then is one of coming 
to understand the nature of the immediate environmental influences 
well enough to know how to alter them with predictable results. 
Control of the innovation process is sought, and Bacon's vision of 
its institutionalization is taken as the means. 
B. Increase in Importance of Institutionalized Innovation  
A measure of the magnitude of the need to understand the 
institutionalized innovation process well enough to alter it with 
predictable results, is provided by the extraordinary growth in 
R & D expenditures. Data exist which indicate that total U. S. 
R & D expenditures increased at an average annual rate of 10% in 
the 1953-1970 time period (Mansfield, et al 1971). Rubenstein 
(1957, p. 95) summarized the growth in R & D activity along a 
different dimension. He noted that the 1956 edition of the Indus-
trial Research Laboratories of the United States lists 4834 R & D 
laboratories operated by 4086 companies. "A sizable proportion of 
these companies were not operating research programs 10 years ago, 
and a majority of them were not doing so 15 years ago. As for the 
programs that did exist then most have grown so fast that today 
they can hardly be recognized." In Hamberg's (1955) words 
there has been a "research explosion" and, "R & D is being conducted 
on an unparalled scale offering the potential for unprecedented ad-
vances in productivity increases." The extent to which such increase 
will in fact be realized depends, in large measure, on how rapidly 
there can be a corresponding increase in understanding the infor-
mational, organizational, and social-psychological constraints on 
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the process. The magnitude of our present commitment to institu,- 
tionalized innovation increases the need for a level of under-
standing that will permit environmental alterations with predic-
table results. 
However, the above assumption -- that deliberate alteration 
of the environment of innovation with predictable results is pos-
sible -- cannot be examined conclusively because the dominant mode 
of current research permits no such conclusion. The case study 
method (which dominates the current research scene), whether retros-
pective or "real time," can only take us so far, and the same is true 
for speculation de-coupled from a tough-minded empiricism. We can- 
not understand the innovation process sufficiently to alter its environ-
mental determinants and modifiers until myopic piecemeal empiricism 
and disjointed speculation are coupled with and guided by a greater 
concern with systematic theory. 
C. The Linkages Between the Exogenous and Indigenous Environments  
As we move from the level of the total societal system, through 
the levels of the innovation-related systems and industrial sectors, 
and finally to the aggregations of the individual firm and the 
particular innovation efforts within it, we discover that we know 
more and more about less and less. Even though our knowledge of 
innovation within the firm is far from complete, we know it like 
the proverbial "back of our hand" relative to what we know about the 
exogenous influences of the higher levels of aggregation. The 
consequences of this state of affairs appear when we come to ask 
about the linkages between the firm and the broader contexts in 
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which it is located. Our knowledge here is "by-guess-and-by-golly" 
speculation, with the exception of the developing literature about 
what are termed "technological gatekeepers." 
In an attempt to clarify these linkages, Richard Rosenbloom 
presents a very persuasive argument for a closer look at corpo-
rate strategy as the integrative framework needed to understand 
the coupling of the firm and its environment. 
The strategy framework is particularly appealing 
because it integrates the two relevant dimensions. 
First, the concept of strategy formulation calls 
for a perspective that cuts across the boundary 
of the organization, matching capability (an as-
pect of the organizational context) with opportu-
nity (an aspect of the environmental context).... 
the strategy framework demands explicit attention 
to technical, economic, social political, and be- 
havioral consideration simultaneously, as it em-
braces factors within the firm and external to it 
(ch. 9, below, p. 180). 
Those scholars who have been most concerned with corporate strat-
egy, however, have typically paid little attention to technological 
innovation. 
Our assessment of Rosenbloom's suggestion is that it indeed 
merits high priority investigation. One consideration is provided 
by our earlier observation about the present nature of innovation 
research, which is echoed by Rosenbloom in a summary comment on 
what he calls the "particular innovation" level of aggregation. 
In summary, research at this level of aggregation, 
in which the primary unit of analysis is a parti-
cular innovation, has contributed a useful body of 
descriptive findings, but only limited explanatory 
findings. In my opinion, extensions of this tra- 
dition of research, whether by enlarged scope or 
more powerful technique, are unlikely to alter that 
conclusion. For more adequate explanation, we shall 
have to move the focus of inquiry to higher levels 
of aggregation, where we can build on available 
theoretical frameworks pertinent to the behavior of 
firms and industries (Ch. 9, see below, p. 155). 
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The move suggested here, from the descriptive-comparative 
research mode to one yielding greater explanatory power by virtue 
of its inclusions of higher levels of aggregation, might be ef-
fected by the integrating concept of corporate strategy. 
Another consideration can be briefly summarized as follows. 
The firm for whom the generation of technological innovations has 
substantial survival value must continue to innovate. To do so 
it must continuously monitor both the external and its own inter-
nal environment. The only organizational unit within the firm 
that has complete access to, and in fact responsibility for, mon-
itoring internal information is top management. But such infor-
mation is meaningful only in terms of a frame of reference. And 
in the final analysis the frame of reference that counts for the 
future is the environment exogneous to the firm. Internal cir-
cumstances, orientation, and capability limit policy options, but 
not to the point of their unique determination. Choices within 
that range are weighted by a reading of the circumstance and 
opportunity characterizing the exogenous environment. This is 
the task of top corporate management since no one else within the 
structure has sufficient command of the internal whole to dis-
tinguish singals from noise. 
We would hypothesize, therefore, that however environmental 
signals initially enter the organization, the functional linkage 
between the two is effected at the policy making level. This 
hypothesis is of course a priori at this point, and the empirical 
work, even if confirming, will surely reveal patterns of consid-
erable complexity. 
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D. Different Contexts of Organized R & D  
In our a priori attempt to structure our survey of the liter-
ature regarding organized R & D, we sought to find differences be-
tween the industrial and agricultural sectors, between the private 
and governmental sectors, and, in the case of organized R & D 
carried on under government auspices, differences between in-house 
laboratories and contract establishments. We found, however, no 
literature dealing directly with any such differences. Even in 
those studies which might have been expected to deal tangentially 
with this topic, the assumption has been that the R & D is more 
dependent upon the internal characteristics of the research or-
ganization itself than upon the auspices under which it is con-
ducted.' If that is so, the organizational pattern of the R & D 
effort would be largely independent of whether or not the R & D is 
industrial or agricultural, governmental or private, military or 
civilian, done in-house or outside. 
However we find it difficult to accept the notion -- es-
pecially in the case of agriculture 2 -- that innovation could be 
so independent of its auspices when it is so context-dependent on 
other variables. It would seem worthwhile to check out this as-
sumption, to see if the innovative effort is truly independent 
of external context and depends primarily on the nature of the 
R & D organization itself. To this end, a series of comparative 
studies focused on this question might reveal the extent to which 
differing auspices affect the nature, direction, and rate of in-
novative activity. Such studies might provide vital information in 
stimulating and guiding innovation in the future.3 
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II. The Individual Inventor/Entrepreneur  
A. Importance and Types 
The process of technological innovation in this century has 
been characterized by an increasingly strong trend towards the 
"institutionalization" of all its phases, including that cluster 
of activities that often bear the generic label "invention." The 
emergence and rapid growth of the corporate R & D laboratory, 
especially in the years after World War II, is the major mani-
festation of this trend, which we earlier referred to as a move 
from "random" to "deliberate" creativity. This phenomenon should 
not, however, cause us to lose sight of the role of the individual 
inventor. 
Despite the growth of institutionalized innovation in R & D 
laboratories, some solo work is still being done. While many in-
vestigators discount the role of the "lone-wolf" inventor in con-
temporary innovations, from time to time claims are made that the 
individual inventor still maintains a major role in the innovation 
process. In the 1960s this view gained support from the Jewkes, 
Sawers, and Stillerman study of fifty important 20th-century inven-
tions, showing that over half stemmed from independent inventors 
or small companies. 
From there the argument moved to a quantitative basis with 
the counting of patents -- or a pseudo-quantitative basis which 
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allowed for differing interpretations. 4 The proponents of the 
individual inventor argued against those who claimed that group 
inventive effort produces new innovations by pointing to the fact 
that the total annual issue of U.S. patents in the 1960s was no 
greater than 30 or 50 years previously, and that in terms of pa-
tents per unit of population, the number was less in 1960 than in 
1870, despite the ten to twenty percent annual rise in R&D expen-
ditures in the half century from 1910 to 1960. They also pointed 
out that the number of patents had not grown in proportion to the 
increased number of scientists; in other words, the research force 
was growing far faster than the number of patents produced by that 
force. 
Their opponents -- the believers in the efficacy of R&D lab-
oratories in producing innovation -- first discounted the number 
of patents as a true index of the nature, amount, and quality of 
innovative efforts. Furthermore, they claimed, current patents, 
though fewer in proportion to the population, are individually 
longer and more technical, and a larger percentage of them were 
being worked than had formerly been. In addition, an increasing 
proportion of inventions were being made by government employees 
or were in the field of weaponry, and in either case would be un-
likely to be patented. They also stated that it was becoming 
more difficult to make patentable inventions as time goes on, be-
cause there was a tendency for the proportion of basic inventions 
to shrink while that of minor, unpatentable improvements grew. 
The high point of the argument in behalf of the independent 
inventor was reached in the Charpie Report of 1967. This report, 
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the product of a panel of private citizens convened by the Secre-
tary of Commerce, was officially titled Technological Innovation: 
Its Environment and Management5 but is usually referred to by the 
name of the panel's chairman, Robert A. Charpie, then president 
of Union Carbide Electronics. The thrust of the report was that 
the government, primarily through tax concessions, must ease the 
way for the backyard or garret inventor and for the small company. 
Its major recommendation -- a White House conference on "Under-
standing and Improving the Environment for Technological Innova-
tion" -- was never held, and few of its other recommendations ever 
took hold. Perhaps just as well, because the Charpie Report was 
based upon a static and hence an unhistorical data base. 
History is a dynamic process. While individual inventors in 
1959 still accounted for 40% of the new mechanical patents, 35% 
in electricity and electronics, and 30% of new chemical patents, 
the percentage of patents in those fields to individual inventors 
was far less than in previous years. The Jewkes, Sawers, and 
Stillerman study, constantly referred to by the Charpie panel, 
dealt with inventions back to the turn of the century, when the 
structure and nature of technological innovation were far differ-
ent from what they have become. Furthermore, while the original 
ideas for many of the inventions cited in that study might have 
come from individual inventors, their actual development had gone 
nowhere until they were put into the hands of large corporations 
possessing industrial research laboratories which could develop 
them into commercially feasible and saleable innovations. 
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By focusing on a limited number of innovations, by looking upon 
the innovatory environment as static rather than dynamic, and by 
failing to distinguish among the different elements entering into 
the innovation process, the Charpie panel had diagnosed -- and pre-
scribed for -- a situation which was at least a quarter of a century 
out of date. At the very time the Charpie panel was carrying on its 
deliberations, the percentage of significant inventions made by in- 
dependent inventors, even measured by their beloved patent count, was 
dropping markedly. The lone inventor was giving away to the group 
worker in the organized research laboratory. 
Nevertheless, the individual inventor cannot be ignored. With 
such examples drawn from recent history as Edwin Land (polaroid cam-
era) and Chester Carlson (xerography), it is obvious that the solo 
inventor is by no means obsolete and that he can be responsible for 
major innovations -- although Carlson's original invention had to 
undergo much development works, carried on in a structured R&D situ-
ation, before it achieved successful application. 
In this section we are concerned with individual inventors whose 
activities have not been carried on in the context of R&D organization 
al structures. We can distinguish three such types: First, there is 
the inventor who is fertile in imagination and technical ingenuity who 
can produce an inventive idea or even a prototype device, but who 
lacks the entrepreneurial capacities to carry it through to an innova-
tion. James Watt at an earlier date and Chester Carlson of today's 
xerography are representative of this type. Second are those whom 
Thomas P. Hughes had characterized as inventor-entrepreneurs, who 
embody the characteristics of both the independent inventor and the 
entrepreneurial capitalist. 
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In many cases, such as Thomas Edison and Elmer Sperry, they work 
alone at the beginning of their careers but later'establish their 
own firms, sometimes working within the context of an organized 
laboratory. And finally there are those research scientists and 
engineers who begin their careers in a corporate context and later 
establish new technologically-based "spinoff" firms. 
B. Individual Creativity  
Investigation of the role of the individual inventor brings 
up complex problems of the wellsprings of technical creativity. 
Methodologically, creativity has been studied from two major view-
points, which correspond, interestingly enough, to the social-
deterministic and individualistic approaches employed for inter-
preting the innovation process: sociological and psychological. 
The psychological approach to creativity tends to focus on 
forces within the individual, concentrating on such factors as 
intelligence, personality, and attitudes. The sociological ap-
proach, while not denying the importance of those elements, claims 
that these derive from various types of social background and con-
ditioning. 6 In other words, this is the old "nature versus nur-
ture" argument applied to innovative creativity. 
One of the earliest scholars who sought to explain creative 
genius was Francis Galton (1870) who found heredity a primary 
determinant of eminence. Other pioneer psychologists also found 
the explanation for creativity in "native genius" (Gattell 1915; 
Cos 1926). 
More recent studies have relegated heredity to a minor role, 
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although not discounting it completely. Ann Roe (1953) showed 
other factors to be of major importance, such as the intellectual 
atmosphere of the home, childhood interests, and position in the 
birth order. Not until 1955 was a conference on the identifica-
tion of creative scientific talent held, and then scholars placed 
differing emphasis on various demographic, cultural, religious, and 
personality attributes (Taylor 1956). Within a few years, however, 
it was evident that "profiles" of eminent scientists did not neces-
sarily shed much light on the creative process itself (Anderson 1959). 
While Samuel Smiles had made out his great inventors to be 
the most reasonable and virtuous of men (Hughes 1966), some icon-
oclastic thinkers of the late Victorian and Edwardian eras were 
endeavoring to show that creativity resided primarily in those 
choleric and splenetic individuals who refused to adjust to the 
world about them and who did not adopt its values. Not surpris-
ingly, the psychoanalysts, with their emphasis upon the neurotic 
and irrational elements in the human mind and behavior, came forth 
with theories relating creativity to emotional disturbances. 7 
More recent investigators, however, have abandoned the popular 
cliche of linking creative genius with a light touch of madness; 
they now tend to view creativity and psychological health not only 
as compatible, but as mutually supportive (Rogers 1964; Kubie 1958). 
Although one body of opinion holds that the creative act is 
basically the same in every field of endeavor (Coler 1963), other 
studies distinguish among different types of creativity and link 
these to different kinds of activities and goals. Some creative 
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individuals, especially composers, expressionist painters, sculp-
tors, and writers, are simply expressing their inner states; 
others direct their creativity to meet externally defined needs 
and goals; while a third type cuts across both the first two. 8 
Nevertheless, such studies of creativity would seem to dis-
tinguish little between an independent inventor and one operating 
in the context of an organized innovative effort. This failure 
to distinguish between the two is justified by our analysis, 
wherein the inventor emerges as a function, not as a person. Be-
fore the institutionalization of innovation, the individual and 
function were merged; in the organized R&D effort, the individual 
is submerged in the function. 
Because invention is a function, discussion of the individual 
inventor's characteristics becomes virtually irrelevant. For our 
purpose it is much more important to look at the environmental 
context in which innovation takes place, as we do in our later 
discussion of the organized R&D effort. Yet we can perhaps learn 
something about the innovation process by briefly focusing on the 
independent inventors in their different roles. 
C. The Inventor qua Inventor  
Some light may be cast upon the role of the inventor qua 
inventor by viewing this function in the light of Usher's gestalt 
theory of invention. As outlined in Chapter 1, that theory pred-
icated a four-step sequence: perception of a problem, setting of 
the stage, act of insight, and critical revision. Typically, the 
independent inventor is strong on the first three of these steps, 
but his critical revision is frequently lacking in those elements 
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necessary to make the invention into a successful innovation. 
James Watt's invention of the steam engine might serve as an 
exemplar of the Usher theory (Scherer 1965). When given a model 
of a Newcomen engine to repair in 1763, he soon perceived the 
problem of inefficiency caused by heat loss in the cylinder's 
wall. For two years he set the stage by tinkering with the cyl-
inder and trying wooden rather than brass cylinders. Then Watt 
tells us of the act of insight which occurred to him "on a fine 
Sabbath afternoon" in 1765 while strolling on the Glasgow green, 
for it was then that he hit upon the idea of condensing the steam 
not in the operating cylinder, as Newcomen had done, but rather 
in a separate condensing chamber. 
Although Watt conceived his brilliant idea of the separate 
condenser in 1765, it was not until 1769 that he obtained his 
first patent, and it was more than a decade later, 1776, that the 
first Watt engine was brought into commercial use. What happened 
during the eleven years between Watt's act of insight and the 
first successful commercial installation of his engine proves the 
importance -- and difficulty -- of the developmental stage in 
transforming an idea (and a model, made within three days after 
the Sabbath afternoon walk) into a practicable innovation? Here 
the question of defining the technical problems and viewing them 
in their economic context was to prove crucial -- and this was to 
be largely the work of Matthew Boulton, not of Watt who had the 
original idea. 
For the fact is that Watt did not have sufficient capital to 
devote fulltime efforts to scaling his model up to an efficient 
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and reliable machine, which involved the solution of many addi-
tional technical problems. In addition, Watt did not possess the 
necessary managerial and entrepreneurial expertise. Boulton be-
came the driving force making for the successful introduction of 
Watt's steam engine; he provided the capital and also brought to-
gether the market demand with the creative ability of Watt. 
Chester Carlson in more recent times exhibits the same inven-
tive imagination as did Watt. But he too lacked both the capital 
and entrepreneurial skills to transform his basic concept of xero-
graphy into commercial application, and was forced to rely on or-
ganized R&D establishments for the critical revision and market-
ing phases of his invention. 
It would seem that the contribution of the entrepreneur is 
sometimes equal to that of the inventor in arriving at an innova-
tion. However, the entrepreneur need not be an individual, for 
we are really talking about a function, not an individual. That 
function -- which includes risk-taking, the provision of capital, 
the development from idea or prototype to operational status, and 
the coupling of the marketplace with the inventor's concept 9 -- 
can be, and is increasingly, performed by a corporate entity. 
But it is also possible for the inventor himself to be possessed 
of entrepreneurial qualities and to do the entire job from per-
ception of need through development and marketing. That unique 
individual is the inventor-entrepreneur. 
D. The Inventor-Entrepreneur 
In his prize-winning biography of Elmer Sperry, Thomas Hughes 
(1971) utilized the concept of the inventor-entrepreneur to explain 
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the process of innovation. He has offered the following defini-
tion and characterizing generalizations of the inventor-entrepre-
neur in the history of American technological development. 
Inventor/entrepreneurs are inventors who preside over 
the innovative process from its origins as a problem 
to, at least, the introduction of the invention into 
use. The usual reason that inventor/entrepreneurs 
were not simply inventors was because they were deter-
mined to have their invention used, and to achieve 
this they realized that they would have to take the 
initiative not only in the early phases of innovation 
but in research and development and marketing. In 
essence they were inventors; in effect, they had to 
be entrepreneurs. The evidence, however, is that they 
found their work most satisfying when identifying prob-
lems and inventing solutions, not when presiding over 
and promoting the other phases. The evidence also 
tends to support the generalization that in America 
before 1930 most successful inventors were in fact 
inventor/entrepreneurs (Hughes Ch. 6 p.5 ). 
The preeminent example of the inventor-entrepreneur -- and 
indeed America's most spectacular and prolific inventor (some 
1093 patents in his name) -- was Thomas A. Edison (Josephson 1959). 
Perhaps the best illustration of Edison's ability to bring an in-
novation to completion -- from definition of the problem to prof-
itable application and diffusion -- can be seen in the case of 
electric lighting. As Hughes has pointed out, "Only the naive 
inventor assumes that the challenge is to invent an arc lamp, an 
electrical generator, a streetcar, or an automobile." Edison saw 
things in their entirety, and one of the major reasons for his 
success was that he realized that the problem was to develop an 
electrical lighting system, not just devise an incandescent bulb 
(Sharlin 1967). 
As far back as 1860 the scientific principles and technical 
requirements of a viable electric light bulb were known and had 
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been tried by many inventors. Practical electric generators were 
already at work, and there were arc-lighting systems employing 
generators, transmission lines, and lamps. The technological 
level was thus at a stage where further steps could be taken. At 
the same time, Edison possessed the capital to undertake the cre-
ation of a complex system because he was the owner of a consider-
able fortune derived from his previous successful inventions. 
What is equally important was Edison's well-equipped and well-
staffed Menlo Park laboratory, which provided him with resource 
requirements -- shop facilities, instruments, a library, special-
ized personnel, etc. -- for a high level of inventive activity. 
The mere existence of such facilities illustrates the essential 
entrepreneurial underpinning for this type of innovative project. 
Above all, Edison defined the problem in large terms and was fully 
cognizant of the economic constraints involved: he was attempt-
ing to develop an entire lighting system which would compete with 
gas illumination. Edison's achievement was as much a triumph of 
entrepreneurial ability, managerial expertise, and economic rea-
soning as of technical ingenuity. 
Unlike Edison's work on a whole complex system, Elmer Sperry 
focused on the bottlenecks, or "reverse salients," in rapidly ex-
panding areas. Such areas were chosen because capital was avail-
able and there was a probable market for his invention. As Hughes 
has pointed out, 
Identification of critical problems was a professional 
capability of Sperry's and one crucially important for 
his survival as an independent inventor. When Sperry's 
numerous patents are examined and their claims consid-
ered, it becomes clear that he did not invent dynamos, 
arc lights, streetcars, or automobiles, though the 
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title of his patents might lead to such superficial 
conclusions. In the case of his dynamo patents, he 
claimed automatic controls; in connection with the 
arc light, he invented a regulator for the feed of 
carbons; and when inventing for streetcars, he con-
tributed an operational control. His patent claims 
in these instances and in numerous others show that 
he solved very specific problems -- these can aptly 
be labelled "critical problems" (See below Ch.6 p.16). 
Sperry's pattern, at least until 1910, was to identify such an 
area in which his special competencies would apply, move in and 
concentrate on its weakest point, make his contribution, and then 
move on to something else rather quickly. 
Sperry seems to have lost interest in a field after about 
five years, which suggests to Hughes "that an inrush of inventors, 
engineers, managers, and corporations brought by capitalization, 
growing market, and size convinced him that his special character- 
istics and circumstances could best be employed elsewhere n (see below 
Ch.6 p. 15). He may well have realized that after a field has 
experienced a period of rapid change it then enters a "mopping-up" 
phase in which the working out of incremental improvements is 
called for. His own talents were less well suited for this. 
The pattern of Sperry's activities prior to 1910 allows the 
anticipation of a point to be discussed later in this chapter. 
One of the crucial elements in the problem definition/idea gener-
ation phase of the innovation process, as conducted in the corpo-
rate R&D lab, involves the identification of market needs. In 
fact, as we will see, most innovations are stimulated in this way. 
This seems to have also been the case in Sperry's career as an 
independent inventor. How did Sperry go about acquiring need-
information. Hughes is again helpful: 
Sperry's letters, memoranda, notebooks, and other 
records reveal that he identified critical prob-
lems by close study of technical journals, patterns 
of patent applications, the patents of others, at-
tendance at professional engineering society meet-
ings, conversations, and his intimate knowledge of 
expanding technological systems. Articles in the 
technical journals often told Sperry of the inter-
ests of other inventors and therefore of problems 
upon which they were working; in weekly reports of 
patents granted, like those published in the Scien-
tific American, he could discern a pattern of con-
centration upon certain problems (for instance a 
bevy of patents on arc light regulation). By a 
close reading of the claims of these patents he 
could delineate the problem of focused attention 
more precisely, while the Official Patent Office  
Gazette provided regular summaries of all patents. 
Sperry regularly attended the sessions of the en-
gineering society meetings, for there he might 
gather from fresh reports and papers more intel-
ligence pertaining to critical problems upon which 
other inventors were working (see below Ch.6 p.16). 
The typical modern corporation, with all the information-gathering 
potential at its command, scarcely acquires need-information as 
carefully, systematically, and with such result, as did Sperry 
working alone. 
Once a critical problem had been identified, Sperry "tried 
to discern the weakest point and strengthen it." After 30 years, 
this "hit and run" pattern of inventing in response to the weakest 
point in an expanding field and then moving on to another was fi-
nally altered with the establishment of the Sperry Gyroscope Com-
pany in 1910. During the early period we can see most clearly 
another characteristic of Sperry's inventing behavior, and at the 
same time note two of the characteristics of the innovation pro-
cess itself that require an entrepreneurial response. 
With the idea for an invention in mind (often the problem 
definition/idea generation phase in our terminology), Sperry would 
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embark upon a process in which "invention merged unperceptibly 
into development," as he successively "scaled up" towards the 
environment of intended use. The successive test environments 
"involved more variables, altered parameters, and new factors, 
and these revealed the need for successive modifications of the 
first idea by revision and new invention." Such scaling up of 
course requires resources and the organization of various special-
ized testing activities, and these in themselves imply entrepre-
neurial commitments which may be substantial indeed, far beyond 
the resources of an individual. Such was the case with Sperry's 
work on a marine gyrostabilizer, the development of which required 
access to the U. S. Navy's experimental model basin, and ulti-
mately sea trials aboard a destroyer, the U. S. Worden. In such 
cases arrangements have to be developed whereby an independent 
inventor shares the entrepreneurial commitment, or consigns the 
development of his invention to an organization with more adequate 
resources. 
There is, however, an even more basic sense in which the in-
dependent inventor intersects with, and is in fact dependent upon, 
the entrepreneurial activities of others. It will be recalled 
that Sperry sought out those fields that were undergoing rapid 
change and looked for the reverse salients, or bottlenecks, to 
further progress within them. Implicit in this approach is a de- 
pendence upon the vigorous activities of those entrepreneurs within 
the field, who had brought about the progress that not only re-
vealed such weak points but would reward an independent for inven-
tions that strengthened them. Thus the independent inventor, if 
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not an entrepreneur himself, is doubly dependent upon those who 
are; he requires the progress they impel and organize, and ulti-
mately the developmental capabilities they possess. 
One further point should be noted in this connection. As 
Gilfillan (1935) has pointed out, inventions are themselves 
changes in a system which necessitate further invention. They 
introduce perturbations into the ecological system to which new 
adjustments must be made. While this consideration poses a con-
straint on the independent inventor, and may ultimately influence 
the acceptability of his invention, it is not his primary concern. 
But the concern of the entrepreneur is with the market fate of a 
larger system, of which the critical problem addressed by the in-
dependent inventor is only a part. 
E. The Business of Independent Inventing and Developing  
Mention of Sperry's need to employ resources in his innova-
tions which were greater than even a prosperous inventor could 
command helps to account for the development of another recent 
phenomenon: firms specializing in inventions which develop them 
up to the point of application. Despite their corporate nature, 
functionally these firms perform the tasks which were previously 
the province of the independent inventor or of the inventor-entre-
preneur (Bass 1962; White 1961; Machlup 1962). 
Some examples of this kind of specialized inventive research 
and development are well known: Arthur D. Little Company, Battelle 
Research Institute, Denver Research Institute, Midwest Research 
Institute. Depending upon the contracts offered them by government 
or private corporations, these firms can perform all the functions 
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of invention from perception and definition of the problem through 
development, up to the point of application. Sometimes, as in 
the case of Chester Carlson and xerography, the inventor comes to 
them with the basic idea, and their task becomes the critical re-
vision and development of the concept to the commercially appli-
cable phase. In the case of the Research Corporation of America, 
the task becomes the weeding out and patenting of the ideas of 
inventors -- typically university faculty -- and sales and licens-
ing of the patent to companies which will exploit the invention 
commercially. 
Still another type of such independent inventing firms is 
represented by the number of high-technology research firms which 
sprang up about Route 128 on the outskirts of Boston in the 1960s 
(Lieberman 1968). These firms were sometimes spinoffs of larger 
corporations, originated by highly talented scientific and techni-
cal personnel who felt constrained within the organizational struc-
tures of larger corporations. Their specialty was the "critical 
problem" which had attracted the attention of men like Sperry at 
an earlier date. 
No matter their antecedents, organization, and field of con-
centration -- the Route 128 firms specialized in electronics and 
computer technology -- these firms were selling "know-how." As 
we have pointed out, technology is a form of knowledge, and these 
firms specialized in particular forms of scientific knowledge and 
technical expertise requisite for today's complex process of inno-
vation. 
Such firms constitute today's "independent inventor." Indeed 
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the term "independent" can lead to misconceptions. Unless inven-
tion is regarded as more than an idle and engaging pastime, the 
"independent inventor" means little more than an "unsalaried pro-
fessional." But once invention is regarded as a function, as an 
activity to provide a useful solution to an existing problem, 
then it must be coupled with the entrepreneurial function, as in 
the case of Watt-Boulton, or Edison and Sperry. 
Yet there comes a time when in today's highly complex and 
scientifically-connected technology when the knowledge require-
ments and the entrepreneurial base go far beyond those available 
from a single individual or a small group. Innovation then 
requires the efforts of numerous individuals and some type of 
organized endeavor. At that point the individual inventor 
"becomes" a team, a research institute, or a specialized R & D 
firm -- and this is more and more the case in modern innovations, 
as is indicated by the story of the spinoff firms. 
F. The Spin-off Phenomenon: New Technologically-Based Firms  
The literature related to technical entrepreneurship and the 
birth of new, technologically-based firms was summarized in an 
article by A. C. Cooper (1973 p. 59). He notes that such 
firms contribute to the growth and vitality of the economy in a 
variety of ways: they are important sources of innovation; they 
serve as new sources of competition which both complement and 
spur the efforts of established firms; they offer new career op-
portunities; and they are a desirable form of industry for re-
gional economic development. Because of these contributions, 
it is important to understand the factors which influence the 
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birth of such companies. The factors can be organized under three 
general headings; namely, the entrepreneur himself, the estab-
lished organization for which the entrepreneur had been working 
(the incubator organization), and a number of external factors. 
Cooper's literature survey identified the following charac-
teristics of the indivudal technical entrepreneur. Founders of 
new, technologically-based firms tend to be in their thirties 
when starting the firm (Roberts and Wainer 1971; Susbauer 1969); 
to have at least a B.S. or other first degree, typically in engi-
neering (Roberts 1969; Susbauer 1969); and to be more single-
minded in their devotion to careers than do hired executives 
(Howell 1972). They often form groups to start new companies in 
order to obtain a more balanced management team and to provide 
psychological support in a time of high stress and uncertainty 
(Cooper 1971; Shapero 1971; Susbauer 1967). Studies involving 
psychological tests have been conducted with a very limited num-
ber of respondents. In these studies, entrepreneurs rated higher 
than average in aesthetic and theoretical orientations, leader-
ship orientation, and achievement orientation (McClelland 1971), 
but lower than average in religious orientation, need for support, 
need for conformity, and practical mindedness. Although they did 
not have high scores in regard to economic values (Komives 1972), 
a disproportionately high percentage of founders were from homes 
where the father was in business for himself (Roberts and Wainer 
1971; Shapero 1971). 
In most instances, when a founder starts a new company he 
leaves some existing organization, called the "incubator 
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organization." Table 1 summarizes the industry and incubator 
organization characteristics which Cooper (1973) reported were 
associated with low and high birthrates of spin-off firms. At the 
industry level, factors such as rate of technological change, 
level of investment required, and economies of scale appear to be 
important characteristics. Similarly, firm size, firm structure, 
employee attributes, and geographic location apparently are impor-
tant characteristics of the incubator organization (Cooper 1971; 
Draheim and Shapero 1966; Forseth 1965). 
The incubator organization also influences such considera-
tions as the location of the new firm (Cooper 1971; Susbauer 1969), 
the nature of the new business, (Cooper 1971; Draheim 1972; Lamont 
1971), and the motivation of the new entrepreneur, (Cooper 1971; 
Howell 1972; Roberts and Wainer 1971). Clearly, the incubator 
organization is an important unit of study in order better to 
understand the spin-off phenomenon and to identify possible organ-
izational barriers to innovation. 
Many of the major complexes of new, high-technology have 
grown up around universities; e.g., such complexes exist in the 
United States in Boston, Palo Alto, Ann Arbor, and Austin. As a 
result, several observers have suggested that universities play a 
central role in the development of local entrepreneurship. 10  Not 
only do entrepreneurs come from local universities, but the uni-
versities attract highly educated young persons to an area and 
provide consulting assistance to the new firm. However, specific 
patterns vary widely from area to area, and the degree to which 
universities play a central or essential role in technical entre-
preneurship is still largely unknown (Cooper 1973). Other 
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Industry and Organizational Attributes  
Related to the Birth-Rate of New Firms* 
Table 1 
Characteristics of Industry 
Low Birth-Rate 	 High Birth-Rate 
slow industry growth 
slow technological change 
heavy capital investment required 
substantial economies of scale 
rapid industry growt 
rapid technological 
change 
low capital investme 
required 
minor economies of 
scale 
Characteristics of Established Incubator Organizations 
Low Birth-Rate 
	 High Birth-Rate 
large number of employees 
organized by function 
recruit average technical people 
relatively well-managed 
located in isolated area of little entrepreneurship 




recruit very capablE 
ambitious people 
afflicted with peric 
crises 
located in area of 1 
entrepreneurship" 
All of the attributes in a given column are not necessarily found 
together nor are they required to bring about a given spin-off 
rate. Various combinations may exist. 
* Taken from A. C. Cooper (1973). 
** Boston, Massachsetts; Palo Alto, California; Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
Minnesota; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Erie-Niagara, New York; Buffalo, 
New York; Austin, Texas; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee are identified 
as geographical areas with high rates of new, technologically-
based firms being founded. 
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important external factors affecting the foundation of spin-off 
firms include the availability of venture capital; 11 the economics 
of location such as transportation, labor, supplies, markets, etc. 
(Cooper 1971; Shapero 1971); and the region's past history with 
respect to the success or failure of new, technological-based 
firms (Cooper 1973). When regional factors are favorable, a self-
reinforcing process appears to take place. Past entrepreneurial 
success makes future entrepreneurial efforts more likely and, in 
time, a high rate of entrepreneurial activity may develop (Draheim 
and Shapero 1966; Susbauer 1972). 
Cooper's excellent summary and integration of the literature 
in this area demonstrates that our knowledge of the spin-off firm 
is quite high when compared with those other aspects of innovation 
which we have surveyed. However, a conclusion that this is not an 
important area for future research is misleading. A number of 
basic questions remain unanswered. Are there conditions under 
which it is better to develop an innovation in the incubator organ-
ization than in the spin-off firm? Is it possible that the spin-
off organizations excel in certain elements of the innovation 
process or under certain conditions? To what extent is the spin-
off firm of today the counterpart of the individual entrepreneur 
of yesterday? Is the spin-off process a viable means of initiat-. 
ing a self-reinforcing process by which a geographical area can 
experience economic development? Thus, the area remains a poten-
tially rich one for additional research. 
G. Section Summary  
The conclusions to be drawn from the literature summarized 
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in this section are clear. There has been an increasingly strong 
trend towards the institutionalization of all phases of the inno-
vation process. The individual inventor, although playing a role 
of diminishing importance overall, continues to make significant 
contributions. He should not be ignored; indeed, he should be 
encouraged by the relevant policy-makers. Yet it appears that the 
role traditionally performed by the individual entrepreneur is in 
the process of being taken over by the spin-off firm. In light 
of the move toward institutionalization of the innovation process, 
it is critical to develop a complete understanding of organized 
innovation, particularly as performed within the research and 
development laboratory. 
III. Organized R & D: Within the Laboratory 
This section is addressed to a special, important phase of 
the innovation process -- organized R & D within the laboratory. 
In one sense, organized R & D can be viewed as a microcosm of the 
overall innovation process, in that problems are defined, ideas 
are created, inventions are developed, applications results, and 
diffusion to other scientific areas and to other organizational 
functions is accomplished. To the extent that the R & D and inno-
vation processes have common characteristics, the contents of this 
section become applicable to the process of organized innovation. 
The reader is made aware of the conjecture that R & D is a micro-
cosm of innovation but strongly cautioned to keep in mind that it 
is a conjecture. 
Our focus is on innovation within the R & D laboratory with 
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special emphasis on processes, process variables, linkages, and 
screens. The purpose is to summarize, integrate, and assess the 
literature which provides understanding of, and insights to, the 
ways in which innovation is enhanced, constrained, and inhibited 
within the R & D laboratory. Our first subsection contains back-
ground, underlying definitions, and basic concepts to be used 
throughout the section. Subsequent subsections deal with problem 
definition and idea generation, R & D project selection and 
resource allocation, and performance of scientists and engineers 
within the laboratory. The final section is a summary assessment 
of research gaps and needs. Throughout, the theme is that organ-
izational structure has a direct impact on function within R & D 
laboratories. 
A. Background, Definitions and Basic Concepts  
The 1945-1955 period was an important one for industrial and 
R & D laboratories in the United States. Both the total level 
of funding and the number of R&D laboratories increased at a 
rapid rate (Mansfield 1968b; Mansfield et al 1971; Rubinstein 1957). 
When this occurred, the top corporate and R & D management of many 
firms adopted for R & D the organizational structures and policies 
which were being used with apparent success to manage the other 
organizational functions, e.g., production. Accordingly, the 
R & D activity was blended into the existing organizational hier-
archy either as a new division (usually called a "corporate labor-
atory") or as a new function in an existing division (usually 
called a "divisional laboratory"). In most organizations, the 
R & D activity was subjected to the same hierarchical control and 
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coordination mechanisms as the other organizational functions. 
Thus, the R & D activity was controlled and coordinated by annual 
operating budgets, periodic performance reviews, and accounting 
systems and these mechanisms frequently were adopted within the 
R & D activity itself. 
In the absence of successful R & D organizational examples 
and of underlying R & D management theories, the implications of 
the hierarchical structure and the associated control and coordi-
nation mechanisms were not well understood. Although the timing 
and operation of the control and coordination mechanisms are con-
sistent with the organizational administrative process it is not 
clear that they are consistent with the innovation process. Indeed 
we will argue that an organized innovation process has emerged 
over time which derives from the control and coordination and 
mechanisms adopted in the 1945-1955 period; serious dysfunctions 
have been experienced as a direct consequence because this does 
not correspond with many aspects of the innovation process. 
Two models of the R & D process were proposed when academi-
cians began studying the R & D process and R & D management. The 
faculty from economics developed process-phase models of R & D, 
and their colleagues from management and industrial engineering 
proposed idea and information flow models. A literature grew up 
around each perspective and a number of important insights resulted. 
However, neither perspective led to a full realizaion of the impor-
tance of the underlying hierarchical structures and the associated 
control and coordination mechanisms. 
During the early and middle 1960s, a new construct emerged 
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in the organization theory literature called "organization devel-
opment" (Bennis 1969). "Organization development is a response 
to change, a complex educational strategy intended to change the 
beliefs, attitudes, values, and structure of organizations so 
that they can better adapt to a new technology, markets, and 
challenges, and the dizzying rate of change itself" (Bennis 1969, 
p. 2). Within the broader organization development literature a 
specialized focus emerged, 12 postulating a two-stage innovation 
process in organizations: initiation and implementation (Zalt-
man, Duncan, and Holebeck 1973). The organizational conditions 
most conducive to innovation at the initiation stage -- high com-
plexity, low formalization, and low centralization -- are the op-
posite of the conditions most appropriate at the implementation 
stage -- low complexity, high formalization, and high centraliza- 
tion -- and yet both phases are necessary for successful organized 
innovation (Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek 1973). Thus, a dilemma 
exists when an organization faces the need for innovative activity. 
A related dilemma can also be deduced from the R&D manage-
ment literature (Rubinstein 1964; Scott 1973). The organiza-
tional structure most conducive to identifying new product and 
process R & D opportunities and carrying out the R & D effort 
apparently is the opposite of the organization structure most con-
ducive for managing the resultant new products and processes. 
Nevertheless, both functions must be accomplished. 
This section begins with a description of the process phase 
and idea flow models of the R & D process. Two composite models 
are then proposed each of which includes both process phase and 
156 
idea flow components. These composite models are used as a 
springboard for a more detailed description of the previously 
mentioned dilemmas and for developing the many important relation-
ships between organizational structure and innovation within the 
organization. 
1. Distinctions Based on Characteristics of the  
R & D Activity -- R & D Process-Phase Model  
Numerous authors have used a "process model of R & D" to 
structure their discussions and analyses 13 . This process phase 
model focuses on the level of technical uncertainty in the R & D 
activity and on the extent to which the activity is directed 
toward organizational objectives. 	Typical R & D process-phase 
definitions employed by these authors are: 
a. Basic research is concerned only with the 
extension of the boundaries of knowledge 
without any technical or commercial objec-
tives in view: it seeks basic principles 
and relationships. 
b. Applied research seeks new knowledge having 
specific technical and commercial applica-
tions, typically in the form of new or im-
proved products or processes: it has a 
specific practical payoff in view. 
c. Development begins with an artifact or con-
cept which has been shown to be technically 
feasible but which requires further change 
due to production or market needs: it 
attempts to reduce research findings to 
practice. 
d. Engineering refines the knowledge and brings 
it to its first use or market introduction: 
it is the refining which leads to commercial 
exploitation or other practical end uses. 
When this perspective is taken, the R & D process is usually 
conceptualized as the flow from basic research to applied research 
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to development to engineering and, eventually, to some end item 
or information which is useful to the organization. Moreover, 
Mansfield et al (1971), and the Commerce Department's Panel or 
Invention and Innovation (Charpie Report 1967), use an analogous 
breakdown for modeling the innovation process within the organi-
zation; namely, applied research, preparation of project require-
ments and specifications, prototype or pilot plant, tooling and 
manufacturing facilities, manufacturing startup, and marketing 
startup. One view of innovation considered by the Georgia Tech 
project team was also a process-phase view -- problem definition 
and idea generation, invention, R & D/ application, and diffusion 
(see Chapter I). Use of a process-phase view both for R & D and 
for innovation lends credence to the conjecture that R & D is a 
microcosm of innovation, but it also introduces definitional con-
fusion. One must be cautious to discern whether an author is 
referring to innovation or R & D phases. In this section, the 
words "process-phase" refer to R & D, not to innovation. 
When the process-phase focus of R & D is taken, phase related 
questions tend to be raised by the authors. The following is an 
illustrative, not comprehensive, list of the typical questions 
posed in the literature: 
a. What percentage of total cost (or total elapsed 
time) is associated with each stage of the pro-
cess? 
b. How do these percentages vary over time? Is the 
cost of one stage increasing more rapidly than 
that of another stage? 
c. Are the estimates of total cost (time to comple-
tion, probability of technical success) more 
accurate for projects in one stage than for those 
in another stage? 
d. Are there significant differences by industry 
(firm, nation) in the funding (cost, time) 
pattern across stages. Are there shifts over 
time in patterns across stages? 
e. What is the source of funding by stage? Is 
the source changing? 
In addition to being related to the process phase model of R & D 
these questions are also influenced by the fact that most of the 
authors who have taken this view are economists. The economists 
tend to focus on the risk bearer, or entrepreneur, who is making 
non-routinized decisions, and hence they model the R&D process as 
viewed by this decision-maker. For example, Mansfield (1968a; 
1968b; 1970; 1971; 1972), Marschak (1967), Hamberg (1966) and 
Kendrick (1961) are just a few of the many economists who have 
written in the R&D area with the process phase model perspective 
and the risk bearer focus (see Mansfield 1972, for an excellent 
summary). 
2. Distinctions Based on Idea or Information Flow Model  
An alternative view of the R & D process 14 is based on the 
flow of information as it impacts on the creation and development 
of ideas and on managerial project selection/resource allocation 
decisions. An "information flow model" example of this approach 
is summarized below. It is noted that Myers and Marquis (1969) 
and Utterback (1973) adopted this perspective for modeling the 
innovation process. Specifically, the innovation process is 
viewed as beginning with a new idea that involves both technical 
feasibility and usefulness, problem solving is activated to solve 
the inherent problems, and finally the idea is introduced commer-
cially in the market or in the firm. Again, this supports the 
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conjectured relationship between R & D and innovation, but intro-
duces additional definitional confusion. 
A. H. Rubenstein and his colleagues at Northwestern Univer-
sity have developed an idea and information flow model of R & D 
in considerable detail (Rubenstein and Hannenberg 1962; Ruben- 
stein 1968) and have utilized it in a number of empirical studies 15 
 Drawing on Rubenstein (1964), an "idea" is defined as "a potential 
proposal for undertaking new technical work which will require the 
commitment of significant organizational resources such as time, 
money, energy." The term "potential proposal" denotes that the 
idea has not yet been communicated to a person who has responsi-
bility to communicate the idea to a reviewer. A "proposal" is an 
idea which has been submitted to an organizational reviewer. A 
proposal becomes a "project" when resources are allocated to it. 
Figure 1 is an information flow model which identifies some 
of the activities, linkages, and decision points which arise from 
consideration of how ideas are created and submitted, proposals 
reviewed, and projects researched and developed in R & D organi-
zations (Baker and Freeland 1972). Following the primary path 
(solid line flow), we find several screens or decision points at 
which potentially beneficial or useful ideas may be lost. The 
first two occur before R & D management has an opportunity to 
exert direct influence or control, namely, at idea creation and 
idea submission. At the point when the idea is submitted to a 
reviewer, the idea originator transfers the control of the idea 
over to R & D management. The proposal is evaluated, typically 
relative to other proposals, and, if its evaluation is sufficiently 
Figure adapted from Baker and Freeland, Management Science, 
Sept. 1972. 
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Figure 1: INFORMATION FLOW MODEL OF R & D  
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positive, resources are assigned and a project is established. 
This proposal evaluation is usually referred to as the "R &D 
project selection/resource allocation decision problem." The 
project is then assigned to selected technical personnel, perhaps 
including the idea originator, to be researched and developed. 
However, management typically maintains control and coordination 
responsibilities, even though they may relinquish the technical 
responsibilities. 
The following questions are illustrative of those posed by 
the authors who employ the idea and information flow point of 
view: 
a. How does idea generation take place in the 
R & D laboratory? Are ideas generated but 
not submitted? Why? How is the project 
selection decision made? 
b. What information is used at each stage? 
How is the information obtained? What is 
its source? How is the information pro- 
. cessed? What additional information would 
be useful? 
c. Which organizational factors are most influen- 
tial at each stage of the process? Do they 
function to inhibit, enhance, or constrain 
the flow of ideas or information? What can 
be done to improve the existing situation? 
d. What are the impacts of managerial evaluation, 
control, and coordination behaviors on scien-
tists' and engineers' idea generation and sub-
mission behaviors? 
e. What organizational conditions are most con-
ducive for scientists' and engineers' activi-
ties in researching and developing projects? 
The idea and information flow influence in the above list of ques-
tions is obvious. In addition, a number of the authors 16 are on 
the faculty of schools of industrial engineering or industrial 
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management, and the decision process and organization behavior 
orientations of such authors also influence the questions. They 
tend to visualize the R & D process from the view of the organi-
zation as an organism which requires information to support cur-
rent operations and encourage future growth. 
3. Composites of the Process Phase and Information Flow Models  
In the preceding subsections we noted that both the acade-
mic disciplinary background of the author and the point of view 
adopted, focus and limit the questions addressed in the litera-
ture. The biases and limitations inherent to each view and 
author are simultaneously the strengths of the literature. For 
example, when economists adopt the process-phase orientation, 
the resulting literature focuses on the reduction of inherent 
uncertainty, the increase in relevancy to organizational objec-
tives, and the accrual of organizational costs as the project 
flows through the process phases. Thus, attention is called to 
the project itself, to the impact of the project on organizational 
resources and their utilization, and to changes in project charac-
teristics. Conversely, when management scientists adopt the idea 
and information flow orientation, the resulting literature focuses 
on creation and interaction behaviors, linkages or filters and 
associated behaviors, and information needs and information seek-
ing behaviors of the R & D personnel and on the impact of organi-
zational variables and conditions on their behavior. Clearly, 
• 
both orientations are critical. Any composite of the two view-
points must maintain the strengths of each as well as overcome 
their limitations. 
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In addition, attention must be given to the organizational 
control and influence aspects of each model. Process-phase liter-
ature identifies such organizational control variables as project 
cost, time to completion, benefit-cost measures, and levels of 
technical, economic, and commercial risk. This literature thus 
concentrates on control after a proposal has been submitted, and, 
most especially, after a project has been funded. It suggests 
that as a project moves away from the research end of the spec-
trum, the inherent uncertainty decreases, better estimates of the 
control variables can be made, and, thus, the project becomes more 
amenable to contol. 
On the other hand, the idea and information flow literature 
is more likely to concentrate on how managerial behavior and infor-
mation flow influence the idea generation, idea submission, and 
problem solving behaviors of the R & D scientists and engineers. 
Much of this literature concentrates on pre-submission and on 
organizational conditions which constrain or enhance idea or infor-
mation flow. A point in common to the two literatures is the pro-
ject selection/resource allocation decision. It will be important 
to examine the organizational control and influence implications 
of the composite models. 
One possible composite view would be to structure the R & D 
activity according to process phase, i.e., to organize the project 
by its phases. Within each process phase organizational needs are 
identified, ideas are generated, projects are selected, and. scien-
tists and engineers are assigned. Project selection and resource 
allocation take place within a process phase according to the 
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needs of the organization for effort in each phase. The effort 
in one phase can be related to the organizational needs for 
effort in another phase. For example, if research uncovers new 
technological results which could be developed for use by the 
organization, then a transfer across phases can be accomplished 
by an appropriately stated need for the development phase. Sim-
ilarily, development results could be transferred to engineering 
and the engineering results then transferred to manufacturing. The 
flow could also be in the reverse direction; e.g., if a develop-
ment activity is being stymied by inadequate technology, then a 
research need could be defined and communicated. In order to stress 
that projects are defined within each phase and that transfer occurs 
by communicating one phase's results or requirements to another 
phase, the resultant model (Figure 2) is named the "Phase Domi- 
nant Model." 
Another composite approach would be to structure the R & D 
activity according to organizational needs or opportunities, i.e., 
to organize the phases around the project. Ideas are generated, 
projects are selected, and resources are allocated as described 
in the idea/information flow literature. A project team is 
responsible for accomplishing the activities necessary to complete 
the project and these activities most likely cut across all the 
R & D process phases. As a whole, the project either progresses 
through the remaining R & D phases or it is terminated. Thus, 
resource allocation and scheduling decisions occur within the con-
fines of the project, but across process phases. In order to 
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phase to phase, but that the project is viewed as requiring inte-
grated multiple-phase activities, the resultant model (Figure 3) 
is called the "Project Dominant Model." Table 2 is a summary com-
parison of the Phase Dominant and Project Dominant Models of the 
R & D process. 
The underlying differences between the two models can be 
illustrated by example. Suppose a firm seeks to add a new camera 
to its product line. The camera requires new capabilities in the 
process by which the film is exposed to light, in the paper from 
which film is made, and in the chemical coatings applied to the 
paper. Not only are the new capabilities required, but also they 
must be combined into a single system for use in the new camera. 
In addition, the housing of the camera must be designed and modifi-
cations must be made to the current production process. 
A firm with a Phase Dominant view of R & D would assign the 
exposure work to its "light research group," the film paper work 
to its "paper research group," and the coating work to its "chemi-
cal coatings research group." The results from each of these re-
search groups would then be transferred to a development team for 
integration into a single system. If difficulties arose in the 
development of the system, these would be handled by the develop-
ment team or, if necessary, the problem would be transferred back 
to the appropriate research group for resolution. When all the 
problems had been overcome, the finished system would be trans- 
ferred to a design engineering team for housing design and to 'a pro-
duction engineering team which would specify any necessary modificat: 







PROJECT ACTIVITY, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, 
AND SCHEDULING ACROSS PHASES 
RESEARCH 	> DEVELOPMENT 	> ENGINEERING 	N. MANUFACTURING 
NEW OR IMPROVED 
PRODUCT OR PROCESS 
The box defined by broken lines contains project 
activity which flows across the R&D process phases. 
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to the production process. Eventually, the new camera would be 
designed and the production process modified, at which time the 
responsibility for the new product would be transferred to produc-
tion. 
A Project Dominant view of R & D would lead the firm to struc-
ture the required activity quite differently than as described 
above. First a project coordinator would be appointed with respon-
sibility for whatever activity is required prior to transfer of the 
new camera to production. The coordinator would organize a team 
which collectively has the talent required to develop the new capa-
bilities, to integrate the capabilities into a system, to design 
the camera housing, and to specify any modifications to the present 
production process. When all this had been accomplished, the pro-
ject coordinator would transfer responsibility for the new product 
to the production department. 
A key difference in the two points of view has been illustrated. 
The Project Dominant Model leads to a single project coordinator 
whc organizes a team to perform all project work. This is quite 
different from the several organizational administrators, each 
responsible for his individual portion of the project activity and 
for its transfer from one organizational unit to another, which 
follows from the Phase Dominant Model. The Project Dominant Model 
suggests a matrix organization; whereas the Phase Dominant Model 
suggests a hierarchical organization. Later we argue that a hier-
archical organization,by the very nature of its structure and its 
control/coordination processes, is led to adopt a Phase Dominant 
view of R & D, perhaps unconsciously. 
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Our two composite models -- the Project Dominant and the Phase 
Dominant -- assume greater importance when we realize that the lit-
erature distinguishes between 1) R & D projects which are concerned 
with incremental improvements to existing products or processes or 
with minor extensions to scientific or technological knowledge and 
2) projects which are concerned with new products or processes or 
with scientific or technological breakthroughs, (e.g., Hollander 
1965;Rubenstein 1964; Schwartz 1973). The terms "incremental" as 
applied to the former and "discontinuous" to the latter are relative 
terms, of course; they emphasize the degree of their departure from 
the organization's current products or processes or from the ex-
isting level of knowledge in the organization. 
Incremental projects tend to be relatively small, single-
phase projects which are carried on within an organizational unit, 
involve one or a few scientific disciplines, and require few R & D 
personnel to be assigned, and of relatively short duration (up to a 
year). They are likely to be funded by R & D management out of thei3 
annual budgets and to require only the budgetary approval of top 
corporate management. In fact, except at an overview budget sum-
mary level, corporate management may be generally unaware of the 
incremental projects being conducted within the organization. 17 
Discontinuous projects are of two quite distinct types. One 
type can be described as the culmination of several incremental 
projects in which some final technical problem is overcome or some 
new insight is drawn. Also included are those scientific advances 
which result from the efforts of the individual scientist or of 
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a small team of scientists. Examples include hybrid corn and 
other small grains, input-output economic analysis and similar 
methodological advances, oral contraceptives, etc. The above 
organizational description for incremental projects appears to 
be applicable to this first type of discontinuous project, the 
"cumulative-discontinuous" project. Both incremental and cumu- 
lative-discontinuous projects appear to fit well within the Phase 
Dominant view of R & D. 
There is another type of discontinuous project, often a new 
product, or new process, project. It can be characterized as a 
large, multi-year, multi-phase project which cuts across organi-
zational boundaries, may involve several scientific disciplines, 
and requires a substantial R & D effort to carry the project from 
initial concept through to end item. Examples include the Man-
hattan project, NASA's manned space effort, the pocket "Insta-
matic" camera, etc. 18 The decision to undertake such projects 
often emanates from the highest level of corporate management. 
Because of the large requirements for organizational resources, 
top corporate management support must be maintained throughout the 
life of the project. For reasons which will shortly become clear, 
we refer to these as "disruptive-discontinuous" projects (Schwartz 
1973). These disruptive-discontinuous projects correspond well 
with the Project Dominant view of R & D. 
We realize that the preceding paragraphs are speculative. An 
important area for future investigation is to evaluate empirically 
the hypotheses that incremental and cumulative-discontinuous pro-
jects can be described by the Phase Dominant Model and that 
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disruptive-discontinuous projects can be described by the Project 
Dominant Model. To do this one must develop operational defini-
tions for "incremental," "cumulative-discontinuous" and "disruptive-
discontinuous" and document case histories for several projects of 
each type. In order to consider the organizational control and co-
ordination implications of the composite models, let us assume for 
the moment that the hypotheses are true. 
The very nature of a hierarchical organization with its annual 
departmental budgets and responsibilities appears to encompass a 
Phase Dominant Model of R & D. The small, single-year, single-
phase project either incremental or cumulative-discontinuous, con-
ducted with a single organizational unit by a few researchers and 
engineers would seem to fit within the policies and structure of a 
hierarchical organization. However, the large, multi-year, multi-
phase project which requires a large number of researchers and 
engineers and which cuts across organizational units (the Project-
Dominant Model) would not seem to fit well within a hierarchical 
organization. Its multi-year, multi-phase, multi-organizational 
unit, and large resource requirements characteristics would appear 
to be disruptive to control and coordination mechanisms such as 
annual departmental budgets and responsibilities. Perhaps this 
is what Schwartz (1973) means when he suggests that such new product 
and process ideas are "disruptive to the culture of the firm." 
Our hypotheses thus result in questions quite different from 
those which arose from the non-composite models. Illustrative' 
questions include: 
a. Does. the Project Dominant Model accurately 
describe disruptive-discontinuous projects? 
Does the Phase Dominant Model accurately 
describe incremental and cumulative-dis-
continuous projects? 
b. Does the very nature of a hierarchical organ-
ization result in a Phase Dominant orienta-
tion for its R & D activity? Are the incre-
mental and cumulative-discontinuous projects 
routinely managed within a hierarchical 
organization? Are disruptive-discontinuous 
projects difficult for the hierarchical organ-
ization to manage? Do project teams with a 
matrix, rather than hierarchical, organization 
emerge in order to manage disruptive-discon-
tinuous projects? Do the authorities and 
responsibilities of the project team cut 
across organizational boundaries? Are addi-
tional organizational problems created? What 
are they? How can they be resolved? Do the 
answers to these questions vary across firms, 
industries, or nations? 
c. How are incremental projects funded? How are 
discontinuous projects funded? At what organ-
izational level are the selection and funding 
decisions made? What is the role of top cor-
porate management? Top R & D management? 
The potential users of the project results? 
d. Does the way in which organizational needs and 
opportunities are assessed and the way informa-
tion is disseminated influence the likelihood 
of incremental or discontinuous projects to be 
proposed and undertaken? How? 
e. Where are the idea sources for incremental pro-
jects? For cumulative-discontinuous projects? 
For disruptive-discontinuous projects? Are 
there systematic differences? What are they? 
Why do they exist? Are the information chan-
nels dissimilar for the various types of pro-
jects? Why? 
f. How do the characteristics of each process phase 
influence the relationships between organiza-
tional variables and conditions and idea gener-
ation, idea submission, and project perfor-
mance behavior by scientists and engineers? 
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g. Is the project selection/resource allocation 
decision made differently depending on the 
process phase? Are different data available 
depending on the process phase? Do data 
estimates have different characteristics de-
pending on the phase? 
h. Do the models help explain why the bulk of 
money spent on R & D in industry goes for 
development, not for research (Hage and Aiken 
1970; Mansfield 1968, 1970 and 1971)? Why 
does the contribution of large industrial 
laboratories tend to be in minor inventions 
(Hage and Aiken 1970)? 
The above questions provide a new focus for empirical research on 
organized R & D. 
It is important to stress that two distinct composite models 
have emerged, each of which includes and subsumes both the R & D 
process phase and information flow models and results in a new 
level of questioning. Our Project Dominant Model appears to be 
descriptive of disruptive-discontinuous projects; our Phase Domi-
nant Model appears to be descriptive of incremental and cumulative-
discontinuous projects. The models are compatable with different 
organizational structures -- the Project Dominant Model is more 
consistent with matrix structures; the Phase Dominant Model is more 
consistent with hierarchical structures. The next subsection de-
velops the organizational structure considerations in more depth. 
4. Orientation and Location: Differences Within the Firm 19  
A number of descriptors have been used in discussing the 
orientation of a firm, or a - laboratory, with respect to R & D. 
One such set of descriptors is the basis for the process phase 
model, i.e., research, development, engineering, etc. Another 
set, common in the R & D management literature (e.g., Hamberg 1966), 
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is the notion of offensive versus defensive R & D. As typically 
used, offensive R & D is activity performed in order to obtain an 
advantage over the competition; whereas, defensive R & D is under-
taken in response to some existing or expected action by the com-
petition. Offensive R & D is usually associated with improving 
the firm's competitive situation, and defensive R & D with main-
taining the existing competitive situation. A related concept is 
the "leader versus follower" notion. Some firms tend to be indus-
try leaders either in technological breakthroughs or in applica-
tion of technology, while other firms in the same industry are 
satisfied to be followers and to use the breakthroughs of the 
leaders. Thus, although the distinctions are related, they are 
different. Leader/follower refers to the R & D activity itself. 
Offensive/defensive refers to the impact of the R & D effort in 
the competitive environment. 
Gordon (1964a) has proposed that the classic process phase 
distinctions, such as research and development, be abandoned, and 
be replaced by more useful distinctions, such as urgency and pre-
dictability. Urgency refers to the speed with which the results 
are required by the potential user of the project results, and 
predictability is the extent to which the steps for obtaining the 
new knowledge are assumed knowable prior to the actual research 
(Gordon 1964a, p. 3). Based on this distinction, Gordon is able 
to draw several interesting speculations regarding the administration 
of R & D and expected behaviors during research (Gordon 1964a; Baker, 
Siegman, Larson 1971). 
Recently, however, it has been argued that the classic process 
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phase distinctions should not be abandoned in favor of urgency 
and predictability, but that urgency and predictability should be 
used to develop measures of a laboratory's orientation in respect 
to the phases (Baker, Siegman, and Larson 1971). In a laboratory 
oriented toward development, technical personnel and management 
can be expected to rate highly those ideas which are relatively 
urgent and predictable. Conversely, a research-oriented laboratory 
should favor ideas which are less urgent and predictable. It 
would be useful for inter-organizational, comparative studies 
to have operational measures for determining a firm's, or a lab-
oratory's, orientation with respect to process phase, offensive/ 
defensive, and leader/follower. 
In summary, there are a number of orientations which can be 
associated with a firm or a laboratory. These orientations often 
surface as balance considerations; e.g., an R & D program should 
be "properly balanced" along each dimension or orientation (e.g., 
Bamberg 1966; Mansfield 1972). The view held by corporate and 
R & D management regarding "proper balance" can have a direct 
effect on the characteristics of the ideas generated, submitted, 
and undertaken within the laboratory. As a result, the location 
of the laboratory within the organization and the administrative 
controls used by the organization become important considerations 
in determining a laboratory's orientation. The answers to ques-
tions related to issues such as whether the laboratory is a divi-
sional or corporate laboratory, to whom the laboratory reports, 
how the laboratory is funded, and where the output of the labora-
tory is used, indicate the orientation a laboratory is likely to 
evince. 
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Let us now turn to an examination of the literature 
dealing with location and administrative controls. The impact of 
organizational location and of administrative controls on the ori-
entation of a divisional laboratory has been illustrated by Ruben-
stein and Radnor (1963). They hypothesized tight control over R & 
D by divisional general managers, in the absence of direct and con-
tinuing counter-influences by corporate management, with a tendency 
of the divisional laboratory's R & D program toward: 
a. relatively shorter range programs. 
b. relatively narrower-scope programs in terms of 
relation to current lines of business, materials, 
processes, products, and applications of these 
products. 
c. relatively less flexible programs in terms of the 
freedom of the researchers to capitalize on the 
unexpected and follow technical leads that might 
appear peripheral to the objectives of particular 
assigned projects. 
In the decentralized companies studied, they found pressures in 
the direction hypothesized and also pressures in the direction of 
longer range, broader scope, and more flexible R & D programs 
(Rubenstein and Radnor 1963). Thus conflicting pressures existed. 
A gap between philosophy and behavior was also found in the 
decentralized organizations studied. Both corporate and divisional 
management agreed that the orientation should be toward longer 
range, broader scope, and more flexible R & D programs. However, 
behavior was much more likely to evince shorter range, narrower 
scope, and less flexible R & D programs. In response to the tendency 
toward shorter range, narrower scope, and less flexible R & D pro-
grams, corporate management acted to change the program orientation 
of the divisional R & D laboratory by the imposition of performance 
requirements, the establishment of evaluation criteria, financial 
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controls, methods of funding R & D, and direct influence on the 
selection of projects and programs (Rubenstein and Radnor 1963). 
These hierarchical controls serve, in as far as they succeed, to 
modify the performance of the divisional R & D laboratory and to 
coordinate the divisional activities. 
Schwartz, in his 1973 Harvard D.B.A. dissertation, presents 
results which suggest an explanation for the philosophy-behavior 
gap. Exploring how firms in high-technology industries make 
decisions, he found that decisions to innovate required a shared 
problem conception within the firm and special provisions for 
risk management. It was necessary for senior managers, middle 
managers, and lower-level generalists to play differing, but 
complementary roles in defining the projects and in developing 
the justification required prior to undertaking the project. 
Technical and marketing risk was "brokered" by assigning various 
responsibilities to managers. Brokering was a negotiation pro-
cess wherein each manager shaped the proposal by negotiating the 
terms under which he would lend his support and hence assume a 
share of the risk. Such justification and risk brokerage functions 
tended to add a conservative bias to proposals. Thus, even in 
such high-technology firms as Digital Equipment and Texas 
Instruments Corporations, the innovations tended to be incremental. 
Schwartz explains the tendency toward incremental improvements by 
the justification and risk brokerage functions; our composite 
models suggest that the hierarchical organizational structure 
and associated control and coordination mechanisms result 
in the managers' felt need for the justification and risk brokerage 
functions. 
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A 1973 paper by Scott looks at decentralization for managing 
new products rather than at the decentralization of the R & D 
program. He states that in the United States and Western Europe 
the organization decentralized by function is declining and that 
there is a dramatic rise of the form based on decentralization 
by product division. This is occurring because the divisional 
structure appears to be the most effective way to manage a 
strategy of diversification where new profit and growth oppor-
tunities have been identified by R & D activity. Scott, it 
would seem, is more concerned with the utilization of. R & D re- 
sults than with the generation of additional opportunities. Yet, 
throughout this section we have argued that the divisionalized, 
decentralized organization is more likely to identify incremental, 
rather than disruptive-discontinuous, R & D advances. Thus, a 
paradox results: the organizational form least suitable for 
identifying disruptive-discontinuous opportunities appears most 
suitable for managing the resultant innovation. 
5. The "Innovation in Organizations" Literature  
A more general literature, that dealing with innovation in 
organizations, provides further insight into the paradox identified 
above. 20 In this literature, an innovation is defined as "any 
idea, practice, or material artifact perceived to be new by the 
relevant unit of adoption" (Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek 1973, p. 10). 
So the definition is not restricted to technological change, but 
does include it. Despite this underlying definitional distinction, 
the literature provides certain concepts which are useful for our 
discussion. 
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Wilson (1966) postulated a dilemma apparently faced by or-
ganizations when attempting to provide a structure supportive of 
innovation. The dilemma derives from concepts associated with vary-
ing levels of complexity and diversity in an organization's incentive 
system and task structure. He argued that the greater the complexity 
and diversity in the incentive system and task structure, the greater 
the likelihood that participants will both conceive of and propose 
innovations. However, that same diversity and'complexity reduce the 
proportion of proposals that will be adopted. 
Subsequent authors introduced concepts such as formalization 
(degree of codification of jobs in the organization [Hage and Aiken 
1970]), and centralization (the concentration of power and decision 
making in the hands of a small proportion of individuals [liege and 
Aiken 1970]). Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek (1973) identify an initia-
tion stage (including problem definition, idea generation and sub-
mission, and project selection) and an implementation stage. They 
propose that higher complexity, lower formalization, and lower con-
centralization are appropriate at the initiation stage, but that 
lower complexity, higher formalization, and higher centralization 
are appropriate at the implementation stage. Thus, the organiza-
tional conditions most conducive to idea generation and submission 
are just the opposite of the organizational conditions most conduc- 
tive for adoption and continued utilization -- and yet both activities 
must be performed -- a dilemma strikingly similar to the one which 
evolved from the integration of the Rubenstein, Radnor, and Scott 
papers. 
The centralization concept identified above is quite dif- 
ferent from the concepts "centralized" and "decentralized" as used 
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by Rubenstein. Here centralization refers to the number of people 
who have organizational power and decision authority, whereas Ruben-
stein's centralized and decentralized refer to the way in which the 
organization is structured. Thus, if the divisional general managers 
exert rigid control over R & D, then that divisional organization 
would exhibit high centralization with respect to R & D. It is 
within the high centralization setting that Rubenstein observed the 
tendency toward shorter range, narrower scope, and less flexible 
R & D programs. Thus, at least superficially, the two dilemmas 
appear to yield consistent implications: The organizational con-
ditions and structures most suitable for initiation are opposite to 
those most suitable for implementation. 
Our composite models of the R & D process suggest a re-
finement to these dilemmas when combined and applied specifically 
to R & D. An R & D activity structured in accordance with the 
Phase Dominant Model of R & D will be hierarchical in nature with 
low complexity, high formalization, and high centralization. 
It will be satisfactory with respect to the generation and sub-
mission of incremental and cumulative-discontinuous R & D pro-
jects and will be capable of implementing and managing the out-
put from either incremental or discontinuous R & D projects. 
However, the organization will be unsatisfactory with respect to the 
generation and submission of disruptive-discontinuous R&D projects. 
In order for disruptive-discontinuous projects to be generated 
and carried out, the organization must be structured in a manner 
consistent with the Project Dominant Model. It would be a matrix 
organization and will exhibit high complexity, low formalization, 
and low centralization. Since all the activities are essential, 
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both organizational forms must exist within the same organization, 
perhaps within the organization's R & D activity. At this point 
no satisfactory means of coexistence has been found and thus the 
dilemma remains. 
Several responses to this organizational dilemma have been 
observed. Among the various strategies are: 
a. Set-up a corporate laboratory to do basic long-
term, multi-disciplinary research. 
b. Do some basic research in-house and contract the 
remainder with a contract research organization. 
c. Contract all basic research to a contract research 
organization. 
d. Acquire the research results which have been accom-
plished elsewhere. 
e. Spin-off the in-house research results to a new tech-
nologically based firm or to a new company division 
or subsidiary. 
These suggested actions do not completely overcome the dilemma. 
The dilemma arises at the time when the transfer, internal or 
external, takes place. This topic is discussed in depth later 
in this chapter. 
6. Further insights from the Organizational Development  
Literature 
In 1961, Burns and Stalker conducted an in-depth study of 
19 rayon and electronics firms in England and Scotland. They 
were primarily interested in the relationships among management 
practice, organizational behavior, and organizational innovation. 
Their study found two distinctive types of organization, termed 
mechanistic and organic. Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek (1973, 
p. 171) present a summary description (see Table 3) of the 
mechanistic and organic organizational forms as defined by 





Tasks are broken into very 
specialized abstract units 
. Tasks remain rigidly defined 
. Specific definition of respon-
sibility that is attached to 
individual's functional role 
only 
. Strict hierarchy of control and 
authority 
• Formal leader assumed to be 
omniscient in knowledge con-
cerning all matters 
. Communication is mainly 
vertical between superiors 
and subordinates 
. Content of communication is 
instructions and decisions 
issued by superiors 
. Loyalty and obedience to 
organization and superiors is 
highly valued 
. Importance and prestige 
attached to identification 
with organization itself 
1. Tasks are broken down into sub-
units, but relation to total task 
or organization is much more clear 
2. There is adjustment and continued 
redefinition of tasks through 
interaction of organizational 
members 
3. Broader acceptance of responsi-
bility and commitment to organi-
zation that goes beyond indivi-
dual's functional role 
4. Less hierarchy of control and 
authority sanctions derive more 
from presumed community of 
interest 
5. Formal leader not assumed to be 
omniscient in knowledge con-
cerning all matters 
6. Communication is lateral, between 
people of different ranks and 
resembles consultation rather than 
command 
7. Content of communication is 
information and advice 
8. Commitment to tasks and progress 
and expansion of the firm is 
highly valued 
9. Importance and prestige attached 
to affiliations and expertise in 
larger environment 
Mechanistic and Organic Organizational Forms* 
Table 3  
From Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek 1973, p. 171. 
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there is no one best way to organize. When the environment is 
relatively stable and fairly certain, the mechanistic type is 
most appropriate; however, when the technical and market en-
vironment is changing and unstable, the organic type is more ap-
propriate, especially for gathering and processing information. 
Note that the mechanistic form could be described as hierarchical 
(items 4, 6) with low complexity (items 1, 2), high formalization 
(items 3, 8, 9), and high centralization (items 5, 7, 8); whereas, 
the organic form is matrix (item 4, 6), with high complexity 
(items 1, 2), low formalization (items 3, 8, 9), and low central-
ization (items 5, 7, 8). 
The mechanistic form provides further elaboration of the 
type of organization that was brought into the R & D laboratory 
during the 1945-1955 period. According to our earlier arguments 
the mechanistic form is satisfactory for generating incremental 
or cumulative-discontinuous R & D projects and for managing the 
output from either incremental or discontinuous R & D projects. 
The Burns and Stalker study suggests, however, that the mechanistic 
form is not satisfactory for managing the output from disruptive-
discontinuous projects (Burns and Stalker 1961; Zaltman, Duncan, 
and Holbek 1973). Their analyses indicate that an organic form 
is necessary for the generation and submission of disruptive-
discontinuous ideas and for the management of output from the 
disruptive-discontinuous ideas, at least until the environ-
ment has become stable and the activities routinized. 
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7. Innovation in the Firm, But Not in R & D  
Organization development is concerned with change through-
out the organization, not just in change which is initiated by 
R & D. Thus, the concepts from organization development which 
are summarized in the earlier sections are applicable, but not 
restricted, to the R & D activity. One of the important con-
structs in organization development is that all organizational 
constituents are responsible for two activities -- performing 
organizational tasks and participating in and being receptive 
to change (Bennis 1969). 
A 1965 study by Hollander provides striking evidence that 
much innovative effort can be accomplished by organizational 
constituents other than R & D (Hollander 1965). Hollander 
analyzed production-cost data during the period 1929-1960 at 
five DuPont viscose-rayon manufacturing plants and surveyed the 
personnel employed at each plant. 
Defining technical change as "changes in the technique of 
production of given commodities by specific plants, designed to 
reduce unit production costs" (p. 23), Hollander pointed out 
that the changes may be "of a technological nature..., or they 
may be 'managerial' and consist in improved organization, "Taylor-
ization', and the like" (p. 190). A distinction was made between 
"major" and "minor" technical changes: a change was "major" if 
its development was considered difficult to accomplish by men 
skilled in the pertinent arts before the development program, 
and "minor" if its development was judged a relatively simple 
process. The cumulative effect of the "minor changes was far 
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greater than that of "major" changes according to Hollander's 
data. "Minor" technical change accounted for 46%, 79%, 80%, 
83%, and 100% of the net reduction in unit costs due to technical 
change at each of the five plants. 
"Major" technical changes were for the most part dependent 
upon formal R & D activity conducted within the DuPont organization. 
However, the "minor" technical changes tended not to originate 
in the formal R & D groups. Instead, the larger part of the 
"minor" technical changes were developed at the plants them-
selves by personnel intimately concerned with current operations. 
Some important "minor" changes were also made by equipment manu-
facturers, suppliers of raw materials, and joint ventures with 
the equipment manufacturers. 	Thus, Hollander presents a most 
interesting finding -- "minor" technical change accounted for 
the greatest percentage of net reduction in unit cost and, for 
the most part, originated and developed not in R & D but in the 
production plants. 
Hollander qualifies his emphasis on the efficacy of "minor" 
technical change. The data appear to suggest a "saturation effect" 
which states that "without some preceding 'major change' the 
potential stream of 'minor' changes will be exhausted" (p. 205). 
"Minor" changes can be expected for a considerable time, 10 to 
15 years in the DuPont data, after the occurrence of "major" 
change. Thus, R & D, through "major" changes, improves the 
process and provides the plant personnel with an output which 
they further improve by "minor" changes. 
It is clear that the "minor" technical changes were in- 
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cremental in nature: it is not clear which, if any, of the 
"major" changes would be classified as discontinuous. Hollander 
provides conclusive evidence that a considerable amount of in-
cremental innovation occurred within five viscose-rayon manufac-
turing plants of DuPont during the period 1929--1960 and that the 
activity neither originated in, nor was developed by, formal 
R & D. Moreover, the evidence is equally conclusive that any 
discontinuous innovation that occurred was conducted by the 
formal R & D activity. Discontinuous, or at least "major," 
innovation is important of itself and, because of the so-called 
"saturation effect," is also necessary for continued incremental 
innovation. Thus, Hollaner's study indicates the relevance of 
the organization development literature to incremental innovation 
and, because of the saturation effect, further supports the need 
for R & D organizational structures and control and coordination 
mechanisms which are conductive to disruptive-discontinuous in-
novation. 
8. The Message 
A consistent theme runs through the literature -- organizational 
structure is a determinant of the function of R & D within or-
ganizations. No one model of the R & D process and no one or-
ganizational type is most appropriate. The most appropriate model 
appears to be a function of whether the R & D activity is incre-
mental or discontinuous in orientation. The appropriate organ-
izational form is a function of both the orientation of the R & D 
project and its stage in the R & D process. Overall the message 
is clear -- organizational structure, strategies, and policies are 
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critical in determining the orientation of a laboratory, the 
nature of the R & D projects which are generated, submitted, and 
accepted, and the effectiveness with which projects are conducted 
and results implemented. Despite the informed speculations 
presented above, relatively little is known about these important 
relationships. In a time of increasing international com-
petition, this area is most important and deserves high priority 
for additional research in innovation. 
B. Problem Definition and Idea  Generation  
Within the R & D Laboratory 
1. Preliminary  Considerations 
In the above typology of R & D projects, each type is pre-
ceded by problem definition. Depending on the nature of the pro-
ject, the magnitude of resource and top corporate commitment re-
quired, and the R&D phase(s) involved, problem definition may 
also be referred to as 'definition of needs' or 'recognition of 
organizational opportunity'. As has been noted, these pre-project 
activities have been examined most extensively in the management 
science literature, and with an emphasis on the organizational 
and social-psychological influences that facilitate or inhibit 
the flow of ideas and information. In this section we shall survey 
the several dimensions of these impingements and assess the state 
of the art understanding of their influence on the patterns of idea 
and information flow. 
It should be rioted that the typology of R & D projects offered 
above has not been employed by those concerned with problem defi-
nition and idea generation activities. Hence any systematic dif-
ferences in the nature of such activities that might result from 
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these distinctions would not be reflected in the literature. For 
instance, the literature is silent as to possible differences be-
tween problem definition and idea generation activities leading 
to incremental projects and those leading to disruptive discon-
tinuous projects. Likewise, it does not point up differences, if 
any, between such activities as they preceed earlier and later 
projects in the Phase Dominant Model. While speculation 
about systematic differences that might correspond to the types of 
R & D projects we have distinguished is an attractive possibility, 
we will not, by and large, pursue it here. Rather, we will remain 
fairly close to the literature's own orientation, which, in terms 
of our typology, deals almost exclusively with problem definition 
and idea generation activities leading to incremental projects. 
This should not be taken to mean that in our judgment no signifi-
cant differences exist. On the contrary, we think they do----for 
various organizational, informational, and social-psychological 
reasons. But these have not been demonstrated (nor has our hypo-
thesized typology of R & D projects), and this report is an inap-
propriate vehicle for such extended speculation. 
A more settled distinction concerns the difference between 
pre-project and project activities. This distinction is not blurred 
by the fact that problems are obviously defined (refined is prob-
ably a better word) and ideas generated, not only prior to the 
establishment of projects, but during them as well. "Problem de-
finition and idea generation" is simply a convenient, though non-
exclusive, label for pre-project activities. 	The differences 
11e not here, but in at least two other dimensions. First, R & D 
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activities are organized in terms of projects which have been 
approved by management and to which resources have been committed. 
Projects thus have a conceptual focus and structure; someone has 
developed a proposal for solving a particular problem and submitted 
it to management, which has in turn committed resources to it. It 
has an organizational existence in that it has been made someone's 
responsibility, and is thus at or near the top of his official 
"worry list." 
For the individual to whom a project has been assigned there 
is typically a fairly well developed set of incentives to carry 
through on it. In pre-project activities, on the other hand, the 
situation is quite different. There is no project to focus the 
researcher's efforts. As we shall see, there are focusing mech-
anisms, but these are tenuous by comparison. Nor are resources 
typically committed, and individuals charged with defining a par-
ticular problem and generating ideas for its solution. To offer a 
rather weak qualification, many firms say that a certain percentage 
of the researcher's time is "free" for such ill-defined activities. 
But, as we will see, the incentive structure is typically such as 
to erode this "free" time in favor of the current project. 
Secondly, prior to the establishment of a project, little 
direct administrative control of a researcher's activity is possible. 
This being the case, problem definition and idea generation activ-
ities seem more susceptible to the influence of localized social-
psychological variables than project activities. Thus an organi-
zation's success in encouraging the flow of high quality ideas is 
unusually dependent upon its sensitivity to the social-psychological 
dimensions of the researcher's environment. On the other side of 
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this coin, the more structured environment of a project is probably 
"more comfortable" to those individual researchers who prefer to 
reduce the level of uncertainty through greater structure and fo-
cus. Reduction of the initial level of uncertainty associated 
with a project has been mentioned above as a later R & D phase con-
sequence in economic and corporate terms. What is being suggested 
here is that the same progression holds for the individual re-
searcher, and that the greatest uncertainty is associated with pre-
project activities. 
Thus while problems are certainly defined and ideas generated 
in both pre-project and project activities, the nature and dynamics 
are substantially different. Projects have substantially more 
structure in both conceptual and organizational terms. Someone is 
put in charge, and progress, or the lack of it, is noted. The 
organization can directly influence the activity in a variety of 
ways. Problem definition and idea generation, on the other hand, 
is a poorly structured and highly unpredictable activity in which 
the organization has little control, and that indirect. In short, 
there are many dissimilarities in activities that are speciously 
similar. From the organizational perspective it is the difference 
between assigning an individual to work on "x" and trying to de-
termine if he has been thinking about some "x" or other that it 
might be worthwhile to work on. 
2. An Influence and Information Flow Model  
Figure 4 indicates the particular problem clusters and major 
lines of influence and information flow that characterize problem 
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definition and idea generation in organized R & D. Boxes 1 - 3 
represent the problems that cluster around the social-psychological 
influence elements, and the arrows to and from these boxes indicate 
the information flow points or filters that are influenced by these 
social-psychological elements. Boxes 4 - 13 represent the flow of 
information from the outside and within the firm. Finally, box 14 
links this phase with the R & D phase which follows. The elements 
of this linkage will be presented in a later section. We shall 
examine these influence and information flow elements in the order 
in which they are numbered in figure 4, beginning with patterns of 
supervisory authority. 
3. Supervisory Authority Patterns  
Organized innovative efforts,by definition, channel and con-
trol the individual researcher's professional judgments and activ-
ities. By becoming a part of an organized R & D effort, he is less 
free than his independent counterpart to choose his research topics, 
to approach these as he sees fit, and to change direction unex-
pectedly in order to follow a new insight or clue. The folklore 
surrounding this point is that freedom not only enhances creative 
accomplishment, but is in fact a necessary condition. If this is 
true, then the need to understand this issue is an urgent one. 
Unfortunately, few empirical studies bear directly on the topic, 
perhaps reflecting the conceptual difficulties inherent in terms 
like "freedom" and "control." Such terms are operationally unclear.. 
They point in so many research directions, though with lack of 
specificity, that it is not surprising to find that so little has 







































Figure 4. Information and Influence Flow Patterns 






been said about them outside the "wisdom" literature. 
One of the directions in which the freedom/control issue 
points is the role and "style" of the R & D manager. This indi-
vidual personifies, for better or worse, the "control" factor in 
the enterprise of deliberate creativeness. The manner in which he 
imposes corporate judgment -- to explore certain research areas 
and not others, to try certain approaches rather than others, and 
to follow only certain leads which involve a change of direction --
determines both the actual limits on the researcher's freedom and, 
often more importantly, the researcher's perception of these 
limits. This observation leads one to posit that different pat-
terns of supervisory authority might differ in impact on the re-
searcher's perception of his freedom and thus upon the frequency 
and quality of his creative accomplishments. Thus one of the 
social-psychological influences indicated above (Figure 4) was 
labelled "Supervisory Authority Patterns." Those elements that 
influence or are influenced by such patterns of supervisory auth-
ority are indicated in Figure 5. 
r Supervisory Subjective 
Authority Perceptions 
Patterns 	1. of Needs 8. 






The unit, or level of analysis, with which we are concerned 
is that of the individual researcher. One can conjecture that 
such influences are also operative at the next or higher levels 
within the organization, and that they also exert an influence on 
the innovation process at these levels. We shall discuss these 
influences only at the level of the individual researcher however, 
with the implication that mutatis mutandis they may apply at other 
organizational levels. 
In one particularly significant study (Gordon and Marquis 1966), 
authority patterns in four types of research settings were examined 
in order to investigate the relationship between freedom and crea-
tive accomplishment. The results of 179 research projects con-
ducted in academic and quasi-academic settings (universites, health 
agencies, hospitals, and medical schools) were assessed by indepen-
dent evaluators in terms of criteria designed to reveal their qual-
ity and degree of innovation. Gordon and Marquis hypothesized 
that maximal research freedom enhances innovativeness only if there 
is an impetus to innovate. Such impetus can be provided by the 
"visibility" of the consequences of an individual's research. By 
"visibility" was meant both the ease with which research conse-
quences may be assessed, and the manner in which they are assessed. 
The first of these relates to the clarity or obscurity of organi-
zational goals. 
In an organizational setting where the owner of 
an organization or his representative can accu-
rately evaluate the findings of a project in 
terms of organizational goals, he can encourage 
the researcher who shows high probability of 
solving such problems. As a consequence, the 
researcher is motivated to seek solutions to 
difficult but "relevant" problems in preference 
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to less relevant but easier problems. In seek-
ing a solution to the difficult problems, the 
researcher at times must abandon traditional 
methods and thinking. This would appear to be 
as true for the academic as for the non-academic 
researcher. Kuhn, for instance, has observed 
that "The novel theory seems a direct response 
to crises" (Gordon and Marquis 1966, p. 198). 
The clarity of organizational goals and the ability of the super-
visor to transmit these goals influence their visibility, and con-
versely the visibility of research consequences. 
Regardless of the ease with which research consequences may be 
assessed vis a vis organizational goals, they are not visible until 
someone assesses them. This raises directly the question of the 
pattern or "style" of research management and its influence on inno-
vative behavior. To get at this question the research projects 
employed in this study were divided into three groups. 
1. Projects in which the project directors 
either stated that they had no administrative 
superior or that they did not discuss their 
research with their administrative superior. 
(Low visibility of consequence + freedom) 
2. Projects in which project directors had 
freedom to specify their research procedures 
and they discussed their research with their 
administrative superior. (High visibility of 
consequences + freedom) 
3. Projects in which the project directors 
stated that they had an administrative supe-
rior with whom they had discussions and who 
consistently influenced procedures. (High 
visibility + limited freedom) 
(Gordon and Marquis 1966, p. 199). 
On the hypothesis that both high visibility of consequences and re-
search freedom are important to creative activity, the second of 
these three types of authority patterns should be expected to 
maximize such behavior while the first and third would minimize 
it. That proved to be the case: two and one-half times more of 
the projects rated as most innovative by the independent evalua-
tors were conducted under the ideal authority pattern (type 2) 
than under either of the non-ideal conditions. 
In sum it is not possible to make a blanket 
statement relating maximal freedom to inno-
vation, but rather maximal freedom is condu-
cive to innovation only when there is an 
impetus to innovate. It further appears that 
the institutional settings in which research 
is conducted---in particular the visibility 
of the consequences of the research in rela- 
tion to the goals of the owners of the insti-
tution---has a significant effect on induc-
ing innovation. (Gordon and Marquis 1966, 
p. 201). 
Thus it would seem that creative behavior is more likely to 
occur where the consequences of such behavior are visible, i.e., 
where the organizational criteria for assessing research results 
are clear and where the supervisor keeps in touch with what the 
researcher is doing and how his work is going; but where at the 
same time the researcher has freedom, i.e., he is not dominated 
by his superior. 
This study was chosen for detailed examination because of the 
linkage it provides among not only freedom, creative behavior, 
and different patterns of supervisory authority, but also between 
these elements and the clarity of organizational goals. On the 
latter point, there are obviously other informational sources 
within the environment that also contribute to shaping the re-
searcher's subjective perception of the organization's needs and 
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goals. The primary one would seem to be the immediate supervisor, 
who does this explicitly through informal discussion, more formal 
meetings, and implicitly by his decisions concerning ideas sub-
mitted. Other dimensions of the concept of "research-result vis-
ibility," as a function of the researcher's primary social group 
within the laboratory, for example, will be examined later. 
The typology of supervisory authority patterns implicit in 
the Gordon and Marquis study and their correlation with innovative 
behavior finds support in a number of other studies. In summa- 
rizing the literature dealing with "leadership styles" Hill reports: 
"Most commonly, three general patterns of a 
supervisor's leadership behavior have been 
described, though the terminology applied to 
these patterns has differed somewhat between 
authors: 
(1) nondirective, permissive, a laissez-faire, 
accommodative or abdicative style where the 
leader relinguishes any influence in setting 
group goals to the group: 
(2) democratic, a participatory, group-centered 
subordinate-centered, employee-centered, human-
relations-oriented style where the supervisor 
allows and encourages a mutual relationship 
with subordinates: 
(3) autocratic, authoritarian, boss-centered, 
task centered, production centered, close and 
punitive style where the supervisor allows his 
subordinates little or no influence in the 
setting up of work procedures, while primarily 
concentrating on achieving task goals (Hill 1970, 
p. 11). 
While the cluster of words associated with each of these three 
leadership patterns reflects differences of detail and emphasis, 
there seems to be, ".h.a high concurrence of findings about general 
leadership patterns across a range of situations" (Hill 1970, p. 11). 
These three leadership patterns and their correlation with more or 
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less innovative behavior strengthens our confidence in the work of 
Gordon and Marquis. 
The work of Ronken and Lawrence also indicates that the dem-
ocratic leadership pattern (high visibility of consequence + free-
dom in Gordon and Marquis' terms) is more effective in stimulating 
creative behavior than a leadership style that is either too per-
missive or overly directive (Ronken and Lawrence 1952). One of 
the problems of a style that is too permissive is that the re-
searcher may interpret being left alone with only minimal contact 
as a lack of interest in what he is doing and thus a devaluation 
of his work. Hill also notes this possible interpretation of a 
leadership style that is overly permissive, and sees it as a 
"demotivating" influence (Hill 1970, p. 12). 
In commenting on the dysfunctional effects of an autocratic 
style (high visibility + low freedom), Pelz and Andrews state that, 
" ...continued direction by the chief will stunt initiative and in-
dependence and these are qualities basic to scientific achievement" 
(Pelz 1966, p. 33). And in a perhaps unexpected result, Hill found 
that while researchers perform best (in the sense of the quality 
and quantity of innovative ideas) under participatory or democratic 
leadership, when the leadership pattern was strongly autocratic or 
overly directive they responded by seeking even greater direction 
(Hill 1970). 
Finally, the studies of Andrews and Farris also support the 
conclusions offered above concerning the need to "keep in touch," 
or provide visibility for the consequences of a researcher's work, 
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if freedom is to be effective in stimulating creativity (Andrews 
1967). They found that freedom was unrelated to innovation if the 
supervisor did not consult with them prior to making decisions con-
cerning their projects. Where freedom was combined with consulta-
tion, however, a substantial increase in innovative behavior was 
observed. A key factor in the effectiveness of such consultation 
would seem to be the supervisor's own technical competence. In 
drawing some general conclusions from their research Andrews and 
Farris say: 
Greatest innovation occurred under supervisors 
who knew the technical details of their subor-
dinates' work, who could critically evaluate 
the work, and who could influence work goals. 
Thus the widespread practice of including tech-
nical competence among the criteria for choos-
ing supervisors seems to be sound. This does 
not mean that a supervisor should constantly 
"meddle" in his subordinates' activities. But 
he should be available, competent in the cur-
rent "state of the art," actively interested 
in the project, and informed about it... 
What if this kind of structure is not pos- 
sible, or if a supervisor's technical competence 
has become obsolete. Again the data were clear: 
provide substantial freedom for subordinates. 
Freedom acted as a partial substitute for skilled 
supervision. But even where subordinates have 
freedom, the supervisor still makes some kinds 
of decisions. For freedom to be effective, the 
data showed that the supervisor must consult with 
his subordinates before making these decisions 
(Andrews 1967, p. 513). 
Thus the visibility of research consequences, as achieved by an 
available and competent supervisor who knows what his subordinates 
are doing, is the intervening variable activating the potential of 
professional freedom to increase creative accomplishment. The 
influence of this intervening variable appears dependent, however, 
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on the technical competence of the supervisor. 
The last point to be mentioned in connection with the "control" 
figure or supervisor in the R & D context concerns his influence on 
the researcher's perception of the needs of the firm. Illustrative 
of this point is an experience related by Hyman. 
I was once talking with the manager of engineering whose 
company had just lost several million dollars because of 
marketing a defective machine which later had to be with-
drawn from the market. As a result, the company was un-
der tremendous pressure to recover its previous position 
in a highly competitive market. The manager was worried 
because, in this market, if you do not look ahead and keep 
generating new patents you cannot survive very long. Yet 
his men, eighteen design engineers, had not turned out a 
patent in the past year or so. Like every one else in the 
company, their major concern was with current pressures to 
keep the business out of the red. The managers, in order 
to change this lack of new patents, first thought in terms 
of his selection policies. Maybe he had chosen the wrong 
men. Maybe he should fire some of his present staff and 
hire new men. One day the thought occurred to him: Why 
not first call the men in and tell them what I want? He 
called them to a meeting and told them, 'Look, men, we 
need patents, or else we die.' The next month his men 
presented him with several patent applications. And they 
have been continuing at that rate ever since. One gets 
the impression that essentially, the men just looked at 
each other and said, 'Well if that's what he wants why 
didn't he say so (Hyman 1964, p. 70)? 
This overly simple and somewhat dramatic little story contains sev-
eral recurrent themes in the research literature: the dominance of 
oral communication throughout the process, the phenomenon of the 
"unsubmitted idea," as well as the role of the supervisor in shap-
ing researchers' subjective perceptions of organizational needs. 
The former points will be treated later. The latter extends the 
inventory of ways in which problem definition and idea generation 
within the lab is strongly influenced by the first-line control 
figure. It is ironic perhaps that one can get the impression from 
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many literature sources that R & D supervisors are but passive 
functionaries whose role deserves less mention than that of the 
"product champion" or "top person." But if the evidence is to be 
believed, their role is a crucial one and their influence substan-
tial. 
The next cluster of social-psychological influences to be con-
sidered are the researcher's primary work group and his social 
group within the laboratory. 
4. Primary Groups  
Those elements of our information and influence flow model 
(Figure 4) that influence or are influenced by primary groups within 
the R & D laboratory are reproduced in Figure 6. 
Figure 6  
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The term "primary group" has two referents in the laboratory con-
text. 	Within the formal organizational structure, it refers 
to the work group within the laboratory to which a researcher has 
been assigned for the conduct of a current project. It also re-
fers to the socialization group to which the researcher belongs 
in the informal organization of the laboratory by virtue of mutual 
social choice. 
As it turns out, there is very little in the innovation lit-
erature dealing with the mediating influence of either primary 
group on the innovation process. We would claim, however, that 
this largely neglected area is important in understanding the pat-
terns of information flow. This is especially true in problem 
definition/idea generation, owing to the relative absence of mech-
anisms for direct organizational control. 
The research community is especially indebted to Thomas J. 
Allen and his colleagues at MIT for their work on the cluster of 
issues that relate to the role of the primary group in the innova-
tion process, by bringing certain insights from social psychology 
to bear on the dynamics of information flow in the R & D laboratory. 
As with all intellectual efforts in their formative stages, the 
data base is presently inadequate, and more questions are raised 
than answered. But we find the questions both theoretically inter-
esting and of practical importance. 
Allen and Cohen (1969) have reported the results of a study 
in which the following concepts were utilized in analyzing the pat-
terns of information flow in two R & D laboratories: (1) the 
primary work group; (2) the primary social group; (3) a two-step 
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pattern of information flow; and (4) technical approach attitudes; 
or biases. Unpacking this cluster of interacting elements and 
determining their relative influence is as complex as it is impor-
tant. Although the results should be taken as suggestive of direc-
tions for future research rather than as definitive, this does not 
reduce their value as it would in the case of a more incremental 
research effort. A meaningful direction is a pre-condition of 
meaningful results. 
In the two R & D laboratories Allen and Cohen studied, the 
amount of overlap in the composition of the primary work groups 
and social groups was not statistically significant. As a result 
their influence on the flow of information was taken as independ-
ently measurable. As indicated in Figure 7, the influence of the 













1. With whom does a researcher 
engage in routine technical dis-
cussion? 
2. Who provided the researcher 
with information that proved cru-
cial in the course of his last 
completed project? 
3. With whom does a researcher 
discuss an idea for a new project? 
(NA) 
( pc 0.05) 
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Number of Overlapping Choices 
(Allen and Cohen 1969, p.15) FIGURE 7 :NUMBER OF OVERLAPPING CHOICES 
BETWEEN THE SOCIAL CONTACT AND WORK GROUP 
STRUCTURE AND THREE NETWORKS OF TECHNI-
CAL INFORMATION FLOW IN RESEARCH AND DE-
VELOPMENT LABORATORIES A AND B. (*Deter- 
mined by Kolmogorov one-sample test; N.S.: 
difference not statistically significant.) 
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The results demonstrate that for routine technical discussions a 
researcher's primary social group is at least as important as his 
primary work group. Indeed, even within the work group those 
individuals whom the researcher seeks out most frequently for 
technical discussion may also be the members of his primary so-
cial group -- although this cannot be determined from the data. 
Finally, there are presumably a number of influences operative in 
the formation of primary social groups, not all of which would 
provide a basis for technical discussion choice, so that only a 
subset of one's primary social group might be sought out for tech-
nical discussion. 
Nevertheless the relationship between the primary social 
group and technical discussion choices is quite strong, and stands 
out as something requiring explanation. Perhaps such explanation 
is provided, at least in part, by a factor discussed by Allen and 
Cohen in an earlier working paper (1966), which was based on the 
same research. The researchers were asked to indicate their atti-
tudes on each of three rather uncertain technical questions con- 
fronting the laboratory, in order to test the following hypothesis: 
Technological attitudes, attitudes toward such 
things as feasibility of particular approaches 
which are not yet physically testable, will be 
strongly influenced by the attitudes held by 
other members of the primary groups to which the 
engineer belongs (Allen and Cohen 1966, p. 7) 
Credit for the formation of this hypothesis was given Kurt Lewin 
and others who had suggested that "when an opinion or attitude 
cannot be tested directly against 'physical reality ' then the 
individual will resort to a test against 'social reality.' 
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In other words, he will look to his peers for confirmation or 
disconfirmation and react accordingly" (Allen and Cohen 1966, p.7). 
A fairly strong correlation was found between the technical 
approaches favored by the individual researcher and the ones 
favored by those he sought out for technical discussion. Unfor-
tunately, the nature of the data precluded determination of causal 
direction, i.e., whether technical discussion leads to attitude 
agreement or whether certain individuals are chosen for discussion 
on the basis of prior knowledge of agreement. A replication of 
this study is needed which would permit determination of this 
causal direction. 
Whether formation or reinforcement turns out to be basic 
function, it may be that the explanation of the strength of the 
relationship between primary social group and technical discussion 
choices lies in this need to "test" one's ideas or position against 
"social reality." Such confirmation would be sought from those 
social peers with whom the researcher had established a base for 
interaction on technical matters. 
Let us push this hypothesis one step further. Allen and 
Cohen made no distinction between "pre-project" and "project" 
activities. As a result they did not determine what the techni- 
cal discussions were about. If they had built in this pre-project/ 
project distinction, we hypothesize that for discussions related 
to pre-project activities they would have an even stronger reliance 
on the primary social group. The argument here is that in the 
problem definition-idea generation phase the level of technical 
uncertainty is even greater, since it explicitly involves the 
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technical approach to be taken as well as technical problems 
within a particular approach. Here the "social testing" of one's 
ideas is crucial, and the Allen and Cohen work should be replicated 
with this distinction in mind. 
To make explicit the practical implications of the influence 
of the primary social group on the flow of technical information, 
we should assume the viewpoint of the R & D manager. Whether 
formation or reinforcement of technical attitudes turns out to be 
the more characteristic function of the primary social group, his 
direct action options are few. Yet they assume added importance 
for that reason. On the assumption that reinforcement turns out 
to be more basic, he should be aware of the rather strong evidence 
that, "engineers, once they have become committed to a particular 
technical approach, tend to discount very strongly information 
which would disconfirm their attitude" (Allen and Cohen 1966, p. 21). 
(The evidence for this phenomenon is developed in our next section.) 
If, in addition, the social group influences are strongly rein-
forcing of particular approaches, then the range of alternatives 
that receive serious consideration is going to be quite narrow. 
Should this prove counterproductive to the laboratory's work, the 
manager must attempt to introduce more diversity by recruitment 
or in the formation of work groups. "Merely introducing a single 
individual with conflicting attitudes should produce sufficient 
jitter to keep the group aware of other points of view" (Allen and 
Cohen 1966, p. 21). 
If we assume, on the other hand, that the primary group does 
influence the formation of certain attitudes as well as reinforce 
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already existing ones, a further caution could be offered to the 
R & D manager. "The possibility that the causal direction is such 
that interaction leads to agreement, implies that management should 
periodically rotate their devil's advocates to prevent their cap-
ture by the prevailing group attitude" (Allen and Cohen 1966, p.21). 
Another, and perhaps powerful, mechanism is available to 
guard against counter-productive primary group influences in atti-
tude formation, namely the introduction of diversity into the lab-
oratory setting by the use of outside consultants, or by the diver-
sification of work assignments. Utterback reports that outside 
consultants played a crucial role in the generation of ideas for 
sixteen of the thirty-two new instruments he studied (Utterback 
1971, p. 139). Likewise, Peters in exploring the relationships 
among consulting, diversity of work assignments, and idea genera-
tion in interviews with faculty in four M.I.T. departments, found 
that 96% of those reporting new ideas engaged in consulting as 
opposed to 55% of those not reporting ideas (Peters 1968). Such 
enhancement of idea generation by means of outside consultation is 
also reported by Morse and Gordon (1968, p.37). Peters, in the 
work cited above also found evidence that diversity in work assign-
ments increases the probability of idea generation; specifically, 
70% of those reporting ideas also reported that their work was 
mixed between research and development, as opposed to 28% of those 
not reporting ideas. Utterback explains these findings in terms 
of the need to synthesize information in idea generation. While 
this should not be discounted, perhaps a deeper explanation lies 
in the function of both consulting and varied work assignments 
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in providing more diverse technical perspectives and attitudes 
than those of the researcher's primary group. 
The implications of the work by Allen and Cohen on the influ-
ence of the primary group on information flow and attitude forma-
tion also need to be explored for organizational levels other than 
the primary group in the laboratory. For instance, there is the 
widely held folk-wisdom that in any industry some firms are inno-
vation leaders while others are followers. If there is substance 
to such distinctions, might it not reflect the influence of the 
dominant attitudes of the primary group at or near the top of such 
firms? Examples of key attitudes that might be formed or rein-
forced by such groups would be those taken towards risk-taking, 
the exploitation of technological capabilities, newly recog- 
nized market needs, and the like. Such prevailing paradigms or 
mind-sets of top management would be expressed in both broad-guage 
corporate goals and strategies, and in the disposition decisions 
regarding particular ideas that are generated in the laboratory. 
Perhaps related to this point, in negative fashion, is the role of 
the "product champion" or "top man" as noted by Langrish et al 
(Langrish 1972, p. 72). Such individuals by their own persuasive 
skill and dogged determination overcome the firm's negative bias 
towards their idea. What is overcome in these instances, or so 
we are suggesting, are the attitudes of a primary group which are 
antithetical to the idea being presented. 
Let us turn briefly now to Allen and Cohen's results concern-
ing the primary social and work groups and the flow of "critical 
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incident" information and new research ideas. As indicated in 
figure 7, almost all the relationships here are decidedly weaker 
than for the technical discussion level, and in fact half are not 
statistically significant. We would speculate this was the case 
because the significant informational sources in these instances 
are the "technological gatekeepers" rather than the primary groups. 
Allen and Cohen, of course, identified such gatekeepers in their 
investigation and showed that they were, in fact, the "sociometric 
stars" of the laboratories. But they did not seem to realize that 
these gatekeepers might be distributed over various work and social 
groupings, and thus that their influence would not appear signif-
icant in data cut along group lines. 
We shall discuss the characteristics and influence of tech-
nological gatekeepers in a later section, and thus will not get 
into further details here. But if the leads from social psychol-
ogy, as applied by Allen and Cohen to the innovation process, are 
indeed of great potential significance, let us offer one additional 
speculation. Perhaps the members of primary social groups do not 
all play an equal role in the development of the group's prevail-
ing attitudes towards various technological approaches and ques-
tions. Related to this point, Allen and Cohen have hypothesized 
the existence of a two-step flow for technical information anal-
ogous to that discovered by Lazarsfeld and others in the mass 
communications field.
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It appeared that ideas flow from radio and print to 
opinion leaders and from them to the remainder of the 
population.... The intervening variables all involve 
the individual's social attachments to other people, 
and the character of the opinions and activities which 
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he shares with them. Thus, the response of an indivi-
dual to a communicated message could not be accounted 
for without reference to his social environment and 
to the character of his interpersonal relation... 
(Allen and Cohen 1966, p. 3). 
The suggestion here is that perhaps there exists within the labo-
ratory context certain key individuals who perform a technical  
attitude formation role in a fashion analogous to the role of 
opinion leaders in mass communications. This may be distinct from 
the technical information transfer role attributed to the techno-
logical information gatekeeper, though we shall later consider the 
possibility that the same individuals may perform both functions. 
Such opinion leaders or "technological attitude gatekeepers" may 
exist, and operate in either a facilitating or inhibiting way to 
bias the problem definition and idea generation process towards 
certain technical alternatives and away from others. The possi-
bility that such individuals exist should be recognized and inves-
tigated, since their impact on the process would be quite signifi-
cant. 
We have earlier mentioned the influence of the supervisor in 
shaping the researcher's perception of the organization's needs. 
Such perceptions may also be sensitive to more subtle, implicit, 
and often unintended "communication" from management. The envi-
ronment which picks up these signals, interprets them (rightly 
or wrongly), and by subsequent behavior gives them substance, 
would seem to be the primary social group within the laboratory. 
Baker and Freeland point to one negative manifestation of such 
group perceptions, in this case triggered by inadequate manage-
ment responses to new ideas that have been submitted in the past. 
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Thus, expectations regarding organizational rewards 
for idea flow effort are modified downward and the 
cycle is ready to repeat. As new employees enter 
the organization they learn these low expectations 
from the veterans who have traversed full cycle. 
In such an environment it is little wonder that 
potentially creative employees fail to realize their 
potential and appear to "go dry" over time (Baker and 
Freeland 1972, p. 111). 
Since the recognition of a need seems to be the precipitating 
event for most problem definition and idea generation sequences, 
the influence of the primary group in shaping the researcher's 
perception of such needs is crucial. As has been the case through-
out this section, this too is a little understood phenomenon which 
merits careful investigation. 
In concluding these remarks we should offer a balancing note 
to what has been a largely negative thrust. The influences of the 
primary group, and the attitudes they serve to form and/or rein-
force, are of course, by no means wholly counterproductive to cor-
porate objectives. Whether the directions in which they lead are 
appropriate or not depends upon many variables in the total envi-
ronment. Perhaps the influences of primary groups can best be 
summed up by paraphrasing the line from the nursery rhyme that 
goes, "When they are good, they are very, very good, and when they 
are bad they are horrid." Whether "good" or "horrid," such influ-
ence would seem to be substantial, yet badly neglected, in the re-
search literature. 
5. Individual Mind-Sets  
The concept of "mind set" or "biasing set" is used in the 
literature to refer to the biasing influence of past experience 
that an individual brings to his present problem solving activ-
ities. Allen and Marquis introduce this concept as follows: 
It is known that the likelihood of finding a solution 
to a problem may be raised or lowered because the prob-
lem solver is set to respond in certain predetermined 
ways. Prior experience with tools or approaches used 
in solving similar problems in a certain way may result 
in a "set" which biases the problem solver and can di-
vert him from consideration of alternative solutions 
(1964 p. 158). 
The individual may thus be "set" to transfer information or 
an approach that he has used successfully in the past to a pre-
sent problem which he perceives as similar. Such mind-sets may 
have either positive or negative effects on the achievement of a 
solution. If the transfer of past experience is appropriate to 
the new situation, it will be a positive factor, but if inappro-
priate, it may block or delay the discovery of a different and 
superior solution. 
A paradigm illustration of the existence and influence of 
mind-sets has been provided in an experiment conducted by Birch 
and Rabinowitz. 
In this problem the S is required to tie together the 
free ends of two cords which are suspended from the ceil- 
ing to the floor of a corridor. The distance between 
the two cords is such that the S cannot reach one cord 
if the other is held. In our arrangement the problem 
could be solved only if the S would tie a weight to the 
end of one of the strings and thus convert it into a 
pendulum which could be set swinging and then be caught 
on its upswing while the stationary cord was held. The 
two cords could then be tied together and the problem 
solved. In our situation only two objects could be 
utilized as weights. The first of these objects was an 
electrical switch and the second, an electrical relay. 
The conditions of pretest training involved the acqui-
sition of differential prior experience with these ob-
jects by our Ss. The pretest training was conducted as 
follows: 
Groups Sw contained 9 Ss who were given the pretest 
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task of completing an electrical circuit on a "bread 
board" by using a switch, which had to be installed 
if the circuit were to be completed and controllable. 
Group R consisted of 10 Ss who received pretest 
graining in the completion of an identical circuit 
by the use of a relay, which is essentially a switch. 
Group C, the control group, consisted of 6 engineer-
ing students with a wide variety of electrical expe-
rience. These Ss were given no pretraining. The Ss 
in groups R and S had had little or no experience 
with electrical wiring. 
Shortly after having completed the pretesting tasks, 
the Ss were presented with the two-cord problem and 
asked to solve it by using the objects lying before 
them on a table. Only two objects were present, a 
switch and a relay, each identical with the ones used 
in the pretraining period. 
All Ss were individually tested. Upon completing 
the two-cord problem, the Ss were asked why they had 
chosen either the switch or the relay as the pendu-
lum weight (Birch and Rabinowitz 1951 p. 122). 
The control group, who were equally familiar with both switches 
and relays, chose equally between them as pendulum weights in 
solving the two-cord problem. Their prior experience was not 
heavily weighted in favor of one or the other in terms of their 
utility in a new context in which their function was quite dif-
ferent from the normal. 
The behavior of the previously naive subjects was strikingly 
different, however. Of those who had been trained to complete the 
electrical circuit with a relay, none of them used this object as 
the pendulum weight (i.e., ten of ten used the switch). On the 
other hand, the subjects who had been trained to use a switch in 
completing the circuit preponderantly chose the relay as a pendu-
lum (seven of nine). Combining the results of both experimental 
groups, 17 of the 19 subjects used that object with which they 
had had no prior experience as the problem-solving tool. Thus 
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specific experience was influential in determining their problem-
solving behavior. Post-experiment interviews reinforced this 
conclusion. 
This study was reported in detail in part because of its 
intrinsic value as a paradigm, but also to illustrate that the 
biasing effect of past experience may be negative as well as posi-
itive (For an experiment with strikingly similar results, see 
Luchins 1942). Prior experience colors the perceived character-
istics or value of an idea, object, or approach in ways that in-
hibit or enhance its subsequent utilization. The old saying that 
experience is the best teacher is only a half truth. 
In the information and influence flow diagram presented ear-
lier, those lines of influence indicated for the mind-sets to 
which an individual researcher is subject are given in 
Figure 8: 
Figure 8  
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For some of these lines of influence there are empirical studies, 
for others we would offer research suggestions. 
Allen and Marquis compared the behavior of eight laborato-
ries in two R & D proposal competitions (1964). They found that 
mind-sets resulting from prior experience do not, by themselves, 
result in a higher or lower probability of achieving a correct 
solution. While this result may speciously violate a commonsense 
feeling about the value of experience, it is hardly surprising 
when coupled with the reminder that, the crucial point about prior 
experience is not its existence per se but rather the appropri-
ateness or inappropriateness of its transfer to a present situa-
tion. In other words, when prior experience is appropriate to 
the present problem the probability of achieving a successful 
solution is increased. Thus the biasing set is positive. On the 
other hand, when the prior experience is not appropriate, the 
biasing set is negative, i.e., the probability of success is low-
ered. Prior knowledge was found to have much the same effect as 
prior experience. 
Other studies (Luchins 1942; Maier 1961) have shown that suc-
cess in overcoming the effect of a negative bias is a function of 
the number of alternatives considered in the problem solving pro-
cess. Allen and Marquis also found this to be the case. 
Of the eight instances in which the laboratory had prior 
experience with a technique which would be unsuccessful 
if applied to the present problem four considered no 
alternative approaches and all four submitted solutions 
which were evaluated as unsuccessful. In our other in-
stances the laboratory considered two, three, or more 
alternative approaches, and half of them achieved a suc-
cessful solution. The additional effort required to 
search for and compare several alternative approaches 
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is justified by the decreased susceptibility to neg-
ative biasing set (1964 p. 161). 
If one knew a priori when an individual's mind-set constituted a 
positive bias and when it was negative, there, of course, would 
be no problem. One would just look for alternatives in the neg-
ative cases. However, an individual is typically not that self-
conscious about the nature of his own biases, nor can he know be-
fore hand which approach will prove successful. 
Given these constraints, the prescription always to consider 
several alternatives would seem to be sound. A somewhat subtle 
complication should be noted, however. If the individual re-
searcher's normal approach to problem solving situations is to 
consider several alternatives, then by definition the influence 
of a particular biasing set is not a problem for him in the first 
place. On the other hand, if he is strongly influenced by a par- 
ticular set, then this fact will lessen the effect of such advice. 
Perhaps the point of such advice needs to be reinforced by cer-
tain approaches available to management. Several points made 
earlier about the influence of the primary group should be re-
called in this regard. While primary social groups are not read-
ily open to restructuring, the primary work group is. The indivi-
dual with a particularly strong mind-set might well acquire more 
flexibility over time if he is a part of a particularly hetero-
geneous work group, or at least a group that included a "devil's 
advocate." One might also consider the beneficial effects that 
have been shown to accrue from a diversity of work assignments. 
It is also important in this connection to be aware of exper-
imental work in social psychology on specific problem-solving 
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techniques. Let us mention two. The first involves a comparison 
of problem solving behavior under deferred-judgment instructions 
with such behavior under conditions of concurrent-judgment. The 
former involves posing potential solutions to a problem without 
evaluation of their quality until a number of alternatives have 
been posed. Concurrent judgment conditions, on the other hand, 
involve instructions which require only solutions of "good" qual-
ity. 
The deferred judgment approach to problem solving is com-
monly referred to as "brainstorming," and received considerable 
popular attention and some serious investigation in the late '50s 
and early '60s. Conclusions as to its merit are mixed, due pri-
marily to the lack of standardized experimental conditions. Parnes 
and Meadow report, "Significantly more good solutions were pro-
duced under the deferred-judgment instructions than under the con-
current-judgment instructions" (1963 p. 315). Others report much 
less impressive or mixed results. While the experimental evidence 
concerning the deferred judgment technique is, therefore, not 
clear-cut, one can assume that it would be of some value in help-
ing the individual or group overcome biasing set influences. 
A related technique which might be of even more value in this 
context is that of "extended effort." A mind-set typically leads 
one to a familiar approach or idea which is transferred to the 
present situation, and, then the search stops. There is experi-
mental evidence, however, that if the conditions are such that 
one is forced beyond this initial production of ideas with which 
he is familiar, he will begin to grope for less obvious ones, the 
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quality of which may be higher (Parnes 1964). The advantage of 
extended effort instructions in overcoming individual and group 
biases should be obvious. 
The focus in this brief treatment of mind-sets has been their 
influence on the innovation behavior of the researcher in the lab-
oratory. Let us now shift this focus slightly to offer a re-
search suggestion that would seem to merit a high priority. In 
light of the above discussion it is probably a mistake to view 
technical information gatekeepers as passive conduits in the in-
formation flow network. Relative to their own mind-sets and the 
tenacity with which they are held, they probably also filter such 
information. 	The nature and extent will of course vary with the 
individual. But to assume that such a filtering function does 
not exist is prima facie questionable. Since the flow of technical 
information in the R & D process seems highly dependent upon such 
gatekeepers, this speculative hypothesis should be explored. 
This completes our survey of the major influence elements 
within the R & D laboratory. We shall now shift our focus to the 
patterns of information flow, beginning with information concern-
ing market needs and opportunities. 
6. The Flow of Information Concerning Needs  
The phrase "problem definition and idea generation" points to 
two informational components on the one hand, and the product of 
their creative synthesis on the other. The two kinds of informa-
tion required for the definition of a problem are described by 
Baker and Freeland as follows: 
1. Recognition of an organizational need, problem or 
opportunity which is perceived to be relevant to organ-
izational objectives, and 
2. Recognition of a means or technique by which to 
satisfy the need, solve the problem, or capitalize 
on the opportunity (1972, p. 107). 
Thus among the necessary conditions for generating an idea is 
information about both a need (problem or opportunity) and a means 
(potential technological capability) for meeting the need. 
One question which arises in connection with the above con-
cerns the identification of the "need" component as a need (prob-
lem, or opportunity) of the organization. Would not an "organi-
zational need, problem, or opportunity" be, by definition, "rel-
evant to organizational objectives?" The point here is not to in- 
troduce a semantic quibble. Nor is it to deny that upon occasion 
the event which stimulated the process to begin was the recogni-
tion of a need within the organization. But it would seem likely 
that for the most part the initial stimulating event would be the 
recognition by someone of a need that lies outside the organiza-
tion, i.e., in the market. Baker indicates that in his research 
this is in fact the case. It was not made explicit in the study 
mentioned above since his purpose there lay in picking up the pro-
cess at a later point, "need as perceived by those within the 
R & D laboratory." 
The distinction here is an important one that has received 
little treatment in the literature. We would suggest that market 
need information becomes organizational need information by a me-
diated or "two-step" flow process. That is, information about 
social and market needs flows into the firm through various chan-
nels. Unless such channels are usually anemic, the total set of 
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such communicated needs should far exceed the firm's capacity to 
respond. This set is then filtered in terms of the firm's capa-
city (both economic and technical), its corporate strategy and 
objectives, its aggressiveness and morale, etc. The much smaller 
subset of recognized needs that pass these filters can then be 
called organizational needs and subject to the next step, which 
is their coupling with potential technological capacities for 
meeting them. This view of a two-step flow of information about 
needs seems to be supported by Langrish et al (see quote, p. 122 
above). 
What Baker has identified as an organizational need, problem„ 
or opportunity would seem (unless it is truly "internal") to be 
that much smaller set of market needs which has survived the fil-
ter process sketched above and is thus compatible with the prevail- 
ing characteristics of the firm. It is important to recognize, how-
ever, that this set of "organizational needs," or perhaps more 
accurately "firm-compatible market needs," is the product of a fil-
tering process. Otherwise our conceptual structure will not be 
sufficiently fine-grained to guide empirical investigations on a 
number of important questions. 
In the diagram with which we began, the principal elements 
in the flow of "need" information were displayed as indicated in 
figure 9. This segment of our model is the first we have considered 
in which the flow of information rather than influence is primary. 
Following the terminology suggested by Utterback (1974), the 
relevant societal determinants and modifiers which were discussed 
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in Chapter 2 are here referred to as "Current Economic and Social 
Utilization." These exogenous environmental influences are of 
course not the only ones that impinge upon the process. In fact 
Utterback suggests that the most crucial ones often lie closer to 
home. "The primary limitations on a firm's effectiveness in inno-
vation appear to be its ability and perhaps aggressiveness in 
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recognizing needs and demand in its external environment" (1971 
p. 81). To this we would add its lack of information or failure 
to use the information it has. 
At this point the state-of-the-art understanding becomes sur-
prisingly uneven. Some aspects of the flow of market-need infor-
mation are understood rather well, while others are almost opaque. 
That which seems to have been studied most extensively, and about 
which there is broad agreement, is the event which triggers the 
innovation process. Sixty-six to ninety percent of the innova-
tions examined by a number of researchers find their starting 
point in the recognition of a need. 	In the remaining cases the 
stimulating event has been new scientific or technical advances 
for which an application is then sought. This impressive commu-
nity of agreement has been discussed in the supply-demand litera-
ture (Chapter 2) and has been summarized by Utterback in Table 4. 
Thus the "need-means" pattern seems clearly dominant. That 
is, in the majority of cases a need first comes to be recognized 
and stimulates the search for a technical capability which will 
satisfy it. 
Information about market needs seems to come primarily through 
oral and informal discussion with contacts outside the firm. 22 
Further, such communication about a need seems to be most often 
initiated by someone other than the individual who ultimately gen-
erates the idea for an innovation. These outside sources of mar-
ket need information are most often an existing or potential cus-
tomer (Utterback 1974). The search for market need information 
(if, indeed, it may be called a search in light of the passivity 
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TABLE 4 
A COMPARISON OF STUDIES OF THE PROPORTIONS OF INNOVATIONS 
STIMULATED BY MARKET NEEDS AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
Proportion from 
	Proportion 





Needs (percent) (percent) 
	
Size 
Baker 	et al. 	(1967) 77 23 303* 
Carter and Williams 	(1957) 73 27 137 
Goldhar 	(1970) 69 31 108 
Sherwin and Isenson 	(1967) 61 34 710+ 
Langrish 	(1971) 66 34 84 
Myers and Marquis 	(1969) 78 22 439 
Tannenbaum, et al. 	(1966) 90 10 10 
Utterback 	(1969) 75 25 32 
*Ideas for new products and processes. 
+Research events used in 20 developments. 
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revealed in the above summary) seems much less structured and de-
liberate than the subsequent search for matching technical capa-
bilities. 
This sketch of the flow pattern for market need information 
occasions a number of observations, which, it should be noted, are 
highly speculative. First, if this is even a reasonably complete 
picture of how a firm comes to know of market needs (which we 
rather doubt) one must be shaken by its impoverished and haphazard 
nature. Informal contacts with customers or potential customers 
is certainly an important channel to the outside world. But if, 
as is pictured here, most of the contacts that matter are with a 
researcher in the laboratory, then one must suspect that there are 
quite rich contacts at other levels within the firm that are 
not being utilized. Salesmen, for instance, would have much more 
extensive contact with customers than the researcher and thus should 
be a better source of market need information. The literature on 
technological innovation, however, does not deal with this input. 
Either salesmen do not provide such need-information inputs to the 
laboratory or their role in this regard has not been investigated 
by those concerned with the process of technological innovation. 
The literature on this point is virtually non-existent, and the 
authors of this report disagree as to which of these possibilities 
is the case. 
The same point applies to other units within a firm that have 
"windows" to the outside world, e.g. technical service groups, 
market research, corporate planning, etc. Certainly these chan-
nels of market need information exist, but the research literature 
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on the innovation process does not deal with whatever inputs they 
make to problem definition in the R & D laboratory. And finally, 
the literature is silent as to the contribution of top corporate 
management in the flow of need information, which, on the hypoth-
esized linkage to the external world (with which we began this 
chapter) would seem to provide a major input. 
What is being suggested here is that information about mar-
ket needs in fact enters the firm via a number of channels and at 
various levels within the corporate structure. 
For those channels that feed directly from the external envi-
ronment to the researcher in the R & D laboratory, the information 
flow pattern is relatively simple and has been described above. 
The only caution that should be added at this point is that the 
researcher himself, and the primary group to which he belongs, pro-
vide some filter-effect in terms of both their technical receptiv-
ity to certain needs rather than others, and their subjective per-
ceptions of corporate needs, goals, and strategies. Were this the 
only channel of market-need flow, as one could conclude from the 
innovation literature, this would constitute a serious barrier to 
innovation, especially in light of the fact that most innovations 
are need-induced. 
For the other channels whose existence we hypothesize, the 
information flow would again involve a two-step flow, from the 
outside source to a transfer agent within the firm and then to 
the researcher within the laboratory. This would involve an 
additional filter or screen which not only is not understood at 
this point, but has not even been identified in the innovation 
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literature. That such transfer agents or mechanisms do exist, 
however, is prima facie plausible in view of the unlikelihood of 
the single-channel alternative. 
If such additional channels of information about market needs 
do exist, this raises another possibility that merits investiga-
tion. Perhaps there are key individuals at various levels within 
the firm who, owing to the richness of their external contacts, 
perform a gatekeeper function. That is, analogous to the techni-
cal information gatekeepers, there may exist what might be called 
"market-need gatekeepers." This too would be a quite specialized 
role, requiring a greater than normal "cosmopolitan" orientation, 
an extensive network of information sources, and unusually broad 
experience to detect market-need signals from the background noise. 
The last of these suggested characteristics of our hypothe-
sized market-need gatekeeper clashes in an interesting way with 
the first. It implies that he must also have a fairly strong 
"local" orientation, since the distinction between market "signals" 
and market "noise" is largely a function of the condition, policies, 
and needs of his firm. That is, since the needs and opportunities 
of the market are always far greater than any firm can begin to 
respond to, the information that is relevant to a firm is that 
which "fits" its current profile. The rest is noise. The hypo-
thetical market-need gatekeeper must, therefore, be "local" enough 
to make these distinctions of relevancy while at the same time 
being "cosmpolitan" enough to "keep on top of" the external envi-
ronment. This consideration alone is enough to warrant investi-
gation of this hypothesized function. Market needs mis-gauged 
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whether by an impoverished network or by inadequate measures of 
relevancy, mean ideas, and thus innovative opportunities, lost. 
Probably no other facet of the problem definition and idea gen-
eration phase is so badly neglected and thus so poorly under-
stood. And yet most innovations begin here. 
Let us assume, now, that by whatever channels are operative 
a firm has continuous access to the raw data about market needs. 
We then need to address explicitly the issue of "relevant" data 
which was introduced above. At least two frames of reference must 
be distinguished here; (1) relevance from the corporate perspec-
tive as determined by top management and articulated in the deci-
sions of the R & D manager, and (2) relevance in terms of the per-
ceptions of the researcher in the laboratory. We will comment on 
these perspectives only briefly since they will receive detailed 
treatment in the concluding section. 
Galbraith has argued that in dealing with a given external 
environment and a given set of internal constraints, a firm faces 
not one but a rich multiplicity of possible strategies (Galbraith 
1970). Whatever the innovation strategy adopted by a firm, it 
becomes the measure of relevance for market-need data. To take 
but one example, if in a highly competitive market a firm assumes 
a basically "defensive" posture reacting to the advances of others 
by small incremental changes in its product line, the market data 
considered "relevant" will have certain rather predictable charac-
teristics. If, on the other hand, it adopts a more aggressive, 
"offensive" stance, seeking to gain a competitive edge rather than 
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just holding its own, different market data will be considered 
relevant. Therefore, the corporate profile, determined partially 
by the environment within which it operates, partially by its own 
internal circumstances, and partially by the aims, strategies and 
structures it chooses, constitutes a major filter for the market 
need data which flows in (or is sought) by the various channels 
suggested above. The role played by individual biasing sets, pri-
mary groups, and particular leadership styles -- as these operate 
at the higher management levels and influence the nature of this 
filter -- can only be guessed at. 
The individual researcher's perception of this corporate pro-
file constitutes another significant filter to which information 
concerning market needs and opportunities is subject before it 
comes to be an element in the creative process of idea generation. 
At this point it is more accurate, perhaps, to follow Baker and 
Freeland and speak of "organizational" rather than "market" needs, 
since the two have by now become one and the same. The researcher's 
perception of these needs is constructed from his own experience, 
and that of his primary group, with management's reception of ideas 
that have been proposed in the past. As we shall see in the con-
cluding section, there is impressive evidence to the effect that 
these perceptions exert a considerable influence upon idea genera-
tion behavior. 
7. The Flow of Technical Information  
The segment of our model representing the key elements of 
technical information flow is repeated in figure 10. 
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FIGURE 10. 
To begin with the box in the lower left of this figure, Utterback 
(1974) stressed two crucial environmental boundary conditions for 
technological innovation. The first, the degree of economic and 
social utilization of existing technology, was discussed above. 
The second is the current state of technical knowledge. Since this 
topic has been treated in Chapter 2, we will have to restrict our 
consideration of this factor to the characteristics of the flow of 
technical knowledge into the firm. 
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The primary means for transferring technological information 
to the user seems to be oral and informal (Utterback 1969; Marquis 
1967). Publication of previous results is less important than in 
science, since the utilization of an innovation is more important 
to its developers than the information about it. While a journal 
system exists for technology, it is not cumulative to the degree 
that scientific literature is (Price 1965). Thus the technolog-
ical researcher both publishes less and finds his professional 
literature a less rewarding source of ideas than do scientists. 
Marquis and Allen have argued that even in his oral comunica-
tion the technologist differs from the scientist (1967). He is 
limited by organizational barriers in the formation of invisible 
college networks analogous to those demonstrated by Price to exist 
for scientific communities. 
This organizational identification works in two ways 
to exclude the technologist from informal communica-
tion channels outside his organization. First, there 
are the usual requirements that he work only on prob- 
lems which are of interest to his employer and, second, 
that he refrain from early disclosure of his research, 
to prevent the employer's competitors from profiting 
from the results (Marquis and Allen 1967, p. 1053). 
As evidence of the differences in the information flow patterns, 
Allen compared the frequency with which ideas were brought to the 
attention of researchers through various channels in seventeen 
development and two research projects. These results are shown in 
Table 5. Although it is unfortunate that more comparably sized 
samples were not available, the comparison of use percentages for 
the various channels is quite impressive nevertheless. Our basic 
Table 5 
SOURCES OF MESSAGES RESULTING ON TECHNICAL IDEAS 





Two Physics . 
Research 
Projects 
Channel Number of Percent- Number Percent- 
messages age of of age of 
produced total messages 
produced 
total 
Literature 53 8% 18 51% 
Vendors 101 14 0 0 
Customer 132 19 0 0 
Other sources external 
to the laboratory 
67 9 5 14 
Laboratory technical staff 44 6 1 3 
Company research programs 37 5 1 3 
Analysis and 
experimentation 
216 31 3 9 
Previous personal 
experience 
56 8 7 20 
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point that the transfer of technological information is primarily 
oral is clearly demonstrated, while the relatively smaller contri-
bution of literature sources is evident. 
Even the limited reliance on literature sources must be fur-
ther qualified. Most widely used of all written materials within 
technology are unpublished or "inhouse" technical reports (Marquis 
and Allen 1967,p. 1055), probably because of the proprietary inter-
est that firms have in the technical information they produce. 
Technical report; despite their limited dissemination, serve the 
need to record such information while restricting its domain of 
use. Although it is difficult to monitor and control the dissemi-
nation of inhouse reports beyond the first user, Marquis and Allen 
report the existence of a norm at the interorganizational level. 
"There seems to be a rather strong norm against the transfer of 
another organization's reports beyond the limits of one's own or-
ganization" (1967,p. 1057). Such a norm could only operate to 
limit dissemination to a third organization, not in the case of 
a direct flow from one to another. 
Yet the interorganizational flow of unpublished technical 
reports would seem to be a significant factor in a researcher's 
effort to stay abreast of his field. This too may be largely a 
two-step flow, mediated by the technical information gatekeeper. 
To offer a speculation based on the above findings, which 
have been distilled by Marquis and Allen from a wide range of em-
pirical studies, it may be the case that an "invisible college" 
also characterizes the flow of technological information, but in 
a subtler sense than Price has demonstrated for science. The 
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subtlety is introduced by the conflicting needs that firms have to 
protect their proprietary interest in information on the one hand, 
and to stay abreast of the state-of-the-art by acquiring informa-
tion on the other. Conflict between these needs can only be sat-
isfied, and then just partially, by trading one off against the 
other. That is, a firm must give as well as receive in order to 
maintain a state of the art awareness for itself; but in the giv-
ing some proprietary interest must be sacrificed: 
We hypothesize that the mechanisms by which the exchange of 
technical information might take place are quite informal and 
operate well down in the corporate structure rather than at or 
near the top. The technical information gatekeepers, who are 
turned to as resource persons by others in the laboratory, could 
be primary channels by which a firm gives as well as receives 
technical information. 
That such a variation on the invisible college hypothesis has 
substance has not been demonstrated, or even suggested, in the 
research literature. It is again a speculative leap beyond what 
is known. But the phenomenon of inter-organizational flow of tech-
nical information is clearly recognized, at least implicitly, in 
the literature. So too is the proprietary interest that organiza-
tions have in the information they generate. Likewise, the role 
of gatekeepers in bringing information into the firm is frequently 
noted. If the scenario offered is inadequate as . an account of the 
interaction of these known variables, perhaps it will at least 
serve to stimulate the research necessary to understand it aright. 
Before leaving this point, let us add one final consideration. 
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Some items of technical information are public rather than propri-
etary, such as government held patents and technical reports. But 
Utterback reports that they "are seldom used in a commercially or 
socially important application other than the specific one from 
which the patent or information arose" (1974, p. 623). Although 
the explanation for this fact is undoubtedly complex, perhaps the 
fact that such information is equally accessible to all who are 
active in the field means that there is no particular advantage to 
any in its exploitation. 
It will be recalled from our earlier discussion that the major-
ity of innovations have as their initial impetus the recognition 
of a market need. Less commonly a technical capability is first 
recognized, followed by the search for a need to which it can be 
applied. In this "means/need" pattern the process begins with a 
particular technical capacity, and the search is among a range of 
market needs. What is the nature of certain technical capacities 
that makes them attractive enough to stimulate the search for a 
need? Utterback suggests, "Older technical possibilities seldom 
attract attention spontaneously" (1974, p. 623). On the other 
hand, a new discovery or technical possibility often attracts the 
researcher's attention and thus stimulates the search for applica-
tions. Thus newness would seem to be characteristic of technical 
means that initiate the process. There is also evidence that "the 
larger technological changes tend to be of the 'discovery push' type" 
(Langrish et al 1972, p. 75). That is, innovations stimulated by 
the recognition of a need are often smaller and more incremental, 
while those stimulated by a new discovery or capability are of 
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greater magnitude and constitute greater discontinuities with the 
past. 
One should not automatically assume, however, that these large 
technological changes have their origin in a scientific discovery. 
To refine somewhat the material in chapter two, Price in fact ar-
gues that science and technology develop quite independently of one 
another, with communication being limited to that which occurs in 
the education of technologists (Price 1965). Marquis and Allen 
agree with this general assessment, but offer two refinements. 
First they note that: 
Occasionally technology encounters a problem block-
ing its advance, the removal of which requires a 
fundamental understanding of the scientific basis 
of the phenomena involved. In this way, science 
discovers voids in areas which have been bypassed 
by the research front. Quite frequently, too, dif-
ficulties encountered during the research process 
in a seemingly unrelated area will reveal a gap in 
the understanding of a basic segment of science. 
Here again, in a sense, application helps to deter-
mine the direction or priorities in scientific in-
vestigation (1967, p. 1057). 
Most cases of technological advance do not seem to be of this sort; 
they neither require information from the forefront of science nor 
define a problem there. But when technological advance requires a 
"gap-filling" contribution from science, "the communication is bi-
lateral
, direct, and quite rapid" (1967, p. 1059). 
The second enrichment of Price's generalization involves a 
distinction among technological areas. Some, perhaps electronics, 
are probably more closely related to work on the frontiers of sci-
ence than others, for instance, mechanical technology. Neither of 
these refinements, however, disturbs the general point that there 
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seems to be little direct dependence of technological innovation 
on science. As science builds on earlier science, so technology 
seems to build on previous technology. 
What does this mean in terms of the technological gatekeepers 
whose role in the flow of information has been anticipated several 
times above? Allen and Cohen hypothesize the existence and func-
tion of such individuals as follows: "There can exist in an R & D 
laboratory certain key individuals who are capable of effectively 
bridging the organizational boundary impedance and who provide the 
most effective entry point for ideas into the lab" (1966, p. 6). 
Such individuals can be characterized in several ways. First, as 
opposed to most individuals within the laboratory who have few 
contacts outside, the gatekeeper's contacts are extensive. There 
is some evidence that such gatekeepers do not all tend the same 
gate (or all gates) with equal facility. Some concentrate on the 
technical literature, while others maintain a richer network of 
informal contacts outside of the organization. Given the dominance 
of oral communication noted previously, the latter would seem to 
provide the more fruitful information channels. Allen and Cohen, 
however, provide a finer-grained distinction which is worthy of 
note: 
The literature has been shown to provide information 
which is important for keeping abreast of the state 
of a technological field, while oral sources are 
probably better in providing more specific detailed 
information about particular techniques. Gatekeepers 
who specialize in knowledge of the state-of-the-art 
would then tend to expose themselves more to the lit- 
erature, while those specializing in particular re-
search techniques would interact more with external 
oral sources (1969, p. 18). 
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This distinction between written and oral sources and specializa-
tions may prove valuable, but one might wonder if it is quite so 
clear-cut as it may seem. 
Unfortunately, the research literature is silent as to the 
extent to which the gatekeeper serves, not only as a channel of 
information from the outside, but aso as a filter for such infor-
mation. This point has been raised above as to the influence of 
the mind-sets or biases to which the gatekeeper is subject owing 
to his past experience. It merits investigation in light of the 
crucial role that gatekeepers seem to play in the information flow 
process. 
The final point to be made concerning the gatekeepers has also 
been anticipated above, but has apparently not been dealt with in 
the literature. We have hypothesized that gatekeepers may not only 
bring information into the firm from the outside, but may also 
share their firm's information with their contacts in other firms. 
To review the argument here, at least some and perhaps most of a 
gatekeeper's contacts outside the firm would be those who perform 
a similar function in other firms. If this is so, then the needs 
of all parties would be similar and the relationships would by 
necessity be reciprocal, i.e., information would have to be ex-
changed. If one party sought to receive only, and never give, the 
informational needs of his contacts would not be met and the rela-
tionships would eventually break down. The research agenda sug-
gested by this point rests on the prima-facie possibility that 
there exists for technology a communications network, or "invis-
ible college," analogous to that which has been demonstrated for 
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science, but with quite distinctive characteristics owing to the 
firm's proprietary interest in information. 
Mention should be made of another avenue by which technical 
information enters the firm. Burns has concluded that the transfer 
of technical information is the work of "agents not agencies," and 
one of the most efficient forms of this transfer is "on the hoof" 
(1961, p. 12). That is, an individual researcher joining a firm 
brings with him not only a certain level of training and technical 
competence, but also a store of ideas and technical information 
acquired in his previous work settings. As to the importance of 
such ideas and information to his new employer, Langrish et al 
found that, "in the cases we have studied, the most frequent sin-
gle mode of technology transfer was by a person joining a firm" 
(1972, p. 44; See also Table 7, p. 79). 
To enter the speculative mode again, it may well be that "on 
the hoof" information transfer is a more important source in tech-
nological breakthrough (and discontinuous-for-the-firm) efforts 
than for incremental innovations. The argument here is that the 
store of technical information represented by a firm's current R 
& D personnel is more likely to be adequate in itself, or with 
routine accretions from outside, for incremental improvements than 
it is for new and dissimilar activities. One of the immediate im-
plications of a corporate decision to undertake a major break-
through project may be that it must "gear-up" for it by bringing 
in new technical personnel with the appropriate specialized know-
ledge. It would thus be availing itself of information "on the 
hoof." 
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Our final topic in this section is the range of technical 
options considered by an individual researcher or laboratory in 
generating an idea. This topic in effect forces a recapitulation 
of much of the foregoing since it points to the discrepancy between 
the current state of relevant technical knowledge and the subset of 
such knowledge actually considered in a particular instance. We 
will be quite brief in summarizing the influences that contribute 
to this discrepancy. 
The number of technical options that are actually considered 
as possible solutions to a recognized market need is a function of 
a wide range of variables. Of most importance as a filter is the 
perceived nature of the need itself. A second obvious considera-
tion is the base of technical information within the firm. Since 
most of the firm's store of relevant technical information was not 
generated within but enters from the outside, primarily by oral 
channels, the richness and state of repair of its communications 
network is a third significant influence. If its gatekeepers are 
able and if the filters introduced by their own biases are not in 
a particular instance counterproductive, then the range of techni-
cal options considered may be large. If, in addition, new people 
with relevant experience have entered the laboratory recently then 
the range could be enlarged even further. If consultants are 
available at this early stage, this again can be a positive factor. 
Anticipating the next section, if the time pressure associated 
with current project work is not so heavy as to preclude the explo-
ration of a number of possibilities for a new idea, then clearly 
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the number that can be considered will increase. Related to this 
point, if the firm has established mechanisms for the explicit 
purpose of encouraging new ideas (see the description of one 
firm's "Idea Generation Groups" in Baker et al 1967), then the 
range explored should be larger. This should also be the case if 
the firm's reward structure is such as to recognize and reward 
effort spent in idea generation activities as well as effort directed 
to other responsibilities. 
In another dimension, the range of technical options consid-
ered will be influenced by the primary socialization groups within 
the laboratory, since these serve to channel technical discussion 
and help either to form or reinforce a researcher's attitudes to-
wards certain technical approaches. And, finally, the number of 
technical options that receive serious consideration is also a 
function of the mind-sets of individuals, especially, it seems, 
those who enjoy status as opinion leaders. 
This check-list of screens or filters that can function to 
widen the gap between the technical options that exist and those 
that actually come to be considered in a particular case is on the 
face of it quite formidable. The actual counter-productive effect 
of these filters individually and in concert will, of course, vary 
with the nature of each need that occasions a search, and over 
time. Minimizing their counter-productive effects and maximizing 
their productive impact are tasks which accrue to those in super-
visory positions within the laboratory. 
This completes our review and assessment of the literature on 
problem definition and idea generation within the R & D laboratory. 
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It remains now to examine what happens to an idea once it exists 
within the organization. 
8. Post-Idea Generation Filters and Linkages  
A significant amount of empirical research has been oriented 
toward the exploration of creativity. Most of this research 23 has 
been conducted by psychologists, whose efforts can be categorized 
as follows: 1) creativity and education, 2) description of crea-
tive individuals, 3) identification of creative individuals, 4) 
prediction of creative performance, 5) early experiences and cre-
ativity, and 6) creative techniques. 
several authors including Kuhn and Kaplan (1959) and McPherson 
(1965) have noted that despite the abundance of literature on cre-
ativity, there has been relatively little study of the organiza-
tional conditions conducive to creativity in organized R & D. From 
the relevant work which has been done, initial insights towards 
identifying organizational factors which influence creative per-
formance in the R & D laboratory and postulating relationships can 
be drawn. This literature exists in two pieces -- that authored 
by psychologists, sociologists, and management scientists 24 and 
that by persons concerned with the management of industrial R & D. 25 
 In addition, two university groups have been particularly productive 
in this area, namely, A. H. Rubenstein and his colleagues of the 
Program of Research on the Management of Research and Development 
(POMRAD) at Northwestern University 26 (see POMRAD's "Annual Reports") 
and the late Don Marquis, Tom Allen, and their colleagues at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 27 Utterback's excellent 
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summary of the literature dealing with innovation and the diffu-
sion of technology in industry is on the "must" list in this area 
(Utterback 1974). 
The literature dealing with problem definition and idea gen-
eration has been assessed above. The purpose of the brief sum-
mary above is to set the background for the remainder of this sub-
section. While relatively little work has been reported which 
relates organizational variables to creativity, even less has been 
done on the process by which an idea existing within an organiza-
tion is communicated for organizational review, i.e., the process 
by which an idea becomes a candidate for the scarce organizational 
resources. It is not sufficient that an idea be generated; it 
must also be set forth in a proposal, get funded as a project, and 
be successfully researched and developed before benefit can accrue 
to the organization. The remainder of this subsection deals with 
organizational factors influencing idea submission, i.e., those 
factors determining whether or not an existing idea will be sub-
mitted for consideration as a project. These influences are re-
presented in Figure 11. 
Although the literature relevant to idea submission was sum-
marized by Baker (1965) and updated by Siegman, Baker, and Ruben-
stein (1969), only conjectures and insights can be drawn from it. 
There are some empirical studies, but they are diverse and of vary-
ing methodological soundness; hence, the following summary state-





















1. The perception of time pressures associated with 
the current R & D activity encourages idea gen-
eration and development associated with the cur-
rent work activity, but stifles idea generation 
and development not associated directly with the 
current work activity (Jones and Arnold 1962; 
Kaplan 1960; March and Simon 1958). 
2. In order for "free time" to be utilized for idea 
generation and development not associated directly 
with the current work activity, the rewards must 
be viewed as: 
a. of the same nature as the rewards for cur-
rent work activity, but, because of the 
inherent uncertainty, of greater magnitude; 
or 
b. valued by the idea originator and of a dif-
ferent nature than the rewards for current 
work activity.  .28 
3. In order for idea generation and submission to con-
tinue over time, it is essential that previously 
submitted ideas be perceived as having been posi-
tively and enthusiastically received and evaluated 
by the organizational reviewers, especially R & D 
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management and supervisors. 29 
4. The perception of organizational goals and needs 
held by R & D scientists and engineers is influ-
enced by the perceived receptivity of organiza-
tional reviewers to previously submitted ideas 
and by interaction with other R & D scientists 
and engineers (Avery 1959; Houton 1963). 
5. If the organizational reviewers perceive an idea 
to be relevant, i.e., to satisfy an existing need 
or solve an existing problem, then they are more 
likely to receive the idea positively and enthu-
siastically (Avery 1960; Kaplan 1960). 
6. Prior to submission, R & D scientists and engineers 
tend to screen their ideas according to their per-
ceptions of its relevance (Kornhauser 1962; Morris 
1962). 
7. Perceptions of organizational needs and problems 
tend to stimulate idea generation and development 
congruent with these perceptions, but to stifle 
idea generation and development not congruent with 
these perceptions. 30 
Many other independent, dependent, and intervening variables can 
be conjectured (Utterback 1964); the statements preceding are a 
logical starting point and summary of the literature prior to 1969. 
The primary concern here is with the process by which exist-
ing ideas are submitted to organizational reviewers and, most 
especially, with the constraints and screens in the process. It 
follows from the summary statements that two screenings occur 
prior to actual submission -- at idea generation and at idea sub-
mission. The factors constituting each screen include perceived 
relevance, perceived time pressures associated with current work, 
and perceived rewards (or costs) associated with expending effort 
on "non-relevant, non-current" idea generation and development. 
Perceptions of rewards (or costs) and organizational needs 
and problems held by R & D scientists and engineers, and used by 
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them to determine the relevance of an idea, are based on managerial 
behavior in reviewing and evaluating submitted ideas and on second-
hand feedback from other R & D scientists and engineers in the or-
ganization. Note that both of these bases are historical in nature 
and, accordingly, that R & D scientists may be judging relevancy on 
obsolete grounds. In an environment that changes as rapidly as 
does R & D, relevancy should not be judged entirely on behavior re-
lated to yesterday's ideas for solving last year's problems. Thus, 
timely "need" and "means" information is essential, not only at 
problem definition and idea generation, but also at idea submission. 
For the ideal operation of the screens in the idea flow pro-
cess "good" ideas should pass through, but "poor" ideas should be 
filtered out. If "good" ideas are halted, the organization loses 
their benefits; conversely, if "poor" ideas pass through, the or-
ganization must expend already scarce resources to evaluate them. 
Recent research in one organization demonstrated that both errors 
were occurring (Baker and Freeland 1972; Baker, Siegman and Ruben-
stein 1967). Ideas were created but not submitted, and, based on 
both subjective ratings and on subsequent managerial disposition 
decisions, these unsubmitted ideas were of higher overall quality 
than those routinely submitted. Perhaps the most startling find-
ing was that 38% of the ideas which eventually achieved project 
status came from the originally not-submitted category, which con-
tained only 15% of the ideas subsequently reviewed by management. 
In an unrelated study, Peters and Roberts (1967) found somewhat sim-
ilar results for a university laboratory. Because the data in this 
area are scarce and incomplete, the results should be treated with 
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caution. However, these two separate studies, indicate that there 
was a substantial loss in innovative potential due to "good" ideas 
not being submitted. 
In order to obtain further empirical insights into the process 
of idea submission, Baker (1965; Baker and Freeland 1972) developed 
detailed case histories for 45 ideas which were generated, but were 
not submitted, in an industrial R & D laboratory. Due to Baker's 
intervention, the ideas were subsequently submitted and officially 
reviewed. As indicated in the preceding paragraph, a number of high 
quality ideas eventually became funded projects. This appeared to 
be an opportune setting for gaining empirical insight into why ap-
parently relevantt timely ideas were not submitted by the idea orig-
inator(s). 
Case histories, constructed prior to the intervention and even-
tual disposition decision, indicate that because of organizational 
review, scheduling, and reward mechanisms which focus attention on 
current project activity and because of the uncertainty inherent in 
the review and reward mechanisms for activities not directly related 
to current projects, R & D scientists and engineers tend to be cau-
tious in expending time on possibilities not directly related to 
ongoing work. Ideas are generated only if market, mission, or pro-
duction needs and technical means can be identified. Ideas are sub-
mitted only if the idea originator believes that the underlying needs 
and means will be perceived as relevant by management i and if the 
perceived rewards will be at least equal to the cost of the time in-
volved in creating and developing the idea, i.e., equal to the cost 
of the time taken from the current project activity. Unfortunately, 
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relevancy is time and reviewer dependent; e.g., an idea judged 
irrelevant by a reviewer at one point in time may be judged rele-
vant by the same, or another, reviewer at another time. Further, 
since expectations regarding reviewer evaluations are based pri-
marily on reviewer actions on previous ideas, there can be a sig-
nificant lag between the time reviewers change their evaluation 
behaviors and the time these behaviors are perceived by the R & D 
scientists and engineers. 
The case histories also provide insights into the impact of 
managerial (reviewer) behaviors on continued idea generation and 
submission. Submitted ideas often are not sufficiently developed 
technically and not sufficiently supported by evidence of relevancy 
so that management can objectively evaluate them. The lack of com-
pleteness is partially explained by the idea originator investing 
minimal time on idea development because of current project activ-
ity pressures, uncertainty regarding organizational reward mecha-
nisms, and lack of knowledge regarding relevant needs and means. 
The idea may also be submitted in a tentative, incomplete form in 
order to test how management will respond, i.e., to get feedback 
on its potential relevancy. Since management is unable to evaluate 
objectively the tentative, incomplete idea, it responds in ways per-
ceived as non-rewarding (costly) by the R & D scientists and engi-
aeers. Typical responses include "develop on your spare time," 
"state of art not sufficiently advanced," "too far out," or no 
response at all. 
It is straightforward and "rational" to conclude that the 
ideas may have been submitted prematurely and that the management 
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response was both expected and correct. However, such manage-
ment responses can be interpreted otherwise and with severe con-
sequences. If read as rejection, expectations regarding organiza-
tional rewards for idea generation and development can be modified 
downward. Additional uncertainty is introduced regarding the 
bases on which relevancy is judged, i.e., relevant needs and means 
become even more unclear. As new employees enter the organization, 
they learn the low expectations and unclear needs and means from 
the veterans who have experienced the process. Thus, the process 
builds up, with even less time being expended for idea development 
prior to submission and fewer ideas submitted. The R & D scien- 
tists and engineers, instead of learning that their ideas should be 
better developed, believe that management is unreceptive to new ideas. 
Hence they come to believe that ideas should be submitted early, 
before too much time has been expended on their development and one 
runs into trouble with respect to current project budgets and dead-
lines -- or not submitted at all. 
Although the above somewhat pessimistic characterization is 
based on a single study within a single organization, it is con-
sistent with the seven summary statements based on the existing 
literature. And it dramatically illustrates the sensitivity of the 
innovative environment within an R & D laboratory. If it is a gen-
erally applicable description, R & D management should be aware of 
it in order to understand better the feedback impacts of their re-
view behaviors. Thus, there is need for replicative research which 
tests the generality of the description for information systems 
designed to provide timely needs and means (see Baker and Freeland 
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(1972) for an initial specification), and for better understanding 
of the behavioral impact of the use of normative budgeting, sched-
uling, and selection models. 
In conclusion, we have stressed throughout this section the 
rich and subtle network of environmental influences that enhance 
or inhibit problem definition, idea generation, and idea submis-
sion, and in turn hone or blunt a firm's competitive edge in tech-
nological innovation. In attempting to shape this environment 
there are few reliable rules, but a methodological reminder is 
appropriate. The technological tradition is strongly oral. In 
the experience related by Hyman earlier, when the R & D manager 
finally respected and utilized this tradition he got two quick 
responses that both ring true. First, his research group said, 
"Well, if that's what he wants, why didn't he say so"? And 
secondly, they produced a wealth of new ideas. Too simple, of 
course, but instructive. 
C. R & D Project Selection and Resource Allocation  
Previous sections have discussed idea generation and sub-
mission: we now turn attention to idea (project) selection. Ruben-
stein (1957) and Bradenberg (1966) wrote remarkably similar intro-
ductions recounting trends in R & D management which have continued 
to the present. The post-World War II period was one of optimism, 
permissiveness, and faith with respect to an industrial R & D rev-
olution. As Rubenstein states, it was a period in which R & D 
" accomplishment usually came as pleasant, and often complete, sur-
prises to others in the company" (Rubenstein 1957, p. 95). The two 
authors saw this atmosphere giving way to one in which measurement, 
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control, and evaluation were being imposed on the R & D activity, 
and by 1964, Baker and Pound (1964) could cite over 80 papers deal-
ing directly with normative models for R & D project selection and 
resource allocation. However, this statement may be misleading; 
although the literature reports many models and methods, there is 
little evidence that the models and methods are being utilized by 
managers of industrial R & D. 31 The evidence which does exist in-
dicates that classical profitability indices (e.g., rate of return, 
payback period, and present worth) and simple scoring models, have 
found some use (Andrew 1954; Baker and Pound 1964; Cochran, Plye, 
Green, Clymer and Bender 1971). 
The purpose of this section is to review the current state of 
knowledge regarding R & D project selection and resource allocation. 
Our first subsection surveys the descriptive literature. Next, 
estimation problems are identified and some of the major normative 
benefit measurement and resource allocation models are described. 
The section closes with a speculative subsection identifying research 
opportunities and conjecturing where the literature is headed. 
1. Descriptive Literature: The R & D Project Selection Problem  
Numerous papers contain descriptions of the R & D project 
selection problem. Most of these are either postulated as des-
criptions of how decisions should be made or based on experience 
of how decisions are made in the laboratory. Both the IEEE Trans-
actions on Engineering Management and Research Management have 
published numerous such papers, as has the new British Journal, 
R & D Management. This literature represents a substantial 
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body of information on which to base descriptions of the R & D pro-
ject selection problem. 
Not until 1966 did Bradenberg integrate the literature and 
conduct an empirical investigation (Bradenberg 1966). The result-
ing document reports the results of intensive investigations in 5 
companies and preliminary explorations in 9 other firms. All of 
the research activities were company-financed R & D in firms with 
formal, on-going research departments and budgets. However, the 
firms varied in size, product-market areas, underlying technologies, 
and R & D organizational configurations. Despite these differences, 
a consistent description emerged. 
Brandenberg portrayed the R & D project selection decision in 
terms of changes made in lists of currently active and proposed 
projects and of the mechanisms which were used to determine the 
specific changes which would be made (Brandenberg 1966, p. 17). 
Typical changes included dropping projects from the list, repro-
gramming active projects, replacing an active project with a pro-
posed project, initiating a proposed project and reprogramming a 
current one, or terminating a current project and shifting the re-
sources. Thus, the decision was described in terms of an inter-
mittent stream of investment possibilities, not as a once-a-year 
decision event (Brandenberg 1966, p. 21). 
A detailed process flow model of the project selection deci-
sion was constructed. In general, the process consists of six 
main stages (Brandenberg 1966, pp. 18-20): 
1. generating and changing the inventory of project proposals. 
2. reviewing the status of current and proposed projects for 
the purpose of deciding when to make a change. 
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3. identifying the projects and proposals to be evaluated 
and compared with respect to change and the criteria, 
variables, and constraints to be used in the evaluation. 
4. evaluating the designated projects and proposals. 
5. comparing the alternatives and choosing among them. 
6. recycling to gather additional information, to reform-
ulate criteria, variables, and constraints, and to 
define entirely new alternatives. 
Thus, as observed and reported by Bradenberg, the R & D pro-
ject selection decision includes generating new alternatives, de-
termining the appropriate time to make a decision, collecting data, 
specifying constraints and criteria, and recycling, as well as 
selection of projects and allocation of resources. 
One of the important questions we might ask refers to the cri-
teria used by R & D managers during the project selection decision. 
In industrial R & D, one would immediately identify profit maximi-
zation as an important criterion. Although it is important, by 
itself it is not sufficient. For example, in one organization, 
Mansfield found that profit maximization accounted for 50% of the 
variation in the allocation of R & D funds (Mansfield 1968, Ch.3). 
In one industrial laboratory, Baker, Siegman, and Larson (1971) 
found that urgency (immediacy of the need or opportunity toward 
which the idea is directed) and predictability (degree of certainty 
with which the methods and procedures for researching the idea are 
known) were significantly related to project selection decisions. 
Rubenstein (1957, p. 97) asked 37 laboratory directors to indicate 
the criteria used in judging the "results of R & D work" or "pro-
gress on R & D projects or program." The general criteria and the 
number of companies citing each are: perceived future effect on 
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sales volume or revenue (19 companies); perceived future effect on 
savings in materials, labor, and other costs (17 companies); per-
ceived future effect on profits (13 companies); time and cost char-
acteristics of the technical solution (28 companies); relationship 
to customer satisfaction (10 companies), and likelihood of tech-
nical success with the proposed solutions (16 companies). By 1968, 
lists of specific criteria had grown to include 25 or more items; 
however, the only new general criteria were compatibility of pro-
ject results with existing products or processes and the interest 
of the R & D personnel in conducting such project activity (Baker, 
Siegman and Larson 1971). It is clear that the R & D project se-
lection decision can be characterized as having multiple criteria 
with no common, underlying measure. 
Even if the criteria were known and a measure existed, two 
significant difficulties remain in the evaluation of proposals and 
projects. First, there is no known way of generating accurate 
estimates of the amount a project is likely to contribute with re-
spect to the individual criteria, and this problem is especially 
acute at the basic research and exploratory development phases. 
Second, the relative importance of the criteria, and hence the 
magnitude of contribution expected to accrue from the project, 
change over time as the project progresses from research to pro-
duction and as environmental conditions (e.g., market, technology, 
and resource availability) change. Thus, difficulties abound in 
estimating and measuring project benefits due to multiple criteria 
which have no natural, common underlying measure and whose relative 
importance varies over time. 
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The project selection decision as described above is imbedded 
within a more general budget process. In large organizations, the 
budget process is hierarchical and, despite simultaneous give and 
take, largely sequential in nature. The hierarchical, sequential 
nature of the process evolves from the facts that nearly all the 
organizational forms in which R & D is conducted are hierarchical 
and that the R & D director is not at the highest level in the 
organization. Thus, the R & D director typically receives guidance 
in the form of budgets from the higher organizational levels and 
passes on guidance in the form of budgets to the lower managerial 
levels in the R & D organization. In an analogous manner, infor-
mation detailing how a proposed budget should be allocated flows 
upward in the organization with each level integrating the input 
from below. Thus, project selection decisions are made at several 
organizational levels and, at each level, an integration of pro-
posed allocations from lower levels occurs subject to budget guid-
ance from higher levels. Baker et al (1972, pp. 1-4) and Shumway 
et al (1974) describe such a process for one large federal R & D 
agency. It should be noted that multi-year planning, as well as 
fiscal year budgeting, is taking place during this process and 
that the process may iterate several times. 
An alternative, but consistent, view is offered by Connolly 
(1972) based on his studies in a large federal agency different 
from that studied by Baker et al (1972). Connolly argues that for 
several reasons -- the lack of an identifiable decision maker, the 
extended time frame, the importance of structuring and linkage 
mechanisms -- the planning and budgeting of expenditures in a large 
research laboratory is not conveniently modelled as a decision 
event, but must be modelled as a decision process. Further, the 
processes are diffuse in nature: i.e., the processes are tempo-
rally diffuse, covering extended periods of time, with indistinct 
end-points; are multi-person with decision-making influence and 
responsibilities diffused across a number of individuals; are 
geographically diffuse in that the individuals are separated by 
non-trivial distances; and are diffused across several organiza-
tional levels. 
As one moves backwards in the R & D process from the output 
(production) to the input (research) it is likely that the deci-
sion problem changes, most likely in the direction of greater dif-
fuseness, less consensus, and more uncertainty. The extreme case 
of a diffuse decision, then, is a process in which many partici-
pants, over an extended period of time, generate a decision in 
response to some decision problem, working with alternatives which 
may initially be unclear or unknown, with costs and benefits not 
reliably estimable, with unclear and/or conflicting preferences, 
and with modifiable resources and constraints. In the approach 
proposed by Connolly (1972), the analytic focus for both descrip-
tive and normative studies shifts from the individual decision 
maker to the decision process as a whole. The concepts of hier-
archy and diffuseness in the R & D decision process are new and 
represent a potentially important area for future research. 
In summary, the R & D project selection decision is a process 
by which an intermittant stream of changes are made to lists of 
currently active and proposed projects. The project selection 
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decision process includes generating alternatives, determining the 
appropriate time to make a decision, collecting data, specifying 
constraints and criteria, and recycling. Evaluation and compari-
son of projects and proposals is complicated by multiple decision 
criteria which have no natural, common underlying measure and 
whose relative importance varies over time. In addition, the R & D 
project selection decision may be made at several different or-
ganizational levels which are participating in a hierarchical, dif-
fuse budgeting and planning process. The empirical support for 
this description is uneven and non-cumulative; considerable empiri-
cal work remains before one can safely conclude that the descrip-
tion is complete and valid. 
2. Estimation Problems: Uncertainty, Risk, Cost, Time to  
Completion, Interactions  
In a 1958 paper, Klein and Meckling (1958) studied 24 post-
World War II military developments and commented that uncertainty 
was an inherent characteristic of the projects which they examined. 
Marschak (1967, Ch. 3) reported nearly identical conclusions in 
1967. The recognition of inherent uncertainty in R & D reached 
such a level of consensus that Mansfield (1971, Ch. 1) defined 
R & D as an activity aimed at reducing uncertainty. Indeed, the 
very distinctions underlying the "phase model" of R & D are based 
on the concept of inherent uncertainty. 
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Uncertainty in R & D, perhaps in the innovation process as a 
whole, arises from a number of sources: technical -- scientific, 
engineering, production; market -- demand, consumer response, com-
petitive actions; organizational -- resistance to change, lack of 
receptivity by management, organizational conservatism; timing -- 
obsolesence (Bright 1964). Although these sources tend to be pre-
sent throughout the R & D process, their relative importance likely 
varies from basic research through engineering. Existence of these 
sources of uncertainty results in the R & D project selection deci-
sion being substantially more complex than the analogous decisions 
elsewhere in the organization. 
Uncertainty in the R & D process gets translated into risk in 
the R & D project selection decision process and impacts strongly 
on the problem of benefit estimation. Throughout the literature, 
at least three types of risk are noted: technical -- that the pro-
ject will not be technically successfully completed; commercial --
that a technically sound project will not be successfully commer-
cialized; and economic -- that a technically and commercially sound 
project will not be economically successful. Mansfield (1968, Ch. 
3; 1971) has reported data which confirm that projects do fail as 
a consequence of each type of risk. 
The most common approach for incorporating uncertainty into 
estimates of benefit is to weight the anticipated benefit by a 
probability measure, typically intended to include all three types 
of risk. 32 Several authors have noted the inadequacy of this ap-
proach and have attempted to include variance, as well as expected 
value, properties in the benefit e stimate (Cramer and Smith 1964; 
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Hertz 1964; Hespos and Strassman 1965). As yet no completely 
acceptable approach has emerged. 
Uncertainty also enters into benefit estimation because both 
R & D organizational objectives and specific project requirements 
tend to change over time in an unpredictable manner (Marschak, 
Glennan, and Summers 1967; Rubenstein 1957). As a direct conse-
quence, project requirements and budgets are often initially set 
in a most flexible fashion based on best predictions of cost, time 
to completion, and technological advance (Marschak, Glennan, and 
Summers 1967, Ch. 3). Unfortunately, the initial "best" estimates 
tend to be subject to large errors, especially at the initiation 
of the project (Marschak, Glennan, and Summers 1967, Chs. 3,4; 
Mansfield 1970, Ch. 5). Additional evidence of the difficulty of 
estimating cost and time to completion exists in the form of 
rather widely publicized cost and time overruns, both in military 
(Marschak, Glennan, and Summers 1967, Ch. 4) and industrial R & D 
(Mansfield 1970, Chs. 4-6). PERT and related scheduling techniques 
may assist in this area. 
The preceding discussion notes that the uncertainty inherent 
in the R & D process is translated into risk in the R & D project 
selection decision process and results in difficulties in the pro-
cesses of estimating project benefits, costs, and time to comple-
tion. These difficulties are compounded by several parameter 
interactions. For example, the time to completion of a project is 
a function of the rate at which resources are expended (Mansfield, 
Rapoport, Schnee, Wagner, and Hamburger 1971, Ch. 7; Marschak, 
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Glennan, and Summers 1967, Ch. 2; Scherer 1963), but only at the 
expense of an increase in the total cost of the project. Timing 
is also related to cost in the sense that the largest percentage 
of the total cost of an innovation apparently occurs when tooling 
is designed and manufacturing facilities are designed and con-
structed (Mansfield 1970, Ch. 6; Mansfield, Rapoport, Schnee, Wag-
ner, and Hamburger 1971; Carter and Williams 1957). Finally, the 
probability of technical success is thought to be a function of 
total cost. 
Thus, the project selection decision is made even more com-
plex. Not only is there significant uncertainty surrounding the 
various parameter estimates, but there are also a number of para-
meter interrelationships. Hence, there is no logical starting 
point -- in order to determine a good allocation pattern, it is 
necessary to have estimates of time to completion, likelihood of 
success, manpower and facility requirements, and the like. However, 
each of these parameters is a function of the specific resource 
allocation pattern selected and cannot be estimated until an 
allocation pattern has been determined. 
3. Normative Models for R & D Project Selection 
The discussion in the two preceding subsections describes the 
R.& D project selection decision from the viewpoints of how the 
decision is made, the organizational context within which 
the decision is made, and the environmental factors which make 
the decision difficult. In this subsection the normative view-
point of "how the decision should be made" will dominate the 
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discussion. No distinction is made between incremental and dis-
continuous projects. A general normative statement of the R & D 
project selection/resource allocation problem is: 
Given a set of alternatives (projects and proposed 
projects) which require common scarce resources (such 
as dollar budgets, manpower, and facilities), de-
termine that allocation of the resources to the al-
ternatives which will maximize the benefit contri-
bution (value) of the resulting program. 
Constrained optimization models of the R & D project selection/ 
resource allocation problem consist of two types of mathematical 
functions: 
1. objective functions which measure the benefit con-
tribution of an allocation patterns, and, 
2. constraint functions which represent the organiza-
tional environment within which the decision must 
be made (of special importance is the availability 
of the scarce resources). 
The purpose of this subsection is to summarize the state of the art 
related to normative R & D selection decisions. 
A number of papers have appeared which survey the literature 
associated with normative R & D project selection models [For ex-
ample, see Baker and Pound (1964), Cetron, Martini, and Roepcke 
(1967), and Baker and Freeland (1972)]. These surveys are peri-
odically updated in the prefatory remarks of numerous papers. 33 
 Table 6 summarizes the categories used to classify the various mod-
els and briefl Y identifies the content of each paper; it is not 
intended to represent a complete summary of the papers, but rather 
to assist the reader who might be interested in investigating the 
area beyond this presentation. Classification into benefit measure-
ment and project selection/resource allocation models is adopted 
for use here. 
TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF LITERATURE RESULTS 
	 262 
AUTHORS 
CATEGORIES USED TO 






-Discussion of general descriptiI 
nature of project selection mate 
-Characteristics of 30 representz 
models. 
-Brief description of areas of 







-Features which describe input ar 
output characteristics of the me 
-Ease of use and data requiremeni 
discussed. 
-Areas of applicability identifi( 








-Brief discussion 	of each model 
-Summary of some accepted descril 
insights. 
-First empirical data relating °I 









-Brief discussion of each model i 
-Identification of critical fact( 









-Scoring models used to evaluate 
representative models from each 
-Uses data from 30 actual projecH 
perform comparative analysis of 








-Benefit measurement models 
discussed in detail. 
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All the benefit measurement methods proposed to date require 
subjective inputs. Some well-informed respondent, or group of re-
spondents, is asked to provide his best judgments regarding char-
acteristics of the project proposals under consideration. Admit-
tedly the level of subjectivity inherent in a simple rating is con-
siderably higher than in a detailed economic analysis; however, 
even the economic analysis requires subjective judgment. The bene-
fit measurement methods can be described as systematic procedures 
for soliciting and integrating subjective and objective benefit 
data. They can be classified on the basis of the thought processes 
which these methods impose on the respondents. The classification 
proposed by Pessemier and Baker (1971) can be summarized as: 
1. comparative models which require the respondent(s) 
to compare one proposal either to another proposal 
or to some subset of alternative proposals. 34 
2. scoring models which require the respondent(s) to 
specify the merit of each proposal with respect to 
each of several project characteristics (criteria) 
which criterion scores can be aggregated to yield 
an overall project score. 35 
3. benefit contribution models which require the re-
spondent(s) to tie the projects directly to R & D 
objectives or to system requirements and benefit 
is measured in terms of contributions to the ob-
jectives or to the requirements. 36 
A number of empirical investigations related to the performance of 
specific benefit measurement approaches or to assessments of sim-
ilarities and dissimilarities among the methods have been reported; 37 
however, the results are too preliminary to permit general conclu-
sions. In summary, a large number of benefit measurement methods 
have been proposed, but little is known about their validity when 
applied within an R & D environment. 
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Project selection/resource allocation models can be classi-
fied along a number of dimensions. The mathematics involved in 
determining which allocation pattern will maximize benefit con-
tribution range from simple ranking according to estimated (anti-
cipated) benefit, as measured by some benefit measurement approach, 
to the sophisticated algorithms of linear, nonlinear, dynamic, and 
interger programming. For constrained optimization models, the 
benefit measurement methods provide input for the objective func-
tion of the model. Linear (Asher 1962; Baker, Shumway, Maher, 
Souder, and Rubenstein 1972; Beged-Dov 1965) and nonlinear (Atkin-
son and Bobis 1969; Hess 1962; Rosen and Souder 1965) have linear 
and nonlinear objective functions, respectively, linear constraint 
functions, and continuous decision variables; however, some allo-
cate R & D personnel or man-hours rather than determine project 
budgets (Asher 1962; Beged-Dov 1965). Also, stochastic (Charnes 
and Stedry 1964; Cramer and Smith 1964; Hess 1962) and goal pro-
gramming (Charnes and Stedry 1964) models have been suggested. 
Thus, a plethora of R & D project selection/resource allocation 
models have appeared. Baker and Freeland (1972) cite over 175 
references. However, as the surveys cited earlier report, few of 
the models have been evaluated empirically and even fewer are 
being utilized by R & D managers (Baker and Freeland 1972; Baker 
and Pound 1964; Mansfield 1970, Ch. 3). 
The reviews 38 and the descriptive material in the previous two 
subsections provide a basis for identifying the limitations inher-
ent in the currently proposed normative models. An integration and 
summary of these limitations is: 
1. inadequate treatment of project and parameter inter-
relations with respect to both benefit contribution 
and to resource utilization. 
2. inadequate treatment of uncertainty as it impacts 
on benefit measurement and parameter estimation. 
3. inadequate treatment of multiple, interrelated de-
cision criteria which have no common, natural under-
lying measure. 
4. inadequate treatment of the time variant property 
of the parameters and criteria and the associated 
problem of continuity in the research program and 
staff. 
5. a restricted view of the problem which (a) portrays 
a once-a-year investment decision rather than an 
intermittant stream of investment alternatives, (b) 
does not include such attributes as timing of the 
decision, generation of additional alternatives, 
and recycling, (c) does not recognize the diversity 
of projects along the spectrum from basic research 
to engineering, and (d) views the problem as a de-
cision event rather than as a hierarchical, diffuse 
decision process. 
6. no explicit recognition and incorporation of the 
importance of individual R & D personnel. 
7. the inability to establish and maintain balance in 
the R & D program; e.g., balance between basic and 
applied research, between offensive and defensive 
research, between breakthrough and improvement 
orientations, between in-house and contracted pro-
jects, between product and process oriented pro-
jects, and between high risk/high payoff and low 
risk/moderate payoff projects. 
Given these limitations, it is clear why few normative models of 
the R & D project selection/resource allocation decision have been 
implemented and used by R & D managers. Most attempted applica-
tions have concerned simple scoring or financial index models. 39 
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As a result of the small number of applications and of the limited 
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types of models which have been applied, it is nearly impossible 
to assess the potential utility of the normative R & D project 
selection/resource allocation models. 
Souder (1972a, 1972b) has made a promising start in providing 
approaches for evaluating R & D decision models. Expanding a list 
of R & D model performance characteristics suggested by Cetron, 
Martino, and Roepcke (1967) and incorporating responses from a num-
ber of R & D managers and management scientists, Souder (1972b) pre-
pared a list of performance criteria and characteristics. This 
list was used as the basis for a scoring model to determine the 
"relative suitability" of certain classes of quantitative models. 
Since the measure of suitability is only a relative measure, it 
provides little insight into the "absolute suitability" of the 
models. Two applications of the scoring model have been reported 
(Souder 1972a), and the results indicate some strengths and limita-
tions of a number of quantitative R & D selection and allocation 
models which have appeared in the literature. The list of per-
formance criteria and characteristics is also useful as a refer-
ence guide during model design. A slightly expanded version of 
the list is reproduced as Table 7. 
Souder (1973) has also provided data which are useful for 
preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of four resource 
(budget) allocation models. His four test models are referred to 
as a "nonlinear model," "linear model," a "zero-one model," and a 
"profitability index model" and are intended to be specific repre-
sentations of broader classes of models. The output from each test 
model is evaluated against the output from two control models; 
TABLE 7 
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R & D PROJECT SELECTION MODELS 
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS 




Market risk parameter 
Technical risk parameter 
Manpower limits parameter 
Facility limits parameter 
Budget limits parameter 
Premises uncertainty parameter 
4. USE CRITERION CHARACTERISTICS 
Model is characterized by: 
Familiar variables 
Discrete variables 
Computer not needed 
Special persons not needed 
Special interpretation not needed 
Low amount of data needed 
Easily obtainable data 
CAPABILITY CRITERION CHARACTERISTICS 5. 
Model performs: 




FLEXIBILITY CRITERION CHARACTERISTICS 6. 





.Budget allocation applications 
Project funding applications 
COST CRITERION CHARACTERISTICS 
Model has: 
Low set-up costs 
Low personnel costs 
Low computer time 







"Flags" for potential problem 
areas 
m Souder (1972b) 
268 
namely, a "benchmark model" which allocates the budget in a pro-
rata fashion (i.e., the budget is distributed proportionately 
according to the project's maximum annual funding level) and an 
"ex-post optimal model" which funds at their maximum annual level 
only those projects that terminated as successes. Perhaps the 
most interesting result is that, for the specified set of input 
data, the benchmark model performed as well, and in some instances 
better, than Souder's test models. In his data, the estimates of 
the probabilities of technical success undergo significant change 
over the life of the projects and the benchmark model performs 
best when the data are least valid. It is impossible to determine 
whether the result -- namely, that the benchmark model is as ef-
fective as the mathematical optimization models -- is an artifact 
of the data or is a general result holding for environments 
with high uncertainty. Regardless, that the pro-rata benchmark 
model is as effective as the mathematical optimization models is 
an interesting and critical hypothesis which should be systemat-
ically tested in subsequent research. 
Several papers 40 have been written by individuals who are 
riot academicians, but who are management science professionals work-
ing for an organization and who are attempting to improve the organi-
zation's R & D selection and allocation decision process. In all 
but two possible situations (Bender and Pyle 1972; Nutt 1972) 
there is little evidence that the models proposed by these practi-
tioners were used, or if used, survived after the departure of a 
critical management sponsor and/or the model builder. Hence 
these papers provide little assistance in assessing the potential 
effectiveness of the proposed models; however, they do suggest some 
level of dissatisfaction on the part of the R & D management. Two 
recent studies whose results are just appearing (Baker, Shumway, 
Maher, Souder and Rubenstein 1972; Maher 1972) report on on-site 
experiments designed to evaluate specifically constructed models. 
The results reported to date are generally optimistic, but are too 
incomplete and specific to provide general results. Additional 
on-site experiments are urgently needed in order to develop general 
conclusions. 
4. Some Speculation and Conjecture  
Initial research efforts have been reported in the R & D lit-
erature and in the relevant methodological literatures which may 
eventually lead to overcoming some of the limitations identified in 
the preceding subsection. This subsection contains speculation and 
conjecture regarding where the R & D project selection literature 
is headed and identifies a number of fruitful areas for research. 
The trend in application appears to be away from "decision 
models" (models which yield decisions) and toward "decision infor-
mation system" (system which provide information for decision-
makers). Three legitimate reasons can be suggested for this trend. 
First, the existing project selection/resource allocation models 
are incomplete in the sense that they do not include all the impor-
tant, relevant aspects of the R & D environment. Second, the de-
cision problem is characterized by multiple criteria, many of which 
are not readily quantifiable, and the current approaches to quanti-
fying subjective preferences are far from satisfactory. Third, the 
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R & D process is highly uncertain and unpredictable. As a result 
managers are skeptical of the validity of the numerous input data 
elements, of the various difficult-to-understand model forms, and 
of the subsequent allocation recommendations. The general mana-
gerial attitude appears to be that the normative models can assist 
with respect to the routine, predictable activities, but are not 
sufficient to analyze the breakthrough, unpredictable activities 
which are the most important and the most difficult to manage. 
Response to this attitude appears to be taking the form of 
constructing scenarios which represent alternative futures, of de-
termining allocation patterns which are expected to produce "good" 
or "satisfactory" results for several alternative futures, and of 
program or portfolio (rather than individual project) benefit meas-
ures. This response can be observed in the work of Dean and Hauser 
(1967) and Rosen and Souder (1965) in the middle 1960s. 	More re- 
cently, advances in relating project benefit to the feasible levels 
at which the project may be funded (Alboosta and Holzman 1970; 
Atkinson and Bobis 1969; Baker, Shumway, Maher, Souder, Rubenstein 
1972) have lead to interactive (i.e., the user can interact with 
the system) decision systems of the sensitivity analysis type which 
permit the user to ask a number of "what if" questions (Baker, Shum-
way, Maher, Souder, and Rubenstein 1972; Cochran, Plye, Greene, 
Clymer, and Bender 1971). Although applied in a non-R & D envi-
ronment, Geoffrion, Dyer, and Feinberg (1971) suggest an inter-
active approach which does net as3ume that the benefit function can 
be quantified and which is specifically designed for a multiple 
criterion decision problem. These interactive, decision information, 
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scenarios offer a promising alternative for coping with the un-
certainty inherent in the R & D decision process. 
The Charnes and Stedry model (1964) is an interesting integra-
tion of the concepts of chance-constrained and goal programming. 
Goal programming permits the expression of multiple objectives in 
terms of acceptable goal levels (e.g., profit, market share, cost 
in dollars, etc.,) and finds allocations which minimize the devia-
tion between the goal levels actually attained and those deemed 
satisfactory a priori. The model also determines the minimum ex-
pected short run and long run resource requirements necessary to 
achieve the specified goal levels and includes explicit considera-
tion of interim adjustments due to research breakthroughs. This 
model is an important first step in modelling for breakthrough or 
crisis planning and warrants further attention and development. 
Decisions which impact on the allocation of resources to R & D 
proposals are frequently made at different levels in a hierarchical 
organization. Each level makes decisions or recommendations based 
on information from both higher and lower levels. Since each level 
operates with some autonomy, there is the problem of coordinating 
the decisions made at the various levels. The resource constraints 
of any constrained optimization model implicitly recognize this by 
identifying such factors as total available budget. The Baker, et 
al, model (Baker, Shumway, Maher, Souder, and Rubenstein 1972) is 
designed to incorporate constraints which are generated by two 
hierarchies -- an organizational hierarchy and a research effort 
hierarchy. Thus, constraint intervention as a form of coordination 
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has been modelled; however, there is no evidence that goal inter-
vention has been modelled or that goal intervention approaches have 
been applied in the R & D environment (Freeland and Baker 1972). 
At a higher level of analysis of hierarchical considerations, 
it is important to note that resource allocation decisions can be 
affected by the specific form of the hierarchy, by the nature and 
content of the information flow, by the way in which coordination 
is attained, and by the negotiations which result from joint deci-
sion-making between officials with different functional responsi-
bilities, e.g., R & D, engineering, production, and marketing. 
Until recently little opportunity existed for conducting such an-
alyses because of the lack of appropriate mathematical methodology 
and model structures; e.g., the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition ap-
proach is primarily a computational technique and is not suitable 
for such analyses (Dantzig and Wolfe 1961; Freeland and Baker 
1972). Recent advances, however, appear to offer sufficient math-
ematical structure so that important general insights into hier-
archical decisions can he derived. 41 This research should con-
tinue, and its application to the R & D environment should be in-
vestigated. 
The research opportunities summarized above represent signi-
ficant areas for advancement in the state of knowledge regarding 
R & D project selection/resource allocation. In addition to this 
theoretical and methodological research, companion empirical re-
search should also be encouraged. More studies are recTuired whic h 
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support and/or modify the existing descriptions of the R & D pro-
ject selection/resource allocation decision process and the organ-
izational environment within which it operates, evaluate the pre-
scriptive capabilities of the normative models and the process by 
which the models are adopted, improve our understanding of and 
ability to model the many and varied interrelationships, and crit-
ically test the implications drawn from the methodological and 
theoretical research. 
D. Performance of Scientists and Engineers  
The previous section surveyed the existing literature related 
to R & D project selection/resource allocation from both descrip-
tive and normative viewpoints. One output from the R & D project 
selection/resource allocation decision process is a list of funded 
projects, i.e., projects to which organization resources have been 
allocated. In this section the focus is on the behavioral and or-
ganizational variables which influence how well researchers and 
engineers in the R & D laboratory will perform on their assigned 
project activities. 
1. A Proposed Scenario of Effective Performance  
One systematic, integrated series of studies exists in the 
literature. The early work in this portion of the literature is 
summarized by Pelz and Andrews (1966), who present data from a 1959 
study involving 1311 scientists and engineers from 11 laboratories 
in industry, university, and government. The study was concerned 
with identifying and understanding the relationship of several 
organizational factors and a number of output measures such as 
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peer judgments of usefulness, peer judgments of contribution, 
unpublished reports, published reports, and patents. It is pos-
sible using the Pelz-Andrews results to construct a scenario which 
is descriptive of effective scientists and engineers. 
According to the Pelz and Andrews data, effective scientists 
and engineers are self-directed; they value and seek the freedom 
to pursue their own ideas. Coordination is provided by a combina-
tion of self-direction and allowing several others a voice in 
shaping their directions. Although self-directed, they also inter-
act vigorously with their colleagues. Their work is diversified; 
that is, they do not restrict themselves either to application or 
to pure science, but maintain an interest in both. Accordingly, 
effect scientists and engineers are not fully in agreement with 
their organization in terms of their interest and do not necessarily 
exhibit the behavior necessary for advancement in the organization. 
Although they tend to be motivated by the same kinds of things as 
their colleagues, they differ in their work styles and strategies. 
One further dimension can be added to the scenario. Andrews 
and Farris (1972) have studied the relationship between time pres-
sure and scientific performance, and their data strongly suggest 
that a sense of time pressure can enhance several qualities of 
scientific performance. In addition to experiencing the most time 
pressure, effective scientists and engineers also tend to want 
relatively large amounts of pressure. The critical finding is 
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that desired and actual time pressure should be consistent: either 
excess or too little time pressure tends to detract from perfor-
mance. Time pressures come not only from the project work, but 
also from active communication with colleagues and from adminis-
trative duties of a limited nature. 
The above scenarios present an internally consistent picture 
of effective scientists and engineers. However, the reader should 
remember that the Pelz-Andrews data for both performance and organ-
izational variable data were collected at one point in time. Cor-
relation techniques were utilized for the statistical analysis; 
hence, causality could not be deduced from the data, although the 
authors attempted to determine causality by logical argument. In 
fact, there was reason to suspect that performance preceded the 
organizational variable for at least some of the relationship. For 
example, Houton (1963) had rather persuasively argued for the pro-
position that 1) getting a "good" work assignment is contingent 
upon demonstrated competence and 2) demonstrating competence is 
contingent upon having a "good" work assignment; thus, he argued 
for causality in both directions. In summary, the scenario re-
quires validation in both a methodological and a timeliness sense. 
Fortunately, it is not necessary to speculate blindly on the 
direction of causality. In 1965, Farris (1969a, 1969b) returned to 
three of the laboratories, all within the electronics industry, to 
obtain new information from 151 engineers who had participated in the 
original 1959 Pelz-Andrews studies. Thus, he had data at two points 
in time and could statistically investigate the direction of 
causality. Farris concentrated on four measures of output -- con-
tribution to the scientific discipline, usefulness 
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to the organization, number of patents, and number of reports --
and on six organizational conditions -- involvement in work, con-
tact with a relatively large number of colleagues, high influence 
on work goals, diversity of work activities, high salary, and num-
ber of subordinates (1969a, p. 9). His empirical findings are: 
1) Engineers who are more involved in their work 
produce more patents subsequently but, more than that, 
engineers who are seen as useful and producing more 
patents, become more involved in their work. 
2) Higher performing engineers subsequently re-
ceive more influence over their own work goals. Greater 
influence on work goals was not followed by increased 
subsequent performance. 
3) Engineers who have greater contact tend to 
(weak finding) perform better subsequently, and high-
performing engineers subsequently come into frequent 
contact with their colleagues. 
4) Greater diversity is followed by higher per-
formance, and higher performance is followed by greater 
diversity of work activities. 
5) Engineers who perform well subsequently are paid 
more, but there is no evidence that those who get paid 
more, subsequently perform better. 
6) Engineers with more subordinates (with super-
visory level controlled) subsequently perform better 
but, more than that, engineers who perform well sub-
sequently receive more subordinates (1969a, pp. 13-14). 
In summary, the general pattern for the six organizational factors 
and four measures of performance is for performances to precede 
the favorable organizational condition, not for the organizational 
condition to precede performance. That is, effective researchers 
and scientists were being rewarded for their performance, and some 
of the organizational rewards assisted them to continue to be 
effective. Thus, Houton's proposition was clarified and supported 
by the Farris study. 
The predominance of the performance-followed-by-factor rela-
tionship was stronger than either Farris or Houton had anticipated. 
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Research should be directed toward more precisely determining the 
ways in which a person's performance affects his social-psycho-
logical working environment. The consequences of performance 
should be considered explicitly in subsequent theories, so that 
performance must be treated as both a result and a cause of change 
in the social-psychological work environment. The implications of 
this viewpoint for designing and implementing R & D personnel re-
ward systems should be studied. 
2. The Impact of Supervisory and Managerial Behaviors  
Since the impact of supervisory and managerial behaviors is 
discussed throughout the section on organized R & D, the purpose 
here is not to repeat that discussion, but rather present what is 
known specifically about the impact on performance. Farris in his 
1972 paper provides an initial framework for understanding the 
impact of supervisory behavior on group performance in R & D. He 
employed a system for measuring group performance by a composite 
score made up of individual measures of how well each group member 
increased knowledge in his field, extended or refined existing 
knowledge in his field, contributed to general knowledge in his 
field, and had been useful in helping his R & D organization carry 
out its responsibilities. The study was conducted in a NASA re-
search center and focused on 94 non-supervisory scientists who 
composed 21 small teams. 
The results can be summarized in terms of colleague roles 
and information flow among group members, between group members 
and the supervisor, and with persons outside the group. High per-
forming groups were characterized by: 1) technical information and 
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help in thinking occurring among group members; 2) help in think-
ing, critical evaluations, and administrative help flowing from 
the supervisor to the group; 3) technical information, help in 
thinking, critical evaluations, and original ideas flowing from 
the group to the supervisor; and 4) original ideas from the out-
side the group for administrative help. Conversely, in low per-
forming groups, the following were observed: 1) discussions of 
organizational rules and policies flowed among the group members; 
2) organizational rules and policies and original ideas were passed 
from the supervisor to the group members; 3) the group members went 
outside the group for help in thinking and for administrative help; 
and 4) the supervisor sought help in thinking and original ideas 
outside the group and received help in thinking and organizational 
rules and policies. Given the earlier results of performance-fol-
lowed-by-factor for effective scientists and engineers, one must 
wonder if this same dominant direction of causality holds for ef-
fective groups as well. Farris's data (1972) do not provide the 
answer. 
Farris (1972) notes two surprises in his results -- surprises 
because they are not consistent with other organizational litera-
ture. First, none of the several measures in the human relations 
area were related to group performance. Second, markedly negative 
relationships were found between the supervisor's performance of 
such administrative functions as planning and scheduling and his 
subordinate's performance measures. These surprises as well as 
the descriptions of roles and information flow are a particularly 
rich base for additional empirical research. 
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3. Some Research Opportunities  
The variables and relationships cited by Martino (1973) in 
his literature survey are drawn from numerous unrelated and non-
integrative studies. His survey indicates the unevenness of the 
literature dealing with performance; e.g., eight papers cited are 
associated with the impacting variable "leadership style," but no 
papers cited as associated with "variables representing character-
istics acquired by the researcher." Studying these variables fur-
ther would obtain more even and in-depth coverage. More impor-
tantly, there is need for more complex, integrative studies in 
order better to understand variable interrelationships. 
A scenario describing effective researchers and scientists 
was constructed from the Pelz-Andrews findings. Farris's subse-
quent study, while supporting the scenario in general, also raises 
significant questions regarding directions of causality. In fact, 
stronger results are found for the hypothesis that performance 
improvement results in improved organizational conditions than 
for the other directions, i.e., that improved organizational con-
ditions result in performance improvement. Replications of the 
Farris study would be beneficial. The consequences of improved 
performance as well as of improved organizational conditions must 
be explicitly included in subsequent theories. Maybe these are 
not causes and effects but both, or perhaps manifestations of 
something else. Theories should be developed and empirically 
examined. 
The scientific group performance research by Farris is in the 
early stages of development and verification. It is critical that 
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work in this area be expanded since team effort will be required 
to research the increasingly more complex R & D projects. The 
question of direction of causality should be investigated for 
groups in order to determine if the results found for individual 
scientists and engineers also apply at the group level. 
As illustrated in the previous section, the R & D literature 
abounds with normative project selection and scheduling models. 
Some literature evaluates the normative models with respect to 
how well the models relate to the existing descriptive literature 
and issues included therein. With few exceptions which barely 
identify the issue (Baker et al 1972, Souder 1974), no work has 
been reported which investigates the impact of the adoption and 
utilization of normative models on subsequent manager, supervisor, 
researcher, and/or engineer behavior. Research should be initiated 
to investigate this issue. 
IV. Transfer from R & D: Implementation and Utilization  
The devices and/or knowledge produced by R & D can not show 
profit until they have been applied. This implementation process 
is often one of translating an R & D result into a new or improved 
product which has been successfully introduced into the market-
place or some other environment exogenous to R & D; for example, in 
the military sector it may entail the adoption of a new guidance 
system for aircraft. Another common form of implementation involves 
a new modified process for producing outputs; e.g., the adoption 
of tape-driven machines to 
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perform functions previously accomplished by'operator-controlled 
machines. In any case, the process by which the technological 
output from R & D becomes an on-going capability of the operating 
units, such as production, marketing, and sales, will be referred 
to as the implementation process. 
In order to clarify further what is intended by the term 
"implementation," let us see what the literature has to offer as 
definitions. Utterback (1971, p. 75) considers implementation to 
include the engineering, tooling, plant start-up, and manufactur-
ing required to bring the solution or invention to its first use 
or market introduction. Quinn and Mueller (1963) view the prob-
lem as one of transferring three aspects of a potential innova-
tion to the operating units of the organization: 1) information 
about the technology underlying the innovation; 2) enthusiasm for 
the innovation; and 3) the authority to use the innovation. The 
dyadic (two person) relationship existing between the researcher 
and the marketer is the aspect of implementation on which Young 
(1973) concentrates. Perhaps the most unique view is Morton's 
(1968) who analyzes implementation in terms of the spatial and 
organizational bonds which facilitate the transfer of information 
and the spatial and organizational barriers which inhibit the 
transfer of information: He seeks to maximize feedback and min-
imize corporate interference. The common characteristic of these 
views is that knowledge and/or devices are being transferred across 
intra-organizational boundaries, from R & D to the operating units 
of the organization. 
Is it important to investigate the implementation process? 
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After interviewing over 200 top operating and research executives 
in the United States, Quinn and Mueller concluded that "the key 
problem in research management today is getting research results 
effectively transferred into operations" (19G3, p. 49). That 
this conclusion is still valid is illustrated by the following 
1973 statement by Lawton Hartman, former associate research direc-
tor at Philco and now a special assistant to the director of the 
National Science Foundation. "No other problem is so persuasive 
and potentially mischievous as the failure of top managers and 
research to communicate with each other. I have never seen it doge 
very well" (Cordtz 1971, p. 103). It seems clear that the implemen-
tation process by which R & D results are transferred to the operatin 
units is viewed as an area of critical concern by top operating 
executives and research management. 
One reason for this concern has been identified by Mansfield. 
The potential innovation leaving the R & D laboratory is entering 
the phase of its development which is most costly and most time 
consuming, implementation. From their sample of chemical, mechan-
ical, and electronic firms, Mansfield et al, (1971, p. 118) found 
that 29.1% of the total innovation expenditures concern prototype 
or pilot plants, 36.9% involve tooling and manufacturing facilities, 
and 9.5% involve manufacturing start-up costs. Thus, in those in-
dustries surveyed, over 75% of the total innovation expenditures 
occurred during implementation. 
In addition to the economic aspects studied by Mansfield et 
al, there are important behaviorial and organizational consider-
ations related to implementation. The organization development 
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literature -- particularly the insights drawn from Burns and Stal-
ker (1961), and Wilson (1966), Hage and Aiken (1970), Zaltman et al 
(1973) and Scott (1973) -- relates organizational structure to 
organizational context. This literature, summarized earlier 
(see "Background, Definition, and Basic Concepts" section of this 
chapter), need not be repeated, but Woodward's (1965) study does 
deserve special mention. She shows that the technologies utilized 
in the production process determine the underlying organizational 
structure. There is one basic structure for firms using mass pro-
duction technology; another for those which employ a process tech-
nology; and still another for firms manufacturing one-of-a-kind 
articles (p. 36). Transfer would thus seem to require a coupling 
of structure and function as well as a coupling of information, 
enthusiasm, and authority. 
The most critical transfer points are those where R & D interfaces 
with the various operating units of the firm. This view is supported 
by the Panel on Institutional Barriers to Innovation and Diffusion 
in the Service Sector which reported to a 1973 Engineering Founda-
tion Conference that nearly 25% of the 200 producers' goods innova-
tions examined were blocked by internal management or by organization 
and staffing (Myers 1973, p. 21). The analysis of liaison agents 
and coupling relations by Rubenstein and Douds (1966), of "sys-
tems engineers" as described by Morton (1964), and of the pro-
ject manager concept by Bean (1968) add further credence to the 
contention that the transfer of R & D results requires a coupling 
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of structure, function, information, enthusiasm, and authority at 
the interfaces which R & D has with the operating units. 
Quinn and Mueller (1963, pp. 61-62) have identified a number 
of organizational forms which have been used to facilitate the 
transfer from R & D, namely: 
Task-force groups - These usually are made up of 
personnel from research, development, marketing, and 
manufacturing who are often given total responsibility 
for exploiting a new technology. The composition of 
the group is heavily weighted 'toward R & D people at 
first, but it shifts toward operating people as full-
scale operations are approached. 
Corporate development units - These, having their 
own marketing staff and flexible pilot-scale facilities, 
pick up new research technologies and exploit them. 
The unit can be a profit center, deriving profits from 
sale of new products. As the products prove profitable, 
operating groups want to take them on. Thus, develop-
ment is constantly forced to see new technologies from 
research, and operating resistances are eliminated. 
Outside companies - At times, these are used to 
entrepreneur new products in specific cases. The re-
search laboratory may take 49% ownership in the new 
concern formed to exploit the technology. Or it may 
simply take license revenues. In some cases, large 
companies have given smaller companies (with special 
knowledge, facilities, or market access) exclusive 
rights, under a royalty agreement, to a new technology 
during a three to five-year introductory period. When 
primary demand has been built up, the larger company 
has the option of continuing the arrangement or intro-
ducing its own branded version of the product. 
Staff groups at corporate level - These units 
serve to coordinate the introduction of new technologies 
through existing divisional and functional organizations. 
They are most effective when they either have functional 
authority over key aspects of line operations or have a 
budget with which to buy time from line units. Product 
managers perform this service successfully in some 
companies. 
A top executive with multifunctional line author-
ity - This executive can effectively force new tech-
nologies into operations in small to medium-size com-
panies. In a medium-size consumer products company, 
the president is also the top technical executive 
and founding genius. Because of his personal in-
terest and follow-up, new products often move from 
research to the market in three to six months. He 
refuses to allow pilot-scale facilities to be built, 
feeling that they waste time and put less pressure 
on operating executives than do full-scale facili-
ties. 
A research group with a special budget to buy  
time on operating machines  - This approach is effec-
tively used in flow process industries (such as 
paper) where (1) the cost of a pilot facility is 
prohibitive, or (2) the scale of operation vastly 
affects technical approaches. There are always 
problems of scheduling these experiments; but, if 
an experiment is successful, research has little 
trouble in demonstrating its value to operations. 
Individual researchers who entrepreneur their  
ideas through pilot facilities and into the market -
A pharmaceutical company sets up a profit center 
for each new product and encourages the researcher, 
if he has the talent and interest, to follow his 
idea to commercialization. If successful, he re-
ceives a share of the center's profits as additional 
compensation. Product policy is coordinated by 
product group managers at corporate level. 
Multilevel committee responsibility - Such com-
mittees have been set up in some companies. In 
fundamental and early applied research, a research 
committee coordinates the program. In late applied 
and early developmental stages, coordination moves 
to an R & D committee. In late development, a new-
product committee takes over program progress. Be- 
fore pilot-scale facilities can be built, the operat-
ing committee must approve. A full-scale operation 
requires executive committee approval. Because de-
cisions tend to be slow and conservative under this 
system, it must normally be supplemented by one of 
the other organizations described here. 
An entrepreneurial group at corporate level - Used 
by several of the companies most successfully diversi-
fying through research - produced new products, these 
groups introduce technologies which are new to the com-
pany and which do not logically fit into the organiza-
tions of established operating groups. Where they are 
successful, these entrepreneuring units are headed by 
a commercially oriented dynamo with a technical back-
ground. He has at his disposal a technical group which 
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reduces research ideas to practice, a special budget 
to build small-scale facilities and underwrite pro-
duct introduction losses, and a small nucleus of com-
mercially oriented technical men who simultaneously 
"ride two or three products into the market." 
Major difficulties with this approach are (1) 
finding people with the complex of skills and atti-
tudes necessary to entrepreneur new products; (2) 
replacing these people as they become committed to 
products they have "ridden into successful division 
status"; (3) developing the top-management attitude 
toward the risk taking such operations must involve. 
Although each of the above forms has proved useful in specific in-
stances, none has been shown to have general applicability. The 
most suitable form varies from firm to firm and from innovation 
to innovation. 
One symptom of inadequate transfer is when developing and newly 
commercialized products often fail because their design specificatior 
fail to mesh with changing market needs (Young 1973). A number of 
examples of successes and failures can be found in the literature. 
Consider, for example, DuPont's seven-year $100 million experi- 
ment with "Corfam," which was reported as a successfully develop-
ing product in 1954 and again in 1966; but on March 17, 1971 
the Wall Street Journal reported "DuPont's Corfam leather sub-
stitute had been given its final walking papers" (Young 1973, p. 65). 
This was a clear example of a market failure, for "Company officials 
attribute Corfam's sluggish sales to the market's indifference 
to the four features -- durability, water repellency, ease of 
care, and competitive price with leather goods -- Dupont thought 
were its major selling points" (Young 1973, p.68). Relative- 
ly inexpensive foreign imports were also a factor in Cor- 
fam's demise. Young (1973, pp. 69-72) offers numerous other ex-
amples of innovations which failed due to improper product design/ 
287 
market need relationships. 
As a result of these observations, Young undertook an empir-
ical study of the researcher-marketer dyad (two-person interaction). 
Working with 30 firms in the health care industry, he found that 
the most common reason for delay of transfer was improper or in-
complete market specification (1973). The researchers and mark-
eters disagreed on such critical areas as the market toward which 
the product was directed, the current stage of development of the 
product, the relationship of the product to the firm's overall 
objectives, and the product's chance of success. Hence, informa-
tion exchange was found to be the variable with the strongest in-
fluence on the dyadic relationship. 
Among the specific findings of the Young study are: 1) it is 
desirable to create an environment in which members of the dyad 
believe that their requests for information and their answers to 
questions will be acted upon promptly, even anticipated; 2) the 
marketer tends to be much more personally committed to the pro-
duct than the researcher and this leads to interpersonal conflict 
between the researcher and the marketer; 3) product managers 
tended to have responsibility for success and failure, but neither 
the budget nor the authority to see the product through to comple-
tion; and 4) the more risky the venture, the more important is a 
supportative management attitude in order to reduce personal risk, 
to encourage new approaches to problem solving, and to provide an 
atmosphere in which mistakes can be admitted and corrected, rather 
than covered or ignored. Young has provided an intensive study 
of the interpersonal relationships inherent to marketer-researcher 
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dyad. Although the study is restricted by its highly selective 
data base, it is well-documented and methodologically sound in an 
area where very little empirical research has been done. 
Although the literature is clear that top operating executives 
and R & D management are concerned about the process by which R & 
D results are transferred to the operating units of the organiza-
tion, we were most frustrated in our literature search in this 
area -- as were Grayson (1968, p. ii) and Young (1973, p. 31). 
In Young's words, "The bulk of the writing has taken one of two 
forms: a general prescriptive solution or a specific solution" 
(p. 31). There is almost a complete lack of definitive, cumula- 
tive research in the literature -- almost, because there are only 
a few isolated studies such as those cited in this section. Thus, 
we conclude that the implementation process is of immediate con-
cern to the managers of organized innovation, but that the litera-
ture offers little assistance due to the lack of definitive re-
search. 
The only other conclusion to be drawn is also largely negative: 
although a number of organizational forms have proven suitable for 
implementation in specific instances, none has been shown to have 
general applicability. If a variety of organizational forms will 
do the job, then one is led to wonder what other variables are 
significant. The literature suggests some candidates: 
1. at the interpersonal level, the Young study iden-
tifies information exchange and compatible levels 
of personal commitment as variables which influence 
the researcher-marketer dyad. 
2. at the supervisory level, Young's study suggests that 
responsibility must be coupled with adequate budget 
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and authority and that a supportative management 
attitude is important, especially for high risk 
ventures. 
3. at the organizational level, it is important that 
R & D activities be directly related to organiza-
tional goals and objectives (Quinn and Mueller 
1963; Cordtz 1971; Pessemier 1966) and that 
careful planning and control be maintained through-
out the implementation process (Hill and Hlavacek 
1972; Pessemier and Root 1973; Peterson 1967). 
The prescriptive nature of the literature is apparent, especially 
at the organizational level of analysis. 
Of all the literature areas which we have surveyed there is 
none for which simultaneously the level of concern is higher and 
our state of knowledge is lower. There may be an on-going prob-
lem because of proprietary information. In any case, definitive, 
cumulative research is an immediate need. Some additional insights 
will be forthcoming when the more general diffusion literature is 
surveyed and assessed in Chapter IV. 
V. Summary and Conclusion  
Just as a variety of factors in the "external" world -- values, 
endowments, and institutions -- influence the innovation process, so 
too do a wide range of elements in the environment to which the pro-
cess is indigenous. Interestingly enough, we might have even analyzed 
the indigenous variables in the same broad terms. The "values" of 
the firm, of the formal and informal groups within it, and of the 
individual participants, all strongly influence the nature and thrust 
of innovative efforts. Similarly, the "endowments" -- the technical 
information and capabilities of individuals and groups, the capital 
and material resources of the organization, etc., -- play a major 
role. Finally, the "institutions" factor -- which has as its analog 
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the structure of the organization -- also turns out to be a signif-
icant variable in terms of the relation of such structures to their 
innovative function. 
We chose to couch our study of the more immediate environments 
of innovation in somewhat different terms, however, in order to 
display more adequately both the broad trends and the fine-grained 
detail that are to be found in the research literature. To high-
light these disparate features of organized innovation, we developed 
the chapter in terms of: (1) a complex of interactive process 
phases, (2) several levels of aggregation or analysis, and (3) a 
wide range of organizational, economic, informational, and social-
psychological variables. 
Perhaps the most significant trend characterizing the process 
of technological innovation in this century is the increasing 
institutionalization of all its phases. The assumption underlying 
this trend is that creativity can be a deliberate and controlled 
function of the organization. This assumption -- while widely 
held by those involved in innovative efforts as well as those who 
study the process -- can be realized only in part, by trial and 
error, given the present state of our understanding. In light of 
the strong institutionalization trend to which this assumption 
has given rise, however, an improved understanding of the process 
has become a matter of some urgency. 
A second, recurrent theme to be found in the several literature 
concerned with organized innovation is that organizational structure 
is a major determinant of the function of R & D within the firm. 
As it turns out, however, no one model of the R & D process and 
no one organizational structure is the most appropriate; their ade-
quacy depends on the nature of the R & D project and on its stage 
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in the R & D process. The message, however, is clear: structure, 
strategy, and policy interact to exert significant influence on 
the orientation of the laboratory, the characteristics of the 
projects generated and funded, and the overall effectiveness of 
the R & D effort. There are some informed speculations, but re-
latively little knowledge regarding these interactions. 
With regard to the phases of the process, it is important to 
recognize that the pre-project activities of problem definition, 
idea generation, and idea submission are not as amenable to direct 
organizational control as later, "project" activities. Thus, these 
pre-project phases are unusually dependent upon the rich and subtle 
social-psychological influences of intra- and inter-group relations . 
There exists a sizeable -- though fragmented -- literature in this 
area, and the relevant variables have been pretty well identified. 
Their interrelations and mutual influences are not well understood, 
however. Nor is there wide appreciation for the fact that while 
management has little direct control over these pre-project activities, 
it can exert indirect influence through a variety of mechanisms. 
The most propitious starting point in utilizing these avenues of 
indirect influence is the clear recognition that the social net-
works of influence and information flow are largely informal and 
oral, and that they help to shape -- as well as respond to -- or-
ganizational "reality." An experience related earlier is instruc-
tive in this regard. When the R & D manager, whose laboratory was 
generating few new ideas, finally came to respect and utilize the 
informal social groups and their strongly oral tradition, he got 
two responses that ring true; "Well if that is what he wants, why 
didn't he say so?" And secondly, he got the new ideas he needed. 
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Too simple? Perhaps, but more complex, more formal machinations 
may miss the point entirely. 
Of all the subtopics in the literature of organized innovation, 
R & D project selection may have received the most attention, as it 
is a focus of both "idea flow" and "process phase" models. The 
R & D project selection decision is a process by which an inter-
mittant stream of changes are made in lists of currently active and 
proposed projects. The project selection process includes generatin4 
alternatives, determining the appropriate time to make a change, 
collecting data, specifying constraints and criteria, and recycling. 
The decision is complicated by multiple decision criteria which 
have no natural, common, underlying measure and whose relative 
importance varies over time. The decision may require contributions 
from several different organizational levels which are participating 
in a hierarchical, diffuse planning and budgeting process. Our 
present descriptive knowledge has not yet been integrated into a 
framework which offers promise of improving the process. 
Another important literature area addresses how the social-
psychological environment is related to the performance of scientist! 
and engineers in scheduled project activities. Recent research in-
dicates that improvements in individual performance are more likely 
to lead to changes in his working environment than the other way 
around. Thus performance should be viewed as a cause as well as a 
result of change. The implications of this viewpoint for designing 
and implementing organizational changes should be studied. 
One additional problem area was discussed in this chapter --
the interface of R & D with the operating units of the organization 
and the effective transfer of R & D project results into operations. 
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With some notable exceptions, namely the Quinn-Mueller survey 
(1963) and the writings of Morton describing the Western Electric - 
Bell Laboratory interfaces (1968), the literature on this topic 
is nearly non-existent. Our assessment of this problem area is 
that it is one of utmost importance, but, the one for which there 
is the least information in the literature. We believe that 
studies of this area deserve higher priority than some of the 
proprietary constraints which may have hindered past efforts at 
study. 
In summary, a number of functions have been identified at 
the individual, informal groups, and organizational levels; idea 
generation, idea submission, project performance, and transfer. 
In addition, the influence 'of a number of structure/function 
considerations have been discussed, including characteristics of 
the organization, the structure of R & D within the firm, charac-
teristics of the specific innovation, and the orientation toward 
R & D which is held by the firm and its members. The overall 
need now is for a widely accepted conceptional framework for in-
tegrating and cumulating across the many fine-grained studies, 
and for determining the mutual influence of organized innovation 
and the many boundaries with which it interfaces. The next chapter 
treats one of the most important of these boundary areas -- the 
diffusion of innovations. 
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Chapter 4 
The Diffusion of Innovation 
I. Introduction  
From the ecological perspective, the subsystems within a 
complex whole are so inextricably interactive and interdependent 
that the consideration of any one of them in isolation yields only 
a partial analysis with a large unexplained "residue." Nowhere is 
this more evident than in diffusion research. Researchers from a 
wide range of academic orientations have sought, and found, the vari-
ables central to their disciplinary approach. Focusing on these 
variables they have each been able to account, in part, for certain 
characteristics of the diffusion process. But their success has in 
each case been only partial; snapshots of part of the action, from 
a particular vantage point, and with the aid of particular lenses and 
filters. 
The dynamics of the complex whole have largely escaped our grasp. 
Since the major elements or dimensions are incompletely defined, their 
interactions and relative influence are largely unknown. As we have 
seen, studies of the higher levels of aggregation (Chapter 2) often 
suffer from a lack of direct empirical confirmation, owing largely 
to the difficulties inherent in gauging the influence of macro-level 
variables. An equal and opposite difficulty was encountered in study-
ing organized innovation (Chapter 3), where the level of analysis en-
courages empirical study, often to the point of sinking the researcher 
in a morass of micro-level detail. Diffusion research cuts across all 
of these levels of analysis and is thus subject to all the pitfalls 
encountered earlier. Hence it is a most difficult area in which to 
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seek an adequate empirically-based yet theoretically integrated 
perspective. 
In the previous chapters we have emphasized "flows" of in-
formation and influence, and stressed the variety of mechanisms 
and structures that focus, filter, impede, or amplify such flows. 
This emphasis will be maintained in our examination of the diffu-
sion process. Owing to the unusually fragmented nature of re-
search in this area, however, there is little in the way of an 
accepted conceptual structure upon which a survey and assessmant 
may be built. 
Thus we are confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand, we 
might work our way through the literature, reporting and assessing 
specific research results without attempting to integrate them, 
since there is no community of agreement as to the form such a 
conceptual integration should take. This basically conservative 
approach is attractive, but would tell us little about what we 
don't and should know. The assessment of a field requires a view 
of the whole as well as the pieces. On the other hand, our ap-
proach might be to impose an integrating conceptual structure and 
then try to fit the particular studies into it. But this might 
prove a procrustean bed, distorting rather than displaying the 
state of the art. 
Dilemmas invite the search for a middle way. Our middle way 
will be to survey the three diffusion research traditions which 
focus on technological innovations; then to summarize and critically 
assess the classical diffusion model, which represents the most 
significant attempt to date to cut across the disciplinary barriers; 
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and finally, to identify the dimensions of a general theory of 
diffusion deriving from the various research traditions and the 
classical model, and pose a number of questions for research about 
their linkages and mutual influence. 
Before turning to these tasks, however, it is important to 
note that one manifestation of the fragmented nature of diffusion 
research is the emergence of specialized concepts, the use of which 
is often unclear and at times conflicting. The growing interest 
in the diffusion of technological innovations, for instance, has 
led to widespread use of the term "technology transfer." While 
there seems to be broad agreement that technology transfer is a 
special case of the broader category of diffusion, there is little 
agreement as to what it is. Some researchers (Burns 1969; Doctors 
1969; Bar-Zakay 1970) use it to refer to the diffusion of scientific 
and technical information (as opposed to the diffusion of artifacts 
or processes). Others (see Chakrabarti 1972, p. 11) use "technology 
transfer" in referring to intersectoral flows, reserving the term 
"diffusion" for intrasectoral instances. Still others (Spencer and 
Woroniak 1967), use "diffusion" to "denote a kind of natural pro-
cess whereby cultural traits (technology being one) flowed from one 
cultural milieu to another," whereas "'technology transfer' incor-
porates an additional specific element....i.e., a planned and pur-
posive type of action [on the part of the adopter]." Finally, 
Brooks (1966) offers a quite broad definition embracing not only 
the "horizontal" spread of an innovation from context to context 
but the "vertical" flow of information from basic science to tech-
nological application as well. 
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Implicit in much of the technology transfer literature (what-
ever its particular emphasis) is a pre-occupation with point-
to-point flow (for instance, see Little 1969, p.2). Chakrabarti 
(1972) takes this as reflecting a difference among research tra-
ditions. Those with a particularly practical, problem-solving 
concern in the diffusion of technological innovations are more 
likely to stress a point-to-point transfer, whereas other research 
interests tend to a broader process view, emphasizing the pattern 
of spread over time and the variables upon which that pattern de-
pends. We would argue that point-to-point transfer cannot be 
understood apart from the larger context in which it takes place. 
Thus we shall take technology transfer, whatever its particular 
referent or emphasis, as a form of diffusion, and thus subject to 
the whole range of concerns characterizing diffusion research. 
As for the concept of diffusion itself, the following dis-
tinctions are important. In the preceeding chapter.we were con-
cerned with the process by which a new innovation is conceived, 
developed, and brought to the point of first use. Thus the term 
"innovation" was used to refer to something that is new relative 
to the state of the art. The term "innovation" is also used in 
the diffusion research literature, but with reference to subse-
quent adoption in contexts other than the original one. Here an 
innovation is "new" relative to the adopting unit; i.e., it is 
an innovation for that unit even if it has previously enjoyed long 
use elsewhere. Likewise, the earliest adopters of an innovation 
within a sector are commonly called innovators. 
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Adoption is the primary process or mechanism by which an 
innovation is diffused. At times, however, an innovation cannot 
simply be adopted for use in a new context. It may also require 
some more or less extensive adaptation -- in essence, innovation --
to meet the particular conditions of the new applications (Kranzberg 
1967, pp. 30-31). Adaptation, while a condition of successful adop-
tion in such instances, is in fact a special case of a state-of-the 
art advance which was the focus of Chapter 3. Thus we shall not 
deal with adaptation here, but only with the variables and in-
fluences that impinge on adoption behavior. 
With these observations and distinctions before us, we are 
now ready to examine the major research traditions comprising 
the diffusion field. 
II. The Present State-of-the Art In Diffusion Research: The 
Several Traditions  
Systematic study of the diffusion process, according to Everett 
Rogers, had its beginning in the late 1930s with the investiga- 
tion of the diffusion of hybrid seed corn from agricultural 
scientists to Iowa farmers (see below Ch. 12, p. 303), particularly in 
the classical articles of Zvi Griliches. In its early years, 
most diffusion research was concerned with the agricultural sector, 
but it soon spread to other fields, including education, anthropology 
communication, marketing, economics, and medicine. Research tra-
ditions grew in each of these specialized areas but with little 
interchange among them. As Rogers has remarked, "In the early 1960s 
each of these diffusion traditions operated as a separate invisible 
college, and the total field of diffusion was relatively uninte-
grated" (See below Ch. 12, p. 321). In terms of Thomas Kuhn's 
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widely-read work (1962) on the development of science, diffusion 
research itself possessed no paradigm, but consisted of schools 
making use of paradigms from the disciplines listed above. Re-
cently, however, it has been argued that these boundaries between 
the diffusion traditions have begun to break down under the reali-
zation that the process is a general one, independent of the dis-
ciplines, the specific innovations, and the variety of research 
methods involved in its study. As Rogers and Shoemaker have con-
cluded: "Diffusion research is emerging as a single, integrated 
body of concepts and generalizations...." (1971, p. 47). 
We believe that this conclusion reflects hope and anticipation 
more than reality. The field is still so fragmented by specialized 
concerns that even the dimensions of an adequate general theory 
are poorly demarcated. It is a conceptual cartographer's dream.... 
or nightmare. This judgment is not acrimonious in intent. It 
It is a reflection rather on the fragmented nature of any emerging 
field, and the enormous range of disparate elements that characterizE 
this one. 
What we know about the diffusion process tends to be almost 
wholly sector or adoptor-specific (that is, it concerns diffusion 
among farmers, or physicians, or Colombian peasants, or industrial 
firms, etc.). What we, by and large, don't know is when and to 
what extent we can generalize from these specific research results. 
But unless we know what is true generally, and why, specific studies 
remain forever specific. They are data points without an inte-
grated frame of reference that permits comparison and cumulative 
development. 
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In short, the state-of-the art understanding of the pro-
cess by which technological innovations are diffused is meager. 
This condition is not likely to improve until an integrating 
theory has been developed, around which a community of agreement 
can begin to coalesce, thus merging the separate research tra- 
ditions. Our analysis of the diffusion literature leads us to be-
lieve that such a synthesis could be achieved with less disruption 
than Kuhn takes to be characteristic of the emergence of single-
paradigm sciences. This is because the various traditions in dif-
fusion research seem, in large measure, implicitly complementary; 
i.e., their differences are more a matter of emphasis than of sub-
stance. We illustrate both the separate and yet implicitly comple-
mentary natures of these research traditions in the following sec-
tion. 
A. The Diffusion Research Traditions  
Rogers (1971) identifies seven major and six minor diffusion 
research traditions in terms of the number of empirical studies 
1 
conducted in each. 	The traditions he identifies are: 















While identification of these traditions in terms of the number of 
studies conducted is of historical interest, it sheds little light 
on their substantive differences and similarities. In terms of 
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assessing the potential for increased interaction among diffusion 
researchers and ultimately the emergence of a single tradition, 
it is more important to identify basic differences in approach, i.e., 
differences in conceptual structure and in the variables that are 
treated as independent or primary. If this approach is taken, 
the traditions identified by Rogers can be reduced to three 2 -- the 
social-psychological, the economic, and the geographical -- each 
characterized by a distinctive conceptual structure. While each of 
these intellectual traditions offers a distinctive perspective 
on the diffusion process, they are not, however, mutually exclusive; 
in fact they seem to supplement and complement one another. We 
shall survey the state of the art in terms of these three traditions, 
beginning with the geographer's. 
1. Spatial Diffusion: The Geographer's Tradition  
Geographers are concerned with spatial diffusion, specifically 
the relationship between innovativeness of adopters and their 
relative position in physical space. Hagerstrand (1968) demon-
strated that the diffusion of innovations exhibits three states of 
growth in the spatial distribution of adopters. In the initial 
stage adopters are usually concentrated in a small cluster or a set 
of clusters. In the intermediate stage, expansion takes place in a 
pattern that indicated that a new adoption is more likely to oc-
cur in the vicinity of existing adoptions than farther away. This 
"neighborhood effect" creates an outward movement along a more or 
less sharply defined frontier, while at the same time the density 
of adoption behand the frontier continues to grow. A saturation 
stage may be reached in the central area of dispersal while the 
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frontier is still growing. If the number of individual adopters 
are plotted over time, an S-shaped curve, the logistic curve, normally 
appears. This curve shows a slow take-off stage of varying length, 
an intermediate stage of more rapid development, and a final stage 
of declining growth, which approaches a maximum value or ceiling 
asymptotically. The spatial and temporal aspects of this pattern 
seem to apply to various categories of innovation adopter units -
individuals, villages, cities, and firms (Hagerstrand 1968, pp. 174-
75). 
Hagerstrand feels that personal communication between pairs 
of individuals and direct observation are the basic channels for 
the diffusion of innovation. The fact that the spread of innovation 
from certain centers tends to follow repeatedly the same spatial 
course implies a hierarchical communication and social influence 
network with a stable configuration over time (Hagerstrand 1968, 
p. 176). Thus the concerns of the geographer are linked in com-
plementary fashion to those of the sociologist and social psychol-
ogist; in particular, spatial patterns imply the existence of sec-
tors or social systems. 
Hagerstrand has also pioneered in simulation studies of spatial 
diffusion of innovations (Hagerstrand and Torsten, 1965). 3 In 
particular he has utilized Monte Carlo techniques to simulate the 
spatial diffusion of farm innovations. In one instance he 
studied the spatial pattern in the adoption of subsidized pas-
ture improvement innovations in Sweden over a 20-year period, re-
lying on the probability assumptions of "neighborhood effect." 
Comparing his results with empirical data, he demonstrated that 
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not only does spatial proximity increase the probability of adop-
tion but that simulation techniques and model of S-curve growth 
are useful predictors of spatial diffusion of innovations (Hager-
strand and Torsten 1965). This type of simulation of agricultural 
innovations has since been repeated by Hanneman (1971) in Colombia 
with similar results. 
Hagerstrand appreciates the limitations of his "neighborhood 
effect" model and acknowledges that there are "receptivity factors" 
which affect the spatial pattern and rate of adoption of innovations. 
These factors include cost, returns, attitudes, predispositions, 
and value systems. Although these latter characteristics are not 
as amenable to simulation techniques as physical space, they are 
modifiers of the "neighborhood effect" and hence must be considered 
in any multivariate theory of the diffusion process. (Hagerstrand 
and Torsten 1952, 1967). (Later we will include these "recepti-
vity factors" among the characteristics of adopters.) 
Brown, an urban geographer and economist, is concerned that 
the Hagerstrand model of spatial diffusion deals only with adop-
ters. Hagerstrand's information flow model, he argues, would 
suffice only for situations in which there were no active pro-
pagators (Brown 1968, 1969). There are, to be sure, communica-
tions networks through which information flows from a few early 
adopters to the larger group. But the basic tenent of Hagerstrand's 
conceptualization is that adoption is primarily the outcome of a 
learning process. This implies that only those factors relating 
to the effective flow of information need be considered. 
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Brown questions this assumption, arguing that market factors, 
especially the role of propagators who champion rapid and complete 
diffusion, must be considered as well as information flow factors. 
Market factors would include both the distribution policies of 
propagators and the shopping behavior of potential adopters which 
determines the markets at which they trade. Brown and Cox (1971) 
analyze the differences between situations in which there is a pro-
pagator of the innovation with an interest in its rapid and com-
plete diffusion and those where there is not such a person or en-
tity. (We shall emphasize such differences in our later develop-
ment of the dimensions of a general theory of diffusion.) 
Brown distinguishes among macro-, meso-, and micro-scale dif-
fusion within an urban area (Brown and Cox 1971; and Brown 1972). 
Macro-scale diffusion takes place within an entire urban system, 
encompassing the processes of diffusion from the propagator of the 
innovation to intermediate diffusion agencies, including the es-
tablishment of the agencies themselves. Meso-scale diffusion is 
within a specified sub-area of the whole urban system, encompass-
ing diffusion from the agencies to the population at large. Micro-
scale diffusion consists of diffusion among individuals within a 
small area or single community. Thus Brown employs the notion 
of social systems within social systems (which will turn out to 
be particularly important in our later integrative task). We would 
offer the caution, however, that the boundaries of an "urban sys-
tem" might prove too diffuse and poorly defined to support in-
vestigations of the influence of laiger aggregations on adopter 
behavior. 
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Brown is particularly interested in identifying conditions 
that influence spatial aspects of diffusion at the macro- and mese- 
levels. and the patterns of diffusion generated by these conditions. 
He hopes that this research will provide a bridge between work in 
the genre of Myers and Marquis on propagator decisions (1969), and 
work in the genre of Rogers on the adoption behavior of individuals 
(1971). This linkage would seem to be an especially important one 
for understanding the diffusion process. 
To augment the geographer's spatial concern with the considera-
tion of propagators we must turn to the economic tradition in 
diffusion research. 
2. Diffusion: The Economic Perspective  
Like the geographers, the economists have also brought their 
perspective to bear on quite diverse sectors. Griliches' work 
(1957) on hybrid seed corn, for instance, is recognized as a 
classic. Beginning with data by state and crop reporting districts 
within states, he fitted logistic growth functions to this data, 
reducing differences among areas to differences in estimates of 
three parameters of the logistic or S curve: origins, slopes, and 
ceilings. His implicit hypothesis was that profit maximization is 
directly related to the regional development of hybrid corn. Grilich 
two major empirical findings were: 
a. Differences in the long-run equilibrium use of hybrid 
corn (ceilings) and in the rates of approach to that 
equilibrium (slopes) are explained in part, by differ-
ences in the profitability of the shift from open pol-
linated to hybrid varieties in different parts of the 
country. 
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b. The lag in the development of adaptable hybrids for 
particular areas and the lag in the entry of seed 
producers into these areas (differences in origins) 
are explained on the basis of varying profitability 
of entry ("profitability" being a function of market 
density), and the cost of developing and marketing 
the innovation. 
Griliches' major conclusion was that the entire process of dif-
fusion, the process of adapting and distributing a particular innova-
tion to different markets, and the rate at which it is adopted was 
largely guided by expected payoff, "better" areas being entered first. 
His perspective, while involving adopter behavior, was basically con-
cerned with the reasons for certain propagator decisions, that is, 
the decision of propagators to enter certain markets or areas. 
Mansfield (1966) is also concerned with the relationship of 
"profitability" or "payoff" to diffusion, though his focus is on the 
industrial rather than the agricultural sector and on adopter rather 
than propagator behavior. His perspective was also somewhat more com-
plex, for he viewed an innovation's rate of diffusion as determined, 
in large part, by four factors: 
a. The extent of the economic advantage of the innovation 
over older methods or products. 
b. The extent of the uncertainty associated with using the 
innovation when it first appears. 
c. The extent of the commitment required to try out the 
innovation. 
d. The rate at which the initial uncertainty regarding the 
innovation can be reduced (p. 123). 
It should be noted that each of these factors influences not only 
the behavior of potential adopters, but of propagators as well. For 
instance, the economic advantage offered by an innovation influences 
whether and how a propagator chooses to market it, as well as the de-
cision of a potential adopter to invest in it. Since each of Mansfield's 
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four factors can thus be viewed from two perspectives (propagator 
and adopter) they actually represent a total of eight process vari-
ables. In addition, the responses of the propagators and potential 
adopters to each factor influences the perceptions and subsequent 
actions of the other. For the sake of brevity we shall for the mo- 
ment follow Mansfield's lead and restrict our attention to the influe 
of these factors on potential adopters, realizing, however, that mu-
tatis mutandis they apply to propagators as well. 
With regard to the first of these factors, which parallels 
Griliches's "profitability" thesis, Mansfield (1961) offered evidence 
that more profitable innovations are adopted more rapidly than less 
profitable ones. 	Nabseth and Ray (1974) also point to the signifi- 
cance of profitability in an innovation's rate of adoption, but right 
indicate that we know little of its relative significance. 
A general conclusion seems to be that profitability is an 
important factor in explaining the diffusion of new processes, 
not only in distinguishing between users and non-users, but 
also in explaining diffusion among firms and within them.... 
But although profitability is a significant variable in most 
calculations, it is more difficult to say anything about its 
importance relative to other factors in explaining diffusions 
of new technology (p. 303). 
This echoes our earlier remarks about the presently "static" state of 
the art which analyzes factors in isolation, and the need for investi 
gation of their linkages and dynamic interaction. 
Uncertainties other than economic may also be associated with th 
adoption of an innovation as indicated by Mansfield's second factor. 
If potential adopters are very uncertain of an innovation's performan , 
 it tends to spread less rapidly than if they are relatively sure of i 
potential. As a part of such uncertainty, innovations that are rela-
tively easy to understand seem to be accepted more rapidly than more 
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complicated ones (Mansfield 1966, p. 123). This particular influence 
on adoption behavior is also emphasized by Rogers and Shoemaker (1971, 
p. 154) in their generalization that the complexity of an innovation, 
as perceived by members of a social system, is negatively related to 
its rate of adoption. It seems to be true in the agricultural sector 
as well, for Rogers cites similar results in studies by Kivlin (1960) 
in the U.S., Singh (1966) in Canada, and Petrini (1966) in Sweden. 
Petrini found that complexity, along with relative advantage (which 
would incorporate Mansfield's and Griliches' factor of profitability) 
explained 71 percent of the variance in the rate of adoption of inno-
vations among Swedish farmers (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971, p. 154). 
Besides complexity, Mansfield includes two other aspects in "ex-
tent of uncertainty." First, innovations which have easily observable 
results, and second, those that are more consistent with existing 
ideas and beliefs, seem to spread more rapidly than others. Rogers 
also supports these points, offering the generalizations that the ob- 
servability and compatibility of an innovation, as perceived by members 
of a social system, are positively related to its rate of adoption 
(Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971, p. 156). In its support he cites studies 
by Hruschka and Rhemwald (1965) to the effect that the more observable 
innovations which were demonstrated by German "pilot farmers" diffused 
more widely than the less visible innovations. Although Mansfield is 
primarily concerned with diffusion of industrial innovations and Rogers 
with agricultural innovations, they are in point to point correspon-
dence with reference to the relationship of the perceived attributes 
of an innovation to its rate of adoption. 
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Mansfield's third factor emphasizes the extent of commitment 
required to try out the innovation. He demonstrated (1961, p. 763) 
that the rate of diffusion of an industrial innovation is inversely 
related to the size of the investment required to put it into use. 
In other words, a relatively small initial investment for an innova-
tion is positively related to its rate of adoption. Rogers (1971, 
p. 352) makes virtually this same point for agricultural innovations, 
though in somewhat different terms. He says that the "trialability" 
of an innovation (the degree to which it may be experimented with on 
a limited basis) is positively related to its rate of adoption. In 
support of this generalization, Rogers cites studies by Fliegel and 
Kivlin (1966), Singh (1966), and Fliegel et al (1968). Again, in thi 
respect, industrial diffusion does not seem to differ from diffusion 
in agriculture, which supports our point about the implicitly comple-
mentary results of the largely separate traditions. 
The rate of reduction of the initial uncertainty regarding the 
innovation's performance -- Mansfield's fourth factor -- is largely 
conjecture. Difficulty in obtaining supporting evidence is due to 
differing intrinsic characteristics of innovations. The nature of sc 
innovations is such that information regarding their performance can 
be obtained quickly; others require a long time. This is not a wholi 
independent variable though; its impact is mitigated by the degree of 
sophistication and training of potential adopters. 
Rogers also alludes to the rate of reduction of initial uncer-
tainty regarding the innovation's performance when he discusses what 
he terms the "confirmation function." Citing supporting evidence by 
Mason (1964) and Francis and Rogers (1962), he indicates there is 
evidence that a decision to adopt or reject is not the terminal stagE 
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in the adoption process (Rogers and Showmaker 1971, p. 113). Instead, 
in the confirmation period the adopter seeks reinforcement for the 
adoption decision he has made, but he may reverse it if he acquires 
negative or conflicting messages about the innovation. 
Using his four factors, Mansfield (1961) constructed and tested 
a simple multiple correlation model in which the probability that a 
firm will adopt a new innovation increases with the number of firms in 
the sector already using it, and the profitability of doing so, but 
decreases with the size of the investment required. This model appears 
to be a useful forecasting device for certain aspects of interfirm 
diffusion of innovations. 
In a recent international study of the diffusion of eight innova-
tions, Nabseth and Ray (1974) summarize a wide range of considerations 
that influence interfirm diffusion and thus might lead to an S-shaped 
pattern of adoption over time within a sector. 
Considering first the opening phase, where we are looking at a 
process of adoption which is initially slow but begins to acce-
lerate: 
(1) There are usually a few firms willing, and even anxious 
(having some special compelling reason) to be among the 
earliest to try out new techniques, which may initially 
involve considerable uncertainty and risk. 
(2) If a few pioneer firms overcome the teething troubles 
of a new technique, they substantially reduce the risk 
in the eyes of those who have yet to adopt it. 
(3) Good reports of a new technique from entrepreneurs al-
ready using it may carry considerably more weight with 
the large majority of firms than reports in the press or 
publicity by suppliers. 
(4) Modifications to the new technique in the early stages 
of commercial application may substantially increase 
the potential range of production to which it can be ap-
plied, as well as increasing the superiority of the new 
method over existing methods in the feasible range of 
application. 
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(5) There may be a bunching of the new adoptions as part 
of a cyclical mechanism of the Schumpeterian type 
(Schumpeter 1939). 
(6) Other factors may also work in the same direction, 
for example, the age of existing technology to be 
replaced by the new one. 
These factors are all consistent with an acceleration in the dif 
fusion process following a slow beginning. After a time, howevE 
other factors may slow down the process: 
(7) It may transpire that there are areas of production in 
which the new technique is, after all, not very suitablE 
probably the most promising areas will have been exploit 
first. 
(8) The very success of the new technique in its early stagE 
may stimulate some firms to improve their existing methc 
of production for fear of being driven out of the in-
dustry, or for other reasons (Nabseth and Ray 1974, p. S 
As with the other studies being considered in this section, Nabseth 
and Ray bring together considerations of various kinds with little at 
tempt to categorize them by type. (We shall attempt to correct this 
methodological weakness at a later point.) 
Mansfield (1963) is also concerned with the rate of diffusion wi 
in a particular firm. He defines intrafirm diffusion as the rate at 
which a particular firm, once it has begun to use a new technique, pr 
ceeds to substitute it for older methods. Employing data on the sub-
stitution of diesel for steam locomotives, he examined the rate of 
diffusion in the various firms in the railroad industry. "Once they 
had begun to dieselize" was operationally defined as 10 percent achie 
ment of dieselization, with substitution is considered fairly complet 
when 90 percent dieselization had taken place in a firm. Nine years 
were required, on the average, to increase a firm's stock of diesels 
from 10 to 90 percent of its number of locomotives. This finding, pe 
taining to only one innovation, provides little more than a data poin 
for understanding intrafirm diffusion in general. The relevant vari- 
316 
ables would seem to be multiple and complex. The rate of reduction 
of the initial uncertainty pertaining to an innovation's performance, 
for instance, may vary from one innovation to another and from one 
adopter to another, as may the condition of, and capital that is tied 
up in existing technology. 4 
Mansfield's work on intrafirm diesel diffusion is similar in 
structure to the one he used (1961) to represent the rate of interfirm 
diffusion. This suggests a certain degree of unity and similarity 
between the two diffusion processes (interfirm and intrafirm), at least 
with respect to the variables under consideration. Further efforts 
should be made, using data for other innovations to test this sort of 
econometric model of the rate of diffusion of an innovation. Something, 
however, will have to be done about operationalizing the concept of 
"rate of reduction of the initial uncertainty," which will involve 
achieving greater clarity about the characteristics of innovations, 
adopters, and their mutual influence. 
Mansfield's most comprehensive work on the diffusion of industrial 
innovations is Industrial Research and Technological Innovation: An 
Econometric Analysis (1968). In it he investigated four large, national 
industries: iron and steel, petroleum, coal, and railroads. Second-
ary data were utilized to analyze the adoption of 150 innovations by 
firms in these industries from 1919 to 1958, and a hypothesized re-
gression model was tested for fit with the actual data. 
A number of significant findings emerged from this massive under-
taking. First, the length of time a firm waits before using a new 
technique tends to be inversely related to its size and the profit-
ability of its investment in the innovation (p. 205). Second, twenty 
years or more are often required for all the major firms in an industry 
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to adopt an innovation. (Nabseth and Ray report similar results 
(1974].) Third, the number of firms adopting is positively related 
to the rate of adoption, which is in keeping with the previously de-
scribed S-curve of growth prior to the saturation stage. Finally, 
"the personality attributes, interest, training, and other charac-
teristics of top and middle management may play a very important role 
in determining how quickly a firm introduces an innovation" (p. 205). 
However, Mansfield's study revealed no close relationship between a 
firm's rate of growth and the rate at which it adopts an innovation 
(p. 203). 
From his earlier studies, Mansfield (1963) expected to find that 
larger firms would introduce innovations more quickly than smaller 
firms because the larger have greater financial resources and more 
extensive engineering and technical resources. They can pioneer more 
cheaply and with less risk. This finding was substantiated in Mans-
field's 1968 work and in Mansfield et al (1971). Interestingly enoug 
firms with younger top management did not adopt an innovation sooner 
than firms with older top management, which is consistent with Rogers 
analysis of farm innovations (See Rogers and Shoemaker 1971, p. 185). 
Both Mansfield and Rogers (pp. 354-56) find, however, that earlier 
adopters are more highly educated than later adopters. 
In one of his most recent collaborative works, Mansfield et al 
(1971) looked at intrafirm research and innovation, in order to en-
hance understanding of the relationship of technological change to 
economic growth. Dealing with the diffusion of numerical control in 
the tool-and-die industry, the authors, using secondary data, found 
that: 
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a. The diffusion process is slowed by lack of 
knowledge and resistance to change. 
b. The primary reason given for non-use was that 
the innovation would be unprofitable. 
c. Both the larger firms and firms with more highly 
educated owners tend to be early users. 
These findings contain substantial non-economic dimensions and thus 
are interesting not only in themselves, but also for the evidence 
they afford of the efforts of those in one diffusion research tradi- 
tion, the economic, to bridge the gap to another, the social-psycholo-
gical. 
Similar linkages between economic and social psychological vari-
ables were suggested by Nabseth and Ray (1974), particularly as regards 
profitability calculations and management attitudes. 
One general conclusion seems to be that calculating the 
profitability of a new process is more difficult than is 
usually acknowledged in studies on the subject. For some 
processes, for instance numerically controlled machines 
and continues casting, profitability turned out very 
difficult to calculate ex post, and even more difficult 
ex ante. This does not mean that firms do not try to 
estimate  the relative advantage of a new process, but 
rather that their calculations are very subjective. Of 
course, new investments always involve uncertainties, 
but they are probably greater in the introduction of 
new technologies than, for instance, in straightforward 
replacement. It follows that profitability calculations 
for new processes are very much linked with management 
attitudes, especially when experience of the technology 
is scarce and perhaps contradictory....The very presentation 
of a profitability calculation therefore involves subjec-
tive elements, with some managements stressing the risks 
and uncertainties, others the benefits that can be gained 
(p. 302). 
Thus they take the determination of utility, not as a purely economic 
calculation, but as containing social-psychological dimensions as well. 
Suggestions of the possibility of such linkages, whether arising from 
the recognition of unexplained "residues" or other sources, represent 
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a positive signal that integration of the several research traditions 
can be achieved. 
3. The Social-Psychological Tradition in Diffusion Research  
As noted above, Mansfield found that the process of diffusion wa: 
slowed by resistance to change. Barnett, an anthropologist, has also 
dealt with this topic in a highly speculative social-psychological 
work (1953). A new idea, Barnett argued, must be compatible with the 
norms of the social system, and the adopter must perceive relative 
personal advantage before he will adopt. But as Rogers points out, 
changes occur in the meaning of an innovation and the use to which it 
is put even as diffusion proceeds (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971, p. 169) 
If the adopter cannot satisfy himself on the score of compatibility 
and relative advantage, he will resist change. There is, then, the 
problem of "merchandizing" the innovation in such a way that the po-
tential adopter can maximize his future expectations. 
Mansfield et al established quantitatively that resistance to chz -- — 
(rejection of numerical control in the tool and die industry) within 
the firm (which is one kind of social system) did exist, but were on1 
partially able to explain the resistance on the basis of profit maxi-
mization. Rogers, having offered the generalization that the relativE 
advantage of a new idea as perceived by members of a social system is 
positively related to its rate of adoption, supported his claim with 
data from 29 studies (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971, pp. 142, 350-351). 
What is needed is additional research into the nature of "relatit 
advantage" and "resistance to change" -- beyond the economic aspect --
in order to determine the relative influence of social, cultural, and 
psychological components. 
Two separate studies heuristically illuminate social, cultural, 
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and perhaps psychological components of resistance to change in the 
diffusion of technological innovation. Spicer (1953) studied fifteen 
cross-cultural cases of successful and unsuccessful attempts to in-
troduce new ideas and methods in agriculture, industry, and medicine. 
He concludes that the change agent, coming from another culture, must 
be careful to operate through existing channels of communication and 
cooperation and must understand the relationship of his position as 
an outsider to the members of a given social system. He must attempt 
to map the linkage of customs and to make sure that his product will 
be perceived as compatible. Above all, he must avoid ethnocentrism --
making judgments in terms of the standards, norms and values of his 
own culture. 
Bright (1964), studying resistance to innovation as a problem of 
management, came up with findings similar to Spicer's. To Bright, 
resistance is associated with the degree to which institutions and in-
dividuals feel themselves threatened by change. Where only slight 
changes in work behavior and habit are required, there is less resis-
tance. Resistance is heightened, however, when the innovator is con-
temptuous of other members in the social system and of existing work 
routines. It should be noted that while Spicer and Bright are concerned 
with the adopter's resistance to change, they deal with this in terms 
of its implications for propagator strategy and behavior. The inter-
actions of these roles is an important topic for future research. 
In this connection (and in anticipation of a later point), it 
should be noted that the dogmatism scale developed by Rokeath (1960) 
is widely accepted as a reliable indicator of the extent to which an 
individual has a tolerance for new and unfamiliar situations. Not to 
be confused with attitudes which have a specific object or referent, 
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this dogmatism refers to an individual trait or characteristic way of 
behaving when confronted with the new and unfamiliar. Those who are 
"high dogmatic" have more difficulty (i.e., feel more anxiety, engage 
in more avoidance behavior) adjusting to a new or unfamiliar situa-
tion than those who are "low dogmatic". Dogmatism seems unrelated to 
either education or intelligence, and individuals differing markedly 
in their dogmatism levels may perform equally well in situations that 
are not new and unfamiliar. 
The relation of this trait to the "resistance to change" pheno-
menon in the diffusion process is that of an intervening variable. 
That which may be, or has recently been, adopted is new so its impact 
on the status quo is uncertain. Those who are high dogmatic will ten 
to be more uncomfortable, anxious, and threatened by the prospect and 
thus more resistant to the change. While not a diffusion-research-
specific instrument, the dogmatism scale has significant potential fo 
contributing understanding in this area. 
The second finding of Mansfield et al (1971) was that "the prima 
reason given for non-use was that the innovations would be unprofit-
able." Mansfield has also used the term "relative advantage" (in its 
economic sense) in this connection. Psychologically, relative advan-
tage is a function of selective perception. It has been established 
by Bruner and others that perception is a highly subjective phenomeno 
(Bruner and Postman 1947). Each individual perceives a new idea, pro 
cess, or product in terms of his own past experience and technical 
competence, his current needs, and his future expectations. Because 
this differs from one individual to another, both the propagator and 
potential adopter of an innovation are going to subject purely econo-
mic and other intrinsic aspects to selective perception, thereby af- 
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fecting the rate of adoption. When Mansfield et al (1971) said that 
the primary reason given for nonuse of an innovation was that it would 
be unprofitable, they were saying in effect that there were other rea-
sons (of selective relative advantage or disadvantage) left unstated. 
That relative advantage is a major reason given fr'r adoption of inno-
vation, but that it means different things to different groups, is sup-
ported by Rogers in his analysis of the perceived attributes of 286 
innovations and their rate of adoption (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971, pp. 
140-41). 
Nelson and Phelps (1966), as economists are interested in the 
relationship of "human capital" (in the form of advanced education) to 
technological diffusion and economic growth. Attempting to explain why 
earlier adopters of innovations, in both industry and agriculture, have 
more education, they suggest that in a technologically progressive or 
dynamic economy, management is a function requiring adaptation to change 
and that the more educated a manager is, the quicker he will be to in-
troduce new techniques of production. Since educated people make good 
innovators, they argue, education speeds the process of technological 
diffusion. By way of example, they contend that the remarkable inno-
vative thrust of the American agricultural sector is due to the greater 
education of today's farmer which has increased his ability to under-
stand and evaluate the information on new products and processes dis-
seminated by the Department of Agriculture, the county agent, farm 
journals, the radio, and seed and equipment companies. Rogers found 
that the majority of studies support the view that those who know of an 
innovation early have more education and more exposure to mass media 
channels of communication than those who learn of it later 	(Rogers 
1962). 
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Nelson and Phelps view education as an investment in people, i.e 
that educated people are bearers of human capital, and account for th 
technological progressiveness of society. Hayami and Ruttan (1971) 
tend to support the analysis of Nelson and Phelps. They assume that 
significant productivity growth cannot be brought about by realloca-
tion of resources in traditional agricultural systems, but becomes 
available by diffusion of technological changes. They distinguish 
three types of technological diffusion: material, design, and (what 
is especially germane here) capacity (Hayami and Ruttan 1971). Inves 
ments in research and education (human capital) provide a basis for 
diffusion, technical change, and productivity growth in agriculture. 
After studying the history of agricultural innovation and diffusion i 
the United States and Japan, and then examining developing countries 
currently experiencing enhanced agricultural production, Hayami and 
Ruttan conclude that one of the major factors in a country's capacity 
to adopt agricultural innovation from elsewhere, as well as diffuse 
indigenous technology, is investment in public education. A literate 
population is an endowment, increased by public education. 
Hayami and Ruttan also indicate how diffusion of technological i 
novations can overcome deficiencies in material endowments. In Japar 
the scarce factor in agricultural output was land; in the United Stat 
it was labor. Several innovations made up for these endowment scar- 
cities. Mechanical technology, by increasing the power available per 
worker, facilitated increases in the land area that could be worked 
by a labor force of a given size in the U.S. New biological and chen 
cal technology increased the efficiency of the process of solar energ 
conversion by plant life and was, in effect, a substitute for additic 
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land in Japan. These widely diffused technological innovations re-
lieved the constraint on production imposed by limited land area in 
Japan and that imposed by an expensive labor force in the United States. 
Underlying not only the social-psychological tradition of dif-
fusion research, but, implicitly at least, the other traditions as 
well, is an agreement on the importance of social networks in the dif-
fusion of innovations. An important early study by Coleman, Katz, and 
Menzel (1957) may be taken as representative of the best research evi-
dence on this topic. They focused on the ongoing social processes 
which finally led to the widespread adoption of a new drug (euphemisti-
cally called "gammamyn") by physicians in four cities. They were con- 
cerned with the effectiveness of the networks of interpersonal relations 
at each stage of the diffusion process. Structured interviews were 
conducted with the physicians to determine the sociometric choice of 
colleagues and the patterned network of their interpersonal relations. 
They then undertook a systematic search of the prescription records of 
local pharmacies to determine the month in which each physician first 
used the drug in the 15-month period following its release. 
The physicians were divided into two major groups. Doctors who 
were more profession-oriented (i.e., were more in communication with 
their colleagues) adopted the drug earlier than those who were patient-
oriented (i.e., more isolated from their colleagues). Adoption of the 
drug by the profession-oriented physicians followed the logistic or S-
shaped curve, since the physicians were themselves propagators, while 
that of the more isolated or patient-oriented doctors, who were not 
propagators, was exponential. Additionally, Coleman et al found that 
the rate of adoption by the patient-oriented doctors differed between 
those practicing alone and those in partnerships, with the latter 
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adopting earlier. However, both groups of patient-oriented physician! 
followed the exponential curve, thus lending support to Hagerstrand's 
assumption that the S-shaped curve implies a stable communications 
and influence network. 
This study by Coleman et al is a fine example of the importance 
of social networks in the diffusion process as well as an indication 
of the usefulness of mathematical formulations. (We shall treat the 
concept of social networks in more detail in a later section.) 
This concludes our brief overview of the three major traditions 
of diffusion research. To offer a preliminary assessment to be ex-
plicated in subsequent sections, the fragmentation and conceptual jum-
ble of the field, as revealed in these pages, constitutes a major bar-
rier to its further development. The most pressing need is the develc 
ment of a unified conceptual structure, in terms of which the several 
traditions and their implicitly complementary specialized concerns cal 
be integrated, and in terms of which a cumulative base of research 
results can begin to develop. There exists one outstanding example of 
just such an effort to bring the field together -- the "classical dif-
fusion model". This model, deserves close examination. 
III. The Classical Diffusion Model  
The so-called classical diffusion model represents the attempt tc 
synthesize some 2400 diffusion research publications carried out under 
the direction of Everett Rogers at the Diffusion Documents Center at 
Michigan State University, and can be found in Rogers and Shoemaker 
(1971). 5 Four elements, which are taken to be central to the study of 
the diffusion process, form the basis for the model: "(1) an innovati 
(2) communicated via certain channels, (3) to members of a social sys- 
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tem, (4) who adopt it over a period of time" (see Ch. 12 below, p.304). 
We can question the adequacy with which these elements are con-
ceptually structured and their importance in understanding diffusion. 
Rogers himself levels criticisms against his own, earlier model in 
Chapter 12 of this study. 
The first element identified in the classical model as central to 
the conduct of diffusion research is an "innovation," which is taken 
to include ideas, practices, or objects "perceived as new by the rele- 
vant unit of adoption." While we would agree that the innovation it-
self is central to an understanding of the diffusion process, the point 
here is not the truism that without an innovation there would be nothing 
to adopt, and thus no diffusion. Rather, as we have seen in the last 
section, adoption behavior is influenced in significant ways by the 
particular characteristics of an innovation. Its "trialability" is 
a significant influence in the adoption decision, as is its complexity, 
its relative advantage, its associated uncertainty, etc. 
Yet the conceptual structure erected by the diffusion researchers 
to explain the influence of an innovation's characteristics on adoption 
behavior is inadequately refined. We would urge a distinction between 
those characteristics whose influence is independent of the nature and 
circumstance of the potential adopter and those whose influence depends 
on certain adopter characteristics. The former we call "adopter inde-
pendent" characteristics, and we present the argument in behalf of this 
distinction in the following section. We shall also re-examine those 
characteristics identified in the research results summarized above and 
suggest two additional characteristics that previous studies have tended 
to neglect. With regard to the first element of the classical model, 
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we concur in Rogers' judgment of its centrality, but believe that 
it requires further refinement before it can support needed research. 
The second element of the classical model concerns the communica 
tions channels through which information about an innovation is dif-
fused. In emphasizing the importance of this point, Rogers and Evela 
suggest that diffusion should be considered "...a subset of communica 
tions research that is concerned with new ideas" (see below chapter 
12). Whether or not communication takes place, and if so, its effect 
on the potential adopter, depends in large measure on the social re-
lationship between the source and the receiver of the information. 
Further, the communication channel employed (whether impersonal mass 
media channels or personal communications) is a function of the purpo 
of the communication (information dissemination or persuasion), the 
size of the audience and the relationships among its members. 
While we agree with this emphasis on the flow of information and 
influence, we do not feel that the conceptual structure supporting th 
element of the classical model is sufficiently strong to permit an in 
tegration of the several research traditions, and thus the emergence 
of a cumulative research mode. What is required for a more adequate 
conceptual structure is the close coupling of the channels of communi 
cation and influence with the various social systems involved in the 
diffusion process. The channels cannot be adequately understood apar 
from internal and interactive dynamics of such systems. Rogers does 
not deny such coupling, but his conceptual structure does not deal wi 
them adequately. Where a potential adopter is an organization, for i 
stance, its internal social system may be quite complex, reflecting t 
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interaction of the formal organizational structure, the informal 
hierarchy, and mutual-choice social groupings. In addition, such an 
organizational adopter will be a part of a larger social system com-
posed of similar adopters and other related units. The patterns of 
communication and influence and the resulting adoption behavior will 
reflect these levels of complexity as well, and cannot be understood 
apart from them. In the following section we will offer an alternative 
structure for this element. 
The third element identified by the classical model as central to 
diffusion research is the social system. This is perhaps the most basic 
concept in diffusion research, and as such bears a heavy load of multi-
dimensional complexity. Rogers discusses the concept in the following 
terms: 
A social system is defined as a collectivity of individuals, 
or units, who are functionally differentiated and engaged in 
collective problem-solving with respect to a common goal. The 
members or units of a social system may be individuals, informal 
groups, complex organizations, or sub-systems....The defining 
feature of such an system is the interaction between its com-
ponent elements; it is not necessary for such interactions to 
be consciously purposive for a system to exist, although the 
existence of common objectives simplifies the detection of in-
teractions for the analyst. It should be noted that the term 
"structure" has multiple acceptable meanings; the communication 
model discussed here emphasized communication structure, which 
is not necessarily equivalent to either the role structure or 
the formal authority structure, although it may correlate highly 
with them. The terminology of "open systems theory" with its 
emphasis on the permeability of system boundaries, allows the 
development of very flexible and useful analytical models. 
(Rogers and Eveland, see below Chapter 12 p.312). 
We call attention to the various dimensions of complexity inherent 
in this "open systems theory;" for it will prove useful to have them 
disengaged for later detailed analysis. In particular, the following 
characteristics of a social system should be noted: 
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a. A social system may be of various sizes, presumably with 
a lower bound of two individuals and an indefinite upper 
boundary. 
b. The units comprising a social system may themselves be socia: 
systems as well as individual persons. 
c. As a result, social systems may exist at various levels of 
aggregation and thus overlap or be imbedded within one anoth( 
i.e., social systems within social systems. 
d. A social system may embrace different types of "structure" 
singly or in combination, i.e., formal authority structure, 
and/or role structure, and/or communications structure. 
e. As a result of its structure(s) a social system may be, and 
usually is, hierarchically ordered. 
The concept of a "social system" is thus much better developed ti 
the two elements of the classical model discussed earlier. We would 
suggest that the integration of the several research traditions might 
be well served by distinctions among the relevant social systems in tE 
of levels of aggregation and their roles in the diffusion process. SE 
cial systems may (1) function as adopters, (2) be composed of adopter 
units, (3) be part of a larger whole which is an adopter, or (4) func-
tions as propagators. The importance of these several types of socia] 
systems lies in their influence upon adopter behavior. This being the 
case, it is important to distinguish them, as we attempt to do in the 
following section. 
The final element identified by the classical model is time. 
Rogers offers three reasons for this emphasis on the temporal dimensic 
(1) the adoption decision is a process not an act; (2) the point in ti 
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at which a unit adopts, relative to others, provides a measure of the 
innovativeness of that unit; and (3) the rate at which an innovation 
is adopted is adopted is a function of the number of adopters in a 
given period of time. The first of these points we agree with, of 
vourse, but view it as a given or presupposition, not as requiring a 
major role in the explanatory structure. The second "reason" in fact 
defines a measure of innovativeness, while the third is a definition 
of a rate. Thus they are methodological rather than substantive con-
siderations. An adequate general theory or model of the diffusion 
process requires the provision of an explanatory structure adequate to 
account for "time to adoption" and "rate of adoption" differences, i.e., 
they are dependent rather than independent variables. Hence we ques-
tion the need for the emphasis time receives in the classical model. 
In Chapter 12 below, Rogers and Eveland offer their own critique 
of the classical model, though in terms of certain of its assumptions 
rather than a point-by-point analysis. One criticism deserves parti-
cular mention. They note that of the more than 2400 diffusion research 
publications, only some 373 are concerned with organizational adopters. 
Further, most of the subset dealing with organizations treats them as 
if they were individuals, i.e., the influence of processes within the 
organization tends to be ignored. Thus they argue that the classical 
model is largely predicated on the assumption that adoption decisions 
are made by individuals rather than organizations. We agree with 
Rogers' own critique of his earlier model and feel that the correction 
of this bias can be made by the development of appropriate distinctions 
regarding the role of social systems. 
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In concluding our examination and assessment of the so-called 
classical diffusion model, we must reiterate that this model was in-
troduced as an attempt to integrate several separate research tradi-
tions. While we view it as a significant step in that direction, for 
the reasons indicated, we do not believe that it constitutes an ade-
quate conceptual framework for unifying the field. In the following 
section we attempt to take the next step in the direction of an adequ 
general theory, though we will not offer such a theory. Rather, rely 
on the findings and special concerns of the various research traditio 
and the partial synthesis effected by the classical model, we indicat 
the dimensions of an adequate general theory. Although this is a mor 
limited and modest task than developing such a theory, it is one that 
is clearly in line with our assessment focus and a necessary prelimi-
nary in any case. After all, surveyors are needed to plot the terrai 
before the roadbuilders and architects can erect the structures. 
IV. The Dimensions of a General Theo of Diffusion 
By their emphases and preoccupation, researchers in the several 
traditions have identified four major sets of influences operative in 
the diffusion process. The classical model, although structured rate 
differently, also reflects a concern with these same influence sets. 
Thus the "dimensions of a general theory" to be identified in this se 
tion should be viewed as merging from, rather than imposed on, the 
literature base. As with any new conceptual structure, however, dif-
ferences of perspective result in somewhat different questions being 
raised. The long-term value of the structure we offer lies in its ex 
planatory and heuristic power concerning the linkages, interdependent 
and relative influence of its elements. The questions raised cannot 
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be answered a priori in this study, but constitute a fecund "research 
agenda" for the future. 
What we take to be the four dimensions of an adequate general 
theory of diffusion are identified in Figure 1 as impinging on the de-
cision process by which an innovation comes to be adopted. Our first 
dimension involves the characteristics of "sectors." Sectors are 
social systems, the constituents of which are adopter units (individuals 
or organizations) plus certain other units with whom the adopters re-
gularly interact (in a sense the sector is for the adopter the counter-
part of the exogenous system with which the entire innovation process 
interacts). The second dimension of influence on adopter behavior in-
volves the characteristics of adopters themselves. The third concerns 
the characteristics of innovations, and with some refinement parallels 
the corresponding element in the classical model. The final dimension 
concerns the various propagation mechanisms that are often active in 
the diffusion process. We shall discuss each of these dimensions in 
turn, noting not only the support they derive from the diffusion litera-
ture, but also certain parallels with the process of R&D discussed 
earlier. 
A. Sector Characteristics 
Innovations are adopted by particular individuals or organizations. 
The behavior of such adopter units cannot be understood, however, in 
isolation from the larger context of which they are a part. Though 
their descriptions and emphases vary, diffusion researchers have long 
recognized the influence of such larger systems on adopter behavior. 
Rogers and Eveland have used the term "social systems" (see Chapter 12, 
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Figure 1. Dimensions of a General Theory of Diffusion 
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role as social influences and communications mechanisms. In light of 
our concern with the process of technological innovation and thus with 
industrial firms, it is tempting to refer to these larger aggregates 
as "industries." Adopter units are not always firms however, and in 
addition, there is rood reason to consider these larger aggregates 
of influence as also including units other than potential adopters. 
Therefore we have chosen the more neutral term, "sectors." 
In previous chapters the term "sector" has been used to refer to 
a functionally differentiated but ecologically interactive whole, com-
posed of the firms in a particular industry and various related or-
ganizations that provide a service to, regulate, or promote the acti-
vities of that industry (university research, governmental agencies - 
funding and regulatory, professional and trade associations, etc.). 
On this structural view alone (and considering only those cases in 
which the adopter units are firms), sectors vary widely not only along 
the dimensions of number and size of potential adopter units, concen-
tration of resources, high versus low technology, and highly competitive 
versus stable distribution of market shares, but also in the type and 
extent of participation by the related service, regulatory, and promo-
tional organizations. 
This hardly exhausts, however, the complexity that must be em-
braced by the concept of a sectors, or the litany of their potentially 
relevant characteristics. In addition to sectors in which the adopter 
units are firms, there are also sectors in the public domain, such as 
those composed of state, county, or municipal governments, each with its 
own set of related organizations. There are also sectors such as agri-
culture, in which the adopter units are largely individual farmers rather 
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than organizations. And finally, by far the largest class of adopte: 
can only very loosely be identified with a sector at all, i.e., the 4 
suming public. Recently there are signs that nascent consumer group! 
are beginning to constitute organized communities of influence and 
communication akin to the sectors described above. Consumers also 
participate in, and are influenced in their adoption behavior by, la] 
and better organized units of aggregation. The complexity of this 
situation, though, may be such as to preclude its coverage by a gene] 
theory of diffusion, at least until the state-of-the-art is much mor( 
advanced. 
In addition to their inherent structural features, sectors must 
also be viewed as communications networks and as mechanisms of social 
interaction and influence. As such they are a primary means by whicl 
potential adopters learn of an innovation, its success in contexts 
similar to their own, and the actions that have been taken concerninc 
it by significant "others" (i.e., those viewed by the potential adopt 
as pace-setters, major competitors, opinion leaders, etc.). Diffusic 
researchers have heretofore tended to stress these communications anc 
social influence functions of a potential adopter's sector more than 
the sector's structural characteristics. 
This emphasis is to be expected if a researcher takes the sector 
structure as his frame of reference, rather than as a process variabl 
He can thus assume: (1) the similarities of activities in which the 
potential adopters in that sector are engaged; (2) the similarity of 
problems and opportunities with which they are confronted; and (3) th 
communications and influence patterns which in fact characterize the 
sector. In short, if the structure of a particular sector is taken a 
the frame of reference -- as a given rather than a possible process 
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variable -- then the way in which that sector functions, will, of 
course, receive the lion's share of the researcher's attention. This 
seems to he the state of affairs in most diffusion research, with the 
work of Mansfield (1968) and Nabseth and Ray (1974) being the exceptions. 
Our ecological approach, relating structure to function, causes 
us to raise a number of questions concerning the influence of sector 
characteristics on adoption behavior: 
1. In what ways is the influence of sectors in which the 
adopter units are individuals (e.g., farmers) similar to 
that of sectors composed of organizations? In what ways is 
such sectoral influence different? 
2. Is the influence of sectors composed of private organi-
zational units (i.e., firms) different from sectors com-
posed of public organizations (e.g., state governments)? 
How is it different? Similar? 
3. Is the influence of a sector in which there are strong 
indigenous propagator units (e.g., county extension agents 
in the agricultural sector) different from sectors in which 
the major propagator mechanisms are external? What are the 
differences and how significant are they? 
4. What difference does it make if the exogenous propagator 
mechanisms are very weak to non-existent (as seems to be 
the case for sectors in the public domain), as opposed to 
sectors where there are active exogenous propagators? 
5. Is the influence of a sector on adopter behavior any dif-
ferent in those cases in which there is strong federal 
governmental input in the form of funding an/or regulation? 
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6. Is the strength of a sector's trade and/or professional 
associations a significant factor in its influence on 
adopter behavior? 
7. What are the types of formal communication channels within 
sectors, and what is their relative influence upon the dif-
fusion process? 
8. What are the effects of the following sector variables on 
its influence on the adopter behavior of its components: 
a. number of adopter units? 
b. concentration? 
c. high or low technology oriented? 
d. spatially compact or diffuse? 
e. R&D intensive or not? 
f. capital vs. consumer goods orientation? 
g. mobility of skilled individuals among sector units? 
h. labor intensive vs. capital intensive? 
i. field of technology? 
These questions concerning the effect of a sector's structural 
characteristics upon its influence on adopter behavior cannot be ade-
quately answered by the sector-specific studies which currently domin 
the diffusion research literature. Cross-sectoral studies might not 
show all the above questions to be significant; some would probably 
turn out to be, while others would not. In addition, research on the 
effect of the structural characteristics of sectors on their adopter-
behavior influence would doubtless reveal significant variables that 
have been omitted from the above list. 
The basic point here is that in the absence of more cross-sector 
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studies only very limited progress can be made in understanding the 
influence of sectors on the diffusion of innovations within them. Un-
til it is known which sector characteristics influence adoption be-
havior and which do not, the generalizability of sector-specific results 
cannot be determined. Generalizability of results is, of course, the 
key to an integrated and cumulative data base, which in turn, permits 
the rapid development of a field. 
One further point should be noted about the above list of questions. 
In addition to their focus on sector characteristics, several of the 
questions also concern the linkage of sector-influence to other in-
fluences in the process, e.g., adopter and propagator characteristics 
(see questions 3,4, and 5). The diffusion process results from the 
dynamic interaction of these dimensions, so it is the relative influence 
of each, in concert with the others, that must be investigated. 
As we have seen, there is impressive evidence that sectors func-
tion as social systems. In such studies as Coleman, Katz, and Menzel 
(1957) on the diffusion of a new drug (gammamyn) among physicians, and 
in Hagerstrand (1968) and Mansfield (1968), the rate of adoption was 
found to be influenced by the number of adopters at a point in time. 
This transient sector characteristic was taken as reflecting the ex-
istence and influence of a stable and enduring social system among the 
adopters. But as was demonstrated very clearly in the gammamyn study, 
the influence of adoption trends within the sector was greater for the 
well integrated active participant than for his more isolated counter-
part. The influence of the social system is thus not an independent 
variable, but depends upon the characteristics of the adopter. For 
the individual adopter (physicians, farmers, etc.), certain personality 
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traits, educational or cultural background, etc. may strongly influen 
his participation or non-participation in the sector's social system. 
For the organizational adopter, management strategies, attitude to-
wards risk-taking, the significance attached to prestige, etc., may 
be decisive. The characteristics of particular innovations themselve 
and the activity of propagators also help determine the influence of 
the number of adopters at a point in time. 
The sector's social influence extends beyond the number of adopt 
at a point in time. Particularly in the early phases of diffusion, w 
the adopters are may be more important than their number. One would 
expect some members of a social system to be more influential than of 
and thus their adoption to carry more weight with the group than that 
another, less influential, member. Walker (1969), for instance, repo: 
evidence that if an innovation was first adopted by other than an opt 
ion leader, it spread slowly if at all. 
But there is troublesome complexity here also, for opinion leade: 
ship may result from a variety of considerations, some of which may 
have little to do with innovativeness. For instance, a firm may enjo" 
considerable status within a sector by virtue of the market share it 
controls, the high quality of its current products, or simply because 
it was an early pioneer in the field. These same factors, however, mz 
cause the firm to feel its status threatened by an innovation and thuE 
to resist it strongly. 
The present state of the art does not permit a clear-cut evaluati 
of the role of opinion leaders in fostering or hampering diffusion. I 
distinction made by Becker (1970) illustrates the complexities involvE 
He found that for "low risk" health innovations (e.g., those such as 
measles immunizations which were viewed as amenable to easy acceptancE 
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the opinion leaders among the 95 health departments studied were the 
earliest adopters. For more risky innovations, (e.g., diabetes screen-
ing), however, the earliest adopters were not the recognized opinion 
leaders but rather those well down the prestige hierarchy. Rogers and 
Shoemaker (1971) report comparable findings among individual adopters. 
This same phenomenon was also noted in Chapter 3 with regard to the 
initial development and marketing of high-risk innovations, with the 
industry leaders often seeming content to be quick imitators rather 
than innovators. 
A pattern found throughout the diffusion research literature 
emerges from these considerations. It is what might be called the 
"other-things-being-equal" syndrome. Other things being equal, the num-
ber of adopters at a point in time is of substantial influence on the 
behavior of the remaining potential adopters; or, other things being 
equal, early adoption by an opinion leader is of substantial influence 
in future adoption behavior within the sector. 
Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) have reference to this characteristic 
of diffusion research when they say, "Our generalizations deal almost 
entirely with pairs of concepts, whereas the real nature of diffusion 
is certainly a cobweb of interrelationships among numerous variables" 
(p. 93). In fact, they report that 95% of the empirical generalizations 
in the diffusion research literature through 1968 were of the bi-vari-
ate type. A particularly good example is the 275 studies supporting, 
and 127 not supporting, the generalization that "Early adopters have 
higher social status than later adopters" (p. 357). The Becker (1970) 
study reported above seems to be in the "not supporting" category, but 
the distinction it makes between characteristics of innovations and the 
341 
influence of these characteristics on the adoption behavior of opinic 
leaders is an important one. The "other-things-being-equal" approact 
by studying the effects of only one independent variable at a time or 
adoption behavior, results in only a static listing of influences 
whose relative weight is unknown. 
This approach also characterizes the results reported earlier by 
Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) and Mansfield (1963, 1968, 1971) that the 
larger units within a sector tend to be earlier adopters than smaller 
ones. That this is the case for the agricultural and industrial sec 
for examined is an important result, but of even more importance woul 
be a determination of the factors that yield this result. Many of tl 
would presumably be concomitants of size -- greater capital resources 
greater capacity to absorb risk, more technically able personnel, etc 
But in certain cases it may be a characteristic of the innovation 
rather than the adopter that favors the large firm over the small. F 
example, Nabseth and Ray (1974) report the following concerning the 
adoption of the float glass process: 
The hugh output of even the smallest float plant in com- 
parison with the market size is a highly important factor. 
One float line alone, if utilized at a rate anywhere near 
normal capacity, makes more glass than the whole consump-
tion of a country the size of Austria. This is important 
in relation to the behavior of firms in smaller markets, 
or indeed smaller independent companies (p. 211). 
This is not to argue that bivariate results are totally without value 
but their explanatory power is not very great because other influence 
are operative. 
As has been noted, a sector's social system is a mechanism for 
the flow of information as well as influence. Rogers and Shoemaker 
(1971) offer a number of bivariate generalizations about the centrali 
of early adopters in a sector's communications network. They tend to 
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be more cosmopolitan, have more contact with agents of change, have 
greater exposure to the mass media and interpersonal channels of com-
munication, seek more information, and hence have greater knowledge 
of innovations than later adopters (pp. 369-74). We would strongly 
caution against drawing simplistic, cause-effect conclusions from such 
data, for we suspect that early adoption rests upon a more complex set 
of conditions than simply being a sector's gatekeeper and outstanding 
communicator. The early possession of information may well be a nec-
essary but not a sufficient condition of early adoption. 
Becker (1970) in fact challenges the assumption that a unit's cen-
trality in the sector's information flow network is the cause of early 
adoption. He, in fact, urges just the opposite, i.e., that early 
adoption is more likely to be the cause for an adopter's early posses-
sion of information than its effect. "A desire to maintain or increase 
prestige (tempered by the risks of adoption) motivates the professional 
to seek....innovations" (Becker 1970). On the other hand, Rogers 
(Chapter 12, p. 336 below) points out that Becker's data may be inade-
quate to permit the determination of casual direction in this matter. 
But nonetheless, Becker has rightly questioned the widespread assump-
tion (also inadequately supported) that the causal arrow runs in the 
opposite direction. 
Thus while opinion leaders have been identified, communications 
and information flow networks mapped, and early to late adopters cate-
gorized in many diffusion studies, the relationships among these sector 
characteristics are far from clear. It seems that those within the 
sector who adopted an innovation at an early point in time constitute 
an important influence on the behavior of the rest of the sector and 
thus upon an innovation's rate of diffusion. But why these things are 
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so -- why certain units adopt early, why the number of prior adoptio: 
is important, and why the influence of adopters varies -- are comple: 
matters that await full explanation. 
Beyond these few generalizations there is little empirical evi-
dence regarding the influence of sectors on adopter behavior. This 
reflects the roint made earlier, that the sector is most often treat( 
as a fixed site in which studies are made, and not as a variable. T] 
sector characteristics have been little examined for their influence 
the process. The major recommendation we would offer is that sector-
specific research be balanced by more cross-sectoral studies, and in 
particular that the kinds of comparative questions raised earlier be 
given high research priority. Until this deficiency is overcome, the 
category of what-we-don't-but-should-know about the diffusion proses: 
will remain embarrassingly large. 
B. Adopter Characteristics  
Sectoral influences on adopter behavior as discussed above, dept 
upon particular characteristics of adopters, and vice versa. Such it 
terdependencies cannot always be determined a priori, so that diffusi 
research must be an iterative process. The more we know about the 
characteristics of a sector to which an adopter unit belongs, the bet 
ter we are able to understand that unit, its characteristics, and be-
havior. Conversely, the more we know about the characteristics of a 
particular unit, the better we can understand that unit's behavior as 
component of the sector. 
We will deal first with organizational adopters, their character 
istics as formal structures, and as social systems; then we will look 
at the individual, as a participant in an organizational adopter unit 
and as an adopter unit in his or her own right. 
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1. Structural Characteristics of Organizational Adopters  
Rogers and Eveland speak of the need to merge the diffusion re-
search tradition with organizational behavior research (see Chapter 12 
below, p.302). This study affords a unique opportunity to sketch some 
of the questions and hypotheses that might result from such a merger, 
since a large portion of Chapter 3 was devoted to assessing the impact 
of organizational structure on the R&D phase of the innovation process. 
If we assume a parallel between the R&D activity and the process by 
which organizations come to adopt an innovation, then a number of the 
points made in the preceeding chapter are relevant here. 
First, as we have seen in Chapter 3, a number of literature 
sources converge on the organizational structure/function dilemma. 
Briefly stated the situation is as follows. There seems no one "best" 
structure for conducting all of an organization's responsibilities in 
all environments. The structure best suited for "business as usual" 
is hierarchical and characterized by low complexity, high formaliza-
tion, and high centralization. However, this "mechanistic" structure 
is apparently poorly suited for responding to the need for significant 
changes which would require new ideas and major innovations in the or-
ganization's operation, service, or product line. Such pressures upon 
the organization require a more "organic" or matrix structure charact-
erized by high complexity, low formalization, and low centralization. 
Except for the most stable of sectoral environments, an organiza-
tion is called on both to "mind the store" and to respond in innovative 
ways to needs and opportunities. Thus an organization is subject to 
conflicting pressures, the responses to which have different structural 
requirements. One organization adopts a more hierarchical form and 
continues to do well what it has been doing, but finds change difficult. 
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The other, with a more organic form, has and initiates new ideas wits 
relative ease, but may have difficulty in implementation and the mair 
tenance of stability. 
A sector characteristic mentioned earlier, which may find its 
partial explanation in this contrast of the structural characteristic 
of organizations, is that of the "influential" or "opinion leader." 7 
 We would hypothesize that the "leader" organization in terms of early 
adoption would have a less rigidly hierarchical and more organic 
structure than the followers or late adopters in the sector. The 
strength of this correlation should be higher in those sectors that 
are more highly competitive or for some reason are experiencing a per 
of rapid change. One would expect the more rigid, less open hierar-
chical structure to be a decided disadvantage in such environments. 
should be stressed, however, that this is speculation, as we know of 
no published diffusion research on this point. 
A further point on the influence of organizational structure de-
serves mention. This concerns a thesis advanced by Richard Rosenbloo 
(see Chapter 9 below) wherein he argues that the primary linkage be-
tween the organization (firm) and the larger contexts of which it is 
part is to be found in the concept of corporate strategy. The parti-
cular structure of an organization, which in turn influences its adop 
tion behavior, must in some significant measure reflect the strategie 
pursued by those in positions of leadership. In a later section this 
point will be linked up to considerations of the influence of individ 
characteristics upon organizational-adopter behavior. 
2. Organizations as Social Systems  
In addition to the influence of an organization's formal struc- 
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tural characteristics upon its adoption behavior, we must also con-
sider effects occuring from the manner in which that organization 
functions as a social system, which would include many informal and 
other elements. Because organizational adopter units have typically 
been treated as "black boxes" by diffusion researchers, we cannot make 
this discussion diffusion-specific by referring to an appropriate body 
of diffusion research literature. However, many of the social-psy-
chological considerations of importance in organized R&D also seem 
relevant to organizational adoption behavior. We briefly sketch the 
major points here in hopes of stimulating the research needed to de-
monstrate their applicability to the diffusion process. 
The influence of an organization's social system on adoption be-
havior can be viewed from a variety of perspectives. One of the most 
fruitful is provided by Kurt Lewin's hypothesis that individuals when 
confronted with uncertainty as to the actual nature of something, will 
seek to reduce such uncertainty by "social reality testing." That is, 
they will look to others -- to "significant others" -- for help in for-
mulating an opinion, or for confirmation of disconfirmation of their 
opinions. (While our frame of reference here is the process of adoption 
internal to an organization, this concept of "social reality testing" 
also has suggestive parallels with relations between adopters.) These 
"significant others" will tend to be the members of his primary so-
cial group, and, in particular, those "influentials" at or near the 
top of that group's social hierarchy. To this we would add the further 
hypothesis, for which there is some empirical support (Hill 1968), that 
in a tightly structured, hierarchical, formal organization, there also 
seems to be a strong tendency to look to the immediate supervisor for 
guidance. 
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The guidance sought in such "testing of social reality" may con-
cern a potential or recent adoption either directly or indirectly. I 
the direct case one may ask a member of his social group what he thin 
about the merits of a particular adoption, or may offer an opinion fo 
which he seeks confirmation. He may also check social reality at a 
higher level by discussing the adoption with his supervisor informall 
before formally proposing a course of action. A rebuff may end the 
matter there. It will also influence the individual's perception of 
organizational goals and/or organizational receptivity to new ideas 
which will then influence future behavior (Baker and Freeland 1972). 
The particularly strong or self-confident individual who is also 
deeply committed to an innovation (the term "product champion" is of-
ten used here), may not react in this way to a negative response or 
lack of support. He may, in fact, persist in the face of stiff oppo-
sition, and at times succeeds in reshaping the prevailing opinion 
(Langrish et al 1972, p. 67). Such behavior, of course, goes beyond 
the concept of merely "testing" social reality. 
In the indirect case, that which is tested is not an idea con-
cerning an innovation, but rather the individual's perception of the 
environment, as either potentially receptive or unreceptive to a part 
cular idea, or to new ideas in general. In this indirect mode the 
question is not "what do you think about X?", but rather, "How do you 
think the boss would react if someone suggested that we adopt X?" 
Implicit in this indirect form of social reality testing is a greater 
degree of uncertainty about the receptivity of the organization to 
new ideas or about the nature of the organization's goals. If this 
negative impression or uncertainty about goals is reinforced in the 
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social testing process, the idea is likely to go unsubmitted (Baker 
1965). 
An important point about testing social reality rather than the 
idea itself (i.e., submitting it as a formal proposal and then seeing 
how it fares) is that nonexistent barriers can thereby become real. 
That is, if the social testing proves negative, and the idea is dropped 
on that basis, it is as if a barrier existed in the formal oraanization 
(even if it did not). 
Thus, in addition to the actual filters of the formal organization 
through which a proposed adoption must pass (compatibility with organi-
zational goals and strategies, economic feasibility, compatibility with 
existing practice, product line or services, etc.), there are also 
filters within the social system, arising from shared perceptions of 
what is and is not possible. Such barriers are nonetheless real for 
residing in the social rather than the formal structure. An idea that 
is filtered out is lost to the organization, whatever the filter. 
It would seem, in the ideal case, that the socially held percep-
tion of an organization's goals, strategies, needs, and degree of open-
ness to new ideas would be continuously updated and thus would corres-
pond closely to what is in fact the case. It seems, however, that a 
substantial lag can develop between organizational reality and the so-
cial perception of it shared by various sub-groups (Baker and Freeland 
1972). We hypothesized (in Chapter 3 above) that a major factor in 
such a lag or gap is the immediate supervisor with whom the members of 
a social group interact. For better or worse the immediate supervisor, 
by his decisions, attitudes, communications, etc., represents the or- 
ganization to those under him. He operationalizes its policies, strate- 
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gies, and goals, and distributes rewards and sanctions. If in so 
doing he distorts the need picture, then the perception of the organ] 
zation held by those under him will also be distorted. 
The tone of these remarks concerning the influence of the socia] 
structure of an organization on its adoption behavior has been large] 
negative. This should not be taken to mean that the social system 
cannot serve to facilitate the adoption process. While we have per-
haps emphasized the social "grit" between the organizational cogs, ii 
should also be clear that the social system is also the lubrication 
without which the cogs would not turn at all. 
3. Individuals in Organizations and Individual Adopters 
Thus far we have dealt with organizational adopters. The basic 
constituent units of organizations are, of course, individuals. The: 
influence upon an organization's adoption behavior must also be con-
sidered. In addition, individuals may themselves be adopters (e.g., 
farmers). Combining our treatment of these two roles should not pro' 
to be a distorting procedure so long as we keep in mind that in the 
organizational context individual characteristics are but one influei 
element among several, whereas in the case of the individual as adopi 
they are the indigenous whole. 
In chapter 3 we discussed at length the concept of "mind sets," 
by which is meant the biasing influence of past experience that an ii 
dividual brings to a present problem-solving or decision making acti' 
The crucial point about prior experience is not its existence per se 
but its appropriateness or inappropriateness in a new situation. If 
what has been learned in the past is appropriate, then the bias is p( 
tive and of help in assessing an adoption; if it is inappropriate th( 
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the bias is negative and makes an accurate assessment more difficult. 
The concept of mind set operationalizes a part of what diffusion 
researchers mean by "resistance to change." Overcoming the individual 
bias which favors the old way of doing things may be a formidable bar-
rier to the adoption of a new innovation, especially if the need for 
change is not perceived as urgent. This raises the question as to 
whether need or an opportunity most frequently serves as the stimulus 
event for the adoption process. For the R&D process it is clear that 
most innovations are need-induced (see Chapter 3 above), but we know 
of no research on this question with regard to diffusion. 
The next individual characteristic whose influence on the adoption 
process we judge to be considerable is the psychological trait referred 
to earlier as "dogmatism." Dogmatism functions as an intervening 
variable in the resistance to change phenomenon. Individuals who are 
"high dogmatic" have more difficulty adjusting to new and unfamiliar 
situations than those who are "low dogmatic." The influence of this 
trait on an individual's adoption behavior (or his participation in an 
organizational adoption process) should be obvious. That which has 
been recently adopted (or is under consideration) is new at least for 
that context and its impact on the status quo uncertain. Those who 
are high dogmatic will tend to be more uncomfortable, anxious, and 
threatened by its prospect and thus more resistant to the change. The 
influence of high dogmatic individuals on organizational adoption de-
pends, of course, upon their relative position in the organization's 
formal and informal hierarchies. The higher their position and/or 
status the more likely it is that this personality trait will sway the 
adoption decision. For the individual adopter a high dogmatic orien- 
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tation may be decisive, i.e., it may well override strong pro-adopti 
influences. 
The final individual characteristic to which we would call at-
tention is the education level of the adopter. As we saw earlier, f 
both organizational and individual adopters the educational level is 
of significant influence on adoption behavior. While the role of th 
variable is undoubtedly complex, it would seem that its influence is 
in large measure a function of the technical complexity of innovatic 
This completes our analysis of the influence of adopter charact 
ersitics upon the diffusion process. As before, our assessment of 
what we know (at least in the sense of cumulative, generalizable kno 
ledge) is that it is meager, relative to what we do not know. In pa 
cular, organizational adopters have been badly neglected by the dif-
fusion research community. Correction of this situation should be 
given a high priority. 
C. Characteristics of Innovations 
The characteristics of innovations were identified in the class 
model as a key element in the study of the diffusion process. We ag 
with this, though we would also argue for the importance of a distin 
tion between "adopter independent" and "adopter dependent" character 
istics of innovations. The former are qualities of the innovation i 
self, independent of the nature or circumstance of the potential ado 
for the latter, the nature and circumstance of the adopter are inter 
vening variables, in the determination of their influence. 
While the distinction between adopter-independent and adopter-
pendent 
 
characteristics has not been made in the literature, it is 
nevertheless commonly recognized that the characteristics of innovat. 
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influence their adoption. In fact, as we have seen, research in quite 
dissimilar sectors has resulted in similar lists of such characteristics 
(most of them being, in our terminology, adopter-dependent). 
1. Adopter-Dependent Characteristics 
As was noted earlier, Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) in the social-
psychological diffusion research tradition and Mansfield (1966) in the 
economic-industrial tradition have developed quite similar lists of 
the characteristics of innovations that influence their adoption. Those 
we take to be wholly, or largely, adopter-dependent are compared in 
Figure 2. 
Rogers and Shoemaker 	 Mansfield  






Figure 2 Comparison of Innovation Characteristics Identified by 
Rogers and Shoemaker, Mansfield 
Sources: Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) 
Mansfield (1966) 
Rogers' use of the term "relative advantage" includes the economic 
dimension identified by Mansfield, but also goes beyond it to embrace 
social-psychological considerations of advantage as well. The influence 
of these additional aspects is more difficult to assess than the econo- 
Initial uncertainty 
Initial commitment 
Rate of reduction of 
initial uncertainty 
*Discussed though not appearing on list. 
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mic because of their non-quantifiability, but if Becker's (1970) ar-
gument is correct -- that the desire to maintain or increase prestig( 
is more important in early adoption than centrality in the informatic 
network, (the latter having been traditionally considered a dominant 
if not decisive factor) -- then prestige may play a major role in th( 
adopter's calculation of relative advantage. This would seem to be 
potentially important focus for future research. 
As we have noted earlier, the second characteristic identified 
by Mansfield, namely the initial uncertainty associated with it, em-
braces three of the characteristics identified by Rogers ---- compat: 
bility, complexity, and observability. This congruence of results f] 
quite different sectors and research traditions increases confidence 
in them. The additional conceptual refinement offered by Rogers wil: 
probably provide the better basis for future research. That is, the 
compabilitity of an innovation with the potential adopter's context 
the ease with which the results of its adoption may be observed, dif: 
significantly from one another and from the difficulty an adopter ma: 
have in understanding and using the innovation. 
Mansfield's third characteristic, the extent of the initial com• 
mitment required to try out the innovation, is similar to Rogers' 
"trialability," though the one refers to the "lumpiness" of the capi . 
 requirement, while the other involves the "lumpiness" of the innovat. 
itself. We shall argue later, however, that while these characteris• 
tics have a similar influence on the interpretation given here, there 
is a significant difference between them on another interpretation, 1 
der which trialability is adopter-independent. One might be incline( 
to view both as adopter independent, since some innovations (e.g., 
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adoption of the continuous-casting process in steel making) in fact 
require a substantial initial investment, while others (e.g., the ap-
plication of gibberellic acid in malting) cost little, 8 and some 
(again, continuous-casting) must just be adopted or not, while others 
(a new hybrid seed) may be tried out on whatever scale one chooses --
independent of the characteristics of the adopter. On reflection, 
however, it becomes clear that initial commitment and trialability 
(in the sense of incremental adoption) are adopter-dependent, since 
what counts as a substantial initial commitment depends on what the 
adopter's resources are like; i.e., if you have a large number of steel 
mills, continuous casting can be tried out in only one of them. 
The final characteristic identified by Mansfield, the rate at 
which initial uncertainty can be reduced, also finds a parallel in what 
Rogers has called the "confirmation function" and fits well into his 
more detailed structure. Such a rate would seem, clearly, to be adop-
ter-dependent, i.e., as with the other characteristics identified above, 
the nature and circumstance of the adopter function as 	intervening 
variables in the determination of its influence upon the adoption pro-
cess. 
While it is difficult to be confident that this set of adopter-
dependent characteristics of innovations will prove fully adequate for 
future research, they appear to offer a sound basis for proceeding. We 
would suggest, however, that the concepts of "relative advantage" and 
"compatibility" embrace a considerable complexity, and will probably 
have to undergo further refinement as the diffusion research field 
develops. Such additional specification may well emerge quickly from 
an increased interaction of the several research traditions. 
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2. Adopter-Independent Characteristics  
There remains a second set of characteristics where the nature 
and circumstance of the adopter seems to make little difference. Th( 
first of these concerns a sense of trialability other than increments 
adoption; namely the extent to which the initial adoption (in what-
ever increment) is reversible at a later point in time. In view of 
the world's population problems, vasectomy is a potentially quite im-
portant innovation, but one with the major drawback that it is irre-
versable, i.e., it has no trialability at all for the individual ado' 
Adoption of the continuous casting of steel, while not completely ir-
reversible, represents a level of commitment which makes it quite dif 
ficult to return to the older three-stage casting process (ingot casi 
soaking pit, blooming mill). Thus it has low trialability. The samE 
is true for a local government building a new sewerage treatment fac: 
lity or a farmer adopting a force-fed irregation system. A great max 
innovations would seem to possess this adopter-independent characterf 
tic of poor trialability in that they allow little reversability of 
the initial commitment. Since this characteristic has not been ideni 
fied in the literature, however, there is no empirical evidence of it 
degree of impact upon diffusion. 
A second adopter-independent characteristic of an innovation is 
its form. Our primary emphasis has been on the adoption of a new prc 
duct, device, or process. Oftentimes, however, that which is adoptec 
is information rather than an artifact or process. For example, Kott 
stette and Rusnak (1973) report the rapid diffusion of the plane-stri 
fracture-toughness test throughout a number of industrial sectors. 
What was adopted in this case was basically information as to "best 
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practice" in the selection and testing of metals for various uses. 
Whether that which is adopted is information or takes the form 
of an artifact or process is independent of the adopter. The innova-
tion simply has the form it has. Differences in adoption behavior 
due to the different forms of innovations are unknown at the present. 
The lack of such knowledge raises again the issue of the generaliza-
bility of research results. 
Introduction of the matter of the diffusion of information leads 
into another adopter-independent characteristic, the proprietary or 
non-proprietary character of information. The plane-strain fracture-
toughness test is an example of the latter. It was developed by the 
American Society for Testing and Materials at the request of the De-
partment of Defense and the National Academy of Science, and was ulti-
mately incorporated in the ASTM Standards (Kottenstette and Rusnak 1973, 
p. 104). As such it was public information and was adopted quickly by 
firms within a number of industrial sectors. Non-proprietary informa-
tion is not always aiffused so rapidly. However, the point is that in 
such cases there are no proprietary barriers or constraints on its dis-
semination. 
In other cases, however, information may be considered the pro-
perty of the unit (usually a firm in a private sector) which developed 
it, and its diffusion severely constrained. The extraordinary secrecy 
about the ingredients of Coca Cola is a paradigm example. Not all bar-
riers are so impenetrable, however. As was noted in our earlier dis-
cussion of the technological gatekeeper function, proprietary information 
does flow between competitors in a sector. There even seem to exist 
informal norms for restricting, but not preventing, such diffusion 
(Marquis and Allen 1967, p. 1057). 
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The influence of this adopter-independent characteristic of prc 
prietary or non-proprietary information on adopter behavior has seld 
been an explicit research focus, and is thus poorly understood. It 
would seem that a negative influence would be greater in the proprie 
tary instance, i.e., that only here would barriers exist. There is 
some evidence, however, that non-proprietary or public information m 
be of various types, some of which may pose barriers to diffusion wh 
others do not. The plane-strain fracture-toughness test was non-
proprietary and spread very rapidly. On the other hand, Utterback h 
found (1974, p. 623) that government-held patents and technical repo 
(also non-proprietary or public information) are seldom diffused bey 
the source of their original application. The reasons for such dif-
ferences have not been established, but they constitute evidence tha 
even non-proprietary information may possess characteristics that lip 
its diffusion. 
Since the distinction between adopter-dependent and adopter-indi 
pendent characteristics of innovations has not been a part of the co: 
ceptual framework that has guided diffusion research, our list of ch, 
teristics may not be exhaustive. We have some confidence in the ade-
quacy of the adopter-dependent list, since the strong research bias 
towards the adopter perspective would seem likely to have led to the: 
identification. But since adopter-independence has, up to this point 
not even been recognized as a factor, one must suspect that those di: 
cussed above do not exhaust the set. Identification of the major adc 
ter-independent characteristics of innovations and empirical determir 
tion of their influence on adopter behavior would seem to merit a hic, 
research priority. 
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D. Propagation Mechanisms 
We come finally to the fourth of the major dimensions of in-
fluence upon diffusion: propagation mechanisms. In its broadest 
sense the term might embrace every influence serving to diffuse an 
innovation, including all of those discussed above. On a narrower 
and more useful interpretation, however, reference is restricted to 
those agents, agencies, and vehicles of communication for whom pro-
pagation, in either an advocacy or informational sense, is a primary 
and explicit function. Thus, while the behavior of a particularly 
influential farmer and the county agricultural extension agent may 
both be crucial in the rate of adoption of a new hybrid seed within 
an area, only the latter would be considered a propagator, since the 
primary function of the former is farming, not the propagation of in-
novations. 
A typology of propagation mechanisms is offered in Figure 3 along 
with examples of each type. The axes of this matrix are 1) the types 
of propagation mechanisms with which the adopter may be linked, and 
2) the levels of aggregation at which the mechanisms function. The 
types and levels arrayed along these axes are not mutually exclusive, 
but do reflect important differences which have been recognized in 
the literature. Griliches' classic work on the diffusion of hybrid 
corn (1957) for instance, rests on the assumption of active organiza-
tional propagators at the intersectoral level. Myers and Marquis 
(1969) and Brown (1968, 1972, 1973) are also concerned with this 
type and level of propagation. Rogers (1962, 1971) on the other hand, 
deals primarily with intrasectoral diffusion, in terms of all three 
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pagator). We know of no studies, however, which systematically com-
pare the function and relative influence of all three types of mech-
anisms across the various levels of aggregation. 
In addition to the distinctions offered in Figure 3, it is also 
important to note that the function performed by the various propaga-
tion mechanisms may range from a strongly "pro-adoption" mode (i.e., 
committed to the rapid and complete diffusion of an innovation), to 
that of a more "adoption-neutral" channel of information (this dis-
tinction is implicit in Rogers [1971, p. 24]). An example of the 
former would be a firm selling an innovation in a competitive market, 
while the latter would be the dissemination of information by the 
Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information of the 
US Department of Commerce. Although all of the propagation mechanisms 
identified in Figure 3 seem to have a dominant orientation as either 
pro-adoption or adoption-neutral, one can also find instances in 
which most of them functioned in both modes. Professional societies 
for instance, while typically adoption-neutral as between most com-
peting innovations within their domain, can also assume an advocacy 
role with respect to professional standards or "best practice." 
The differential impact of this active/passive distinction on 
adoption behavior is perhaps substantial, but poorly understood at 
present. Even more so is the influence of a shift from one mode to 
the other. The endorsement of a particular fluoride toothpaste by the 
American Dental Association, for instance, is widely assumed to have 
had a major impact upon its rate of diffusion. Perceived shifts from 
straight reporting to advocacy by the mass media often occassion a 
great outcry, again indicating an assumption, at least, that the in- 
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fluence of shifts in a propagator's normal function is substantial. 
This topic merits a high research priority. 
The typology in Figure 3 offers a structure for examining what 
is known about the influence of various propagator mechanisms on the 
behavior of potential adopters. As has been the case with the other 
influences we have examined, however, there are few studies which 
examine the linkage of propagator with other variables. 
1. Observable Artifact to Adopter Linkages  
Because the foremost writers on diffusion are academicians, the: 
are perforce immersed in literature. Hence they sometimes tend to 
overlook the importance of the actual demonstration of the innovatio: 
to the potential user (what Rogers [1971] has called its observabili . 
 Thus the study of artifact-to-adopter diffusion has been largely neg,
 lected, yet it would seem to be a powerful diffusion mechanism. In-
deed, the efficacy of this technique is known to every primary-schoo. 
pupil under the descriptive title of "Show and Tell." Every technic. 
salesman, wherever practicable, carries samples or demonstrator mode: 
with him for the "show-and-tell" effect (thus coupling visual with 
oral propagation techniques). Trade shows and exhibitions form part 
of every trade organization and professional society meeting. This 
means that there might be some quantitative data available -- atten-
dance figures, or, buried within corporation ledgers, some analysis 
of sales derived from showing innovations to potential users -- for 
demonstrating empirically the efficacy of this diffusion mechanism. 
However, we know of no study which presents such data. 
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There is, however, some historical information on the impact of 
world's fairs and international exhibitions on technological progress 
and diffusion. Much of this literature centers on the role of such 
exhibitions in creating a sociocultural climate of acceptance of 
technological growth. Little attention has been given to the way in 
which exhibitions fostered the diffusion of specific innovations, 
although there is the well-known case of Britain's introduction to 
the American technique of interchangeable parts at the Great Crystal 
Palace Exhibition of 1851 in London. This led to the dispatch of a 
commission under the great machine-tool designer, Joseph Whitworth, 
to see the "American system of manufactures" in operation. On the 
basis of the Whitworth commission's report, the British equipped the 
Enfield Armory with American machine tools, and hence accelerated 
the diffusion of these innovative devices and processes (Rosenberg 
1969). 
Such diffusion-specific literature as exists on the observable 
artifact-to-adopter linkage has been concerned with observability as 
a characteristic of innovations, rather than with the propagator 
mechanisms that provide or increase such observability. Thus the 
mechanisms, as opposed to the observability itself, have hardly been 
identified to date. The examples offered in Figure 3 must, therefore, 
be taken as illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
2. Person/Organization to Adopter Linkages  
People-to-people transfer of technical information is being in-
creasingly studied. Thomas Allen's concept of the "technological 
gatekeeper" (1966), the individual within the laboratory who infor-
mally links his colleagues with outside sources of information, is 
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being extended by work in progress on the "informational entrepreneur 
carried on at the Georgia Institute of Technology. The Georgia Tech 
study 9 stresses the passivity of most current information systems 
(even highly computerized information storage-and-retrieval systems 
represent nothing more than a fast librarian), and the need for a 
more active and flexible scheme of information diffusion which would 
allow for feedback from the user to the generator of information, as 
in the highly successful Agricultural Extension Service. 
The mobility of professional engineers can be an important factc 
in diffusing technology (referred to in Chapter 3 as "on-the-hoof" 
transfer). Gilfillan claims that the mobility of labor, industrial 
spying, disclosure in patents, and the inability to seal off the re-
search and productive processes tend to erode the differential level 
of knowledge among firms.(Gilfillan 1935). When an engineer moves 
from one firm to another, or when a scientist or technologist moves 
from a government laboratory into private industry, or vice versa, he 
carries with him knowledge and information, much of which may legalll 
be transferred to his new employer. Many unpatented processes and 
techniques can thus be diffused by the movement of people from firm 
to firm, from industry to industry, or from country to country. In-
deed, in the mid-1960s, the "brain drain" from other nations to the 
United States was held responsible for the "technological gap" be-
tween the United States and other nations. The "brain drain," while 
exaggerated in its impact, represented not so much the transfer of 
actual devices and designs as it did the transfer of technological ce 
bilities. 
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The role of professional societies as propagators has already 
been mentioned in the case of the American Society for Testing and 
Materials reported by Kottensette and Rusnak (1973). Here the organi-
zation itself assumed an advocacy role in the diffusion of "best 
practice" information at the intersectoral level. A contrasting 
professional society role reported by Coleman, Katz, and Menzel 
(1957) illustrates not only activity at a different level of aggre-
gation (i.e., the intrasectoral), but also an adoption-neutral pro-
pagation function. Those physicians most active in the organization 
were not the earliest adopters of the drug because the society formally 
advocated it (which it didn't), but because of their centrality in 
the sector's social structure. The society was a propagator, however, 
in the neutral, information-dissemination sense. In light of this 
result, one might hypothesize that the adoption-neutral propagation 
function depends for its influence upon the existence of social sys-
tems (the two-step flow hypothesis discussed in Chapter 3 also lends 
support to this view). This hypothesized linkage merits further in-
vestigation. 
One might ask at this point whether a linkage might also exist 
between pro-adoption propagators and the potential adopter's social 
system? Such data as exist at this point seem to indicate an affirma-
tive answer, though the relationship is somewhat different. For in-
stance, Spicer (1952) and Bright (1964) offer evidence that the in-
fluence of a pro-adoption propagator varies considerably depending 
on whether such a propagator is perceived as being a member of the 
potential adopter's social system or not. Thus the linkage in this 
case is more complicated, with propagator influence depending not only 
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on the existence of a social system as above, but also on the relatio 
ship of the propagator to that system. 
Thus, in addition to the distinctions offered above, it would 
also seem to be important to differentiate between pro-adoption pro-
pagators as internal or external to the potential adopters sector 
(in terms of Figure 3 this is the distinction between the intrasec- 
toral and intersectoral levels). The latter may be of several types, 
For instance, a pro-adoption, external propagator may represent a 
private firm which has marketed an innovation for which there are 
presently no competitors offering comparable advantages, (e.g., the 
Polaroid Corporation). What differences in adoption behavior might 
accrue from this circumstance as opposed to one in which there are a 
number of competing propagators advocating adoption of highly similar 
innovations? Or the external propagator might be a professional as-
sociation to which only some adopters in a sector belong. Would this 
make a difference in the adoption behavior of members of that sector 
(independent of the characteristics of the particular innovation unde 
consideration), relative to a sector in which all the potential adopt 
were members of the association? How would the propagator's behavior 
differ in these instances? How would the behavior of adopters be 
different? 
Included under the category of external propagators (those func-
tioning at the intersectoral level) is a wide range of federal agenci , 
 a representative sample of which are: 
The Technology Transfer Program of the Environmental 
Protection Agency 
NASA's Technology Utilization Office 
The Technology Utilization Program of the Small Business l° 
 Administration 
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The Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical 
Information, the Office Field Services, the Economic 
Development Administration, and (until recently) the 
State Technical Services Program, 11 all of the US De-
partment of Commerce. 
The Agricultural Extension Service of the US Department 
of Agriculture. 
The range of propagator activities of the federal government under-
taken by these programs, and others that could be mentioned, are too 
diverse to be surveyed in this context. Two, however, deserve special 
mention. The most successful of these efforts has been the Agricul-
tural Extension Service, and a good deal of the success of American 
agriculture during the 20th century is testimony to the effectiveness 
of this device. The agricultural program, fostered by the federal 
government beginning with the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 which 
founded the land-grant colleges for promoting the agricultural and 
mechanical arts, combines all elements of the innovation process with-
in it. Agricultural research stations, both state and federal, usually 
connected with the land-grant agricultural college, generate the dis-
covery or invention; and the extension service, through county agri-
cultural agents, works to see that the innovations thus produced are 
applied and diffused. 
The county agricultural agent not only transmits scientific, 
technical, and economic information (in a form and manner aimed directly 
at the farmer-user), but he also serves as a means for feedback from 
the farmer-user to the information-generating source. For example, 
when the individual farmer is faced with a new problem, the county 
agent transmits this user need to the information-producing source, 
which then seeks out or adapts old information or creates new infor-
mation to provide the answer. In other words, direct feedback from 
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the user helps in the problem-definition phase of the innovation 
process. The agricultural research station, faced with the problem 
has access to past literature and to laboratories for carrying on 
experimentation. It can thus perform all the functions associated 
with R & D from idea generation through the research and development 
phase. Then the county agricultural agent diffuses it among other 
potential users. Finally, the county agricultural agent serves as 
an important feedback in the ecology of the innovation process. 
When J. Herbert Hollomon was Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Science and Technology, he sought to develop an industrial analog of 
the agricultural extension service. His efforts were not completely 
successful, because the Congress never approved of the program as a 
whole nor provided sufficient funding for those parts of which it 
did approve. However, the State Technical Services, which emerged 
for a time, did result from Hollomon's work, (Nelkin 1971). 
Nevertheless, there are non-agricultural and non-governmental 
modes of propagation which resemble somewhat the agricultural exten-
sion service and which have exhibited some success in the marketplace 
One example would be the "detail men" in the pharaceutical industry, 
who go directly to the users (doctors) to present them with the liter 
ature and samples of new drugs. At the same time, they feed back to 
their employers the needs of the doctors; although not medical men 
themselves, they provide the crucial coupling between innovator and 
user. Interestingly enough, there seems to be little serious study 
in the diffusion literature regarding the role of the drug detail men 
in such two-way diffusing of information (Burkholder 1963). 
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The "sales engineer," the salesmen of technical products, per-
forms a similar diffusion function. He brings information of new 
technical products and processes directly to the customers, and at 
the same time serves as a conduit whereby the technical needs of his 
customers are transmitted to the manufacturer-innovator whom he re-
presents. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no scholarly 
studies of the role of technical salesmen as propagators or as arti-
culators of consumer needs and hence as problem definers for innova-
tors. 
A second widely heralded government attempt to diffuse informa-
tion regarding innovation is the NASA Technology Utilization Program 
(Doctors 1969). Through contracts with Midwest Research Institute, 
Stanford Research Institute, Denver Research Institute, and others, 
NASA has actively sought, in accordance with its mandate, to transfer 
the scientific and technological "spinoff" of the space effort to the 
civilian economy. Despite good intentions and the expenditure of con-
siderable money and effort, this attempt to diffuse innovation has had 
only mixed results. In an unpublished research study prepared for the 
NASA Office of Scientific and Technical Information, Kranzberg and 
Rossini have indicated flaws in NASA's Technology Utilization Program: 
it does not allow for feedback, and when user needs cannot affect the 
information generation source, the information-coupling mechanism is 
weak. On the other hand, in that part of its mission relating directly 
to civilian aeronautics, NASA has an excellent record -- reaching back 
to its old days as the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, when 
its innovations were directly in line with user needs. 
The defects in the NASA Technology Utilization Program are further 
proof of the ecological nature of the innovation process. If there is 
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no feedback, no interplay, among the different phases, the innovatioi 
process becomes flawed and imperfect. In the case of NASA, civilian 
user needs could not directly influence the problem-definition and 
idea-generation phase of the innovation process. Such needs were 
outside its mission. Instead, NASA's Technology Utilization Program 
must rely upon serendipity; the innovations arising from the space 
program might happen to be useful for civilian industry, but it is 
not the task of NASA to make them so nor to embark upon innovations 
with that end in mind. In order to apply NASA's technological inno-
vations, the civilian user must frequently re-define his own problem: 
rather than having the innovation produced in answer to his needs 
from the very beginning (Doctors 1969). 
An important international propagation mechanism has only recent 
come to public attention, although it has been around for some time: 
the multi-national corporation. 12 Multi-national corporations take c 
many different organizational forms, with some allowing a substantial 
autonomy to their international parts while others maintain a high de 
gree of centralized control. Although there is a vast literature on 
the diffusion of technology to less-developed countries through gover 
ment and international aid and financial programs (e.g., the World Pa 
there are only beginning to be serious studies of multi-national cor-
porations. Most of these, however, deal with political, financial, a 
international monetary problems arising from the operations of multi-
nationals, and little attention has yet been paid to their role in th 
diffusion of innovations. 
Unlike international aid and development programs sponsored by 
governments, which especially since World War II have served as devic 
for the transfer of technology to the less developed nations, the 
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multi-national corporation diffuses technology primarily to already 
industrialized nations. In fact, multi-national corporations have 
approximately two-thirds of their activities in industrially deve-
loped countries, whose advanced economic level and similar institu-
tional and social structures have facilitated their spread (United 
Nations 1973). With the exception of the United States, which is 
primarily a home country, developed market economies serve simul-
taneously as home and host countries. Although only one-third of 
the direct investment by multi-nationals is in developing countries, 
their presence in those countries is perhaps of greater relative 
significance than in industrialized nations. 
Herman Kahn13 claims that the multi-national corporation "is 
probably the most efficient social, economic, and political institution 
ever devised" to accomplish, among other things, the transfer of tech-
nology. The Diebold Institute for Public Policy Studies (1973), how-
ever, indicates that some critics of multi-nationals claim that the 
impact of such transfer is often minimized because: (1) R&D is gen-
erally carried out by the home country; (2) the training of host 
country nationals for R&D work is often neglected; and (3) the techno-
logy itself is often closely held and not diffused within the host 
country. 
The report of an AdHoc Panel of the Board on Science and Tech- 
nology for International Development, of the National Academy of 
Science (1973), looked at the prospects for industrialization in low-
income countries through the work of multi-nationals. The Panel ex-
amined five industrial sectors: automotive and agricultural machinery, 
chemicals, electronics and communications, pharmaceuticals, and food 
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processing. It pointed out that the multi-nationals do not engage it 
or support much research, development, and engineering in the low-
income countries, and suggest that they reconsider their position. 
The Panel concluded that the multi-nationals and the host-countries 
would find it in their mutual self-interest to foster such cooperatiN 
and proprietory programs of research, development and engineering. 
The Panel recognized the limits of "workability" posed by what might 
be called the host country's "receptivity threshold." "The develop-
ment of basic engineering capabilities -- the ability to manage 
quality-control systems, introduce material specifications and stanch-
maintain tool shops, and establish other production-support activitie 
normally must precede more ambitious developmental and applied re-
search on product design, new materials, equipment design, and other 
changes in production or processing techniques. In other words, the 
logical and chronological sequence is E, D & R (Engineering, Develop-
ment, and Research) rather than R, D & E (1973). 	This concept of a 
"receptivity threshold" is similar to the adopter-dependent character 
tic of particular innovations which Rogers has called "compatability. 
In terms of Ruttan and Hayami's (1971) three modes of technology 
transfer (material transfer, design transfer, and capacity transfer), 
the Panel's point is that multi-nationals should be more concerned 
with raising the host countries receptivity to advanced technology by 
the transfer of "capacity." They are, of course, concerned with 
material transfer, which refers to the diffusion of the technological 
artifacts themselves, and often design transfer also, as is the case 
with licensing arrangements. 
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3. Media to Adopter Linkages  
Much of the research of potential relevance to this topic of 
linkages between the media and adopters has been previously discussed 
(in Chapter 3) and need only be mentioned here. The flow of techno-
logical, as opposed to scientific, information in R&D is a highly oral 
process, in which literature sources play a decidedly secondary role. 
We would hypothesize the same oral pattern for the diffusion of tech-
nological innovations. Thus while the role of such propagation mechan-
isms as professional and trade journals is certainly not negligible, 
and would vary considerably in terms of certain sector and adopter 
characteristics, it is probably not so important an influence in adopter 
behavior as the other types discussed above. It should be stressed, 
however, that this is conjecture, and even if the needed research 
should prove it to be a valid generalization, it would be important 
to know such exceptions as may exist. 
Not all mass media propagation sources are literature-based, how-
ever. Radio and television, in both informational programs and ad-
vertising, amy also serve adoption-neutral and pro-adoption propaga-
tion functions. Television offers the additional advantage of a "show 
and tell" capacity. As has been indicated by the two-step flow hypo-
thesis, however, the mass media do not have the same direct influence 
on all potential adopters, i.e., the social system serves as an in-
tervening variable. Thus while Rogers reports that the preponderance 
of studies show early adopters to have greater exposure to the mass 
media than later adopters (1971, p. 372), he also reports them as 
having greater exposure to interpersonal communications channels 
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(1971, p. 374). Not only are the causal influences hard to disengage 
even the determination of the causal direction is difficult. For in-
stance, Rogers also reports that early adopters have a higher degree 
of opinion leadership than late adopters within their social system 
(1971, p. 375). If this is coupled with Becker's (1970) contention 
that desire for prestige is a more important factor in early adoptior 
than centrality in the communication system, then the relative in-
fluence of the mass media and the early adopter's receptivity to it 
becomes very hard to determine. There is a need for carefully de-
signed research to enable us to begin to sort out these multi-variant 
complexities. The simplistic, "other-things-being-equal" approach 
will simply not serve to advance the state of the art much beyond the 
present fragmented condition. 
* 
This completes the description of what we take to be the four 
major dimensions or types of variables basic to an adequate general 
theory of diffusion. As we shall indicate in the following section, 
the holistic view of the process to which the consideration of its 
dimensions naturally leads, introduces a quite different level of 
questioning than has thus far characterized diffusion research. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
At the present stage in its development, the diffusion research 
field has little explanatory or predictive power at its command, i.e., 
it has no theoretical structure of its own and offers few empirical 
generalizations that may be confidently applied to a wide range of 
diffusion instances. That this is the case should not be surprising 
in light of the following considerations: 
1. The field is a relatively new one and deals with extremely 
complex phenomena; 
2. It is shared by an unusually large number of research 
traditions that interact with one another very little; 
3. Empirical research is dominated by studies that deal with 
only two variables at a time -- "whereas the real nature of 
diffusion is certainly a cobweb of interrelationships among 
numerous variables" (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971, pp. 93). 
4. It is a field that does not seem to possess even the most 
redimentary sort of theoretical structure or paradigm -- the 
so-called "classical model," which represents the best attempt 
in this direction to date, has only limited value in this regard. 
This largely negative characterization of the state of the art 
in diffusion research is tempered somewhat by the implicit -- though 
unexploited 	complementarity of its three major research traditions. 
We have attempted to draw out and build upon the complementary thrusts 
of these traditions by gleaning from them the dimensions of a general 
theory of diffusion. Such a theory, when developed, could serve to 
overcome the present fragmentation of effort, and provide the basis 
for achieving research results more commensurate with the complexity 
of diffusion phenomena. 
Identifying the dimensions of a general theory is, of course, 
just the first step; a static categorization of the variables opera- 
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tive in the diffusion process. How these influences interact with 
one another, and how in multi-variable clusters they impinge on 
adopter behavior -- in short the dynamics of the diffusion process 
calls for empirical work that is beyond the scope of this study. 
The development of a general theory, which would capture the 
dynamic interaction of the dimensions we have portrayed statically, 
requires a new level of questioning. These questions have as their 
point of departure the concept of types of variables, or -- as we 
have called them -- process dimensions. This concept leads one to 
ask about clusters of variables -- not some "x" and "y" in isolation 
and about clusters that embrace all the process dimensions, not just 
one. 
This is not to say that the research design for every investiga• 
tion can, or should, embrace the total diffusion process in all its 
complexity. Nor does an ecological systems view require this. But 
it is to say that while the several process dimensions may be treater 
as a "quasi-separable" system for purposes of analysis, ultimately 
they must be integrated. And even in the analytic phase of an invest 
gation an awareness of the interacting whole must be maintained. 
Illustrative of the kinds of questions that need to be addressec 
by diffusion researchers in the analytic or "quasi-separable system" 
mode, but can only be answered by theory-based cumulative research 
are the following: 
1. What is the relationship, if any, between public and private 
sectors on the one hand, and the types of propagation mech-
anisms that prove most effective in the diffusion of innova-
tions? 
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2. What is the relationship, if any, between highly aggregated 
and highly disaggregated sectors, and the existence and in-
fluence of pro-adoption propagators? Adoption-neutral pro-
pagation mechanisms? 
3. Are there adopter characteristics that are sector-specific 
while others are found with similar frequency in widely di-
vergent sectors? With regard to the latter, do they all have 
a direct influence on adoption behavior, or is the influence 
of some indirect, i.e., dependent upon the presence of some 
other, intervening variable(s)? 
4. Does the distinction we have urged between adopter-independent 
and adopter-dependent characteristics of innovations correlate 
systematically with certain propagation mechanisms, and the 
rate at which innovations are diffused? 
5. What are the differences/similarities in the meaning and 
determination of "relative advantage" across diverse sectors 
(e.g., public/private, high/low competition, etc.)? 
6. What is the relationship between an adopter unit's organiza-
tional structure and the influence of sector characteristics 
and/or certain propagation mechanisms on its initial adoption 
behavior and/or on the rate of intra-organizational diffusion? 
7. Which sector, adopter, and innovation characteristics, and 
which propagation mechanisms are most significant determinants 
of the effectiveness of federal participation in the diffusion 
of technological innovations? 
Such questions, while lacking specificity, are illustrative of the kinds 
of linkage issues that arise once the two-variable generalization ap- 
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roach is seen as only the first weak step in understanding the pro-
cess. They can hardly begin to be specified, however, in the absenc 
of a theoretical framework, and cannot be answered outside the con-
text of a "normal" science, cumulatively building a shared knowledge 
base. 
Lest this assessment of the state of the art understanding of 
the process of diffusion seem unduely pessimistic, let us repeat an 
observation made earlier. While the perspectives and emphasizes of 
the several diffusion research traditions are substantially differen 
they are, by and large, not incompatible or in conflict. They are, 
in fact, implicitly -- occasionally explicitly -- complementary. Th 
unexplained "residue" of one is often a major preoccupation of anoth 
Thus, we would venture the judgment that the development of a compre. 
hensive theoretical framework, and the emergence of a single, inter-
active, research community could, in fact, take place rather quickly 
We would urge the assignment of the highest priority to the conceptu4 
work necessary to make this a reality. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1The exception to this "number of studies" criterion is early 
sociology with Rogers lists as a major tradition "because of its 
considerable influence on most of the other traditions which develop 
later" (1971, p. 48). 
2We would group the traditions identified by Rogers as follows: 












The Geographic Tradition  
Geography 
Two traditions identified by Rogers have been omitted in this arrange-
ment; education and speech. Rogers offers a low evaluation of the 
contribution of education studies to the understanding of diffusion. 
As Carlson (1968) notes, "Data collection on acceptance has not been 
characterized by rigor....Given this weak base, it is rather dif-
ficult to count on what is known about the diffusion of educational 
innovations." Speech was omitted as being too far removed from our 
primary concern with technological innovations. 
3See also Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971, p. 194. 
4Nabseth and Ray (1974, p. 210) report, for instance, that the 
rate of adoption of the float glass process was very slow for some 
large European companies "because of existing expensive and relatively 
new equipment which was using the latest pre-float technolgoy." 
5A brief description of this model may also be found in Chapter 
12 below. 
6The point here has been made previously, that, with regard to 
the process of diffusion, "new" is relative to a potential adopter, 
whereas in the innovation process somethina is new relative to the 
state-of-the-art. 
7These particular terms reveal the bias of the classical model 
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toward the individual adopter, i.e., they both carry more the con-
notation of evaluation and social-psychological "pecking orders" 
than offensive/defensive strategies of firms in the marketplace. 
Th..ir analog in organizational sectors would perhaps be the "leader/ 
follower" concept. 
8See Nabseth and Ray (1974) for a discussion of this point. 
9 "ThR Flow of Scientific and Technical Information in the 
Innovation Process," NSF Grant GN-42061. 
10See Kottenstette and Rusnak (1973) for an analysis of the sim-
ilarities and differences in these programs. 
11See Arthur D. Little & Co. (1969) for an evaluation of this 
office. 
12The United Nations has recently adopted the term "trans-nation 
to refer to these firm- in order to reflect the fact that, while the 
do business in many countries, typically they are not multinational 
in terms of ownership and decision-making. 
13An undated publication "If the Rich Stop Aiding the Poor..." 




Overview and Prospects  
I. An Ecological Perspective  
This assessment of the current understanding of the innovation 
process was designed to achieve several objectives. One was to 
synthesize a diverse and scattered literature, so as to make what 
is presently known about the process more easily available to 
scholars, students, and those researchers and managers actively 
engaged in technological innovation. A second objective was to 
identify the gaps and weaknesses in our understanding -- what we 
should but don't know -- as input to the research priorities of 
individuals, research groups, and funding agencies. Finally, it 
was hoped that the very act of assessing the state of the art might 
serve to advance both the understanding and practice of innovation, 
to the end that our national and international dependence upon 
technology might permit greater choice, diversity, and control. 
As our investigation proceeded, a fourth, unanticipated, ob-
jective emerged. A subject matter as complex as technological 
innovation embraces an unusually wide range of variables, and thus 
requires for its understanding the cooperative effort of scholars 
from many disciplines. The unexplained residue of one disciplinary 
perspective is often a central focus of another. This interdependency 
has typically not been dealt with in the research literature, with a 
resulting isolation of the several perspectives and fragmentation of 
what is known. We became convinced that this fragmentation of effort 
and results constitutes a major barrier to substantial advances in 
understanding. Thus it became an additional objective of our study 
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to emphasize the interdependent and complementary roles of the 
several research communities that are involved in innovation 
research, and to point out, wherever possible, linkages that 
need to be explored. 
Initially, we attempted to structure our assessment in terms 
of a simple but speciously attractive view of process phases 
following one another in linear fashion: (1) problem definition 
and idea generation; (2) invention; (3) research and development; 
(4) application; and (5) diffusion. We were disabused of this 
simplistic notion rather quickly -- it just did not correspond 
with the facts -- and cast about for a more adequate represen-
tation which would capture both the intertwined complexity of the 
process, and its dynamics. 
A closer analogy, and the one we came to adopt, is that of 
an ecological system. Viewing the innovation process as an ecolog-
ical system not only enabled us to develop a more adequate notion 
of process phases, but also to portray the wide range of immediate 
and more remote influences and their complex linkages, and the 
interaction of embedded and overlapping levels of aggregation. 
We have come, therefore, to treat an innovation and its diffusion 
as the outcome of a multi-phase but often non-linear process in 
which a host of social-psychological, economic, organizational, 
and informational variables interact throughout several levels of 
aggregation. 
Although we speak of a lake or forest and its inhabitants as 
constituting an ecological system, we recognize that this does 
not mean that it is completely self-contained or self-sufficient. 
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Such systems are linked to others as a part of a larger whole. 
Just so, the process of technological innovation affects and is 
affected by systems and factors exogenous to the immediate con-
texts in which it takes place. Thus we have not only given the 
term "process of technological innovation" a very broad interpre-
tation -- as embracing the whole range of activities from the 
initial problem definition and idea generation through to the 
diffusion of an existing innovation to new contexts -- but have 
also included in our investigation the exogenous influences of 
societal values, endowments, and institutions. 
On the other hand, we were not equally interested in every-
thing about the larger systems which embrace innovation, or even 
in every aspect of those immediate contexts to which the process 
is indigenous. With rare exception those factors which influence 
the innovation process, in both the immediate and remote environ-
ments, exist for reasons, and perform functions/ other than the 
innovation-specific ones with which we were concerned. Most 
federal agencies whose actions affect innovation, for instance, 
also perform many other functions which have little or no direct 
relevance to it. Likewise, even a highly innovative firm may 
still have as its dominant orientation the continued production 
of goods for which innovative improvements are not contemplated 
or called for. Thus while we recognize the other, often dominant, 
activities in which most of these institutions are also engaged, 
we have restricted our study to their innovation-specific roles, 
and have dealt with their other functions only as they impinge 
on innovation. 
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Given the constraint that we were concerned only with the 
innovation process, and given an ecological perspective that 
precluded treating this process as if it were self-contained and 
independent of all else, what evolved was a conceptual structure 
of three dimensions. That is, we were concerned simultaneously 
with (1) the process at various levels of aggregation, (2) as 
involving a wide range of disciplinary variables, and (3) as 
amenable to phase distinctions. The first two of these structural 
dimensions are reflected in Chapter 2 which deals with the environ-
ment exogenous to the context of innovation, and all three are 
interwoven in Chapters 3 and 4 which treat innovation and diffusion 
respectively. Each of these chapters is summarized below. 
II. The World Outside  
Innovation is but one of the possible responses to a perceived 
need or want, and in the broader sweep of human history, it does 
not seem to have been man's dominant one. On the contrary, the 
fatalistic assumption that things are as they have always been 
and cannot he otherwise, with the deadening and dreamless accep-
tance that this entails, has surely had a longer and stronger grip 
on the human mind. For some cultures, and for some manifestations 
of the religious quest, there has been yet another alternative to 
innovation in the face of need or opportunity. In those cultures 
the material world has been taken as somehow less real, less im-
portant that the spiritual, and thus such groups have not been 
preoccupied with schemes to change it. Some, in fact, have regarde 
the failure to meet a physical need -- save by endurance -- 
as the measure or path of spiritual attainment. 
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To the extent that such alternative responses to material 
needs characterize a society's value orientation, the innovative 
response is not considered, or is viewed as misguided or beside 
the point. Thus if innovation is to flourish, the cultural 
"soil" of its basic value orientation must be supportive. 
While a change-oriented value system is thus necessary, it 
does not exhaust the ways in which values and preferences in-
fluence the innovation process. They also operate at every 
level of aggregation -- national economic policy, corporate be-
havior, and individual responses, for example -- to channel, 
inhibit, facilitate, and focus innovation. The nature of the 
value systems operative at these several levels is poorly under-
stood -- and their linkages hardly at all. 
Societal values and the particular preferences they yield 
are not the only exogenous influence worthy of consideration. 
There are also societal endowments of various kinds -- material 
resources, labor talent, knowledge -- whose nature, scarcity or 
abundance, cost, distribution, etc., impinge upon the process. 
Likewise, a host of institutions, governmental and private, play 
a major role; by inadvertance as well as design, and as a result 
of their structure as well as their function. Our assessment of 
what is known about the interactions and influence of these ele- 
ments of the exogenous system -- values, endowments, and institutions 
-- is summarized in the following. 
A. Values 
We know that values and preferences both influence innovation 
and are influenced by it. As recent surveys indicate, the public 
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is still generally positive about technology, but feels some 
serious uneasiness. Although the public realizes that technology 
is responsible for much of the material welfare it enjoys, at 
the same time it holds technology responsible for changes, not 
always viewed as beneficial, in established life patterns in 
many areas, including employment and leisure. The uneasiness 
apparently stems from a feeling that individuals or the public 
as a whole have little or no control over how technological 
change affects their lives. In the future this latent frustra-
tion may be translated into more structured demands for public 
control over technology similar to what has occurred in the 
environment area and has already led to the technology assess-
ment movement. Thus, we must consider modes of public partici-
pation in decisions regarding technological innovations which 
transcend the present governmental mechanisms. 
Unfortunately, on balance, we know little about values from 
a scientific point of view. It sounds simplistic to say that 
we need an adequate value research methodology, but that is in 
fact what we need. We should be able to determine value systems 
existing at various levels of aggregation such as the government, 
firm, and individual, and how they interact. Furthermore we 
must be able to determine the ordering of preferences within 
these systems as well as the linkages and conflicts among values 
and value systems. Finally we must learn to forecast trends in 
value changes so that we can make today's decisions affecting 
future innovations in terms of these trends as well as present 
values. 
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True, considerations of value research methodology go far 
beyond the limits of our study. Yet they are important in 
understanding innovation because values act to facilitate or 
constrain various innovations. We know how to survey individual 
preferences, and we can observe specific choices made by firms 
and governments. The problem is to comprehend the relationships 
between preferences at different levels, and the multi-faceted 
linkages between values and innovation, as well as understanding 
the interactions of values with institutions and endowments. The 
alternative to developing value research methodology is to remain 
at the present "wisdom level" supplemented by some cross-sectional 
studies indicating specific preferences. 
B. Endowments 
Fortunately, the state of our knowledge regarding endowments 
is greater than our knowledge of values. We know more about how 
endowments affect innovation and how they interact with other 
elements of the exogenous system. 
In the case of the relationship between scientific knowledge 
and technological innovation we are confronted with collections 
of case studies which recount, with varying degrees of detail, 
the "events" leading to an innovation. However, there has been 
virtually no attempt to dissect the case studies in order to 
determine differential relationships by field of science and 
technology. Perhaps the existing data could be culled to deter- 
mine whether such relationships do in fact exist, and what further 
studies are appropriate to clarify them. 
Scientific knowledge appears to play different roles at the 
various phases of technological innovation. For example, 
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relativity theory underlies nuclear technology. But more localized 
scientific investigations, dealing, for example, with the proper-
ties of materials and not relativity theory, play a role in im-
provements in existing nuclear technologies. However, the most 
fruitful and basic formulations of relativity theory and the theory 
of matter are not generally accessible to the technologist who is 
developing specific innovations. It would therefore be quite 
useful to understand more fully the various uses of scientific 
knowledge at different points in the development of an innovation. 
Additionally, we should understand better the process of trans-
lating a scientific theory from its general and abstract version 
to a form usable by technologists. Enough case study data pro-
bably exist to begin to structure the problem and to find sources 
of relevant information. 
An area which has been studied in bits and pieces is the re-
lationship of supply and demand to innovation. Although the 
balance of evidence indicates that innovation is largely in re-
sponse to demand, it might be worthwhile to examine the origins 
and types of demand. Demand may be generated from changes in 
- factor markets or market needs. Schmookler's classical studies 
consider only the dollar measure of demand -- in terms of influen-
cing patent activity -- without delving into why this money was 
committed in the first place. It is tantalizing to speculate 
that the origin of demand may, in part, be created by the supply 
of appropriate scientific and technical knowledge. Looking at the 
sources of decision to commit investment capital might thus yield 
some useful information. Beyond this, Rosenberg's recent analysis 
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of Schmookler's work has effectively pointed out that supply and 
demand factors are highly interactive. We need additional re-
search on this interaction. 
One of the most interesting questions raised in our study of 
endowments is, "What are the limits to substitutibility among 
endowments in our world?" We have tried to lay the groundwork 
for structuring an approach to this problem whose solution would 
give us some grasp of the factors determining the upper and lower 
limits of the rate of innovation which would preclude disasters 
such as those predicted by The Limits to Growth. The answer to 
this question might have more effect on the future of innovation 
than the contributions of both the technological growth economists 
-- who study the mechanisms of technological development -- and 
systems dynamicists -- who model the total context in which tech-
nological development takes place. 
Throughout its treatment of endowments the literature tends 
to consider sections of problems in isolation, without seeing 
how the partial solutions offered might link with the solutions 
to other parts of the same problem. One advantage of our ecolog-
ical framework is that it relates the parts to the large whole. 
Certain endowments are determined and influenced by values and 
institutions. For example, public and private support of scien-
tific research and education is a manifestation of social values 
translated through institutions. Public perception concerning 
pollution and environmental decay set limits on how much coal 
and oil may be recovered and what technologies may be used in 
their recovery. The nexus among endowments, values, and in-
stitutions is multi-directional and complex. This complexity, 
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however, does not lessen its importance. 
C. Institutions  
Researchers studying institutions have again generally not 
stressed their mutual linkages or their connections with other 
elements of the exogenous system and with innovation itself. 
In discussing the economic institutions which affect the 
innovation process, economists have been limited in their analyses 
because of their tradition of treating technology as a given ex-
ternal constant. Until the innovation process becomes an integral 
part of the economic theories of both firm and industry and until 
these theories become more dynamic in nature, technological change 
will continue to receive inadequate attention. 
Some attempt has been made to overcome these static supposi-
tions of economists. Schumpeter in the 1930s and Galbraith and 
his disciples in the 1950s and '60s hypothesized that large sized 
firms in concentrated industries were more innovative than small 
firms in competitive industries. Although the Schumpeter-Galbraith 
hypothesis stimulated much empirical research, this research has 
encountered both definitional and data problems. One major pro-
blem is defining and measuring innovation. Economists have 
utilized R & D expenditures or R & D employment as a surrogate 
for innovational output, which meant that they utilized an input 
as an estimate of an output, with all the uncertainties implicit 
therein. On the other hand, attempts to use patents, an output, 
as a measure of innovative activity have resulted in a different 
set of problems and in equally inadequate perspectives. 
Attempts to match the Schumpeter-Galbraith hypothesis with 
existing data show that the original hypothesis is simplistic. 
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The relationship between firm size and measures of R & D activity, 
such as R & D expenditures or R & D employment, is far from linear. 
Initially, increases in firm size bring more than proportional 
increases in R & D activity. But beyond some point, which appar-
ently differs from industry to industry, that is no longer the 
case. R & D activity flattens out and increases less than pro-
portionally to additional increments in firm size. 
The effect of industry concentration on R & D activity is even 
less well understood. It does appear, however, that some concen-
tration may stimulate innovation -- or at least R & D activity --
but that too much concentration may lead to opposite results. 
In order for the role of firm size and market structure in 
the innovation process to be more clearly comprehended, additional 
empirical work is necessary. Much of this work should be conducted 
at the levels of the industry, the firm, and the individual in-
novation. In other words, we require disaggregated information 
to augment that which we have in aggregated form now. One diffi-
culty in conducting research of this type is that data are classi-
fied in accordance with schemes based on existing technology. Such 
classificatory schemes are inadequate to measure changes in tech-
nology itself and they give inadequate attention to inter-product 
competition. Similarly the conglomerate firm, which operates in 
a large number of differing product groups, is often an inappro-
priate unit for measuring technological advances. Many of the 
divisions of these conglomerates perform most of the functions 
usually associated with a single firm, and yet under existing 
classification schemes the firm belongs only to that industry in 
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which its sales are greatest. The program recently initiated 
by the Federal Trade Commission to require large firms to report 
operating results by product line is a first but important step 
in providing the data necessary to understand more fully this 
aspect of innovation. 
Political institutions also play important roles as modifiers 
and determinants of innovative activity. In many cases they 
interact with economic institutions. For example, antitrust 
policy and patent policy are closely related to questions of 
firm size, market structure, and technological progressiveness. 
Understanding the relationship between market structure and gen-
eral economic performance, including innovativeness, is a first 
step in securing antitrust and patent policies which will stimu-
late innovation. The second step is making sure that present 
laws, policies, and procedures are working in harmony with the 
values of society; this is not easy; because society is not mono-
lithic and has many different and sometimes contradictory values. 
Government policies, such as patent policy, tax and spending 
policies, and direct regulation of certain industries, all affect 
the innovation process not only separately but also as they inter-
act with each other. While each individual policy may be con-
sistent with the attainment of some particular goal, the overall 
effect in terms of general government policy might contain con-
flicts and contradictions. For example, patent and procurement 
policy may conflict with antitrust policy. As a general rule, 
existing studies look at the effects on innovation in terms of 
only one governmental policy or one single institution or one 
narrow and closely related group. As a first step in structuring 
future research, we recommend that a "map" of all government 
policies and institutions affecting innovation be made. This 
"map" would indicate the effect of each entity on innovation 
as well as showing linkages and conflicts. Not only would this 
initial territorial survey indicate critical areas for future 
research, it would also allow researchers in one area to see 
important links which should be considered in their research 
design. 
The purpose of our study of the world outside innovation 
was to structure that realm so that its aspects most important 
to innovation are highlighted. We have indicated the major 
linkages between the world at large and innovation taking place 
in an organized context as well as connections within the ex-
ogenous system important for innovation. We have looked at 
innovation from the outside, as a closed box; we have located 
that box and shown its connection to its environment. The con-
sideration of values, endowments, and institutions at various 
levels of analysis has proven a most useful approach in parti-
tioning the exogenous system. These same considerations prove 
useful inside the innovation system. 
III. The Process of Innovation: Organizational and Individual  
Contexts  
As has been indicated, our ecological perspective led us to 
structure our investigation in terms of process phases as well as 
levels of aggregation and disciplinary variables. The most basic 
phase distinction is between that part of the process which 
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results in the first introduction of a device product, or process, 
and that part which involves the spread of an innovation to other 
contexts. The former phase we have called innovation, and the 
latter diffusion. While it is a bit awkward to use the term 
"innovation" both in a generic sense to refer to the whole pro-
cess and as referring to one of its phases, it is a common practice 
in the literature and one we have followed. 
A. The Trend Toward Organized Innovation  
Technological innovation in this century is characterized 
by an increasingly strong trend towards the institutionalization 
of all its phases. This conclusion is not intended to imply that 
the role of the individual inventor has become negligible. Such 
examples as Edwin Land (polaroid camera) and Chester Carlson 
(xerography) demonstrate that, although the role of the individual 
inventor may have diminished, it cannot be ignored. The individual 
inventor can still claim credit for many major inventions which 
later become innovations. 
However, the relative importance of the individual inventor 
appears to vary from industry to industry and from technological 
area to technological area. The reasons for this observed variance 
are not well understood; indeed, the significant parameters have 
not even been identified. The unanswered questions include the 
following: Do independent inventors excel for certain types of 
innovations or in certain settings? Are independent inventors 
more likely to invent in some technical fields than in others? Do 
individual inventors contribute more in high technology industries 
than in low technology ones? Not only are the answers to these 
questions not known, but our state of understanding is such that 
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it is difficult to determine if these are the relevant questions. 
According to the explanation of Schumpeter, the innovation 
function must be coupled with the entrepreneurial function if 
the invention is to evolve into an innovation. In some rare 
instances, e.g., Sperry and Edison, a single individual performs 
both as inventor and entrepreneur. More frequently, however, 
the inventor is not the entrepreneur. Increasingly the entre- 
preneurial function is being performed by the larger corporations 
just as invention is becoming a group process. Corporations 
possess the resources necessary to develop, produce, and market 
the budding innovation. Even when the entrepreneurial function 
is not initiated by the larger corporations, it may expand to 
become a large corporation which the individual inventor/entre-
preneur can no longer control, e.g., Sperry Gyroscope Company. 
The so-called spin-off organization (that is, an innovative 
corporation "spun-off" by a larger one, or, more usually, a group 
of inventive individuals within a large firm who, restive under 
the constraints of a large organization, form their own firm) 
can be viewed as a modern day counterpart of the individual 
entrepreneur. Research on the spin-off phenomenon reveals agree-
ment on the industrial and organizational attributes related to 
the birth rates of new firms. On the surface it appears that this 
research area would not warrant further study, but such a con-
clusion may be premature. A number of basic questions remain 
unanswered: Are there conditions under which it is more effective 
to develop an invention in the incubator organization? Is it 
possible that the spin-off organizations excel in certain elements 
of the innovation process or under certain conditions? To what 
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extent is the spin-off firm of today the counterpart to the 
individual entrepreneur of yesterday? Is the spin-off process 
a viable means of initiating a self-reinforcing process by which 
a geographical area can experience economic development? Thus, 
interesting, unanswered questions remain in the study and under-
standing of the spin-off phenomenom. 
Nowadays the innovation process is represented chiefly by 
organized research and development. This might be expected since 
the institutionalization of innovation has been accomplished 
primarily by organized R & D, even though innovation also occurs 
in other organizational units. There is some evidence that R & D 
is the primary source for major, or discontinuous, innovations, 
but that non-R & D units are the primary sources for the minor 
or incremental improvements which cumulatively can result in 
major cost savings. Incremental improvements are made to the 
major improvement until a saturation (diminishing returns) point 
is reached; i.e., until the cost of the improvement exceeds it 
benefits. At this point another major improvement is required, 
and the process repeats. The role played by R & D and non-R & D 
(operating) units in organized innovation and the process by which 
major and minor improvements result and interact are promising 
areas for research relevant to organized innovation. 
* * * 
Technological innovation does not occur in a vacuum, but is 
embedded in an environment with particular and describable char-
acteristics. The literature supports the hypothesis that some 
R & D environments are more conducive than others for organized 
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innovation. Once this is recognized, either as an assumption or 
as an empirical conclusion, derivative questions arise: 
1. If some environments are more conducive than others, 
is it possible to isolate and define the critical 
individual and organizational variables? 
Status: A number of studies have identified vari-
ables in information flow between organizations, 
information flow within the organization, and per-
formance of scientists and engineers. Although these 
variables have been identified, their interrelation-
ships have not been determined, nor has their relative 
importance been measured. 
2. Once the relevant variables have been defined, is 
it possible deliberately to modify an existing R&D 
environment and make it more conducive to innovation? 
Status: In general, the answer to this question 
remains unknown. A major difficulty is that no 
acceptable measure exists which directly relates 
the environment to the innovation, so it is very 
difficult to evaluate the consequence of the modi-
fication. The resource allocation and scheduling 
literatures of operations research and the creativ-
ity literature of applied psychology suggest progress 
toward approaches which might lead to enhanced innov-
ation. The prescriptive literature assumes that 
deliberate improvement is possible, but does not 
test the assumption. 
As suggested by the preceding questions, there is a literature 
which is concerned with description, explanation, and under-
standing, and another literature oriented to prescription and 
improvement. In general, the prescriptive literature is not 
based on the descriptive, explanative literature, but is based 
on an author's conjecture of how the process should operate, 
either generally or in specific instances. Our primary emphasis 
has been on integrating the descriptive literature as a basis 
for better informed prescriptions. 
A number of different contexts of organized R & D exist, e.g., 
the industrial, agricultural, and military-space sectors. However, 
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when the focus narrows to the internal R & D activity, these 
differences seem to disappear and the same questions, approaches, 
and results appear in the literature. To some extent this is a 
consequence of the tendency to study technological innovation as 
a process operating within an organization. The organization is 
viewed as a study site, not as a process variable. Consequently, 
process similarities are emphasized while organizational differ-
ences are minimized. Comparative studies specifically designed 
to investigate differences in innovation resulting from the 
various contexts of technological innovation are certainly justi-
fied. 
B. Focusing Mechanisms and the Behavior of Scientists and Engineer: 
Each organization receives input from the external environment 
which it translates into organizational goals, needs, and cap-
abilities. The existing studies indicate three mechanisms by 
which this information transfer and translation is accomplished. 
First, top management and their planning staffs determine cor-
porate policy and strategy, the incarnation of the firm's values, 
and thus effect a match of opportunity or need with capability. 
Corporate policy and strategy operate as guidelines and con-
straints at the lower levels of the organization, and it is within 
these guidelines and constraints that projects are proposed and 
evaluated. Second, technological gatekeepers operate as a conduit 
by which technological information enters the firm. Third, need 
and opportunity information may be brought into the firm by market-
need gatekeepers such as personnel in marketing, technical service, 
or sales. Thus, at least one formal mechanism, determination of 
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corporate policy and strategy, and two informal agents, technolog-
ical and market-need gatekeepers, interact to transfer external 
data into internal information and translate it into goals, needs, 
and capabilities. 
The literature presents convincing empirical evidence for the 
existence and role of technological gatekeepers, but the infor-
mation transfer and translation role attributed to top management, 
and the existence and role of what we have called "market-need 
gatekeepers," have not been verified empirically. The process by 
which environmental input is transferred and translated into inter-
nal information for use in organized innovation is thus not well 
understood or even well documented. In fact, Hughes has provided 
a more complete description of Sperry's information gathering 
behavior (see Ch. 6 below) than exists in the literature for 
organizations. Such studies would appear to offer a high payoff, 
due both to the lack of existing knowledge and to the importance 
of information transfer and translation for organized innovation. 
Although relatively little is known regarding the process by 
which environmental input is transferred and translated into or-
ganizational information, there is widespread agreement that in-
formation about market needs tends to come from sources outside 
the firm. The significance has been demonstrated in a number of 
empirical studies indicating that from 60-90% of the ideas which 
resulted in innovations were initiated by the recognition of mar-
ket, mission, or production needs. The needs, when coupled with 
a technological capability, resulted in an idea for an innovation 
project. The remaining ideas were initiated by recognition of a 
technological capability which later was coupled with a need or 
opportunity. 
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An idea is generated when a reasonably well-defined match is 
made of an organizational need or opportunity with a technological 
capability. Corporate policy and strategy from top management and 
information from technological and market-need gatekeepers are im-
portant informational inputs for the individual researcher and en-
gineer. They serve to focus his attention on needs, opportunities, 
and capabilities, and thus simultaneously broaden and restrict his 
perceptual base. 
Other important factors which operate to focus the individual 
researcher's effort include: 
1. The specific mind set of the individual, which reflects 
his past experience and the habitual ways of thinking 
that he brings to his current problem-solving effort; 
2. The organizational control and coordination pro-
cesses -- including project selection, budgeting, 
scheduling, and project review systems -- which 
restrict individual behavior and provide secon-
dary input regarding corporate policy and strategy; 
3. The attitudes and actions of the supervisor in 
his roles as a) a middle man in the communication 
of corporate policy and strategy, b) a path by 
which organizational rewards are obtained, c) a 
source for critical evaluation of ideas, d) a 
provider of resources and administrative help, 
e) an implementer of control and coordination 
mechanisms, and f) an enforcer of rules and reg-
ulations; 
4. The role of the primary group, both social and 
work, as another source of administrative, tech-
nical, and market-need information and idea 
evaluation, most especially as a vehicle for 
introducing diverse opinions regarding the range 
of technical options considered and the interpre-
tation of corporate policy and structure. 
An overall assessment of the literature dealing with focusing 
mechanisms reveals that a number of variables have been identified 
and their general significance has been demonstrated empirically; 
however, the specific impact of each variable on the process of 
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organized technological innovation, and the variable interrelation-
ships, remain in the category of informed speculation. 
The literature on focusing mechanisms deals primarily with 
idea generation as an important aspect of organized innovation. 
But in addition to generating ideas, scientists and engineers 
perform the technical work necessary to move an idea to its fruition 
as a utilizable innovation. The mechanisms by which the organiza-
tion rewards its scientists and engineers and by which projects 
are controlled tend to over-emphasize assigned, scheduled project 
activity at the expense of idea generation and idea submission 
(the process by which an idea becomes a candidate for the allocation 
of organizational resources). There is evidence that the "un-
submitted idea" phenomenon is real and significant. For example, 
in one organization a number of ideas existed which had not been 
submitted to management for review and possible funding. Due to 
intervention by an outside research observer, some of these projects 
were funded and resulted in substantial benefit to the organization. 
Yet it is unlikely that these ideas would ever have been brought 
to the attention of management without the observer's intervention. 
Study of the "unsubmitted idea" phenomenon should be replicated in 
other organizational settings; these studies should explicitly con-
sider the type of innovation (incremental versus breakthrough) and 
the view taken of the R & D process (project dominant versus pro-
cess dominant), and try to explain what organizational conditions 
lead to unsubmitted ideas. 
A systematic, integrated series of studies have been reported 
regarding the effectiveness with which scientists and engineers 
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perform the technical work associated with an R & D project. 
Basically, these studies report that effective scientists and 
engineers: 
1. are largely self-directed, i.e., directed by their 
own ideas. 
2. value and seek the freedom to pursue their own 
ideas. 
3. are coordinated by allowing several others a voice 
in shaping their directions. 
4. interact vigorously with their colleagues. 
5. work throughout the phase cycle of the project; 
i.e., perform research, development, design, etc. 
Surprisingly, the literature does not conclude that effectiveness 
can be enhanced by deliberate modification of the environment to 
induce these characteristics. Instead, the evidence is quite the 
contrary. The most recent data are more consistent with the hypo-
thesis that it is effective performance which leads to the above 
behavioral characteristics rather than with the opposing hypothesis 
that the above behavioral characteristics lead to effective perfor-
mance. Again, we are frustrated in the attempt to determine if 
it is possible deliberately to modify an existing R & D environ-
ment and make it more conducive to innovation. 
The research undertaken in these three areas -- 1) focusing 
mechanisms and their influence on idea generation, 2) idea sub-
mission and the "unsubmitted idea phenomenon, and 3) individual 
work style and its relationship to effective performance on 
assigned tasks -- attempts to explain the influence of organiza-
tional and individual variables on the specific behavior of in-
dividual scientists and engineers. In addition, such factors as 
individual mind sets, time pressure, interaction with colleagues, 
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and organizational goals are considered in all three topics. 
Despite these commonalities, the three topics are essentially 
disjoint in the literature -- we have not found a research 
study which simultaneously studies all three activities and 
only a handful consider more than one. Research which explicitly 
studies the three behaviors, their interactions and their trade-
offs, should be given a high priority. 
C. Relationship Between Structure and Function  
Because of the concentration on behavioral variables, the 
literature dealing with above topics tends to downplay 1) the 
importance of the specific innovation and its characteristics, 
2) the relationship between organizational structure and the 
function being performed, and 3) the mutual, self-reinforcing 
relationship between organizational structure and orientation 
toward R & D. Our view of innovation as an ecological process 
forced us to consider explicitly the relationship between structure 
and function, and this in turn led to a consideration of the 
specific innovation and of orientation toward R & D. 
We were thus able to identify two R & D orientations. The 
"phase-dominant" orientation results in an organizational frame-
work wherein the R & D activity is structured by process phases --
e.g., research, development, engineering, and tooling -- within 
each of which idea generation and submission occur. Another 
orientation, the "project-dominant," results in an organizational 
structure such that the R & D activity is primarily structured by 
projects within which all process phases are carried out. Our 
"phase-dominant" and "project-dominant" models of organized R & D 
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evolved from our synthesis of the literature -- they are not 
contained in the previous literature, although several of the 
case studies imply them. More empirical confirmation is needed, 
because these models have the potential for providing the 
analytical ability needed to relate structure and function in 
the study of organized innovation. 
The preceding paragraph suggests a one-way implication --
orientation toward R & D determines how the R & D activity will 
be structured. Our analysis suggests that the converse implica- 
tion also holds -- how the R & D activity is structured determines 
which orientation toward R & D will be predominant within the 
organization, and hence the kind and number of innovations which 
will emerge. 
* * * 
During the 1945-1955 growth period for R & D, the structures 
and the control and coordination mechanisms which were being used 
with apparent success to manage other organizational functions 
were simply extended to this emerging activity. As a result, R & D 
was blended into the existing organizational hierarchy as a new 
division (a "corporate laboratory") or a new function in an ex-
isting division (a "divisional laboratory") and was subjected to 
the organization's usual hierarchical control and coordination 
mechanisms. In the absence of conceptual models, the implications 
for R & D of the hierarchical structure and the associated control 
and coordination mechanisms were not well understood at that time. 
Specifically, it was not understood that they would most likely 
lead to a "phase-dominant" orientation toward organized R & D. 
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In order to explain the significance of this implication, it 
is necessary to consider distinctions at the level of the specific 
innovation. The literature distinguishes between innovations 
which constitute incremental improvements or minor extensions, 
i.e., "incremental" innovations, and innovations which represent 
major breakthroughs or discontinuities, i.e., "discontinuous" 
innovations. Thus, "incremental" and discontinuous" refer to the 
degree to which the innovation is an extension of, or a departure 
from, current practice or existing knowledge. Other distinctions 
made in the literature include: size, in terms of cost and/or 
personnel; time to completion; level of uncertainty, both technical 
and economic; number of technologies; number of organizational 
units; number of R & D phases; urgency with which the results are 
needed; and extent of contribution to organizational goals and 
objectives. 
The phase-dominant orientation, and the resulting organiza-
tional structure, are consistent with the attributes of relatively 
small, short-time horizon, single-phase innovations which are car-
ried on within one organizational unit and which involve one or 
at most a few fields of technology (for brevity, "unimodular" 
innovations). The phase-dominant orientation is not consistent 
with the attributes of relatively large, long-time horizon, multiple-
phase innovations which cut across organizational boundaries and 
which involve several fields of technology ("multimodular" innov-
ations). Conversely, the project-dominant orientation is consis-
tent with the attributes of multimodular innovations, but inconsis-
tent with unimodular ones. 
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We have concluded, therefore, that the hierarchical structures 
and mechanisms adopted for R & D during the 1945-1955 period led 
most U.S. organizations to a phase-dominant orientation of R & D. 
This orientation, in turn, slanted subsequent R & D activity toward 
unimodular innovations and away from multimodular innovations. 
When multimodular innovations were attempted they could be carried 
out only at high cost and with major disruption to existing or-
ganizational norms and structures. 
Consider, for example, the Rubenstein and Radnor (1963) find-
ing that, even though both corporate and divisional management 
agreed that the emphasis of R & D should be on "multimodular" 
R & D programs, "unimodular" programs were much more likely to 
occur in the decentralized organizations which they studied. We 
suggest the explanation that organizations with a phase-dominant 
orientation are more likely to identify and undertake unimodular 
innovations even if they would prefer to identify and undertake 
multimodular ones. The current popularity of topics such as "matrix 
organizations" and "project management" in the management literature 
would suggest an attempt to move toward a project-dominant orien-
tation in order to facilitate the research and development of 
multimodular innovations. However, difficulties are being experi-
enced with these approaches also. The difficulties arise at two 
points: when the matrix or project organization must interact 
with the parent, hierarchical organization and when the project 
is finished and the team members must re-enter the parent organ-
ization. 
The interrelations among organizational structure, function, 
and orientation toward R & D are complex and not well understood. 
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Even less well understood is how these factors interrelate with 
such considerations as focusing mechanisms and project performance 
at the level of the individual scientist and engineer. It is 
highly unlikely that understanding of organized innovation will 
be accomplished by the myopic, piecemeal, non-cumulative empiricism 
which now characterizes the literature. There is a critical need 
for higher-level, integrative theories and models which can guide 
the empirical studies and lead to cumulative results, both ex-
planative and normative. We see an immediate need for an iterative 
relationship between theoretical and empirical research. 
Several of the necessary theoretical constructs appear in 
the organization development literature -- one of the few liter-
atures which has recognized the relationship between structure 
and function. The literature defines such constructs as: level of 
complexity in the organization's incentive system (a highly complex 
system can reward for a large number of different behaviors); 
level of diversity in the task structure (a highly diverse struc-
ture permits an individual to perform a number of different tasks); 
degree of formalization (a highly formalized organization has 
highly codified tasks); and degree of centralization (the extent 
to which power and decision-making authority is in the hands of a 
small proportion of the organizational members). These constructs 
are directly related to control and coordination mechanisms and 
focusing mechanisms: perhaps they are surrogate measures of how 
highly controlled, coordinated, and focused the innovative activ-
ity is within the organization. 
The organization development literature views innovation in 
terms of an initiation phase and an implementation phase. One of 
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the more interesting hypotheses in this literature is that the 
organizational conditions most supportive to innovation at the 
initiation phase (high complexity, high diversity, low formaliza-
tion, low centralization) are just the opposite of those most sup-
portive at the implementation phase (low complexity, low diversity, 
high formalization, high centralization). It appears that this 
literature contains a number of theoretical constructs and hypo-
theses that can serve as a start point for developing the higher-
level, integrative theories and models of the process of organized 
innovation. 
D. The Utilization of R & D Results  
One additional problem area was discussed in Chapter 3 --
the interface of R & D with the operating units of the organiza- 
tion and the effective utilization of R & D project results. With 
some notable exceptions, namely the Quinn-Mueller survey (1963) 
and the writings of Morton describing the Western Electric - Bell 
Laboratory interfaces (1968), the literature on this topic is 
nearly non-existent. Our assessment of this problem area is that 
it is one of utmost importance, but, the one for which there is 
the least information in the available literature, owing perhaps 
to problems with proprietary information. We believe that studies 
of this area deserve high priority. 
* * * 
In summary, a number of functions have been identified at 
both the individual and organizational level: idea generation, 
idea submission, performance characteristics, and transfer from 
R & D. In addition, the influence of structural conditions has 
been examined; including characteristics of the organization, the 
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structure of R & D within the firm, and characteristics of the 
specific innovation. We have also attempted to assess the in-
fluence of the orientation toward R & D which is held by the 
firm and its members. 
In the course of drawing together the results of these 
several lines of investigation, we have developed a preliminary 
conceptual structure -- a framework for integrating and cumulating 
across the many diverse and fine-grained studies of R & D. This 
integrative conceptual structure or some superior alternative to 
it -- though we know of none at the present -- needs to be refined 
to the point of enjoying broad acceptance by the research community. 
In the absence of such a unifying framework, research results will 
continue to be largely non-cumulative, and our understanding of 
organized innovation correspondingly piece-meal. 
The need for such a conceptual structure, adequate for inte-
grating and guiding research on organized innovation, is matched 
by the equally pressing need for an even larger framework which 
displays the linkages of this segment of the total process to the 
societal context in which it is embedded. The "input" side of 
this larger whole was sketched in Chapter 2. The "output" side 
involves the diffusion of innovations, which was the focus of 
Chapter 4. 
IV. The Diffusion Phase  
The field of diffusion research is not clearly defined either 
sociologically, in terms of a single, interactive community of 
scholars, or conceptually, in terms of a theoretical framework 
which yields a set of relevant variables and criteria of methodo-
logical rigor. On the contrary, diffusion research is conducted 
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by several communities or "traditions," each with its own dis-
tinctive intellectual orientation and commitment. Each of these 
traditions seeks, and finds operative, certain variables in the 
diffusion process, and in terms of these variables accounts for 
a portion of the phenomenon. Each tradition also leaves a large, 
unexplained "residue." 
We surveyed the three basic diffusion research traditions 
(the geographical, the economic, and the social-psychological), 
noting both their differences and their implicitly complementary 
findings. We also examined the so-called "classical model" which 
attempts to identify the basic elements of the diffusion process. 
Finally, we described what we take to be the dimensions of a 
general theory of diffusion. In the absence of a theoretcial 
structure embracing at least these dimensions, we argued that 
understanding of the diffusion process can advance little beyond 
the present fragmented, myopically empirical, and non-cumulative 
state of the art. 
The so-called "classical model" of diffusion identifies the 
following elements of the process; "(1) an innovation (2) com-
municated via certain channels, (3) to members of a social system, 
(4) who adopt it over a period of time" (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971). 
We agree with the centrality of the first element (the character-
istics of innovations) but regard its conceptual structure as 
inadequate to support needed research on the influence of such 
characteristics on adoption behavior. We also agree with the em-
phasis on channels of communications, but again do not feel that 
the conceptual structure supporting this element of the model is 
sufficiently strong to permit an integration of the several 
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research traditions. In addition, it does not reflect adequately 
the complexity inherent in the various levels of aggregation in-
volved in diffusion and the communications patterns within and 
between these levels. 
With regard to the social systems concept, we again agree 
with its centrality, but suggest distinctions must be made among 
relevant social systems in terms of levels of aggregation and 
their roles in the diffusion process. That is, social systems 
may (1)function as adopters, (2) be composed of adopter units, 
(3) be part of a larger whole which is an adopter, or (4) function 
as propagators. 
The final element identified by the classical model, time, 
is introduced as defining a measure of innovativeness (time to 
adoption) and a measure of diffusion, namely, the rate of adoption. 
While a model or general theory of diffusion must account for these 
differences, the fact is that they are dependent rather than in-
dependent variables. Thus we question the emphasis on this 
methodological, as opposed to substantive, consideration. 
Despite these deficiencies, the classical model does represent 
a first effort to move beyond the fragmentation of effort and 
results of the several research traditions. In addition to this 
fragmentation, which works against needed theoretical development, 
another weakness in the diffusion literature derives from what 
what we have called the "other-things-being-equal" syndrome. 
As Rogers and Shoemaker have noted, 95% of the 6,811 empirical 
generalizations they identified in diffusion research publications 
were two-variable generalizations, -- "whereas the real nature of 
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diffusion is certainly a cobweb of interrelationships among 
numerous variables" (1971, pp. 93-94). Thus, the dominant pro-
cedure has been to investigate the relationship of some "x" and 
"y" either on some dubious assumption that all other variables 
are unimportant, not operative, or always function in the same 
manner, or on the scholarly dead-end that the generalizability 
of results is unimportant. 
The myopic empiricism of the "other-things-being-equal" 
syndrome yields meager understanding of the diffusion process. 
It can be overcome, however, only by an increase of multivariate 
research designs and development of an expanded and refined con-
ceptual framework to guide empirical research. As a first step 
in this direction, we have offered a preliminary sketch of the 
dimensions of a general theory, derived from the existing, dis-
parate literature and the classical model. 
Four major dimensions of influence were identified as im-
pinging upon the process by which innovations come to be adopted. 
The first involves the nature and characteristics of sectors. 
Sectors are social systems, the constituents of which are adopter 
units plus certain other units with whom the adopters regularly 
interact. Sectors may be public (e.g., state or local governments) 
or private (e.g., firms); they may be composed of either individuals 
or organizations; and they function as mechanisms of influence 
(social hierarchies) as well as communication. 
The second major dimension of influence on adopter behavior 
is the characteristics of adopters themselves. Certain parallels 
were suggested between the influence of organizational structure 
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on innovative behavior and on adoption behavior. We also examined 
the influence of organizations as social systems and as embracing 
smaller social systems (work and social groupings). Finally, we 
looked at the role of individuals, both as influencing the adoption 
behavior of organizations, and as adopters in their own right. 
The third dimension of influence concerns the characteristics  
of particular innovations themselves. Here we introduced a dis-
tinction between adopter-independent and adopter-dependent char-
acteristics. As these terms indicate, the influence of the former 
arises directly from the nature or form of the innovation itself, 
while for the latter the nature and circumstance of the potential 
adopter is an intervening variable in the determination of their 
influence. As it turns out, quite similar lists of characteristics 
have been developed by different research traditions. These char-
acteristics have not been sorted according to the adopter-indepen-
dent/adopter-dependent distinction, however, with the result that 
there has been little success in attempts to assess their relative 
influence and how such influence operated. 
The final dimension of the general theory which we have sug-
gested involves the various propagation mechanisms active in the 
innovation process. These mechanisms as they couple with the 
potential adopter may be of three types; (1) material artifact-to-
adopter linkages, (2) person/organization-to-adopter linkages, and 
(3) media-to-adopter linkages. They may also function at various 
levels of aggregation; international, intersectoral, intrasectoral, 
and for organizational adopters, intra-adopter. And finally, this 
typology of propagation mechanisms must distinguish between those 
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who are active advocates, pro or con a particular innovation, 
and those who perform an adoption-neutral function of dissem-
inating information. 
Such identification of the dimensions of a general theory 
of diffusion is, of course, but a first step towards overcoming 
the fragmentation of the several research traditions and the 
simplicity of the "other-things-being-equal" syndrome. What is 
missing, and which cannot be supplied a priori, is an understand-
ing of how these several dimensions of influence are linked. In 
fact, the long-term potential of the conceptual structure we 
have offered lies in its hueristic value in eliciting a new level 
of inquiry concerning the linkages, interdependence, and relative 
influence of the process dimensions. It is meant to serve as a 
starting point which may be revised in the course of further 
research. 
Lest this assessment of the state of the art understanding 
of the process of diffusion seem unduly pessimistic, let us 
repeat an observation made earlier. While the perspectives and 
emphasis of the several diffusion research traditions are sub-
stantially different, they are, by and large, not incompatilbe 
or in conflict. They are, in fact, implicitly -- though rarely 
explicitly -- complementary. The unexplained "residue" of one 
is often a major preoccupation of another. Thus, we would ven-
ture the judgment that the development of a comprehensive theo-
retical framework, and the emergence of a single, interactive, 
research community could, in fact, take place rather quickly. 
We would urge the assignment of the highest priority to the con-
ceptual work necessary to make this a reality. 
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V. A Final Word  
We have tried to gather together what is known about technol-
ogical innovation and assess it with an eye toward the future. 
In so doing we have: 
Pictured the process as an ecological one, not to 
be "trendy" but because simpler analogies failed; 
Conducted our investigation at several levels of 
aggregation, both indigenous and exogenous to the 
process itself, because understanding required it; 
Dealt with an unusually wide range of variables 
because the research community has found them to be 
important; 
Identified a number of process phases and dimen-
sions which synthesize and at times extend the con-
ceptualizations to be found in the literature; 
Considered both empirical and theoretical works, 
because the quest for understanding requires both; 
and have 
Reported, assessed, hypothesized, and speculated, 
because there is a place -- and a need -- for all of 
these. 
Having done these things, there remains only a final obser-
vation. 
We have earlier noted assumption that the innovation process 
-- and the complex multi-level environment in which it takes 
place -- can be deliberately altered with the predictable result 
of becoming more conducive to the creation, development, and dif-
fusion of innovations. This assumption is not only implicit in 
the literature, it also underlies the increasing institutional-
ization of the process itself. While trial and error is largely 
the present state of the art, a growing capacity to control the 
process is envisioned. 
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Such an act of faith is not foolish; on the contrary it 
is probably a necessary condition of a professional engagement 
in the process at all, or in its study. One probably cannot 
endure the early-learning frustrations of any complex process, 
e.g., the game of chess, without some assumption that thoughtful 
diligence and practice will make us better. But is is worse than 
foolishness -- it is folly -- to assume that our understanding 
and success at chess will grow if we concentrate solely on our 
bishops and ignore the rest of the pieces, their relative position, 
their functions, and their dynamic interplay. They all have a 
distinctive contribution to make, and success comes from master-
ing their interdependent and complementary roles. 
Likewise, our assumption that the innovation process will 
be increasingly subject to rational control is folly given the 
present fragmentation of emphasis and effort. Purely technical 
considerations constitute "a piece of the action," but there are 
many other pieces as well: economic, social-psychological s organ-
izational, informational, etc. We have reported the often im-
pressive progress of these specializations in demonstrating the 
influence of the variables with which they deal. But the process 
and its study will continue to be characterized by too many un-
expected turns, frustrations, defeats, and unyielding puzzles as 
long as pieces and their linkages are ignored or discounted as 
unexplained "residue." We have probably realized all of the 
easy gains from gross correlations of action and outcome, or from 
"muscling" things through. 
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We would suggest, therefore, that the future of technolog-
ical innovation -- if the assumption of increased understanding 
and control is to be realized -- lies in learning how to integrate 
the presently fragmented and ill-coordinated specialized concerns. 
Neither the university nor the firm is particularly good at such 
interdisciplinary or inter-organizational cooperation. 
But both will have to learn, for the alternative is simply 
to wait on those unpredictable -- and rare -- "happy accidents" 
that might come our way; and while we may delight in the seren-
dipitous we aspire to more, for noise is rarely music or the drop 




Problems of Measurement  
I. Measurement in the Ecological System of Innovation  
The purpose of this brief appendix is to review some of 
the measurement problems associated with our knowledge or lack 
thereof of innovation. Measurement is confined to the present 
and past; although the future is worth knowing, knowledge of 
the future is gained by forecasting, not by measuring. 
This study treats the innovation process as an ecological 
system. This ecological framework was found to provide a 
fecund structure for organizing and integrating the diverse 
parts of innovation into a coherent whole. Likewise, it will 
be argued that this ecological perspective is useful in organ-
izing and highlighting the problems associated with measuring 
various aspects of innovation. 
For example, the ecological perspective also argues for the 
dynamic nature of the innovation process. Just as organisms evolve 
and change in relation to subtle changes in other organisms and 
in the environment, so do structure and function change and inter-
act with each other and with the larger environments in terms of 
the innovative process. It is not surprising that measurement in 
such a dynamic, complex, and inter-dependent world is far from 
easy. 
There are two main groups of researchers who use measurement 
to study innovation: economists and management scientists. The 
latter, together with psychologists and social scientists, use 
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behavioral measurements involving a large number of diverse para-
meters. Methodological problems associated with this type of 
measurement for innovation are dealt with by Douds and Rubenstein 
in Chapter 9 below, so we will not deal with them in this appendix. 
Here we will review the problems of economic measurement of inno-
vation. 
This review will be illustrative rather than exhaustive for 
two reasons. First, the literature treating technological growth 
is but a part of the extensive econometric literature dealing with 
economic growth. It would be impossible to treat technological 
change in detail without becoming embroiled in the complexity of 
the larger literature. Second, recent literature reviews of the 
problems associated with the measurement of technological change 
are available and will be referred to here (Nadiri 1970; Mansfield 
1972; Stewart 1972; Griliches 1973). These reviews should provide 
the interested reader with an introit into the literature. 
II. Technological Change and Growth of the Economy  
One important measurement concern of economists has been the 
relationship between technological change and economic growth. In 
our ecological context this relates to a rather high level of 
aggregation, usually the nation-state or some large part thereof. 
In the mid and late 1950's Abramowitz (1956), Fabricant (1959), 
and Solow (1957) attempted to relate technological change to over- 
all economic growth. They made certain simplifying assumptions abo 
the nature of the production process and incorporated these into 
an aggregate production function. They next attempted to measure 
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the inputs of resources, mainly labor and capital, and related 
these to the output of products and services. They found that 
they were unable to explain a large part of the increase in out-
put in terms of increases is labor and capital. This "residual" 
was felt to contain a component which could be labeled "techno-
logical advance." In one of the earliest studies Solow (1957) 
found that this "residual" was quite high, and indeed that 87 per 
cent of the increase in output per man hour was a consequence of 
influences other than increments of capital and labor. Solow, 
however, made no allowance for changes in the quality of either 
capital or labor. 
While. this "residual" surely contained elements of techno-
logical change, it was also likely that it masked other aspects 
which contributed to economic growth. Denison (1962) tried to 
take into account the effects of changes in labor quality on the 
size of this "residual." He specifically identified such aspects 
of labor quality as reduction in hours worked, the age-sex com-
position of the labor force, and the level of educational attain-
ment. He found that the last item was especially important in 
terms of its influence on economic growth. Denison was able to 
significantly reduce the "residual" by taking into account the 
effects of increases in labor quality, especially education, on 
increases in production. The effect of Denison's inclusion of 
characteristics of labor quality in his model was to reduce the 
"residual," which among other things contains the effect of 
technological change, to account for 40 per cent of overall 
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economic growth or less than one-half of Solow's result. 
Denison's work, by taking into specific account changes in 
labor quality, had reduced the number of items included in the 
"residual" labeled "technological change." Jorgenson and Griliches 
(1967) extended the work of Denison. They accepted the adjustment 
that Denison had made in terms of the labor input and attempted 
to make similar adjustments for capital inputs. They felt that 
if the effects of improvements in the capital inputs were ex-
plicitly accounted for, an additional portion of the "residual" 
could be explained. They attempted to make adjustments for ag-
gregation and measurement errors in the area of capital inputs. 
Additionally, they hypothesized that if inputs and outputs were 
correctly measured and if certain biases were eliminated, then 
the "residual" itself would be significantly reduced, if not 
eliminated. And indeed they found the "residual" to be very 
small. 
Denison's response (1969) to the revisions of Jorgenson and 
Griliches brought about further revisions in these estimates 
(Christensen and Jorgenson 1969; Jorgenson and Griliches 1970). 
These revisions took the form of including rates of utilization 
for capital inputs and including in outputs those items which 
are excluded or under-counted in national income data (Jorgenson 
and Griliches 1970). As a result of these revisions, the dif-
ferences between the estimates of Denison and those of Jorgenson 
and Griliches were reduced. 
There are three basic sets of problems which are encountered 
in measuring the relationship between technological change and 
the growth of the economy. These sets of problems relate to 
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specification of the model, measure of outputs, and measure of 
inputs. The problem of developing a model which differentiates 
the effects on productivity and growth of many interdependent 
forces is the basic problem of measurement in an ecological 
system. The complexity of this process and its dynamic nature, 
coupled with this interdependency, makes it difficult to specify 
a production function which will separate out the various tech-
nical aspects of the production function and their interaction 
with one another and with changes in factor prices. This is an 
especially difficult problem in terms of building models which 
are capable of empirical investigation, given data sources that 
are now available. Along the same lines, some of the assumptions 
which have proved necessary in order to look at this relationship 
empirically are of questionable validity and may impose unrealistic 
constraints on the models. Examples of questionable assumptions 
are: perfect substitution between old and new capital, constant 
rate of depreciation, and the use of income shares as proxies 
for the contribution of various inputs to the growth of output. 
Difficulties are also encountered in measuring the output of 
the economy. Some of these are of the type that have been en-
countered before in measuring gross national product and national 
income, whereas others pertain more specifically to the measure-
ment of technological change and growth. One significant dif- 
ficulty is in treating improvements in the quality of final goods 
'and services. Price indices often do not account for quality 
•changes, or at best underestimate them (Fellner 1972, p. 45; 
Griliches 1973, p. 67; and Mansfield 1972 p. 479). Problems are 
also encountered in handling new products. Present modes of 
measurement often understate the importance of new products 
as vehicles of technological change (Nadiri 1970). Existing 
methods are much better at measuring changes in technology 
which reduce the cost of products already in existence. Nor 
is the increase in consumer welfare associated with a larger 
range of choice included under present means of measurement 
(Mansfield 1972, p. 478). 
There are also certain conceptual problems of defining 
and measuring the output of the government and service sectors 
of the economy. Government output is valued at cost, and there-
fore existing measures of government output are in fact measures 
of input. This means that for measurement purposes there is an 
implicit assumption of zero productivity change. This is es-
pecially important when it is remembered that a large portion 
of R & D output, as well as a significant portion of goods and 
services, is sold to the public sector (Griliches 1973, p. 67; 
Stewart 1972, p. 15; and Nadiri 1970, p. 1170). Additionally, 
most empirical studies have dealt with private benefits, not 
social benefits. To the extent that these two series differ 
significantly, economic growth and the contribution of technology 
to economic growth is misstated (Nadiri 1970, p. 1170). 
The third set of measurement problems relates to factor 
inputs. As has been discussed previously, the quality of labor 
varies through time. More serious problems of input measurement 
have been found in attempts to calculate aggregate capital. Some 
of these problems relate to quality improvements of new capital. 
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One particularly thorny problem is whether to treat capital as 
a stock or whether to estimate the flow of capital services. 
The second method is clearly preferable in terms of theoretical 
validity, but it is extremely difficult empirically. The con-
sumer of capital services is usually also the supplier, and 
the "purchase" is an internal transaction to the firm and, as 
such, very difficult to estimate. This has led to a rather 
roundabout method of estimation of capital services, which is 
explained in some detail by Jorgenson and Griliches (1970). 
Additional problems are encountered in the use of price indices 
for investment goods. In many cases these price indices are in 
fact cost indices (Jorgenson and Griliches 1970). 
Not only are theoretical and measurement difficulties en-
countered in establishing the relationship between technological 
change and growth, but even greater difficulties present them-
selves when the relationship between R & D activity and tech-
nological change is examined. It is evident that only a portion 
of the contribution to economic growth is due to formalized 
R & D expenditures and that many other activities contribute to 
technological progress. Given these problems, it is not sur-
prising that there have been but few attempts to measure the 
relationship of one component, R & D expenditures. 
Denison (1963, p. 245) made a rather rough estimate of the 
contribution of organized R & D to growth. By making assumptions 
of the relative importance of technological progress versus'im-
provements in other types of knowledge, e.g., improved business 
organization, of the importance of foreign sources of technological 
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knowledge, and of the failure of R & D expenditure figures to 
include all the activities which lead to technical progress, he 
arrived at the conclusion that no more than one-fifth of the 
"residual" can be explained by organized R & D. This trans-
lates to a .12 to .15 per cent increase in national product. 
Professor William Fellner (1970) in his presidential 
address to the American Economic Association attempted to es-
timate the costs and benefits of technological progress. Be- 
ginning with a "residual" as a measure of technological progress, 
he then attempted to estimate a range of rates of return to what 
he called "activities generating technological progress," which 
included but was not limited to R & D expenditures. R & D ex-
penditures estimates range from 1/6 to 1/2 of the total cost 
of productivity gains. He included in his calculations the "un-
recorded costs" associated with technological progress, such as 
obsolescence of durable goods, technological unemployment, etc. 
Fellner found a social rate of return on "activities generating 
technological progress" of from 13 to 55 per cent. The reason 
for the large range was variations in his estimates of the "un-
recorded costs" of technical progress. He concluded that the 
marginal rate of return is higher for these activities than for 
physical capital. 
Griliches also attempted to estimate the contribution of 
R & D to economic growth. Making what he called "arbitrary but 
perhaps not unreasonable assumptions" relating to rates of return 
on priyate and public R & D investments and externalities asso-
ciated with these investments, he calculated the contribution 
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of R & D to economic growth at between 1/3 and 1/2 per cent per 
year. He then proceeded to explain why this estimate may in 
fact be too high (Griliches 1972, pp. 77-79). 
The attempts to gauge the effect of R & D expenditures or 
investments on overall economic growth are in a preliminary 
stage. In addition to the problem of determining the relation-
ship between technological change and economic growth, there 
is the added problem of ascertaining the relationship between 
R & D expenditures and technological change, with R & D ex- 
penditures being only one factor affecting technological change. 
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that attempts 
to relate R & D expenditures to technological and economic 
growth have been tentative. Improvements in this area await 
a clearer understanding of the nature of the interrelated com-
ponents of technological growth as well as better and more 
disaggregated data (Nadiri, p. 1169; Stewart 1972, p. 17). 
III. R & D Expenditures and Industry Productivity  
In the late 1950's work was undertaken that looked at 
technological change and productivity growth at the industry 
level. The most comprehensive of these studies was conducted 
by Kendrick at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Kendrick calculated average annual rates of change in total 
factor productivity by 33 industry groups for the period 1899-
1954 (Kendrick 1961, pp. 136-137). Using Kendrick's basic data, 
Terleckyj was able to relate average annual growth of factor 
productivity to research intensity for 19 industrial sectors 
classified according to the two-digit code of the U. S. Department 
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of Commerce's Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. 
Using his concept of research intensity, which he defined as the 
ratio of research inputs to total input, Terleckyj found that a 
"tenfold difference in research intensity was associated with a 
difference of roughly one percentage point in the annual rate of 
growth of industry productivity" (Terleckyj 1967, p. 376). 
Brown and Conrad (1967) treated research and education as 
fundamental variables in trying to explain productivity. Using 
the 1958 input-output table in an attempt to trace the inter-
industry flow of knowledge, they found that there was a signif-
icant and positive correlation between R & D expenditures and 
productivity. Their results indicated that a one per cent in-
crease in R & D expenditures was associated with a 0.2 to 0.3 
per cent increase in productivity depending upon the industry. 
Unfortunately, the measures used by Brown and Conrad are not 
directly comparable to the measure used by Terleckyj. But 
Terleckyj (1967) in reviewing the Brown and Conrad work indicated 
that their estimate of the effect of R & D expenditures on pro-
ductivity was somewhat higher than the results he obtained. 
Mansfield (1965) in a study of ten firms in the chemical and 
petroleum industries and ten two-digit SIC industries found that 
the rate of productivity change was related to the rate of growth 
of accumulated R & D (the sum of all R & D expenditures over time) 
for both the firms and the industries. The marginal rates of 
return depended in part on whether technological change was 
embodied (included in new capital goods) or disembodied (such 
things as improved organization which affects both old and new 
capital). In the petroleum industry the marginal rate of return 
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was about 40 to 60 per cent regardless of whether technological 
change was embodied or not. In the chemical industry embodied 
technological change yielded a marginal rate of return of 30 
per cent and embodied change only 7 per cent. High rates of 
return (of at least 15 per cent) were found for the ten industry 
groups. Minasian (1969) studied seventeen firms in the chemical 
industry and also found a positive and significant relationship 
between value added and accumulated R & D. He found a gross 
rate of return on investment in R & D of 54 per cent compared 
with 9 per cent for physical capital. 
The above mentioned studies, while differing in time periods, 
industries covered and methodology, yielded a fairly high and 
consistent relationship between R & D expenditures and increases 
in productivity. The rate of return on research was often in 
the 30 to 50 per cent range (Griliches 1973). This high figure 
is impressive since industry and firm level studies have the 
advantage that R & D expenditures can be treated as an explicit 
variable rather than being treated as part of a residual, as was 
the case in studies of the economy (Mansfield 1972). 
But even at the industry and firm level, difficulties in 
measuring the relationship between R & D expenditures and increases 
in productivity occur. Many of the problems that were encountered 
at the level of the economy remain. There are still problems of 
measuring outputs and inputs and problems in model specification 
(Mansfield 1972). Changes in product and input quality also pre-
sent problems at the industry level. It is still difficult, if not 
impossible, to gauge the relative contributions of the many 
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determinants of productivity increases. Also, the necessity of 
securing adequate price and cost deflators remains troublesome. 
A major problem associated with industry level studies re-
lates to the fact that much of the R & D activity is directed at 
improving the productivity of products that will be used in an 
industry other than the industry doing the R & D (Mansfield 1972). 
Improvements in farm tractors may not show up as productivity 
increases in the tractor industry, but as increases in produc-
tivity in the farming industry (Griliches 1973, p. 68). Although 
attempts have been made to trace interindustry or explicit inter-
firm flows of technology, using input and output tables, by Brown 
and Conrad (1967), much still remains to be done. The problem is 
made more difficult by the fact that time lags exist between the 
time R & D expenditures are made and increases in productivity 
take place both within the same firm or industry or in some other 
industry. 
IV. Patent Statistics  
One measure frequently used in studies relating to innovation 
and economic growth is the counting of patents in technological 
areas of particular interest. Perhaps the most significant use 
of patent statistics is the time series and cross sectional 
studies of Jacob Schmookler (1966) which were summarized in Chapter 
2 above. 
Briefly, he found that changes in investment in an industry 
were strongly correlated with changes in the number of captial 
goods patents in that industry. This correlation was interpreted 
as meaning that invention was stimulated by economic demand. 
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Rosenberg (1974) has criticized Schmookler's neglect of supply 
factors. Our interest in this section, however, will be in 
Schmookler's use of patent statistics as a measure of innovation. 
Schmookler (1966, p. 1) argued that understanding invention 
is important to understanding technical progress generally. 
However, invention is but one component of technical progress. 
The linkage between patented inventions and technological pro-
gress is complicated by a number of factors. First, all inven-
tions are not patented. Reasons for non-patenting include anti-
trust problems, the ability of firms to exploit an invention 
before a competitor can imitate it, and the secrecy involved in 
classified defense work. Second, not all patented inventions are 
applied commercially (i.e., become innovations). Third, inven-
tions, when applied, differ considerably among themselves in the 
technical progress they effect (Kuznets, 1962). Thus, patenting 
is a possible intermediate state in innovation; it is not a final 
output. 
On the input side Sanders (1962) argued that if patents are 
to be a measure of inventive activity: 
1. The proportion of inventive activity resulting 
in patented inventions must have remained 
invariant over the span of time during which 
patents are deemed to serve as a useful index. 
2. The inputs per average patent must have remained 
similarly invariant. 
The non-patenting phenomenon, which was especially im-
portant after the middle 1930's (Schmookler 1966, Ch. 2), intro-
duces an uncertainty in the proportion of inventive activity re-
sulting in patents. Likewise the input per patent altered 
drastically after World War II because of the dramatic 
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increase in industrial R & D and the increasing complexity of 
inventions (Schmookler 1966, p. 39). 
Thus while patent statistics may be the most useful data 
available in periods before industrial R & D became important, 
they are not very desirable as a final measure, and while 
Schmookler's results give strong qualitative indications of the 
importance of demand, it is important to remember that they are 
based on pre 1950 data. The problems mentioned earlier, such as 
non-patenting, make patent statistics questionable measures for 
later periods. 
V. The Data Base  
We have argued, and we hope convincingly, for viewing innovation 
as being a dynamic and ecological process with complex interaction 
between function and structure. This kind of structure, while it 
may be meaningful in terms of understanding the process, assured 
that difficulties will be encountered in measuring the magnitude 
of the components of the system. In order for measurement to 
take place, a structure must be enumerated and measurements taken 
in relation to that structure. There is a fundamental conflict 
between the requirements for orderly measurement (that the structure 
remain unchanged so that results are comparable) and the dynamic 
nature of the innovative process. 
The basic data source concerning formalized R & D expenditures 
is a time series that has been collected by the Bureau of the 
Census for the National Science Foundation since 1953. In con-
ducting this survey the National Science Foundation attempts to 
delineate what activities should be included in R & D expenditures 
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and what should be excluded (NSF 1973, pp. 84-85). The quality 
of the data received, however, is limited by the fact that except 
for a very small section of the survey, the NSF has to depend upon 
the voluntary compliance of those being surveyed, and has to rely 
upon their estimates of the magnitude of the expenditures. The 
NSF survey breaks down R & D activity by industry, in most cases 
two-digit SIC classifications and in some cases three and four-
industry SIC classifications. When Standard Industrial Classifi-
cations are used, certain difficulties do arise. Among these 
are that the categories are determined in large part by existing 
industry structure and to facilitate ease of reporting. These 
categories are often based on particular existing technology, 
materials, or past competitive relationships. As such, they are 
often poor instruments for measuring changes in technology which 
have the effect of changing industry structure s including material 
substitutability and changing competitive relationships (Ch. 2 
above). 
The National Science Foundation data also classify firms ac-
cording to size. The basic size variable used here is number of 
employees. Some difficulties are encountered in using the number 
of employees as the major determinant of size classification, es-
pecially when the largest sized category is 10,000 employees and 
over. 
The NSF data also relate R & D expenditures by activity (basic 
research, applied research, or development) and distinguish between 
federally sponsored and company sponsored R & D. The number of 
scientists and engineers employed in R & D activity by industry 
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firm size, etc. is also given. The presumption is that this 
extensive data collection does catch most of the formalized 
R & D as defined by the National Science Foundation, but un- 
fortunately, as has been discussed, not all of the productivity 
increasing activities of the firm are a result of R & D ex-
penditures. 
The last important type of data is patent statistics. There 
are a number of problems in interpreting these data. The classifi-
cations of the patent office are designed to facilitate patent 
searches. Schmookler's research efforts took a year to convert 
the data he needed from the patent office classification to the 
standard industrial classification scheme by assigning relatively 
homogeneous patent office subclasses to particular industries in 
which they were used (Schmookler 1966, pp. 20-23). Subclasses 
which were not homogeneous or could be used in many industries 
were ignored. Thus Schmookler's railroad patent data did not 
contain such pertinent inventions as diesel engines and bearings! 
While other researchers may need the data in other forms, e.g., 
by general areas of technology, it does appear difficult to pro-
cess these data because of their original classification scheme. 
It can be said without much uncertainty that measurement in 
the innovation field remains fraught with problems. In those areas 
dealt with by economists, not only are the data limited, but their 
linkage to that which they purport to measure is constantly changin4 
over time. Finally, much of what we would like to know, such as 
the changes caused by an innovation, lies in the future, outside 
the scope of measurement, and subject to the yet primitive tech-
niques of forecasting. 
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Preface 
Volume I of the Georgia Tech innovation Project report examines 
the process of technological innovation from a holistic or ecological 
perspective. By juxtaposing variables that are usually treated 
separately, by integrating the results achieved at different levels of 
analysis, and by meshing the several disciplinary perspectives, we 
sought to determine the state-of-the-art understanding, i.e., what we 
know, don't know, and should know about the innovation process. 
At the inception of this integrative study, however, we recognized 
that no state-of-the-art review and assessment could hope to do justice 
to every important area of concern; the subject matter is too complex 
and the body of scholarly literature too large and diverse. Thus we 
needed to balance and complement our integrative thrust with more 
specialized treatments of selected aspects. 
Volume II provides this balance. It contains commissioned papers 
by nine distinguished scholars dealing with special aspects of the in-
novation process. These scholars, each of whom has made major contribu-
tions to understanding technological innovation, were asked to assess 
the state of the art in their research areas. The resulting essays, in 
addition to being an integral part of the Georgia Tech Innovation Pro-
ject, stand on their own as unique contributions by major scholars in 
the field. We are deeply grateful for their contributions to this study 
and to our knowledge of technological innovation. 
All of the project participants whose papers appear in this volumE 
represent academia. But the innovation process itself is a world of 
action as well as of thought; it takes place not in the "ivory labora-
tory" of academia, but in the "real world" setting of corporations and 
governmental laboratories. Recognizing this, we also sought -- and re-
ceived -- the assistence of consultants from this "real world." Al-
though they did not prepare special papers for this study, their advicE 
has been invaluable in keeping our efforts in contact with innovation 
itself, not just those who study and write about innovation. 
The names of all the participants -- the scholarly consultants 
and the industrial advisors -- are listed in the foreword to Volume I. 
We want to take this opportunity to thank them again for their sig-
nificant contributions to our work. 
Patrick Kelly 
Melvin Kranzberg 
Frederick A. Rossini 
Norman R. Baker 







THE PROBLEMS THEY CHOOSE, THE IDEAS THEY HAVE, 
AND THE INVENTIONS THEY MAKE 
Thomas P. Hughes 
The innovation process may be defined as including a number 
of activities, among them problem identification; idea response; 
invention; research and development; introduction into use; and 
diffusion. However, innovation has been so thoroughly investigated 
by now that a definition as broad as the foregoing is distressingly 
inadequate. Nevertheless, the simple listing of five or six stages 
in the general innovation process is an opening reminder that inno-
vation is a complex of interactive events. The listing also pro- 
vides a way of setting the limited scope of this essay in perspec-
tive. 
For the purpose of this study, problem identification means the 
inventor's perceiving a problem or problem complex and deciding to 
devote himself to seeking a solution to it. Idea response is the 
inventor's effort--active and passive (subconscious, perhaps)--to 
formulate concepts that will initiate the process that will solve 
the problem. Usually the inventor gathers information as he pur-
sues--or even awaits--ideas. The idea response is a mental one and 
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will become an invention only after the idea has been given form. 
The initial form is often a drawing, a mathematical model, or equa-
tion; subsequently the idea is given form as a mechanical and elec- 
trical device or as chemical process. This invention is then broughi 
to the stage at which it can be introduced to the market by research 
and development. The research is an information-gathering exercise 
and can be done by a literature search or by scientific experimenta-
tion. Development, an important part of the innovation process, 
often involves the redefinition of the problem, new ideas, and re-
search as the invention is tried in environments increasingly like 
the real use environment within which the innovation must function. 
It is important to add that the innovation process is not a simple 
linear one but a process involving backtracking in order to identify 
new sub-problems, to elicit additional ideas, and to make new sub-
inventions. 1 
The problem identification, idea response, and invention stages 
of the innovation process will be the area of attention in the fol-
lowing essay and the area will be further defined by concentration 
upon the inventors themselves as problem identifiers, men of ideas, 
and the makers of inventions. The focus will also be clarified by 
limiting attention to American inventors during the period 1870-1930 
This constraint seems reasonable and possibly fruitful / for the era 
was a supportive one for independent inventors and inventors in re-
search laboratories. Directing attention to American inventors of 
this era is practical because the literature available on them is 
in relatively good supply. 2 By contrast, it would be extremely 
difficult to write about inventors since 1930 because few detailed 
biographies have been written about them. Not only are biographies 
about the earlier inventors available, but these books and essays 
are generally grounded on a broad base of source information, for 
the inventors of the heroic age of the independent inventor--men 
like Bell, Edison, and the Wrights--were public figures and were 
often asked to talk about themselves, their work, and even their 
"Eureka moments." And the inventors of the research laboratories 
that mushroomed in the United States after 1900 and before 1930 
were publicized by corporations impressed by their achievements 
and not adverse to impressing public and shareholder as well. 
Considering the biographies of individual inventors and the 
histories of individual inventions should prove fruitful, not only 
because they and their works are known, but because the historian 
is able to focus sharply upon problem identification, idea response, 
and invention synthesized in a single mind. This is not meant to 
deny collegiate inspiration and constructive activity, but to take 
advantage of the feasability of depending upon an individual's ideas 
and activities as a synthesis of the thoughts and activities in his 
environment. For instance, Thomas Edison, Elmer Sperry, and Thomas 
Midgley, who will be considered in this paper, drew upon and organ-
ized the intellectual currents and the technological talents known 
and available to them in order to identify problems and originate 
inventive responses. 
Often the historian lacks the articulated methodology and fails 
to provide the highly structured analysis associated with social 
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scientists. However, the historian has a unique contribution to 
make though his detailed knowledge of the persons and events whose 
biographies and histories provide the information and the situa-
tions by which theory can be formulated through methodology and 
analysis. Some studies of innovation made by social scientists 
lack the richness and complexity that well-chosen case histories 
provide. On occasion, history, methodology, and analysis will be 
found combined in the work of a single scholar, as is the case with 
those whose works on innovation are considered in the following 
pages. In its history and analysis this essay will emulate their 
approach. Its essential methodology will be to focus upon three 
major inventors, single out a major invention of each, and recre-
ate the surrounding circumstances and the events of problem identi-
fication, idea response, and reduction to practice, or invention. 
Edison (1847-1931), Sperry (1860-1930) and Midgley (1889-1944) 
not only span the period but they are regarded as representative 
types. Edison is generally considered an heroic inventor who, 
early in his career, worked alone and who, even after having estab-
lished his Menlo Park, and later West Orange, New Jersey, labora- 
tories, invented without becoming an adjunct of a large corporation. 
Furthermore, Edison is widely believed to have been a self-educated 
empirical inventor, a genius who worked without dependence upon sci-
ence (this image, however, as will be shown, is somewhat wide of 
the mark). 
Sperry, is a transitional figure -- from heroic independent to 
industrial research scientist. He began a career -- highlighted by 
more than 350 patents -- as an independent who greatly admired 
Edison and probably imitated his style. At middle age, however, 
he established the Sperry Gyroscope Company (later Sperry Rand) 
and directed an electromechanical research laboratory populated 
by very bright, enthusiastic, and energetic young engineers and 
inventors. The symbol of Sperry's transition was his posing for 
a photograph wearing a white lab coat and peering through a micro-
scope; a dress and pose virtually unknown to him. 
Thomas Midgley represented for his generation the industrial 
research-scientist role fulfilled. He was not only generally ac-
corded the status of scientist, but his method has been character-
ized by a noted historian of chemistry as one of exemplary scien-
tific research. "His synthesis of the antiknock agent, tetraethyl 
lead, and the refrigerant, trichlorofluoromethane...were," accord-
ing to Eduard Farber, "beautiful pieces of pure, or at least delib-
erately planned chemical research." His biographer for the Memoirs  
of the National Academy of Sciences wrote, "in the matter of recog-
nition for his scientific endeavor he was particularly fortunate". 
He received all four of the most important medals for chemical 
achievement: the Nicols Medal of the New York Section, American 
Chemical Society, 1922; the Perkin Medal of the Society of Chemical 
Industry, 1937; the Priestley Medal of the American Chemical Society, 
1941; and the Willard Gibbs Medal of the Chicago Section, American 
Chemical Society, 1942. 
Edison, Sperry, and Midgley were not simply inventors; they were 
inventor-entrepreneurs. Inventor-entrepreneurs are inventors who 
preside over the innovative process from its origins as a problem to, 
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at least, the introduction of the invention into use (they may also 
be involved in the diffusion process, but this will not be noted 
here). The usual reason that the inventor-entrepreneurs studied 
here were not simply inventors was because they were determined to 
have their invention used/ and to achieve this they realized that 
they would have to take the initiative not only in the early phases 
of innovation but in research and development and marketing (intro-
ducing into use). In essence, as will be seen, they were inventors; 
in effect, they had to be entrepreneurs. The evidence, however, is 
that they found their work most satisfying when identifying problems 
and inventing solutions, not when presiding over and promoting the 
other phases. The evidence also tends to support the generalization 
that in America before 1930 most successful inventors were in fact 
inventor-entrepreneurs, for if a list of the outstanding inventors 
is made --Edison, Thomson, De Forest, Hall, Wright, Sperry, Sprague, 
Acheson, and Midgley -- it reminds us that these men brought their 
inventions into use; most of them seem to have gone so far as to or-
ganize companies or enterprises for their inventions. 
Edison, then, was the heroic inventor, Sperry the transitional 
figure, and Midgley, the putative research scientist. By choosing 
this variety of types flourishing in the period 1870-1930, the val-
idity and general applicability of several interpretations of the 
innovation process can be considered more effectively than if only 
one kind of inventor -- the heroic, for example -- were the subject 
of attention. Those parts of the interpretations that are relevant 
to problem identification, idea response, and the act of invention 
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will be focused upon; case histories of an Edison, a Sperry, and a 
Midgley invention will provide the information for critically eval-
uating the interpretations. 
The interpretations are drawn from three essays on the innova-
tion process: Abbott Payson Usher, A History of Mechanical Inven-
tion (1954); S. C. Gilfillan, The Sociology of Invention (1935); 
and Thomas Parke Hughes, Elmer. Sperry: Inventor and Engineer (1971). 3 
There are other studies of note on the general character of innova-
tion, but the three studies used here are suitable because they are 
based on extensive and intensive case histories of invention and 
because they are particularly concerned with the formulation of a 
theory about the identification of the problems, idea reaction, and 
invention. Other studies on innovation, such as those by Schmookler, 
Kuznets, Bright, Rosenbloom, Rogers, Rubenstein, Strassman,and Mans-
field direct attention to economic, institutional, and social fac-
tors and changes affecting the innovation process in general. 4 
Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman (Sources of Invention (New York, 
1958] present a large number of case histories and an essay based 
upon these, but their principal concern is to demonstrate the im-
portance and survival of the independent inventor in the twentieth 
century; not to develop a theory of innovation. 
Usher highlights in his analysis "the act of insight." He 
illustrates the act of insight by an example drawn from Kohler's ex-
periments with chimpanzees at Tenerife. A chimpanzee, Tschego, had 
bananas placed outside her barred cage just beyond her reach. Within 
the cage, "somewhat to one side," were several sticks. Tschego 
was exasperated by her inability to reach the fruit and after a 
number of tries reluctantly, abandoned the effort, discouraged. 
When, however, several young animals outside the cage approached 
the bananas, she seized the stick, which had apparently gone un- 
noticed, and deftly maneuvered the fruit within reach -- an act 
of insight. Judging by the prominence Usher gave the experiment 
in his chapter on "novelty in thought and action," his learning 
of it was his act of insight into the nature of invention. Further- 
more,Usher constructed his theory of the nature of insight as a 
generalization of the experiment or incident. Usher wrote that: 
for purposes of generalized exposition, this analysis 
of the individual act of insight can be formalized as 
a genetic sequence of four steps. The first step is 
the perception of a problem which is conceived as an 
incomplete or unsatisfactory pattern. Typically, the 
problem is an unfulfilled want. Gratification is made 
effectively possible by some fortuitous configuration 
in event or in thought, which present to the individual 
all the data essential to a solution. This step can 
be called the setting of the stage. For the great apes 
at Tenerife, this vital step was really the work of the 
experimenter; for the general process of invention this 
step is dependent upon pure chance, or upon the mediated 
contingency of a systematic effort to find a solution 
by trial and error. At low levels of empiricism, trial 
and error is commonly presented as aimless fumbling; at 
substantial levels of scientific activity, the trial-
and-error approach is described as systematic exper-
mentation. The setting of the stage lead directly to 
the act of insight by which the essential solution of 
the problem is found. But this does not bring the pro-
cess to an end. Newly perceived relations must be thor-
oughly mastered, and effectively worked into the entire 
context of which they are a part. The solution must, 
therefore, be studied critically, understood in its 
fullness, and learned as a technique of thought or action. 
This final stage can be described as critical revision. 5 
It should be noted that confusion could arise from Usher's 
statement because he has the "act of insight" as one step in a gen-
eric sequence that he calls "the individual act of insight." Judg-
ing by the context of the chapter in which he developed his "act of 
insight" thesis, one assumes Usher intended that the generic se-
quence be called "the emergence of novelty." 
Usher believed that an individual act of insight -- or the emer-
gence of novelty -- in human society, as contrasted with the act of 
the apes of Tenerife, became significant, i.e., emerged as a major 
invention, only through cumulation. His explanation is complex and 
deserves detailed analysis, but in essence he seems to be saying 
that a major invention, like the incandescent light, the airplane, 
or the automatic ship pilot, results, at least in part, from the 
synthesis by an inventor of his insight and a number of earlier in-
sights that were known to him because knowledge of them was pre-
served and available to him. Some of the earlier insights, as a 
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matter of fact, may be the inventor's own, but Usher wanted to 
stress that the organized social communication system of a social 
structure makes possible the complex syntheses of man as compared 
to the relatively simple novelties of the apes. 
In order to explain novelty in thought and action, Usher 
stressed the emergence of an unsatisfactory pattern, which he 
equates with "perdeption of a problem" in his "emergence of novelty" 
sequence. In this instance, he was drawing upon Gestalt psychology, 
for he assumed that the inventor was able to comprehend the in-
adequacy of an existing technological device or process by the men-
tal act of comparing it to a mental pattern encompassing it, re-
lated to it, but extending beyond it in effectiveness, as judged 
by function, efficiency, or some other external factors. This 
sense of inadequacy is the unsatisfactory pattern and the inventor 
feels tension until by an act of insight the implications of the 
pattern are fulfilled. 6 Usher's generalized exposition on the act 
of insight and the emergence of novely will be returned to later, 
but Gilfillan's theory of invention must also be considered so that 
the two can be compared. Gilfillan explicitly labelled his theory 
one of invention in contrast to Usher who seemed reluctant to encom-
pass his act of insight, his emergence of novelty, within such sim-
ple conceptual confines. In The Sociology of Invention, Gilfillan 
defined thirty-eight "social principles of invention." These, he 
wrote, were based primarily upon his detailed study of invention in 
his companion volume, Inventing the Ship. He characterized his 
principles as social because of his conviction that invention is 
evolutionary, an accretion of "details, modifications, perfectings, 
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minute additions," and is not solely the brainchild of an heroic 
individual inventor. His belief that invention is a social pro-
cess is further revealed in his thirty-eight principles. 
Not all of the Gilfillan principles are relevant to the pro-
blem definition, idea reaction, and invention stages, as the con-
cepts are used in this essay. The relevant ones fall primarily 
within five of the seven categories within which he grouped the 
thirty-eight principles: 1) "the nature of invention"; 2) "changes 
evoking invention"; 3) "factors fostering, retarding, and locating 
invention"; 4) "principles of chance"; and 5) "inventors and other 
classes, and tendencies in the craft." 7 Within the category "na-
ture of invention," Gilfillan advanced the proposition that an 
important invention is an accretion of detail and an evolution re-
sembling a biologic process. He also defined an invention as 
involving a complex of elements, including a process for using it, 
a method for building it, installations such as shops and facto-
ries for housing, supplying, and maintaining it, and diverse other 
elements. Under "changes evoking invention" he subsumed inventions 
themselves, for they introduce changes in complexes that alter the 
whole and necessitate other inventions, so that the whole can ful-
fill its functional implication. Other changes invoking invention 
are "increase of wealth, growth of population, industrialization, 
and institutional change." Among the "factors fostering, retarding 
and locating invention" are leading firms that use inventions tofos-
ter production. Because their products have a set character such 
as automobiles, electric light and power equipment, or heavy chemicals, 
these firms tend to attract or "locate" inventions of relevant 
characteristics. Similarly, regional specialization of labor and 
production tends to attract a certain type of inventive activity 
or invention to particular regions. 	On the other hand, Gilfillan 
found that the vested interest of heavily capitalized firms leads 
them to oppose or retard inventions that would antiquate the means 
of production in which the firms have heavily invested. Under 
"principles of chance," Gilfillan argued that inventions are sel-
dom accidental but usually inevitable "when the time is ripe" be-
cause of evolution in general and changes -- such as those men-
tioned above -- in particular (inventions disturbing the stability 
of an existing complex or system; increase in population and indus-
trialization). For Gilfillan, such inevitability helps explain 
frequent simultaneity of invention. As for "inventors and other 
classes, and tendencies in the craft," he believed that perception 
of need depends primarily upon the inventor class but secondarily 
upon the informed and articulate in any society. The craft of in-
vention revealed to Gilfillan a trend from the "accidental toward 
deliberate... and ... from the individual source to the organized 
inventing group." Further, on inventors, Gilfillan found that in-
ventions of a revolutionary character come from outsiders, while 
the perfecting devices come from those within the industry that 
the invention affects. "The inventors," Gilfillan stated, "are 
in partnership usually with enterprisers...." 
Not all of Gilfillan's principles have been summarized, but 
only those that pertain to problem identification, idea response, 
and invention. The principles have been summarized in an order and 
in a form much like Gilfillan's original statement in order to 
suggest the cast of his thought and the general character of his 
analysis before reorganizing and restating the principles so that 
they can be used in an analysis of the early stages of the inno-
vation process as presided over by inventor-entrepreneurs. It 
seems appropriate in order to achieve the objective at hand to 
recast his principles in the following way: invention is the cum-
ulation through an evolutionary process of a complex system; such 
a system is affected by new inventions in a way that necessitates 
still further invention in order that the system can fulfill its 
function; evolving inventions and existing systems are stimulated 
and modified by non-technological factors such as population in-
crease and economic growth or recession; industrial firms and 
regions tend to preside over and attract inventive activity that 
maintains the momentum of their existing means of production and 
products, while inventors beyond the influence of the region or 
the industry tend to invent devices and processes that would an-
tiquate or alter the status quo; the general trend toward spe-
cialization in industrial activity has been accompanied by a 
trend toward specialization in invention, which has manifested it-
self in the professional inventor. He responds, Gilfillan believed, 
to specific needs revealed more clearly by the specialization of 
labor and in industry. 
The biography of Elmer Sperry is, among other things, a se-
quence of analyses of at least twenty of Sperry's major inventions 
and a less exhaustive discussion of many more of the 350 patented 
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inventions that he made during his lifetime.
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From the analyses 
of the creative work of this professional inventor emerged a pat-
tern of problem identification, idea response, and invention. 
Until more biographies of professional inventors are written in an 
analytical vein, one cannot state with authority that Sperry's 
style was typical or atypical, but comparing the analytical case 
histories that follow of other inventions and inventors with the 
Sperry style is a step in the direction of this goal. 
Sperry's problem identification was complex and subtle, but 
it should be added that he never analyzed or articulated his meth- 
od. Evidence of his activity supports the conclusion that he chose 
fields of endeavor in which his particular characteristics as an 
inventor were needed. His particular characteristics began to 
emerge early in his career as he found himself adept in solving 
problems amenable to the electromechanical and the automatic con-
trol approach. For example, patents that he acquired in his early 
twenties claimed improved design and controls for electric arc 
lamps and electric generators. Because other problems, such as 
ones involving streetcars and electric automobiles i responded to the 
electromechanical and automatic control solution, he acquired a 
generalized characteristic as an inventor. Because Sperry was a 
professional -- not a dilettante -- he sought problems in various 
fields, but instinctively problems amenable to his acquired char-
acteristic. He sought in varied fields for problems susceptible 
to his style because he sought environments, or fields, in which 
capital was available for inventors; in which a market for his kind 
of invention was probable; and in which critical problems were 
emerging. Furthermore, he gravitated to fields not yet populated 
by teams of corporation supported inventors, engineers, and sci-
entists. If he found such a field, or environment, in the nascent 
automobile industry, he would concentrate there; if he found it 
in electrochemical, he would work in it. Later in his career, he 
discovered that the armaments race preceding World War I provided 
the funding, the market, or need, the opportunity for the unsal-
aried professional, and the critical problems which attracted him 
as a professional. 9 
Between 1880 and 1910, the period before he established the 
Sperry Gyroscope Company and worked closely with the military, 
Sperry shifted his efforts from electric light and power to elec-
trical mining machinery, electric traction, automobiles, batteries, 
and industrial chemistry. Superficially these shifts may seem 
irrational, but a deeper probe reveals besides the electromechanical 
factor common to all and the automatic control shared by half, a 
sharp growth of investment in a rapidly emerging field common to 
all. Judging by the nature of his patent applications, Sperry seems 
to have lost interest in a field after about five years, which sug-
gests that an inrush of inventors, engineers, managers, and corpora-
tions brought by capitalization, growing markets, and size convinced 
him that his special characteristics and circumstances could best 
be employed elsewhere. The research and development, or industrial, 
laboratory loomed on the horizon, and Sperry was canny enough not to 
try to compete. 
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Identification of critical problems was a professional capa-
bility of Sperry's and one crucially important for his survival as 
an independent inventor. When Sperry's numerous patents are exam-
ined and their claims considered, it becomes clear that he did not 
invent dynamos, arc lights, streetcars, or automobiles, though the 
title of his patents might lead to such superficial conclusions. 
In the case of his dynamo patents, he claimed automatic controls; 
in connection with the arc light, he invented a regulator for the 
feed of the carbons; and when inventing for streetcars, he contri-
buted an operational control. His patent claims in these instances 
and in numerous others show that he solved very specific problems-- 
these can aptly be labelled "critical problems." 10  
Critical problems can be defined as ones retarding technolog-
ical and/or industrial change and as problems likely, in the opinion 
of the inventor, to be solved by invention. Sperry's letters, mem-
oranda, notebooks, and other records reveal that he identified crit-
ical problems by close study of technical journals, patterns of pa-
tent applications, the patents of others, attendance at professional 
engineering society meetings, conversations, and his intimate know-
ledge of expanding technological systems. Articles in the technical 
journals often told Sperry of the interests of other inventors and 
therefore of problems upon which they were working; in weekly re-
ports of patents granted, like those published in the Scientific  
American, he could discern a pattern of concentration upon certain 
problems (for instance,a bevy of patents on arc light regulation). 
By a close reading of the claims of these patents he could delin-
eate the problem of focused attention more precisely, while the 
Official Patent Office Gazette provided regular summaries of all 
patents. Sperry regularly attended the sessions of the engineering 
society meetings, for there he might gather from fresh reports and 
papers more intelligence pertaining to critical problems upon which 
other inventors were working. In his later years, Sperry was a 
part of the engineering establishment, and his conversations with 
his peers of the "invisible college" also helped him direct his in- 
ventive talents. However, it should be stressed that Sperry's close 
attention to the work of others was probably matched by a careful 
check by them of what he, Sperry, was "up to." 
Also it is important to stress that he identified problems 
through deep involvement in evolving technological systems. For 
example, he learned of the need for a whole family of shipboard 
inventions by realizing the implications of the centralized feed-
back guidance and control device (the gyrocompass) that he had in-
vented and installed upon American dreadnoughts. A complex and 
elegant shipboard system for gunfire control emerged as he and his 
small staff of engineers identified critical problems with the help 
of naval line officers and invented electromechanical solutions de-
pendent upon the reference system provided by the gyrocompass. 11 
Up to this point in the discussion of the Sperry model, focus 
has been upon his identification of critical problems. Identifica-
tion implies the prior existence of the problem that the inventor 
perceives and formulates. In the Sperry biography, these complexes 
were named "reverse salients." The concept originated in the mil-
itary idea of an advancing line of battle punctuated by segments in 
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which the advance has been significantly retarded. These seg-
ments of the line, reverse salients, are often seen as situations 
that must be improved upon if the advance is to continue. Simi-
larly, advancing technological, economic, and social systems have 
reverse salients, bottlenecks, or imbalances calling for response. 
If an inventor perceives in the reverse salient a critical prob-
lem that he is inclined to attempt to solve by invention, then 
the reverse salient and the critical problem have been related by 
him-- a step in the innovation process. Possibly, the identifica-
tion of a critical problem should be placed not only in the "prob-
lem identification" category but also in "idea generation," for 
the identification itself is an act of insight, not unlike -- prob-
ably -- idea response. Defining the problem is a big step along 
the route to solution. 
Having identified critical problems--in reverse salient areas--
susceptible to his inventive style, Sperry had yet to experience the 
"Eureka moment," related to idea response. After a long and dis-
tinguished career, Sperry ruminated about this experience, which can 
assume mystical proportions in popular and ill-informed accounts of 
invention, or acts of insight. He said: 
Think as I may, I cannot discover any time in which I have 
felt in the course of my work that I was performing any of 
the acts usually attributed to the inventor. So far as I 
can see, I have come up against situations that seemed to 
me to call for assistance. I was not usually at all sure 
that I could aid in improving the state of affairs in any 
way, but was fascinated by the challenge. So I would 
study the matter over; I would have my assistants bring 
before me everything that had been published about it, 
including the patent literature dealing with attempts 
to better the situation. When I had the facts before 
me I simply did the obvious thing. I tried to discern 
the weakest point and strengthen it; often this in-
volved alterations with many ramifications which imme-
diately revealed the scope of the entire project. Al-
most never have I hit upon the right solution at first. 
I have brought up in my imagination one remedy after 
another and must confess that I have many times re-
jected them all, not yet perceiving the one that looked 
simple, practical, and hard-headed. Sometimes it is 
days and even months later that I am brought face to 
face with something that suggests the simple solution 
that I am looking for. 12 
Having thus commented upon problem identification, Sperry sug-
gested the nature of idea response, at least for him. A close read-
ing discloses that he set the stage by reading all he could about 
other inventors' efforts to solve the critical problem to which he 
was currently directing his attention. A clue to his movement to-
ward fresh ideas is contained in his statement that he "tried to 
discern the weakest point and strengthen it," this remark can read-
ily be associated with Usher's Gestalt theory with its emphasis 
upon the incomplete pattern. Continuing, Sperry brought up into 
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his imagination "one remedy after another" until perhaps many 
days -- or even months later -- he realized the perfectly "simple, 
practical, and hardheaded" one. The act of imagination or insight 
defies precise logical analysis, but Sperry's having familiarized 
himself with prior efforts to solve the problem, his seeming ability 
to find the "weakest" point, and his emphasis upon practical and 
hardheaded "remedies" defined in part the matrix from which emerged 
that perfectly "simple" solution. 
Having thus had the idea of an invention, Sperry then embarked 
upon a process that can be categorized as invention, but invention 
merged imperceptibly into development. Analysis of Sperry case 
histories leads to the conclusion that he transformed the idea into 
an invention and then into a developed device ready for the market 
by continually modifying the original idea to adapt it to increa-
ingly more complex environments until it functioned as a device or 
process in the real environment in which it was intended to be used. 
The invention-development process often involved initial notebook 
sketches with mathematical equations predicting performance. 13 
This was followed by the construction of a model, perhaps by a pro-
fessional model builder, which was used in laboratory tests. (The 
laboratory environment was usually far simpler than the real envi-
ronment in which the device or process ultimately would be used.) 
Afterwards the device was scaled up to full size and given experi-
mental runs in a controlled environment. Finally, the complex full-
scale developed invention was tried in real circumstances. What 
needs to be emphasized is that the successive environments usually 
involved more variables, altered parameters, and new factors, and 
that these revealed the need for successive modifications of the 
first idea by revision and new invention. What had been an ele-
gantly simple idea expressed as a mathematical equation at the 
start became, at the end, an almost incomprehensible complex of 
adaptations to succeeding environments. It should be added that, 
after introduction onto the market or into use, unanticipated en-
vironments were often encountered; this necessitated post-innova-
tion invention and development so that the device or process could 
survive. 14 
Having considered three theories of innovation as they per-
tain to problem identification, idea response, and invention, at-
tention must now be directed to three case histories in order to 
illustrate the theories and to test their validity. It is not 
to be expected that each case will confirm each item in the the-
oretical frameworks that have been erected. It is hoped that the 
cases will suggest the items in each theory that are most helpful 
as explanations and will suggest a selection and a single theoret- 
ical synthesis. The resulting synthesis cannot be presented as 
having general validity beyond the case histories considered in 
this essay, but it can be taken as an hypothesis to be tested by 
broad application and it might prove a basis for further research 
and analysis. It might also prove helpful as a hypothesis in 
formulation of policy to stimulate problem identification, idea 
response, and invention. 
The first case to be investigated is that of Elmer Sperry's 
marine gyrostabilizer. It is suitable because detailed information 
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relevant to problem identification, idea response, and invention 
for this case is available. Sperry's notebooks suggest that he 
identified gyrostabilization as a likely problem area of interest 
after reading in 1907 of experiments abroad using gyros to sta-
bilize ships and monorail trains. His notebooks carry references 
to gyro articles in Scientific American, Electrical Engineering, 
and Engineering, technical journals often read by him. 15  He seems 
to have been inclined to investigate this area initially because 
he had been fascinated by gyros ever since he had seen them dem-
onstrated in science class and because he had been interested 
enough some years earlier -- for reasons the sources do not dis-
close -- to have tested the stabilizing effects upon a rowboat of 
a small electrically-driven gyro. 
Initially in 1907, Sperry's commitment to the gyro field was not 
substantial -- he carried on other inventive activities simultane-
ously with more enthusiasm and resource expenditure. His first 
application of the gyro in 1907 was a circus trick: a wheelbarrow 
was to enclose a gyro, and a clown was to use the stabilized wheel-
barrow to steady himself as he walked a tightrope. Nothing came 
of this despite approaches to Barnum and Bailey Circus. Next, he 
thought he had found a critical problem which, if solved, would 
bring funding by a rapidly expanding industry for which he had in-
vented earlier. He proposed a gyrostabilizer for automobiles. 
Knowing that the automobiles of 1907 had a high center of gravity 
in order to clear the bumps of the poor highways of the day and 
recalling the overturning of an auto that had threatened to injure 
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his son seriously, he patented an automobile stabilizer similar 
in action to ship and monorail stabilizers that were being tested 
abroad. 16 Again, the response was negative because the automobile 
manufacturers considered it an expensive solution to a marginal 
problem. 
Early in 1908, judging by the frequency of his notebook entries 
about the subject, he was substantially committed to the gyro field. 
And he found the "weakness point" in "earlier attempts to better 
the situation." This weak point assumed the proportions of a crit-
ical problem for Sperry after he decided that if he could correct 
it, he would have a significant invention. So convinced, he spent 
weeks in "idea generation." 
The weak point, or critical problem, holding back acceptance of 
ship stabilization was -- Sperry decided -- the sluggish reaction of 
the well-publicized gryostabilizers being tested by the inventor 
Ernst Otto Schlick in Germany. 17 The sluggishness allowed the ship 
to develop the momentum of a roll before the gyro reacted. Friction 
and inertia were well known to mechanical inventor Sperry; also well 
known to him, because of his earlier work on automatic controls for 
electrical dynamos, were techniques of controlling large masses with 
small sensors and servomotors (Sperry used these devices, but not 
these terms of relatively recent origin). In short, the idea gener-
ation came out of his imaginatively coupling his ability to identify 
the friction and inertia component of malfunctioning machinery (he 
was an artful diagnostician) and his automatic control experience 
and inclination. Also to be appraised in seeking to understand 
Sperry's idea generation is the probability that he was aware of 
the technique used by the monorail-stabilizer inventor, Louis 
Brennan, "to accelerate the precession of the gyro." Simply to 
have read the infinitive phrase might have been enough to stim-
ulate Sperry to imagine by analogy a stabilizer able to anticipate 
the roll of a ship and to head it off. 
In essence, Sperry's patented "active" ship stabilizer in-
volved an electric motor to activate the stabilizing response of 
the gyro before an unaided "passive" gyro could respond, because 
of inertia, to the roll of the ship. He controlled the activating 
motor with what he called an actuator, or what would later be 
called a sensor. The sensor was a pendulum, sensitive to extremely 
small, incipient rolls. The pendulum operated switches, valves, or 
other means for controlling the activating motor causing the early 
gyro response. By "activating" the gyro, Sperry solved a critical 
problem that was obstructing the development of the gyrostabilizer. 
Comparative U.S. Navy tests of this "active" gyrostabilizer and 
the "passive" gyro proved the superior roll-quenching capacity of 
the former. 
The ultimate intention here is not, however, to explain Sperry': 
technology but to analyze his inventive style. After conceiving of 
the active gyro and using sketches and mathematical formula to vis-
ualize and predict its behavior, he simulated a ship and an active 
gyro. He used a pendulum to simulate a ship and a small hand-con-
trolled gyro to simulate the automatic device, which would be in-
stalled aboard ship. He then interested U.S. Navy captain, David 
W. Taylor, who was a naval engineer and in charge of the navy's 
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experimental model basin, in the gyrostabilizer as a means of 
providing a stable ship, or gun platform, that would increase ac-
curacy of gunfire. Taylor and Sperry, however, agreed that the 
early simulation did not introduce sufficiently realistic condi-
tions. Therefore, in order to develop Sperry's invention, Taylor 
provided a far more sophisticated ship simulation at the model 
basis, and Sperry had a more complex embodiment of his invention 
constructed. 18 With the data derived from these experiments, 
Taylor and Sperry felt confident that they had a close enough ap-
proximation of reality to design a gyrostabilizer for installation 
in 1911 aboard a torpedo-boat destroyer, the USS Warden. As was 
anticipated, sea trials led to post-innovation modifications. 
Easily discernible in the Sperry marine gyrostabilizer case 
are Usher's perception of the problem, or incomplete pattern (the 
passive gyrostabilizer), his "setting of the stage" (Sperry's ex-
perimentation directed by his experience in automatic controls), 
the act of insight (active principle), and critical revision (de-
velopment). Sperry's inventive style as described earlier is also 
manifest in the single case history given: concentration upon new 
and rapidly expanding industrial or technological fields likely 
to have problems amenable to solution by his acquired characteristics 
as an inventor; the appraisal of earlier attempts to solve prob- 
lems in the field (gyrostabilization) with particular attention to 
the weakness of the attempted early solutions; identification of a 
critical problem that could be solved by invention; and the genera-
tion of ideas by synthesis and analogy from prior experience and 
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need-parameters of the critical problem. The case history also 
illustrates Sperry's style of development. 
Some of Gilfillan's principles are also fulfilled by the 
case history. The naval armaments race generated the funds that 
Taylor and the Navy used to develop Sperry's extremely expensive 
invention (an example of the non-technological factors like in-
dustrialization that Gilfillan believed stimulated innovation). 
Also, the ship stabilizer was a complex of electric motors, feed-
back control devices, mechanical components, and materials that 
obviously supporting Gilfillan's contention that an invention is 
a complex system of components that have evolved over a long period 
of time. 19 Also Gilfillan's statement that industrial firms or 
regions tend to attract inventions that maintain the momentum of 
existing systems is supported by the U.S. Navy's attraction to and 
support of Sperry and his invention, for it was another step in the 
improvement of naval gunfire, a technique undergoing dramatic change 
in the prior decades. 
Another case history about which sufficient information is 
available to allow detailed analysis of problem identification, idea 
response, and invention, is Thomas Alva Edison's invention of a sys-
tem of incandescent electric lighting. 20 First using the framework 
provided by Usher, one would agree that Edison's invention of the 
system of incandescent lighting was the culmination of a societal 
process. Before Edison turned to the field, electric generators of 
improved characteristics had been introduced in the 1860's and 70's 
by Werner Siemens and Z.T. Gramme, to mention only two of many 
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significant contributions. 21 The transmission of electric cur-
rents had been studied and achieved by numerous inventors, engi-
neers, and scientists working with the telegraph and the under-
water cable. Arc light inventors, like Charles Brush and Paul 
Jablochkoff, had installed systems of arc lighting involving gen-
erators, transmission lines, and lamps. The experience obtained 
by these earlier acts of insight and by the emergence of nov-
elties was recorded and available to Edison and technical arti-
cles, books, patents, and the devices themselves. Furthermore, 
the culmination of the societal process was a part of the setting 
of the stage. 
Usher's setting of the stage is an embracing concept. The 
societal cumulation can be thought of as an underlying cause. 
The simple illustration used by him--the sticks and the bananas 
in close proximity--suggests an effort is also needed to find the 
immediate causes of Edison's act of insight into the essential 
characteristics of the system he intended to invent. (Besides 
the setting of the stage for this act of insight, there were many 
other stage settings for the acts of insight resulting in the emer-
gence of the various components of the systems, such as the incan-
descent bulb.) The environmental factor that seems to have set 
the stage most immediately was Edison's Menlo Park laboratory. He 
had established it in 1876, equipping it with a library, office, 
chemistry laboratory, scientific instruments, machine shop, car-
penter shop, and other special facilities. He also staffed it with 
craftsmen, engineers, and scientists. 22 This array of facilities 
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and talents probably set the stage upon which Edison's thoughts 
turned to inventions that were complex systems and that would 
utilize the varied human and physical resources at his disposal. 
A less heavily capitalized inventor would probably have attempted 
to invent a single component of the system. 
Because Edison intended to invent a system involving many 
components, he perceived many incomplete patterns. The interac-
tion of the various components he was inventing and developing 
revealed incomplete patterns in one another. For example, the 
emerging characteristics of the distribution system affected the 
evolving concept of the incandescent lamp. Edison, like Sperry, 
also contemplated the earlier efforts of other inventors to invent 
incandescent lamps, generators, and distribution systems; in so 
doing he undoubtedly focused upon the "weak points" in these ear-
lier endeavors, and, in finding them, perceived Usher's incomplete 
pattern. As indicated earlier, an analysis of the Edison history 
carried on at length would reveal incomplete pattern following 
upon incomplete pattern. 
Usher's act of insight occurred many times for Edison, as he 
was inventing the system.
23 Attention here will be directed to 
the act of insight that defined the characteristics of the system 
as a whole. Also like Sperry, Edison set up need-parameters and 
searched for analogies. In the Edison case, his parameters were 
economic as well as technological. 	In 1878 he wanted a system of 
lighting that would compete with gas lighting prices; when he em- 
barked upon a sustained effort to introduce a comparable incandescen 
lighting system. After having evaluated the various costs antici-
pated, he found that the copper costs of his distribution system 
was a major consideration. 	A prime technological objective was 
the invention of an incandescent lamp filament that would last 
for hours--not for the mere minutes of the earlier filaments of 
other inventors. 
Edison's act of insight in response to these parameters was 
the concept of an incandescent filament that would minimize the 
amount of current that had to be carried in the conductors. He 
reached this concept by a complex route involving the imaginative 
application of science. Essentially, the idea response was struc-
tured by Edison's familiarity with Ohm's law and his ingenious 
manipulation of the characteristics of his system within the struc-
ture provided by Ohm's law. He was also guided by his resourceful 
application of Joule's equation relating the energy in a system 
and the voltage and current relationship of the system. One of 
Edison's laboratory associates, Francis Jehl, in recounting the 
Menlo Park days, repeatedly recalls with admiration Edison's adept 
use of Ohm's law, but Jehl does not explain in sufficient detail 
how Edison gained insights with it. 24 
Edison's development of his system involved many critical re-
visions of the various components in order to increase their ef-
ficiency, practicality, and durability. One example of critical 
revision must suffice because it falls within the category of de-
velopment, which is beyond the scope of this essay. After trying 
his system of incandescent lighting experimentally at Menlo Park 
in 1879, Edison commercially introduced his central station on 
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Pearl Street in New York City in 1882. For this station, he used 
110 volts and two-wire distribution. Critical analysis of the sys-
tem revealed that high transmission cost remained a deterrent to 
the adoption of the Edison system for lighting in other than densely 
populated markets. His critical revisions included an important 
patent on a three-wire 220-volt system, which was tried out in 
Sunbury, Pennsylvania. 25  Despite this revision, Edison's low-volt-
age transmission system could not lower transmission costs for 
lightly populated areas to the level of the high-voltage trans-
former system introduced in America by George Westinghouse and his 
engineers in the late 1880's (the Westinghouse innovation is a case 
of a response to an incomplete pattern or critical problem, for it 
remedied the high transmission cost component of the Edison sys- 
tern) . 26 
Some events of the Edison innovation having been considered 
within the Usher framework, they will also be analyzed using the 
Sperry and the Gilfillan categories. Where Usher saw the percep-
tion of a problem (incomplete pattern), the Sperry analysis would 
posit the identification of a critical problem and also the emer-
gence of a reverse salient in an expanding front as an inseparable 
antecedent phenomenon. (Usher was not explicit in his step-by-step 
analysis on the emergence of the incomplete pattern or problem per-
ceived). The front would involve a cumulation of many components 
conserved and related by collective action over a long period. Where 
Usher's interpretation suggests that the Edison Menlo Park labora-
tory was an immediate cause (stage setting), the Sperry analysis 
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has Menlo Park as a set of circumstances that inclines the inven-
tor to perceive a particular critical problem within a reverse 
salient. 
Edison's perception of incomplete patterns, such as the lack 
of durability in other inventor's earlier incandescent lamps and 
the inefficiency of earlier high internal resistance generators, 
should be named critical problems within a Sperry frame of refer-
ence. 27 Continuing the Sperry analysis, the acts of insight con-
ditioned in part by scientific notions and economic parameters 
would simply be labelled solutions to the critical problem. 
Similarities between the Gilfillan categories and the Usher 
can also be shown by the Edison case. Gilfillan believed inven-
tion to be a complex accumulation; the societal cumulation of im-
provements in generators, lamps, and transmission systems men-
tioned in conjunction with Usher is a relevant example. Edison's 
finding that advances in the design and functioning of one com-
ponent in his system necessitated invention elsewhere in the sys-
tem supports Gilfillan's invention-mothering-invention, as well 
as Usher's incomplete patterns. Gilfillan's conclusion that inven-
tive activity tends to localize according to the special character-
istics of the invention and of the environment in which it is in-
vented relates to Usher's stage setting (taken to be Menlo Park, 
for the setting's character conditions the inventive drama enacted 
thereon). 
In the third case history, that of Thomas Midgley and the in-
vention of a gasoline antiknock additive, we have a notably clear 
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example of the emergence of a reverse salient in an expanding tech-
nological front. The reverse salient, it should be recalled from 
the Sperry analysis, is a subject area in which a perceptive in-
ventor identifies a critical problem. The reverse salient on a 
technological front emerging in the Midgley case resulted in part 
from the rapid development of an industry, a relationship that 
Gilfillan anticipates by predicting that rapid industrialization 
and economic development stimulate invention. 
Specifically, the reverse salient in the Midgely case occurred 
in the automobile production and use system, one that includes, 
among other industries, the petroleum and the automobile. 28 The 
technological problem emerged as the automobile-engine manufacturers 
sought to increase the compression ratio in the cylinders in order 
to raise efficiency, but found that destructive knocking of the 
fuel frustrated the attempt. The reverse salient, then, emerged 
at the interface of two technologies, petroleum and automotive, an 
interface embraced by the concept of the automobile production and 
use system. 
Dayton Engineering Laboratories Company, an independent researc 
and development organization, responded to the interface problem. 
Charles F. Kettering, who presided over the laboratories, had in-
vented a motor generator set for electric lighting (Delco) in rural 
areas, a cash register, and a self-starter for automobiles, to men-
tion only a few of his inventions. 29 Kettering and his staff had 
their attention drawn to the knocking problem because of the tendenc 
of the Delco unit to knock. Furthermore, the critics of battery 
ignition and Kettering's self-starter depended upon battery igni-
tion (if the opponents of battery ignition--who were proponents 
of magneto ignition--had had their way, then self starters could 
not have been used). 30  Kettering's need to turn to the problem 
of knocking because of the nature of two of his inventions illus-
trates Gilfillan's proposition that invention is the mother of 
necessity. 
Kettering turned the antiknock project over to Thomas Midgley, 
who joined the Dayton Laboratory staff in 1916 after receiving a 
degree in mechanical engineering at Ohio State. Midgley's search 
for the critical problem in the reverse salient area led him to 
attempt to define precisely and to clarify the concept of knock. 
Trained in science as well as engineering, he did a literature 
search on the subject and concluded from the not altogether conclu-
sive evidence that knock was not a pre-ignition problem as many 
believed, but a detonation resulting from a rapid and intense build-
up of heat in the ignited fuel and a consequent explosion of the 
fuel. The shock wave from the explosion striking the cylinder walls 
caused the knock,Midgley believed. 31 
By engaging with specifics, Midgley moved nearer critical prob-
lem identification. Having decided that the general problem was de-
tonation, Midgley, advised by Kettering, sought a method of increas-
ing the volatility of the fuel by means of an additive (a more vola-
tile fuel would absorb and disperse the heat of ignition rapidly, thus 
avoiding explosion, or detonation). His quest for an inventive so-
lution resulted in a short-lived Eureka moment (act of insight). 
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Reasoning by analogy, this ingenious and resourceful mechan-
ical engineer drew upon a limited knowledge of flora to try to 
solve a chemical problem. Knowing that red trailing arbutus bloomed 
under the snow, Midgley hypothesized that the early flowering re-
sulted from the superior heat-absorbing quality of the trailing 
arbutus and that this quality was a function of redness. So Midgley 
asked for a red aniline dye to pour into the fuel. Because his lab-
oratory had no aniline dye, he was given iodine as a substitute. 
The knocking reduced. 32 
Further experimentation disclosed, however, that it was not 
the color but the chemistry and structure of iodine that made it 
an antiknock additive. As Usher argued in his analysis of innova- 
tion, an accident (the availability, in this case, of iodine in the 
laboratory) resulted in an invention. However, the Eureka moment 
was a short one, because subsequent developments showed that iodine 
not only cut knocking but also turned the inside of the cylinder 
into a salt factory, with the cylinder walls as raw material. 
Nevertheless, Midgley had proved that there was a chemical that 
reduced knock and he assumed--and was encouraged by his assumption--
that there were others with less corrosive side effects. Midgley's 
idea response was now what he mislabelled--in view of Edison's sys-
tem and method--an Edisonian approach: he tried gasoline soluble 
compounds of many elements. This proved to be a time consuming and 
expensive wild goose chase, because the making of compounds that 
were soluble proved difficult. 33 
Again however,accident played a role in setting the stage. 
Reading casually in a newspaper, Kettering noted the discovery of 
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a so-called universal solvent, selenium oxychloride. Long sensi-
tized to the subject matter by their search for soluble compounds, 
Midgely and Kettering procured some of the compound. To their de-
light, the venture brought another antiknock agent to their atten-
tion. To explain this act of insight is not simple, but an incom-
plete pattern (untried soluble compounds), accident (casual encounter 
with a newspaper article), and inventor inclination (try out all 
elements possible in a so-called Edisonian style) should be noted. 
Knowing that oxygen and chlorine had negative antiknock qual-
ities in prior experimentation, Midgley used diethyl selenide in-
stead of the oxycloride compound and found selenium an excellant 
antiknock element. Also in this instance, however, the agent had 
an unacceptable side effect--a nauseous odor that would fill garages 
and streets. At this point, Midgley's idea response was imaginative. 
Exploiting a scientific notion, he converted the wild goose chase 
into a "fox hunt." He had a notion of the orderliness of the peri-
odic table that he had acquired in secondary school. If we accept 
his own account, it was this vague notion that led him to use the 
orderliness of the periodic table to bring a system or a method to 
his research. 34 
Midgley used a variation of the periodic table prepared by 
R. E. Wilson, following the valence and atomic structure theory of 
Langmuir, as a three-dimensional plotting board. He focused his 
attention upon testing soluble compounds of the elements that fell 
near selenium in the orderly structure of the periodic table, and 
he inserted in a wooden model of the periodic table wooden pegs of 
varied length according to the antiknock property of the element. 
The high rise area led him to tetraethyl lead. Again, it is dif-
ficult to analyze the act--or acts--of insight involved in the use 
of the periodic table notion, but the Midgley case history has pro-
vided details closer to the heart of the matter than most stories 
of invention. 35 
There were many other problems encountered in development be-
fore tetraethyl could be marketed by the Ethyl Corporation, a com-
pany of which Midgley was an officer. 36 This story will not be 
followed, however, for the focus of this essay is upon problem iden-
tification, idea response, and invention (act of insight). 
What emerges from the three case histories is a verification 
of the three interpretations of innovation defined initially. No 
one proved capable of fully ordering or explaining the sequence of 
events involved in problem identification, idea response, and in-
vention, but together they brought clarification and understanding. 
The categories of the interpretations, such as "critical problem" 
and "incomplete pattern," embraced the varied events in each of 
the three case histories despite the three cases being accounts of 
invention by an heroic type inventor, a research industrialist type, 
and a figure who bridged the gap between the two. Furthermore, the 
abstractions or categories as ordered in a sequence by Usher and in 
the Sperry biography corresponded with the real chronological order 
of the case histories. 	In conclusion, an attempt will be made to 
combine the concepts and interweave the sequences of the interpreta-
tions. Hopefully, this will result in a more complex, subtly nuance( 
interpretation of more general validity. Despite the increased 
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complexity, the synthesis interpretation should bring more clarity 
to the process of problem identification, idea response, and in-
vention, for the process in reality is a complex one and simplifi-
cation probably brings distortion rather than clarification. 
Before a problem can be identified, it must emerge. Generally, 
inventors do not create problems; they solve them. Therefore, in 
order to understand the innovation process, one should consider the 
ways in which problems emerge. Too often this step in the process 
has been ignored. Judging by the Sperry case, a successful inven-
tor has the ability to focus his attention where problems are emerg-
ing. This ability can, perhaps, be explained by an awareness, con-
scious or unconscious, that problems tend to emerge where change 
is dramatic. Dramatic change has been labelled variously: indus-
trialization; population increase; technological revolution; and 
economic development. In all cases, the change generates reverse 
salients in an expanding front, imbalances, and incomplete patterns 
--to name a few essentially interchangeable concepts. Incomplete 
pattern, reverse salient, and imbalances all imply a complex sys-
tem or gestalt configuration, otherwise there would be no incom-
pleteness, balance to achieve (it takes more than one to balance ), 
or advanced segments of a front in comparison to which the reverse 
can be seen. Because an invention is often a complex of compo-
nents, it too can be perceived as a dynamic assemblage from which 
emerges imbalances, reverse salients, and incomplete patterns ne-
cessitating sub-invention so that the total invention will function 
effectively as a system. 
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How does an inventor identify the problem? In the first 
place, it should be stressed that a professional inventor, like 
Edison or Sperry, discerns within the general area of the reverse 
salient a critical problem. A critical problem can be distin-
guished from the general problem, or reverse salient that has 
emerged, by a critical problem's specificity and amenability to 
solution. To illustrate, the steam engine, wireless telegraphy, 
the incandescent lamp, and the marine stabilizer were not invented--
a separate condenser, a superheterodyne receiver circuit, a high 
resistance filament, and an active feedback control for a stabi-
lizer--or some other component--were. An inventor identified a 
weakness in the steam engine or another device and decided that 
the correction of that weakness would greatly improve the perfor-
mance of the device. In so doing, he identified a critical problem. 
General problem areas, such as imperfectly functioning steam 
engines or ship stabilizers, may involve a number of weaknesses or 
critical problems. How does the inventor decide upon which to 
focus? A number of influences are at work, but his prior education, 
experience, and demonstrated talent determine his expertise and the 
wise professional knows it and takes advantage of it. Otherwise, 
he might find himself working with a handicap relative to other 
inventors working in the same general problem area. Other influ-
ences determining the inventor's selection of a critical problem 
are his anticipation of funding, foreseeing a market, and availa-
bility of research and development facilities of an appropriate 
kind, such as laboratory ones. 
Another influence working upon the professional searching 
for the critical problem is the prior activity of other inventors 
who have worked in the same general problem area or reverse salient. 
The inventor can inform himself about the direction and focus of 
this prior work by an analysis of the literature, patents in the 
field, and by conversation with his peers. If he finds, for example, 
that a majority of the earlier patents or technical reports in the 
area were about incandescent filaments, he can assume that there 
is probably a critical problem at this point. Prior failures not 
only alert him about focus, but also inform him about dead ends 
and open avenues. 
Having identified a critical problem, how does the inventor 
have the idea response or come upon the solution? The Edison, 
Sperry, and Midgley cases are instructive, but do not answer the 
question satisfactorily. This is not surprising, because idea 
response is essentially creative, a human attribute that has long 
defied analysis. However, the cases considered suggest, among 
other things, that the creative inventor seeks one small step for-
ward; he does not pretend to great leaps. Furthermore, he looks 
for a component in earlier manifestations of the invention that 
can be labelled a "weakness." The simple act of structuring his 
perceptions by the search for weakness predisposes him to have a 
means of improving upon the situation, for the act of identifying 
weakness presumes an incomplete pattern or the existence of a rem-
edy. Sperry saw sluggishness as a weakness because he knew from 
experience that inertia and friction could be overcome in machines. 
39 
4 
Another means by which inventors find solutions, or generate 
idea responses, is by analogy. In the cases discussed, Sperry and 
Midgley used analogy. They found an analogy to the problem and 
then recalled the solution to the analogous situation and tried to 
modify the early solution to suit the unique particulars of the 
new problem. To do this the inventors had to have the mental abil-
ity to abstract the similar essences of superficially different 
problems and to particularize an abstraction of the earlier solu-
tion. 
There are undoubtedly many intellectual and emotional quali-
ties besides the power of abstraction that entered into the idea 
response in the cases discussed. One emotional quality valued 
highly by Sperry when appraising his qualities as an inventor and 
which may have contributed to the solution of problems by other 
inventors was courage. 37 Obviously, courage is of many kinds, but 
it seems likely that the kind of courage Sperry related to inven-
tion was an ability to live with tension and unresolved problems. 
In his analysis of invention, Usher emphasizes an ability to con-
tain tension. Psychological capability to withstand the tension 
arising from a well-identified but unsolved problem would sustain 
the long term empiricism and painstaking routine and the carefully 
worked out and fulfilled methodology involved in the case histories 
of invention discussed. To put it differently, the inventive type 
must have the psychology to accept, even seek, problems. 
The early stages of innovation are more complex than any one 
or any combination of the interpretations that have been examined. 
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The reading of the surviving sources on many inventions and the 
inventions themselves sustain this argument. On the other hand, 
the exploration of case histories considered in this essay demon- 
strates that analytical interpretations do bring credible--and not 
simplistic--order out of the chaos of facts. What is obviously 
needed, in view of the paucity of studies now available, is an 
intense and sustained effort to research and write analytical his-
tories of inventions and inventors, especially inventor-entrepre-
neurs. It is hackneyed to say that we know much more about our 
politicians, diplomats, and generals than our inventor-entrepre-
neurs; it is less obvious to say that what we do know about our 
inventor-entrepreneur, generally, is simplistic and adulatory. 
What is important to stress is that we need biographies and his-
tories in the field of innovation that are based on the same 
close reading of the sources and the same critical analysis that 
has come to be taken as commonplace in political and diplomatic 
history. With the twentieth century structured by technology, it 
is remarkable that more support and encouragement has not been 
given to the study of the history of man making his world with tech-
nology through innovation. 
When such studies are done, the historian must shift to the 
appropriate sources. In the preceding essay, the analysis drawn 
from the Sperry biography was based on a close reading of the in-
ventor's notebooks, his patents, and, when possible, an inspection 
of the inventions themselves. Inventors' notebooks provide a day-
by-day, even hour-by-hour account of the problem identification, 
14 
idea response, and reduction to model. A political historian of 
high standards would not think of analyzing a political campaign 
without the hard, tiny facts of the process; yet theories of inno-
vation are formulated without reference to the basic source material. 
Surprisingly, perhaps shockingly, Edison's notebooks have not yet 
been analyzed in a systematic manner nor has the pattern of his 
patents been discovered. In the case of the patents, an analysis 
of Sperry's was a key to understanding his inventive style. Until 
these types of sources are used, it is fatuous to say that inven-
tion is a creative process that defies analysis. It should be added 
that the facts and the interpretations considered in this essay 
strongly recommend that any analysis be one that is shaped, or in-
fluenced, by a dynamic systems-model. Each interpretation and each 
case reinforce the conclusion that complex change within even more 
complex change is the process underway when innovation is occurring. 
Furthermore, the events of innovation take on meaning within a sys-
tems context that has been labelled variously as expanding front; 
complex and dynamic societal cumulation; and economic, demographic, 
or industrial environment. Further study would probably prove that 
exploration of other systems concepts, such as output-input analysis, 
would prove extremely helpful to the historian and biographer in the 
study of the early phases of innovation. 
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Chapter 7 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES: 
The Niggardliness of Nature Reconsidered 
Nathan Rosenberg 
I 
Concern over the adequacy of natural resources has always been 
a central preoccupation of economists. The management of human 
enterprise at both the household and large societal levels has always 
been perceived to be dependent upon the intelligent management of the 
limited resources made available by the natural environment. Indeed, 
this is evident in the very etymology of the word "economy," which 
derives from the Greek words oikos (house) and nomos (manage) , or 
the management of household affairs. When economics as a discipline 
is conceived as dealing with the problems of the household writ large, 
the obvious and central question is how the resource endowment con-
strains the production of goods and services. 
Some of the basic insights of classical economics emerged out 
of this preoccupation with natural resource constraints. Malthus 
and Ricardo were both pessimistic about the long-term prospects for 
economic growth in an economy experiencing substantial population 
growth and with only a fixed supply of land available for food pro-
duction. Indeed, as Malthus argued, in an "old" country population 
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growth was always pushing society against the limits imposed by 
the fixed supply of land and subsistence incomes were, as a con-
sequence, inevitable-- at least for the working class. Indeed, it 
was in speculating about the consequences of Great Britain attempt-
ing to grow its own food supply as population continued to grow 
that classical economics formulated one of its central relation-
ships --the law of diminishing returns. It is worth noting that 
the formulation of this law clearly distinguished both a quanti-
tative and a qualitative dimension. 1 For not only did continual 
population growth lead-- necessarily-- to a decline in the land/ 
man ratio; it also, in its Ricardian variant, created the neces-
sity for resorting to qualitatively inferior soils-- i.e., soils 
where an equal dosage of capital-and-labor led to a smaller incre-
ment to output than was the case with land already under cultiva-
tion. There was, in other words, both an extensive and an inten-
sive margin of cultivation. The classical economists' concern 
with the benefits of free trade and the theory of comparative 
advantage followed directly from this vision of the deteriorating 
resource position of a growing economy in possession of a fixed 
supply of land. 
The impact of the Malthusian conception is difficult to exag-
gerate. It not only forcefully focused upon the implications of 
limited resources for the prospects for economic growth, but it 
1Furthermore, the simplifying assumption was usually employed that 
capital and labor were applied in doses of fixed proportion, thus 
collapsing a three variable model to one of two variables. Note 
that this procedure also has the effect of ignoring the possibil-
ities for offsetting by capital formation the decline in worker 
productivity due to the deteriorating resources/man ratio. 
specifically linked the problem as it must be linked, to the rate 
of population growth. Malthus, it turned out, was not much of a 
demographer, but his formulation nevertheless has had an overwhelm-
ing influence upon the framework within which these matters have 
been discussed right up to the present day. 2 If the Malthusian 
view seemed to play a subordinate role in the writings of profes-
sional economists after the "Marginal Revolution" of the 1870's, 
it was not so much because the Malthusian spectre had been exor-
cised as because economists began to address themselves to a very 
different range of problems--problems dealing with the optimal 
allocation of a fixed amount of resources. John Bates Clark sum-
marized this new focus very well in this Distribution of Wealth: 
In any given society, five generic changes are going on, 
every one of which reacts on the structure of society by 
changing the arrangements of that group system which it 
is the work of catallactics to study. 
1. Population is increasing. 
2. Capital is increasing. 
3. Methods of production are improving. 
4. The forms of industrial establishments 
are changing. 3 5. The wants of consumers are multiplying. 
Clark regards all of these forces as belonging to the area of eco-
nomic dynamics. Economic statics, on the other hand, is the study 
of an economic system where none of these forces is present. There-
fore in the study of economic statics, Clark argues, we must rigor-
ously abstract from the operation of these forces. 
2For an incisive analysis of the Malthusian theory, see K. David, 
"Malthus and the Theory of Population," in P. Lazarsfeld (ed.), 
The Language of Social Research, Glencoe, Illinois, 1955. See also 
Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect, Homewood, Illinois, 1968, 
revised Edition, Chapter 3. 
3John Bates Clark, The Distribution of Wealth, New York, 1899, p. 56. 
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One function of economic society is that of growth. It 
is becoming larger and richer, and its structure is chang-
ing. As time passes, it uses more and better appliances 
for production. The individual members of it develop new 
wants, and the society uses its enlarging process to gra-
tify them. The organism is perpetually gaining in effi-
ciency, and this is promoting the individual members of 
it to higher planes of life.4 
But all of these "generic" changes connected with economic growth, 
Clark argues, must be firmly placed aside in order to permit the 
study of economic statics. Clearly this is a level of abstraction 
within which there is no room, by assumption, for the operation 
of Malthusian forces. 
Although Malthus and Ricardo had been primarily concerned 
with the adequacy of the supply of arable land to provide food for 
a growing population, the voracious appetite for natural resources 
of an industrializing economy shifted the locus of concern to other 
resources in the second half of the 19th century. As early as 1865 
the distinguished English economist W. S. Jevons published his book, 
The Coal Question, in which he warned that the inevitably rising 
costs of coal extraction posed an ominous and urgent threat to Bri-
tain's industrial establishment. Having demonstrated the British 
economy's extreme dependence upon coal-- especially in the form of 
its reliance upon steam power-- Jevons went on to argue explicitly 
that there were no prospective reasonable substitutes for coal as 
a fuel. 5 After examining recent trends in coal consumption he dem-
onstrated the inevitability of rising coal costs associated with 
4 Ibid., pp. 55-6. 
5See The Coal Question, chapter 7, "Of Supposed Substitutes for 
Coal." 
the necessity of conducting mining operations at progressively 
greater depths. As a result, 
I draw the conclusion that I think any one would 
draw, that we cannot long maintain our present rate of  
increase of consumption; that we can never advance to  
the higher amounts of consumption supposed. But this  
only means that the check to our progress must become  
perceptible considerably within a century from the pre-
sent time; that the cost of fuel must rise, perhaps 
within a lifetime, to a rate threatening our commercial 
and manufacturing supremacy; and the conclusion is inev-
itable, that our present happy progressive condition 
is a thing of limited duration. 6 
II 
Even in the U.S., a country of continental proportions and 
possessing a resources/man ratio far more favorable than that of 
Great Britain, expressions of concern over the adequacy of natural 
resources became widespread before the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The Conservation Movement emerged into the consciousiness of 
American political life at just about the time that Frederick 
Jackson Turner was announcing The End of the Frontier (1893). The 
movement was a significant force in American political life from 
1890 to 1920. 7 Although the spokesmen of the Movement did not 
attack their concerns in an analytical or rigorous way, they did 
forcefully present a conceptualization of the problem which was to 
exercise a profound influence upon later thinking. In the words 
of Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester of the United States, and an 
articulate leader of the Movement, 
6 Ibid., p. 215. Emphasis Jevons'. 
7Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and The Gospel of Efficiency: The  
Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920, Harvard University 
Press, 1959. 
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We have a limited supply of coal, and only a limited sup-
ply. Whether it is to last for a hundred or a hundred 
and fifty or a thousand years, the coal is limited in 
amount, unless through geological changes which we shall 
not live to see, there will never be any more of it than 
there is now. But coal is in a sense the vital essence 
of our civilization. If it can be preserved, if the life 
of the mines can be extended, if by preventing waste there 
can be more coal left in this country after we of this 
generation have made every needed use of this source of 
power, then we shall have deserved well of our descend-
ants. 
And, 
The five indispensably essential meterials in our civili-
zation are wood, water, coal, iron, and agricultural pro-
ducts,... We have timber for less than thirty years at 
the present rate of cutting. The figures indicate that 
our demands upon the forest have increased twice as fast 
as our population. We have anthracite coal, for but fifty 
years, and bituminous coal for less than two hundred. Our 
supplies of iron ore, mineral oil, and natural gas are 
being rapidly depleted, and many of the great fields are 
already exhausted. Mineral
8 
resources such as these when 
once gone are gone forever. 
The Conservationist view, therefore, was that nature containE 
fixed stocks of useful inputs for man's productive activities, whicl . 
 could be readily identified and measured in terms of physical units. 
These resources need to be husbanded carefully. Preference should 
be given to exploitation of renewable resources-- agriculture crops, 
forests, fisheries-- which should be operated on a sustained yield 
basis. Waste should be avoided in the exploitation of nonrenewable 
resources so as to pass on the larges possible inventory to future 
generations. 
When, in the years immediately after the Second World War, 
8Gifford Pinchot, The Fight For Conservation, 1910, pp. 43, 123-
124. As quoted in H. Barnett and C. Morse, Scarcity and Growth, 
Baltimore, 1963, p. 76, Emphasis Barnett and Morse. 
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economists turned their attention once again to the problems and 
prospects for long-term economic development, the Malthusian pres-
sures once again figured prominently. Undeveloped countries all 
appeared to confront some serious demographic obstacle - either 
that of already high population densities, or rates of population 
growth which had sharply accelerated in the twentieth century, or 
both. Not surprisingly, Malthusian-type models made their appear-
ance. In these models, that is to say, there existed a "quasi-
equilbrium" such that temporary improvements which raised per 
capita income triggered off demographic changes which eventually 
restored the low level of per capita income at a higher absolute 
population size. 9 Concern over the implications of population 
growth subsided in the U.S. and most high income countries by the 
late 1950's when the post-war "baby boom" appeared to have exhaust-
ed itself. However, it reappeared forcefully in the 1960's as a 
consequence of the growing concern over pollution and environmental 
deterioration; and its possible consequences have been more recently 
dramatized in the apocalyptic Meadows Report which attempts to focus 
attention on the long-term implications of continued growth of pop-
ulation and industrial production. 10 In this model, exponential 
growth of population and industrial output confront a world of 
finite resources-- mineral deposits, arable land, etc.-- and limited 
capacity of the natural environment to absorb the growing pollution 
9See, e.g., R. Nelson, "A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibrium Trap 
in Underdeveloped Countires," American Economic Review, December 
1956; Harvey Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, 
John Wiley and Sons, 1957, Chapter 10. 
10D. H. Meadows, et. al., The Limits to Growth, New York, 1972. 
"fallout." The finite limits appear to guarantee, not merely a 
ceiling to future growth, but a precipitous and disastrous decline 
in approximately a century, 
III 
In assessing the Malthusian view and its implications over 
the past century or so, a convenient starting point is the recog-
nition that Malthus and Malthus-like models have led to predic- 
tions which have been demonstrably and emphatically wrong. Indeed, 
it is difficult to understand the persistence of widespread attach-
ment to a hypothesis which has been so decisively refuted by the 
facts of history. As Stigler has said: 
What evidence could have been used to test the theory? 
If the subsistence level has any stability, and hence any 
significance, Malthus' theory was wrong if the standard of 
living of the masses rose for any considerable period of 
time. He did not investigate this possibility ... and 
ignored the opinions of such authorities as Sir Frederick 
Eden that it had been rising for a century. His theory 
was also contradicted if population grew at a constant 
geometrical rate in an "old" country, for then the means 
of subsistence were also growing at this rate, since popu-
lation never precedes food. Despite the rapid increase 
of population in almost all western European nations at 
the time, which he duly noted, he persisted in considering 
this as only a confirmation of his fecundity hypothesis ... 
The "principle of population" had the dubious honor of 
receiving from history one of the most emphatic refutations 
any prominent economic theory has ever received. It is now 
fashionable to defend Malthus by saying that his theory 
applies to other places and times than those to which he 
and his readers applied it. This may be true, but it is 
tantamount to scientific nihilism to deduce from it any 
defense of Malthus. It is an odd theory that may not some 
day and somewhere find role; for every answer one can 
find a correct question.1 1 
11George Stigler, "The Ricardian Theory of Value and Distribution," 
Journal of Political Economy, June 1952. Mark Blaug has made the 
(Continued on page 9.) 
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Not only have per capita incomes in the western world experienced 
a sustained increase over long periods of time while population 
has grown at exponential rates.
12 The long-term historical record 
also fails to reveal any convincing evidence that the limited sup-
ply of natural resources and associated diminishing returns have 
significantly hampered long-term growth of these countries in 
the past. Clearly, no amount of evidence from past history will 
enable us to predict future relationships, for there is certainly 
no necessary reason to believe that the future will resemble the 
past. However, it is not our purpose to attempt anything so fool-
hardly as prediction, but rather to grasp more firmly and pre-
cisely the nature of the interrelationships between shifting pat-
terns of resource scarcity and the innovative process. 
Classical models have failed to make relevant predictions 
primarily because they adopted an excessively static notion of the 
economic meaning of natural resources and because they drastically 
underestimated the extent to which technological change could off-
set, by-pass, or provide substitutes for increasingly scarce natural 
resources. A large part of what economists have had to say in recent 
11 (continued) 
same point: "If Malthus' theory were indeed a theory, we would 
want to ask: What would happen if the theory were not true? The 
answer is, or ought to be, that income per head would rise, not fall, 
with increasing population. The history of Western countries, there-
fore, disproves Malthus' theory. The defenders of Malthus reply: 
But what of India today? No one denies that India is overpopulated 
because the death rate was lowered by the introduction of Western 
medicine, thus divorcing population growth from the current level of 
income. It follows that India would be better off if she could also 
"Westernize" her birth rate. But what has this piece of advice to 
do with Malthusian theory of population? Mark Blaug, Economic  
Theory in Retrospect, op.cit., pp. 79-80. 
12 Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, New Haven, 1966, Chapter 2. 
years about the innovative process in relation to natural resources 
needs to be seen as a prolonged effort to break out of the restric-
tive conceptualizations inherited from Malthus and Ricardo. 
The need to break out of this framework has been made increas-
ingly apparent by numerous studies,each of which, in their differ-
ent ways, has shown that natural resources have played a role of 
declining importance, at least within the favored circle of indus-
trializing countries. Whereas classical economic models based upon 
fixed resources, population growth, and diminishing returns, lead 
us to expect rising relative prices for extractive products and 
an increasing share of GNP consisting of the output of resources, 
such features have obviously not dominated the growth experiences 
of industrial economies. The agricultural sectors, to begin with, 
have declined in their relative importance. A declining agricul-
tural sector, as Kuznets has shown, has characterized all economies 
which have experienced long-term economic growth. 13 Indeed, per- 
haps the most distinctive characteristic of growing economies has 
been the complex of structural changes associated with the declin-
ing importance of the agricultural sector. Moreover, within agri-
culture itself, the implicit assumption that there were no good 
substitutes for land in food production has been belied by a broad 
range of innovations which have sharply raised the productivity of 
agricultural resources and have at the same time made possible the 
widespread substitution of industrial inputs for the more traditional 
13Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, op.cit., Chapter 3. 
agricultural labor and land-- machinery, commercial fertilizer, 
insecticides, irrigation water, etc. As Schultz observed in 1951, 
It is my belief that the following two propositions 
are historically valid in representing the economic de-
velopment that has characterized Western communities: 
(1) a declining proportion of the aggregate inputs 
of the community is required to produce (or to acquire) 
farm products; and 
(2) of the inputs employed to produce farm pro-
ducts, the proportion represented by land is not an in-
creasing one, despite the recombination of inputs in 
farming to use less human effort relative to other in-
puts, including land. 14 
IV 
The growing appreciation of the importance of technological 
change in raising resource productivity has led to several notable 
studies of the working of this process in agriculture. Attempts 
have been made to identify and measure the contribution of separate 
variables to the growth in agricultural productivity (including the 
impact of individual innovations), as well as to studying the fac-
tors accounting for the rate of diffusion of new innovations. The 
most notable attempt to measure the contribution of a single inno-
vation was Griliches' pathbreaking study of hybrid corn, in which 
he estimated that the social rate of return over the period 1910-
1955 to the private and public resources committed to research on 
14T. W. Schultz, "The Declining Economic Importance of Agricultural 
Land," Economic Journal, December 1951, p. 727. Schultz presents 
quantitative evidence to support his generalization, which he holds" 
. to be empirically valid for such technically advanced communi-, 
ties as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States." (p. 739) 
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this innovation was at least of the order of 700%. 15 Parker, in 
his study of cereal production (wheat, corn, and oats) found that 
output per worker more than tripled in the U.S. between 1840 and 
1911. Parker estimated that 60% of the increase was attributable 
to mechanization, which raised the acreage/worker ratio, and that 
practically all of the growth in productivity can be explained by 
the combination of mechanization with the westward expansion of 
agriculture. The most important improvements came in those acti- 
vities which had previously been highly labor-intensive-- especially 
the harvesting and post-harvesting operations. In fact, two inno-
vations alone-- the reaper and the thresher-- accounted for 70% of 
the total gain from mechanization. 16 
It is worth emphasizing at this point that major improvements 
in productivity in agriculture were the result of innovations in 
other sectors of the economy. For example, the growth in agricul-
tural productivity due to westward expansion and an increasing 
degree of regional product specialization was, in turn, dependent 
upon improvements in transport facilities. Indeed, by the end of 
the 19th century the railroad, the iron steamship, and refrigeration 
had created, for the first time in human history, a high degree of 
regional agricultural specialization on a world-wide scale. 17 
15 Zvi Griliches, "Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn 
and Related Innovations," Journal of Political Economy, October 1958 
16William Parker and Judith Klein, "Productivity Growth in Grain 
Production in the United States, 1840-60 and 1900-10," in Dorothy 
Brady, (ed.), Output, Employment and productivity in the United Stat 
after 1800, New York, 1966. 
17See A. J. Youngson, "The Opening of New Territories," Chapter 3 
in M. M. Postan and H. J. Habakkuk (eds.), The Cambridge Economic  
History of Europe, Vol. VI: The Industrial Revolutions and After,  
Cambridge, 1965. 
The impact of an innovation upon productivity growth in agri-
culture, as is the case elsewhere, is not only a function of its 
potential for reducing costs, but of the speed with which it is 
adopted. As a result, increasing attention has been devoted to the 
diffusion process in agriculture. Paul David has employed a thresh-
old model of farm size to explain the very slow adoption of the 
reaper for the twenty-year period before 1893 and the sudden rapid 
rate of adoption beginning in that year. 18 Griliches has shown how 
the spatial and chronological diffusion of hybrid corn can be 
explained in terms of economic factors shaping the profit expecta-
tions of farmers and seed suppliers. His model closely accounts 
for the early and rapid adoption in Iowa as compared to the later 
and slower adoption on the western fringes of the Corn Belt. 19 A 
significant element of Griliches' diffusion model is its explicit 
recognition of the dependence of the adoption process upon the need 
to undertake local adaptations. 
An important attempt to provide a synthesis of a wide body of 
literature on the interaction between resource endowment and agricul-
tural technology is represented in the recent book, Agricultural  
Development, by V. Ruttan and Y. Hayami (The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1971). In this book the authors present a theoretical framework for 
18Paul David, "The Mechanization of Reaping in the Ante-Bellum Mid-
west," in H. Rosovsky (ed.), Industrialization in Two Systems, 
Wiley, 1966. 
19 Z. Griliches, "Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of 
Technological Change," Econometrica, October 1957. 
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examining the patterns of agricultural development in individual 
countries within which endogenous technological change plays a 
critical role. A crucial feature of their approach is a theory 
of induced innovation which incorporates a unique, dynamic res-
ponse of each country to its agricultural resource endowment and 
relative input prices. Hayami and Ruttan argue that 
... there are multiple paths of technological change in 
agriculture available to a society. The constraints im-
posed on agricultural development by an inelastic sup- 
ply of land may be offset by advances in mechanical techno-
logy. The ability of a country to achieve rapid growth 
in agricultural productivity and output seems to hinge 
on its ability to make an efficient choice among the al-
ternative paths. Failure to choose a path which effec- 
tively loosens the constraints imposed by resource endow-
ments can depress the whole process of agricultural and 
economic development. 20 
In developing their induced innovation model, Hayami and Ruttan 
postulate the existence of a "metaproduction function." This is an 
envelope curve which goes beyond the production possibilities attain 
able with existing knowledge and described in a neoclassical long-
run envelope curve. It describes, rather, a locus production possi-
bility points which it is possible to discover within the existing 
state of scientific knowledge. Points on this surface are attain-
able, but only at a cost in time and resources. They are not pre-
sently available in blueprint form. 
Within this framework Hayami and Ruttan study the growth of 
agricultural productivity as an adaptive response to altering fac-
tor and product prices. The adaptation process is conceived as the 
20Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural Development, pp. 53-54. 
ability to move to more efficient points on the metaproduction 
function, especially in response to the opportunities being gen-
erated by the industrial sector, which offers a potential flow 
of new inputs. 
From the intercountry cross-section and time-series 
observations, the relative endowments of land and labor 
at the time a nation enters into the development process 
apparently have a significant influence upon the optimum 
path to be followed in moving along a metaproduction 
function. Where labor is the limiting factor, the opti-
mum for new opportunities in the form of lower prices 
of modern inputs is likely to be along a path character-
ized by a higher land-labor ratio. Movement toward an 
optimum position on the metaproduction function would 
involve development and adoption of new mechanical inputs. 
On the other hand, where land is the limiting factor, 
the new optimum is likely to be the point at which the 
yield per hectare is higher for the higher level of fer-
tilizer input. Movement to this point would involve de-
velopment and adoption of new biological and chemical 
inputs. 
The partial productivity and factor input ratios 
presented earlier in this chapter suggest that those 
nations which have achieved relatively high levels of 
either land or labor productivity have been relatively 
successful in substituting industrial inputs for the con-
straints imposed by a relatively scarce factor, either 
land or labor. It seems possible to explain many of the 
vast differences in productivity levels and factor input 
ratios in agriculture among countries by hypothesizing 
that technical advance in agriculture occurs primarily 
as a result of new economic opportunities created by de-
velopments in the nonagricultural sector. The advances 
in mechanical andbiological technology do not, however, 
occur without cost. Development of a more fertilizer-
responsive crop variety, in response to declining prices 
of fertilizer, typically requires substantial expendi- 
tures on research, development, and dissemination, before 
it actually becomes available to farmers. Public invest-
ment in improvements in water control, land development, 
and other environmental modifications may also be re-
quired before it becomes profitable for farmers to adopt 
the newly developed varieties. 21 
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21 Ibid., p. 84. 
The Hayami and Ruttan approach constitutes a very significant 
development because it is the most detailed attempt to date to 
specify the nature of the mechanisms through which technical change 
and adaption take place in response to shifting patterns of relative 
resource scarcities. 22 
V 
Barnett and Morse (Scarcity and Growth) have attempted a quan-
titative test of the implications of the classical model that in-
creasing natural resource scarcity should make itself apparent in 
the secularly rising unit cost of extractive products generally - 
agriculture, minerals, forestry and fishing. To do this they exam-
ined data for the American economy over the period from about 1870 
to the late 1950's. Their findings are that unit costs of extrac-
tive products, as measured by labor plus capital inputs required to 
produce a unit of net extractive output, declined through the period 
1870-1957. For agriculture, minerals, and fishing, the trends are 
22 For further treatments of technological change in agriculture 
with particular emphasis on their impact upon agricultural produc- 
tivity, see: V. Ruttan, "Research on the Economics of Technological 
Change in American Agriculture," Journal of Farm Economics, Novembe 
1960, and the numerous citations contained therein; R. Loomis and 
G. Barton, Productivity in Agriculture: United States, 1870-1958, 
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Technical Bulletin No. 1238, Washington,D. 
1961; Z. Griliches, "Productivity and Technology," appearing under 
"Agriculture" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences; 
Z. Griliches, "The Sources of Measured Productivity Growth: U.S. 
Agriculture, 1940-60," Journal of Political Economy, August 1963; 
Irwin Feller, "Inventive Activity in Agriculture, 1837-1900," Journa 
of Economic History, December 1962; W. Rasmussen, "The Impact of 
(Continued on page 17.) 
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persistently downward. Indeed, the time sequence of the trends 
is particularly damaging to the increasing scarcity hypothesis 
because in the cases of agriculture and minerals (which together 
account for about 90% of the value of extractive output) the 
rate of decline in unit costs was greater in the later portion 
of the period than the earlier. Forestry, in fact, is the only 
extractive industry in which the long-term trend in unit costs 
and relative prices has been upward since 1870. Since forestry 
has accounted for less than 10%, by value, of extractive output 
in the 20th century, the influence of this sector has been swamped 
by the downward trends elsewhere. But, moreover, the rising cost 
of forest products seems to have induced a large-scale substitu-
tion of more abundant non-forest-based products for forest-based 
ones - e.g., metals, masonry and plastics - which may account for 
the rough constancy since 1920 in the unit cost of forest products. 23 
The declining importance of raw materials is further confirmed 
in the findings of input-output analysis. Anne Carter in her re-
cent book, Structural Change in the American Economy (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1970) provides important insights into the process 
of technological change between 1939 and 1961 by studying changing 
22 - continued 
Technological Change in American Agriculture, 1862-1962," Journal  
of American History, December 1962; W. Parker, "Agriculture," 
Chapter 11 in L. David, R. Easterlin, W. Parker et al., American  
Economic Growth, New York, 1972. For an informative, wide-rang-
ing survey of world-wide food prospects and the possibilities for 
their augmentation by use of scientific knowledge, see The World  
Food Problem, Vol. II, A Report of the President's Science Advisory 
Committee, U.S.G.P.O., 1967. 
23The material in this paragraph is drawn from chapter 8 of Barnett 
and Morse's Scarcity and Growth: "The Unit Cost of Extractive 
Products." 
intermediate input requirements. In particular, she neatly doc-
uments, for this period, the decline in the quantities of materials 
required in order to make possible the delivery of the same bill of 
goods. The great virtue of input-output analysis is that it enables 
us to understand the structural interdependence of the economic sys-
tem by providing quantitative measures (input-output coefficients) 
of the inter-industry flow of goods and services. Changes in such 
coefficients need to be interpreted with care, since they may alter 
not only as a result of technological change, but also as a result 
of changes in product mix over time and because of substitution re-
sulting from changes in the relative prices of inputs. However, it 
can also be counter-argued that much of what is called "substitution 
is, itself, made possible by earlier technological change. 24 Indeed 
one of the most significant findings of Carter's book is precisely 
her careful demonstration that "there now seems to be a technolog-
ical basis for greater substitutability as relative price conditions 
change." 25  Carter shows that economic change has been associated 
with an increasing reliance upon general sectors--producers of serv-
ices, communications, energy, transportation, and trade. What is 
most interesting for our present purposes is that these increases 
have been offset by decreases in other sets of co-efficients, most 
conspicuously in the general, across the board declines in the 
24As Carter points out: "There is also research directed specif-
ically toward the use of low-priced materials, which tends to blur 
even more the operational distinction between technological develop-
ment and price substitution." (p. 85) 
25 Ibid. For empirical evidence to support this proposition, see 
Chapter 6. 
contributions of producers of materials. Technological change has 
been forcefully associated with a significant expansion in the 
kinds and qualities of materials and in improvements of design gen-
erally. Moreover, Carter demonstrates how technological change 
has been expanding the range of substitutability among materials. 26 
The traditional dominance of steel in many uses, for example, has 
been successfully challenged by improved aluminum, plywood, and 
prestressed concrete. The growing importance of plastics and chem-
icals, and the changes in product design associated with such new 
and versatile materials, is thoroughly documented. 
An attempt to provide an overall estimate of the role of re-
sources in the growth of the American economy finds quite conclu-
sively that "Since about the beginning of this century, the re-
source base has been playing a noticeably smaller, and in many res-
pects different, role in growth than it did before then. General 
economic growth has been less closely and clearly tied to abundant 
26The degree of substitutability, the number of such substitutes, 
and the quantity in which they are available are, of course, cri- 
tical to long-run arguments over the possibility for avoiding rising 
costs imposed by the increasing scarcity of particular mineral de-
posits. On this issue, Barnett and Morse point out that "...near-
perfect substitutes are better scarcity mitigators than imperfect 
ones. If consumers are virtually indifferent to whether they obtain 
Btu for heating, cooling, and lighting from gas, coal, or electri-
city, a change in the proportions in which these commodities are used 
will not, in itself, affect welfare. The same is true of rayon or 
silk, cinder-block or wood-frame construction, margarine or butter, 
and so on. The point is relevant to the present discussion because, 
by and large, scarcity-induced substitutions often involve commodi-
ties that can be employed or consumed in widely varying proportions 
without making much difference in welfare terms. Preferences for 
different forms of heating fuel, construction, clothing, or even 
foods are largely matters of socially conditioned taste, and are 
(Continued on page 20.) 
69 
resources than it was previously. "27 In quantitative terms Fisher 
and Boorstein find that the output of resources, expressed as a 
percentage of United States GNP, has declined from 36 in 1870 to 
27 in 1900 and to 12 in 1954. 28  Furthermore, it is apparent that 
a decline of this magnitude can in no way be accounted for by an 
increasing importation of primary products and resource-intensive 
goods, 29 although it is of course true that our reliance upon im-
ports of certain resources--e.g., metallic ores--has vastly in-
creased in recent decades. In fact, after a comprehensive study 
of a wide range of prices and other data, Potter and Christy found 
that the available evidence did not support the apprehensions of 
the Paley Commission a decade earlier, that the long-term decline 
in natural resource prices was finally and permanently coming to 
an end for the United States. 30 
26 - continued 
therefore quite flexible over time. Long-run elasticities of sub-
stitution are thus greater than short-run elasticities." Barnett 
and Morse, op. cit., p. 130. 
27Joseph Fisher and Edward Boorstein, The Adequacy of Resources for  
Economic Growth in the United States, Study Paper No. 13, materials 
prepared in connection with the Study of Employment, Growth, and 
Price Levels, U.S.G.P.O., Washington, 1959, p. 42. 
28 Ibid., p. 43. 
29The basic empirical justification for this statement is the very 
low level of American imports expressed as a percentage of GNP. See 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the U.S.: Colonial 
Times to 1957, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 542. For a careful study 
of the changing natural resource composition of U.S. foreign trade, 
see J. Vanek, The Natural Resource Content of U.S. Foreign Trade, 
1870-1955, Cambridge, 1963. See also the detailed assessments for 
individual materials in President's Materials Policy Commission, 
Resources for Freedom, Washington, D.C., U.S.G.P.O., 1952. 
30N. Potter and F. T. Christy, Jr., Trends in Natural Resources Com-
codities: Statistics of Prices, Output, Consumption, Foreign Trade , 
and Employment in the U.S., 1870-1957, Baltimore, 1962. 
In a suggestive article, "The Development of the Extractive 
Industries," 31 Anthony Scott constructs a three-stage model for 
dealing with the sequence through which man has gone in the exploi-
tation of his natural environment. In the third stage, where the 
application of science makes possible a sophisticated degree of 
control and manipulation over the environment, older scarcities 
are deliberately by-passed in the systematic search for substitutes 
from abundant and convenient sources--the classic early 20th century 
example would be the Haber process of extracting nitrogen from the 
atmosphere. Scott makes the important point that there is no eco-
nomic demand for specific minerals as such, but rather for certain 
properties, and that an advanced technology makes it possible to 
attain these properties from materials available in great abundance. 
Demand for minerals is derived from demand for certain 
final goods and services. Therefore, certain proper-
ties must be obtainable from the raw materials from 
which such services and types of final goods are produced. 
Man's hunt for minerals must properly be viewed as a 
hunt for economical sources of these properties (strength), 
colour, porosity, conductivity, magnetism, texture, size, 
durability, elasticity, flavour, and so on). For example, 
there is no demand for "tin," but for something to make 
copper harder or iron corrosion-free. No one substitute 
for tin has been found, but each of the functions per-
formed by tin can now be performed in other ways. Tin's 
hardening of copper (as in bronze) has been supplanted 
by the use of other metals. Food need no longer be packed 
in tin cans: Hence the immense capital investment that 
society might have been forced to undertake to satisfy its 
former needs for tin from the minute, low-grade quantities 
to be found in many parts of the world have been replaced 
by simpler investments in obtaining other materials. Chief 
of the replacements for tin is glass, made from apparently 
unlimited quantities of sand and with little more energy 
31Anthony Scott, "The Development of the Extractive Industries," 
The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, February 
1962. 
71 
than is needed to bring metallic tin to the user. Lead 
and mercury are being bypassed in similar fashion; zinc 
and copper may be next.J 4 
Thus, although there may be no close substitutes for tin in nature, 
there may be excellent substitutes for each of the properties for 
which tin is valued. The implications of this position are, of 
course, far-reaching. 
VI 
These findings have had a great deal to do with what may be 
called a steady downgrading of the importance of natural resources. 
Schultz called attention, in his 1951 article, to the fact that 
R. F. Harrod, in his notable book, Toward a Dynamic Economics, pub-
lished in 1948, "...saw fit to leave land out altogether." 33 
 Although it is doubtful that many economists concerned with eco-
nomic growth (as opposed to Harrod's primary concern with cyclical 
phenomena) would wish to go that far, there has certainly been in-
creasing agreement on some weaker propositions. This was made 
strikingly apparent in 1961 with the publication of a collection of 
32 Ibid., p. 81. For an interpretation of the British industrial 
revolution as revolving around the substitution of abundant, inor-
ganic materials for increasingly scarce organic ones, see E. A. 
Wrigley, "The Supply of Raw Materials in the Industrial Revolution," 
Economic History Review, August 1962. 
33, The Declining Economic Importance of Agricultureal Land," 2E. 
cit., p. 725. Schultz cites the following statement from page 20 
of Harrod's book: "...I propose to discard the law of diminishing 
returns from the land as a primary determinant in a progressive 
economy...I discard it only because in our particular context it 
appears that its influence may be quantitatively unimportant." 
conference papers in a volume titled Natural Resources and Eco-
nomic Growth, edited by J. J. Spengler. Although the participants 
approach the subject from A wide variety of different perspectives, 
there are two propositions which recur so frequently as to amount 
almost to a consensus: (1) the pervasive influence of classical 
economics in its Malthusian-Ricardian variant had resulted in a 
vast exaggeration of the importance of natural resources and an 
overstatement of the constraints which they imposed upon an eco-
nomy's development possibilities; (2) the relative importance of 
natural resources is a declining function of development itself. 
Kindleberger, for example, adopted what almost has to be described 
as a patronizing tone in conceding the economic significance of 
natural resources: "It may be taken for granted that some minimum 
of resources is necessary for economic growth, that, other things 
being equal, more resources are better than fewer, and that the 
more a country grows the less it needs resources, since it gains 
capacity to substitute labor and especially capital for them." 34 
In a similar spirit, Barnett and Morse conclude that 
...the Conservationists' premise that the economic 
heritage will shrink in value unless natural re-
sources are "conserved," is wrong for a progressive 
world. The opposite is true. In the United States, 
for example, the economic magnitude of the estate 
each generation passes on--the income per capita 
the next generation enjoys--has been approximately 
double that which it received, over the period for 
which data exist. Resource reservation to protect 
the interest of future generations is therefore un-
necessary. There is no need for a future-oriented 
34Natural Resources and Economic Growth, p. 172. 
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ethical principle to replace or supplement the eco-
nomic calculations that lead modern man to accumu-
late primarily for the benefit of those now living. 
The reason, of course, is that the legacy of eco-
nomically valuable assets which each generation 
passes on consists only in part of the natural en- 
vironment. The more important components of the 
inheritance are knowledge, technology, capital 
instruments, economic institutions. These, far 
more than natural resources are the determinants 
of real income per capita. 3 D 
VII 
It should by now be obvious that economics has in the past 
been burdened with an excessively restrictive definition of natural 
resources. More precisely, economists (and conservationists) worked 
with a conception of natural resources which encompassed the prevail 
ing state of technology but failed to recognize how profoundly tech-
nological changes required a redefinition of the economic meaning of 
the natural environment. Purely physical or geological definitions 
of resources, even if they are exhaustive, 36 are not very interest-
ing. 
The Plains Indian did not cultivate the soil; neither 
coal, oil nor bauxite constituted a resource to the 
Indian population or, for that matter, to the earliest 
European settlers in North America. It was only when 
technological knowledge had advanced to a certain point 
that such mineral deposits became potentially usable 
for human purposes. Even then the further economic 
question turns, in part, upon accessibility and cost 
35Barnett and Morse, 2E. cit., pp. 247-8. 
36 lmprovements in the technology of resource discovery, for example, 
have been an important factor in continually falsifying the pessi-
mistic predictions of imminent exhaustion of oil reserves period-
ically issued by the U.S. Geological Survey. See Hans Landsberg 
and Sam Schurr, Energy in the United States, New York, 1968, p. 98. 
of extraction. Improvements in oil drilling tech-
nology (as well as changing demand conditions) make 
it feasible to extract oil today from depths which 
would have been technically impossible fifty years 
ago and prohibitively expensive twenty years ago. 
Similarly, low grade taconite iron ores are being 
routinely exploited today which would have been 
ignored earlier in the century when the higher-
quality ores of the Mesabi range were available in 
abundance. Oil shale, known to exist in vast quan- 
tities--for example, in the Green River formation 
in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming--is not yet worth 
exploiting but might well be brought into produc-
tion if petroleum product prices rise very much 
above their present levels. The rich and abundant 
agricultural resources of the Midwest were of lim- 
ited economic importance until the development of 
a canal network beginning in the 1820s with the 
completion of Erie Canal, and later a railroad sys-
tem which made possible the transportation of bulky 
farm products to eastern urban centers at low cost. 
Natural resources, in other words, cannot be cata- 
logued in geographic or geological terms alone. 
The economic usefulness of such resources is subject 
to continual redefinition as a result of both economic 
changes and alterations in the stock of technologi-
cal knowledge. Whether a particular mineral deposit 
is worth exploiting will depend upon all of the forces 
influencing the demand for the mineral, on the one 
hand, and the cost of extracting it, on the other. 37 
The extreme sensitivity of any definition of natural resources 
to changing economic conditions as well as to changing technology 
needs to be emphasized. The President's Materials Policy Committee 
reported an estimate of 30 billion tons of coal were recoverable at 
1951 cost levels. However, as Dewhurst has pointed out, "A rise of 
50 per cent in prices and costs...would mean a 20-fold increase in 
estimated recoverable reserves." 38 Not only is there a widening 
37Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and American Economic Growth, New 
York, 1972, pp. 19-20. 
38J. F. Dewhurst and Associates, America's Needs and Resources, New 
York, 1955, pp. 765-6. Chapter 31 of this book contains much use-
ful data on individual materials. 
75 
range of substitution among resources with respect to end uses--
new materials, such as plastics and aluminum, and older ones, 
such as glass, have been replacing wood as a packaging material--
but there is often also a range of sources from which a given 
input may be extracted. Oil, for example, is found in nature not 
only in its crude form. Enormous reserves of shale oil are known 
to exist and "The technical feasibility of recovering oil from 
shale has been clearly demonstrated. "39 Furthermore, oil can be 
produced from coal, a much more abundant resource. Finally, the 
extraction of oil from tar sands is a clear possibility. A sig-
nicant increase in crude oil costs may be expected to activate 
such possibilities. 40 
The manner in which sharply rising prices of timber products 
(which quadrupled between 1870 and 1954) triggered off technologi-
cal and other adaptations is illuminating. Conventional materials, 
such as iron and steel, were substituted in many uses. In construc-
tion, which is by far the largest single user of lumber, tradition-
al masonry and other mineral building materials as well as aluminum 
were substituted. 	More recently, technologically new products 
such as plastics and fiberglass have served as substitutes. More-
over, new techniques for economizing upon wood requirements have 
3 	. 9Fisher and Boorstein, 2E. cit., p. 59. 
40 Similarly, , a sufficient rise in the price of fresh water would 
activate techniques for the desalination of ocean water which are 
already established but are, at present, prohibitively costly. 
Even our present state of technological knowledge provides us with 
many such options which, in effect, place an upper limit to the 
prospective rise in raw material prices. 
been developed which do not involve the substitution of compe-
titive materials, or which, in effect, substitute cheaper woods 
for more expensive woods--as in plywoods and wood veneers. Other 
technological changes, such as the self-powered chain saw, the 
tractor, and the truck have made previously inaccessible forest 
stands available for exploitation by reducing the cost of extrac-
tion and transport. Yet other technological changes have signif-
icantly increased the size of our forest resource based by making 
possible the exploitation of low-grade materials which had pre-
viously gone unused. 
Although wood pulp has been manufactured for about 
100 years in this country, it was the rapid advances 
in sulphate pulping technology in the 1920's that 
released the industry from its dependence on spruce 
and fir of the Northeast and made it possible to 
utilize southern pine for pulp. This led to the 
"sulphate revolution" of the South and was largely 
instrumental in increasing national consumption from 
6.8 million cords in 1926 to 33.4 million in 1955. 
The South's share of production rose from 1.1 mil- 
lion to 19.2 million cords in this period while 
pulpwood consumption in the West was increasing from 
0.5 to 6.4 million cords. By the mid-1950's the 
South's share of woodpulping capacity had risen to 
over 55 percent of the national total. 
In sum, the main tradition of economic thinking has been dom-
inated until comparatively recently by a view of the economy's nat-
ural resource base which was excessively restrictive because it ig-
nored the dynamic interactions between technological change and 
natural resources and because it ignored a whole range of additional 
41V. Ruttan and J. Callahan, "Resource Inputs and Output Growth: 
Comparisons between Agriculture and Forestry," Forestry Science, 
March 1962, p. 78 
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adaptations which are a mixture of pure technological change, re-
designing and substitution. Thus, rising fossil fuel costs may 
lead to the more rapid development of techniques for the exploi-
tation of atomic or solar energy, but they will doubtless also 
lead to the utilization of lower quality oil sources, to the re-
design and modification of automobile engines, to the substitu-
tion of smaller for larger cars, to the use of more blankets and 
thermal underwear, and perhaps to greater immigration to the 
southern tier of states. The point is not that, therefore, the 
rising fossil fuel costs are of no consequence. That would be 
patently absurd. Rather, the point is that an advanced indus-
trial society has available a wide range of mechanisms by which 
this rising cost and its consequences may be offset, and the his-
torical evidence suggests overwhelmingly that such rising costs 
have not, in the past, constituted an insurmountable obstacle to 
sustained increases in both total population and per capita in-
comes. One of the main thrusts of past technological developments 
has been to reduce the economy's dependence upon any specific re-
source input and to widen progressively the possibilities for 
materials substitution. 
As a result, although particular resources of spe-
cified quality do inevitably become increasingly 
scarce, the threat of a generalized natural re-
source constraint upon economic growth by no means 
follows from this. It now seems clear that the 
discussion of the role of natural resource con-
straints upon economic growth cannot be usefully 
pursued within the framework of asking how long 
it will be before we "run out" of specific re-
source inputs defined and estimated in physical 
units. That is simply not an interesting ques-
tion, partly because there are seldom sharp dis- 
continuities in nature, and partly because, by 
making it possible to exploit resources which 
could not be exploited before, technological 
change is--in economic terms if not in geolog-
ical terms--making continuous additions to the 
resource base of the economy. What we are more 
normally confronted with are limited deposits 
of high quality resources and then agradually 
declining slope toward lower-grade resources, 
which typically exist in abundance. The much 
greater profusion in the earth's crust of lower-
grade resources than high-grade resources is 
one of those geological facts of life which 
we can--and, if the past is any guide at all, 
will--learn to live with. Our technological 
adjustment to this fact has been apparent in 
recent decades. As the high quality Mesabi 
iron ores approached exhaustion, the major steel 
companies not only turned increasingly to foreign 
sources, but directed their research toward the 
exploitation of the enormous deposits of hard, 
low-grade taconities. Techniques such as bene-
ficiation have proven to be highly successful 
in resisting the pressures toward higher cost, 
even though the iron ore which we exploit today 
is inferior in quality to the iron ore which we 
exploited fifty or sixty years ago. Similarly, 
although we import large quantities of bauxite 
because our domestic reserves of high-grade 
bauxite are now inadequate, alternative sources 
of aluminum such as clays are, quite simply, 
immense. As a matter of fact, the earth's crust 
contains far more aluminum that it does iron. 
The economic exploitation of these and many other 
low-grade resources turns primarily upon the ques- 
tion of fuel and power costs, since the techno-
logies of low-grade resource utilization are high-
ly fuel-intensive in nature. 42 
VIII 
The current round of intense concern over natural resources, 
which began in the late 1960's, contains an important new element. 
Not only does it assert the inadequacy of the resource base to sus-
tain continued growth of population (because of the limited supply 
79 
42Nathan Rosenberg, "Innovative Responses to Materials Shortages," 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1973, pp. 116-17. 
of arable land) and industrial production (because of the limited 
supply of mineral resources). Insofar as models such as The Lim-
its to Growth and its companion, Jay Forrester's World Dynamics  
(Cambridge, 1971) do this, they are essentially, for all their 
elaborate systems dynamics and computer methodology, Malthus in 
modern dress. That is, they deduce the conclusion, from certain 
restrictive behavioral assumptions, that continued exponential 
growth is impossible in a world of finite resources. The element 
in the present debate is the prominence, not to be found in Mal-
thus, of conern over the pollution problem and the assertion of 
additional limits to growth imposed by the increasing incidence 
of environmental pollution. 43 
Although an extended appraisal of the unique aspects of the 
new concerns is impossible here, it is important to stress that they 
are subject to the same criticisms which have been made of earlier 
static approaches to the resource problem. That is to say, all such 
extrapolations of recent trends which point to some collapse of the 
social system years hence, fail fundamentally to take account of the 
43Why this environmental concern should have emerged when it did is, 
itself, an interesting sociological question. One interpretation 
is that it is primarily a demand phenomenon associated with rising 
incomes. "(I)n relatively high-income economies the income elasti-
city of demand for commodities and services related to sustenance 
is low and declines as income continues to rise, while the income 
elasticity of demand for more effective disposal of residuals and 
for environmental amenities is high and continues to rise. This is 
in sharp contrast to the situation in poor countries where the incom 
elasticity of demand is high for sustenance and low for environmenta 
amenities. The sense of environmental crisis in the relatively af-
fluent countries at this time stems primarily from the dramatic 
growth in demand for environmental amenities." V. Ruttan, "Technolo 
and Environment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
December 1971, pp. 707-8. 
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human capacity to adapt and to modify technology in response to 
changing social and economic needs. Indeed, a central feature of 
such models (like the dog that did not bark in the night) is the 
total absence of any social mechanism for signalling shifting pat-
terns of resource scarcity and for reallocating human skill and 
facilities in response to rising costs, either the rising direct 
costs of raw materials or the rising indirect costs associated with 
environmental pollution. 44 One need not be a capitalist apologist 
to argue that the price mechanism does perform such a function, 
albeit imperfectly, or to believe that it might perform these func-
tions even better under altered arrangements which no longer allowed 
private firms to treat our water courses and atmosphere as if they 
were free goods. 45 
44" Forrester's model is unsound in basic structure. He fails to 
build in feedbacks whereby societies utilize knowledge to over-
come resource depletion and pollution. When specific mineral re-
source deposits begin to run out in modern societies, the prospect 
of rising costs feeds back signals. Man then undertakes to find 
new ones or substitutes, and he develops technology to utilize for-
merly uneconomic deposits. In response to feedback signals, he 
counters pressures upon agricultural land by devising hybrid plants, 
high yield varieties, fertilizers, pesticides, transportation, and 
refrigeration. Responding to feedback, he overcomes anticipated 
energy shortages by exploiting deeper or new resources of great vol-
ume. In modern nations he has been successful in devising new tech-
nologies not merely to maintain real output per capita but to increase 
it. The real costs per unit of output have declined greatly in the 
face of population increases. In the U. S. the unit cost of agricul-
tural products, in terms of labor and capital, has fallen by more 
than half and of mineral products by three quarters since the Civil 
War, and the rate of decline has accelerated since World War I." 
Harold Barnett, review of Jay Forrester, World Dynamics, Cambridge, 
1971, in Journal of Economic Literature, September 1972, p. 853. 
45A well-known feature of the price mechanism as a signalling device 
is that it fails to provide socially correct signals where external-
ities are present, as is notoriously the case with pollution phenom-
ena. In large measure, this is due to the peculiarities of our 
(Continued on page 32.) 
These models constitute a reversion to Malthusian Fundamen-
talism in another, closely-related way. They allow no possibility 
that mankind's taste for offspring and therefore his reproductive 
practices will be altered as a result of the growth experience it-
self. In both the demographic and technological realms, therefore, 
such purely deductive models ignore the mass of dramatic evidence 
of the past 150 years or so that human behavior - undergoes contin-
uous modification and adjustment as a response to the changing pat-
terns of opportunities and constraints thrown up by an industri-
alizing society .46 
45 - continued 
property rights system which allows private individuals to make 
unrestricted use of common property resources in the discharge of 
their pollutants. For an intelligent discussion of a range of pol-
icy alternatives for dealing with the problem of the pollution of 
common property resources, see J. H. Dales, Pollution, Property  
and Prices, Toronto, 1968. 
46For a searching and suggestive analysis of the demographic res-
ponse over the course of American history, see R. A. Easterlin, 
"Does Human Fertility Adjust to the Environment?" American Eco-
nomic Review Papers and Proceeding, May 1971, pp. 399-407. 
Easterlin's conclusion is "...that both theory and the empirical 
research done so far on historical American fertility suggest that 
human fertility responds voluntarily to environmental conditions. 
If this is so--and it seems hard to ignore the evidence--then the 
nature of what is called 'the population problem' takes on a rad-
ically different guise. The question is not one of human beings 
breeding themselves into growing misery. Rather, the problem is 
whether the voluntary response of fertility to environmental pres-
sures results in a socially optimal adjustment. In thinking about 
this, it seems useful to distinguish between the potential for 
population adjustment and the actual degree of adjustment. The 
staggering change in American reproductive behavior over the past 
century and a half clearly demonstrates the immense potential for 
adjustment. Whether, currently, the degree of adjustment is social-
ly optimal remains a matter for research." (p. 407). See also the 
same author's book, Population, Labor Force, and Long Swings in  
Economic Growth: The American Experience, New York, 1968. 
IX 
The thrust of these critical remarks is not that population 
growth, pollution, and increasing scarcity of key natural resources 
are unimportant problems, or that technology may be confidently 
relied upon to provide cheap and painless solutions whenever these 
key variables, and their interactions, begin to behave in prob-
lematic ways. Quite the contrary. The main complaint against such 
apocalyptic, neo-Malthusian models, built upon a global scale and 
incorporating naive behavioral assumptions, are first, that they 
define the problems incorrectly, and secondly, that they deflect 
attention from more "modest" but genuine questions which ought to 
be placed more conspicuously upon the agenda of social science 
research. Consider the following sample. 
What are the determinants of human fertility? How is it likely 
to respond to future changes in mortality, income, urban densities, 
pollution, education levels, female employment opportunities, new 
goods (including new contraceptive techniques)? The very recent 
reductions in American fertility levels, which may indeed turn out 
to be a short-run phenomenon, indicate forcefully that demography 
is a subject about which our present state of ignorance is truly 
momentous. Malthusian-type models which simply accept certain pop-
ulation growth rates as somehow exogenously determined and then go 
on to demonstate the awesome power of exponential growth over time 
periods of a century or more, should surely be losing their capacity 
to fascinate all but the most intellectually immature. 
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What sort of alterations in our system of property rights 
and our tax structure hold the greatest promise for the control 
of pollution? What are the technological possibilities that an 
altered incentive system might lead to the development of "cleaner" 
technologies, and at what cost? 
What kinds of technological and social adaptations can we 
visualize if the cost of key resources, such as fuels, should in-
crease substantially in the future? 
What improvements can be made in our present mix of private 
and public institutions devoted to the "production" of useful know-
ledge? 
Instead of the almost total preoccupation with supply consid-
erations, is it possible to anticipate future shifts in income and 
social organization which may reduce the need for resources by 
shifting demand away from resource-intensive goods? 
What can we find by opening up the "black box" of technological 
change? How responsive are human agents with the requisite talents, 
to the market forces which continually shift the prospective payoff 
to inventive and innovative activities? And--a very different ques-
tion--what can be said in a systematic way about the responsiveness 
of nature? That is, given the incentives, what factors shape the 
prospects for success in overcoming different kinds of scarcities? 
Is there any meaningful sense in which it may be harder or easier 
to make resource-saving innovations than capital-saving innovations, 
or either of these innovations than labor-saving innovations? Is 
a dollar spent on agricultural invention likely to yield the same 
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eventual social return as a dollar spent on manufacturing or on 
service? What of petrochemicals vs. textiles, or building materials 
vs. transportation, or pharmaceuticals vs. machine tools? Instead 
of computing the number of years before we "run out" of specific 
mineral deposits, can we project reasonable estimates for the chang-
ing resource costs of alternative technologies? 
Finally, of what relevance is the historical experience of the 
presently rich countries to the prospect for the presently poor 
countries? For one thing, the industrializing countries of the 19th 
and 20th centuries were often able to overcome their own resource 
deficiencies by imports of primary products from the less developed 
world. When--or if--these regions are able to enter successfully 
into the stream of industialization, what alternatives will they 
be confronted with in overcoming their own resource deficiencies? 
But, perhaps most fundamentally, what factors have determined the 
differential effectiveness with which societies have responded to 
the problems and constraints posed by their unique resource endow-
ments? For, as Simon Kuznets has observed: 
It need not be denied that in the distribution of 
natural resources some small nations may be the 
lucky winners at a given time (and others at other 
times). But I would still argue that the capacity 
to take advantage of these hazards of fortune and 
to make them a basis for sustained economic develop-
ment is not often given. In the 19th century, 
Brazil was commonly regarded as an Eldorodo--and 
indeed enjoyed several times the position of a 
supplier of a natural resource in world-wide de-
mand; yet the record of this country's economic 
growth has not been impressive, and it is not as 
yet among the economically advanced nations. The 
existence of a valuable natural resource represents 
a permissive condition, facilitates--if properly 
exploited--the transition from the pre-industrial 
to industrial phases of growth. But unless the 
nation shows a capacity for modifying its social 
institutions in time to take advantage of the 
opportunity, it will have only a transient effect. 
Advantages in natural resources never last for 
too long--given continuous changes in technology 
and its extension to other parts of the world. 
To put it differently: every small nation 
has some advantage in natural resources--whether 
it be location, coastline, minerals, forests, etc. 
But some show a capacity to build on it, if only 
as a starting point, toward a process of sustained 
growth and others do not. The crucial variables 
are elsewhere, and they must be sought in the 
nation's social and economic institutions. 47 
47 S. Kuznets, "The Economic Growth of Small Nations," in E. A. G. 
Robinson (ed.), Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, pp. 
27-28. Elsewhere Kuznets stated: "(A)ny emphasis on relative 
scarcity of irreproducible resources, as a factor in determining 
low levels of economic performance extending over a long period, 
must be countered with the question why no successful effort has 
been made by the victim of such scarcity to overcome it by changes 
in technology. To be retained, the hypothesis must, therefore, 
be rephrased: the have-not societies are poor because they have 
not succeeded in overcoming scarcity of natural resources by 
appropriate changes in technology, not because the scarcity of 
resources is an inexorable factor for which there is no remedy. 
And obviously human societies with low levels of economic per-
formance are least able to overcome any scarcities of irreproduc-
ible resources by changes in technology; but this is a matter of 
social organization and not of bountifulness or niggardliness of 
nature." S. Kuznets, Economic Change, New York, 1953, p. 230. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: 
MAJOR QUESTIONS, STATE OF THE ART, AND NEDED RESEARCH 
Edwin Mansfield 
1. Introduction  
This paper, commissioned by the National Science Foundation 
and Georgia Institute of Technology, attempts to do three things. 
First, it describes briefly some of the major questions concerning 
industrial innovation that have interested economists in recent 
years. Second, it discusses and evaluates the kinds of research 
that have been carried out by economists and others to help resolve 
these questions. Third, it describes the sorts of research that, 
in my opinion, are needed to provide a more satisfactory under-
standing of these questions. This paper is part of a larger pro-
ject, coordinated by Professor Melvin Kranzberg of Georgia Insti-
tute of Technology, the overall purpose of which is "to determine 
and critically assess the present knowledge and understanding of 
the innovation process." 
Needless to say, the economics of industrial innovation is a 
very broad area. To cut the subject down to a size that can be 
handled in a paper of the suggested length, I must concentrate on 
particular aspects of the subject. In accord with my earlier dis-
cussions with Professor Kranzberg, I shall focus here on the inno-
vation process in the individual business firm, particular attention 
Dr. Mansfield is professor of economics at the Wharton School of 
the University of Pennsylvania. 
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being devoted to the effects of the organization and decision-
making procedures and forecasting techniques of the firm on the 
innovation process. Also, attention will be devoted to the effects 
of industrial organization on the rate of innovation, and to the 
extent to which industrial innovations can be forecasted. 
At the outset, we must define what we mean by innovation. In 
this paper, I shall use the term to mean the first application on 
a commercial scale of a new or improved process or product. Clearly, 
the process leading up to a successful innovation is often a complex 
web of interrelated processes involving the formation of a new con-
cept, the development of a new device based on this idea, and the 
probing and stimulation of a market for the device. Sometimes this 
entire process goes on within a single organization, but frequently 
this is not the case. 
2. 	Some Leading Questions Concerning  
Industrial Innovation  
Economists have shown a very lively interest in a wide variety 
of questions concerning industrial innovation. Any attempt to pick 
out a relatively small number of these questions for special atten-
tion is bound to be influenced by one's interests and biases. In 
this section, I describe five broad problem areas that seem to me 
to be of fundamental importance, but it should be recognized that 
others might pick out a different set of questions. 	Also, note 
once more that I am concerned solely here with the innovation pro-
cess within the individual firm. 
The first set of questions concerns the nature of the innova-
tion process. How does innovation occur? What inputs does it 
require? How profitable is it to the innovator? How risky is 
it? What types of information are used? Where does this informa-
tion come from? What is the role of formal research and develop-
ment (R and D)? This set of questions has stimulated a consider-
able amount of work, both here and abroad. 
Second, economists are concerned with the very difficult 
question of whether or not the existing rate of innovation is opti-
mal -- or at least satisfactory. Assuming that one can estimate 
the rate of innovation, to what extent is the rate of technologi-
cal innovation in a particular firm less -- or greater -- than it 
should be? Clearly, the answer may differ, depending on one's 
values. For example, an individual firm, weighing the benefits and 
costs of particular innovations, may come to a different conclusion 
than would society as a whole. What if anything, can be said on 
this score? And to what extent is our knowledge potentially use-
ful to public and private policy makers? 
Third, economists are interested in the determinants of the 
rate of innovation. For example, to what extent can organizational 
and managerial changes influence the rate of innovation? To what 
extent can changes in the characteristics of markets influence the 
rate of innovation? More broadly, if the rate of innovation in 
particular firms or industries should be increased (or decreased), 
how can this be done? Obviously, this set of questions complements 
the second set: The second set is concerned with the proper direc-
tion and rate of change of the rate of innovation, whereas this set 
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is concerned with how such a change can be effected. ' 
Fourth, economists are concerned with the relationship between 
industrial organization and the rate of innovation. To what extent 
does successful innovation in particular industries require very 
large firms? To what extent must industries be composed of a few 
large firms in order to achieve a high rate of innovation? How 
much conflict is there between the preservation or creation of a 
competitive industrial structure and the achievement of a high rate 
of innovation? In recent years, economists and policy-makers have 
shown a considerable interest in this set of questions. 
Fifth, the past decade has seen a spectacular increase in the 
amount of attention devoted by social and management scientists to 
technological forecasting. Books, articles, journals, and firms 
devoted to this subject have appeared in large numbers. Exploratory 
technological forecasting2  attempts to predict the technological 
state-of-the-art that will be attained and used at future points 
in time if certain conditions -- such as levels of research support 
-- are met. How adequate are the techniques of technological fore-
casting? To what extent can they forecast the rate of innovation? 
1Needless to say, the answer to the second set of questions is 
dependent on the answer to the third set. In other words, the pro-
per rate of innovation depends, of course, on how changes can be 
effected in the rate of innovation, and on how costly they may be. 
2The literature on technological forecasting generally distinguishes 
between exploratory and normative technological forecasting. Norma-
tive technological forecasting attempts to specify a rational allo-
cation of resources to influence the rate and direction of techno-
logical change. The quantitative project selection methods dis-
cussed in section 7 are examples of normative technological fore-
casting techniques. 
This too is a very important set of questions. 
3. The Innovation Process: Nature, Inputs, 
Risks, and Returns  
In this section, we describe briefly the existing state of 
the art with respect to the first set of questions. There are many 
models or descriptions of the phases involved in the process lead-
ing up to an innovation. For example, Myers and Marquis [66] say 
that the process begins with a new idea that involves the recogni-
tion of both technical feasibility and potential usefulness or 
demand. But this new idea, or design concept, is only the formula-
tion of a problem that seems worth pursuing. The next step, accord-
ing to Myers and Marquis, is the problem solving activity -- the 
search processes and research and development -- that, if success-
ful, results in a solution to the technical and commercial problems 
related to the idea. Finally, there is the stage when the new 
device is introduced commercially. Of course, there is no guarantee 
that a given project will go through all of these stages. As we 
shall see, most projects do not clear all of the technical and com-
mercial hurdles required for completion and implementation. More-
over, as Langrish et al [45] and others point out, the sequence of 
activities leading up to an innovation often fails to conform to 
any simple linear model. 
Another way that the innovation process has been broken down 
is shown in Table 1. The first stage is applied research. The 
91 
second stage is preparation of project requirements and basic spec-
ifications, which consists largely of routine planning and sched-
uling but also often involves coordination with marketing to try 
to insure that the proposed innovation will be a success commer-
cially. The third stage is prototype or pilot plant design, con-
struction, and testing. The fourth stage includes preparation of 
detailed manufacturing drawings, tooling, and the design and con-
struction of manufacturing facilities. The fifth stage is manu-
facturing start-up, and the sixth stage is marketing start-up. 
(Of course, not all of these stages must occur in every case.) 
This breakdown of the innovation process has been used by the Com-
merce Department's Panel on Invention and Innovation [18] and by 
Mansfield, Rapoport, Schnee, Wagner, and Hamburger [57] 3 . 
Table 1 shows that the third and fourth stages account, on 
the average, for about two-thirds of the total costs of a commer- 
cialized product innovation, based on data from [57]. Table 1 also 
shows that there is an enormous amount of variation among innova-
tions in the percent of total costs attributable to each of these 
phases. Based on a sample of chemical innovations, it appears that 
much of this variation can be explained by the importance of the 
innovation (as measured by sales volume), the extent of the inno-
vator's experience in the relevant technological area, how rapidly 
the innovation was carried out, and other such variables. Specif-
ically, a simple econometric model, to appear in [58], can explain 
3 This breakdown is designed for product innovations; for process 
innovations, changes (of a rather obvious sort) would have to be 
made. 
TABLE 1. PERCENT OF TOTAL COST OF INNOVATION ARISING IN EACH STAGE 
OF INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY. 























Prototype or pilot plant 
Mean 13 41 44 29 
Standard deviation 8 17 17 
Tooling and Manufacturing 
facilities 
Mean 41 37 30 37 
Standard deviation 29 10 18 
Manufacturing startup 
Mean 8 4 14 9 
Standard deviation 8 6 9 
Marketing startup 
Mean 7 11 6 8 
Standard deviation 12 12 5 
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Source: 	[57] 
about one-half of this variation. 
Table 2 shows the average percent of total elapsed time that 
occurred in each stage of the innovative process. Clearly, the 
stage that generally goes on for the longest period of time is the 
stage during which the prototype or pilot plant work is done. Note 
too that there is considerable overlap among these phases, one 
phase often going on at the same time as another. The extent of 
this overlap seems to depend on how rapidly the innovation is car-
ried out and on the size of the firm. Also, there seems to be a 
time-cost tradeoff, the costliness of reducing time being a func-
tion of the extent of the attempted advance in the state of the 
art and the size of the innovating firm [57]. According to Frank 
Lynn [49], the entire process from basic establishment of techni-
cal feasibility to commercial introduction tends to take much less 
time than it did prior to World War II. 
Many studies have attempted to shed light on the extent to 
which firms are induced to undertake innovations by technical oppor-
tunities or by market factors. In other words, to what extent are 
innovations triggered by market needs, and to what extent are they 
triggered by technological opportunities? Obviously, this is not 
an easy distinction to make, and data based on it are not easy to 
interpret. But based on the studies conducted by Carter and Wil-
liams [13], Goldhar [25], Langrish et al [45], Myers and Marguis 
[66], the Materials Advisory Board of the National Academy of Sci-
ences [61], Baker, Sieman, and Rubenstein [5], and others, a much 
larger proportion of innovations are initially stimulated by the 
TABLE 2. PERCENT OF TOTAL ELAPSED TIME IN EACH STAGE OF 
INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY 
Whole 













Mean 34.6 9.2 12.7 18.8 
Standard deviation 28 14 9 
Prototype or pilot plant 
Mean 35.0 57.0 58.9 50.3 
Standard deviation 22 21 
Tooling and Manufacturing 
facilities 
Mean 21.9 41.3 29.8 31.0 
Standard deviation 18 17 16 
Manufacturing start-up 
Mean 7.8 7.8 19.4 11.7 
Standard deviation 6 13 7 
Time overlapa 
Mean 59.1 26.0 27.5 37.5 
Standard deviation 49 31 26 
aThe overlap measure here is j=I x 100, where Lj is the 
T 
overlap in months between stages j and j + 1 and T is total elapsed 




recognition of market and/or production need, than by recognition 
of a technological opportunity. Specifically, about three-quar-
ters of the innovations included in these studies seemed to be 
stimulated initially by a recognition of such need. Schmookler's 
findings [97], based on patent statistics, point in essentially 
the same direction. 4 
Studies have also been carried out to deteimine the source 
of the major information inputs that evoked the design concept for 
the innovation, as well as the information used in the subsequent 
problem-solving activity. According to Myers and Marquis [65], in 
about 25 percent of the cases they studied, an information input 
initiated active work on the problem. With regard to the solution 
of problems already being worked on by the firm, the major informa-
tion inputs which contributed to the solution of the problem were 
predominantly general in nature, widely diffused, and generally 
accessible. (Active search, analysis, experimentation, and outside 
help were involved in getting the major information input in only 
about 24 percent of the cases.) Personal experience and personal 
contacts were the principal sources of information for the cases 
they studied. 5 
4See Usher [106] and Ruttan [92] for discussions of the processes of 
problem perception and solution involved in the acts leading up to 
successful innovation. 
5 See Allen [1] for a discussion of the relative performance of var-
ious channels in transferring technical information. Many studies 
refer to the importance of various kinds of "gatekeepers." Also, se 
Rosenbloom and Wolek [90] for an interesting study of how engineers 
and scientists acquire information. Further, see National Science 
Foundation [74]. 
Because these studies indicate that only a majority of the 
innovations in may industries are based to any significant degree 
on formal R and D, some people have been led to conclude that R 
and D is not a very important source of innovations. 6 This conclu- 
sion may be quite wrong, due in part to the fact that the innova-
tions in these studies were not weighted by their relative impor-
tance. Based on a sample of chemical innovations, findings by 
Mansfield and Rapoport [58] indicate that R and D plays a more 
important role in bigger, more important innovations (as measured 
by sales volume of new products) than in smaller, less important 
innovations. Also, the finding in [45] that larger technological 
changes tend to be of the "discovery push" type seems to point in 
the same direction. Much more information is needed on this score. 
One of the most obvious characteristics of the innovation pro-
cess is its riskiness. For example, an early study by Booz, Allen, 
and Hamilton [6] concluded that 7 out of 8 hours devoted by scien-
tists and engineers in major firms to technical product development 
are spent on unsuccessful projects, and that 5 out of every 10 pro-
ducts that emerge from R and D fail in product and market tests, 
and only 2 become commercial successes. A detailed study of the R 
and D portfolio of several chemical and drug firms indicated that, 
on the average, about 43 percent of the projects that were begun 
were not technically completed, about 45 percent of those that were 
technically completed were not commercialized, and about 62 percent 
6For example, see some of the discussion in "Bringing the Labora-
tory Down to Earth," Fortune, January 1971. 
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of those that were commercialized were not economic successes [57]. 
An extremely important characteristic of any economic activity 
of the firm is its profitability. Far too little is known about 
the profitability of innovative activities of various sorts carried 
out in various industries. As I have pointed out elsewhere [56], 
what information we have (based largely on the studies of Griliches 
[28, 29], Mansfield [51], Minasian [62], and Feilner [20]) seems to 
indicate that the rate of return from the investment in technolog-
ical innovation has been quite high. But for a variety of reasons, 
which I have tried to spell out in detail [56], this information 
is too weak to support very confident conclusions concerning the 
proper direction for private or public policy. 
4. Needed Research Concerning the Innovation Process  
From the discussion in the previous section, it is evident 
that our understanding of the innovation process has improved dur-
ing the past decade, due to the efforts of researchers who have 
approached the subject from a variety of points of view. Nonethe-
less, it is evident as well that we know far too little about many 
key aspects of this process. Specifically, in my opinion, at least 
three types of studies are badly needed. First, we need much better 
estimates of the profitability of firms' investments in innovations. 
Confining our attention to the private returns (since the social 
returns will be discussed in the next two sections), we can visu-
alize at least three types of studies that could be carried out. 
(1) Studies could be made of the profitability of .a number of firms' 
R and D investments, based on their internal records and past 
evaluations made by the firms themselves. (2) Holding other fac-
tors constant (statistically), a comparison could be made of the 
profitability of innovators and non-innovators (or unsuccessful 
innovators) in particular industries. (3) Estimates could be 
made of the rate of return from R and D, based on the estimation 
of production functions with R and D included as an input. All 
three types of studies are being carried out on a small scale, 7 
but much more work is needed. 
Second, more studies are needed of the sources of innovation 
and the characteristics of innovators. A great many studies have 
taken place in recent years, including Jewkes's study [39] of 
about 60 inventions, Hamberg's study [32] of about 25 inventions, 
Enos's study of petroleum refining [19], Mansfield's study [51] 
of the iron and steel, petroleum, and bituminous coal industries, 
OECD's studies [78] of electronic computers, electronic components, 
plastics, non-ferrous metals, and a number of other industries, the 
study of the pharmaceutical industry in Mansfield, Rapoport, Schnee, 
Wagner, and Hamburger [57], the study of the chemical industry in 
Mansfield, Husic, Rapoport, Romeo, Villani, and Wagner [58], and 
the study of 84 innovations in Great Britain by Langrish, Gibbons, 
Evans, and Jevons [45]. But more needs to be done. For example, 
more attention should be paid to failures and to organizations with 
7As part of the work supported by the National R and D Assessment 




mediocre or poor performance. Also, we still lack reliable and 
reasonably comprehensive data for many, many important industries. 
But perhaps the most important need is for a more sophisticated 
level of analysis. In particular, more attention needs to be paid 
to research design, quantification, and analysis, and less should 
be paid to description. Indeed, a good deal might be accomplished 
at this point by bringing together the existing case studies and 
descriptive material, and by subjecting this body of material to 
more intensive analysis based on uniform concepts and measurement 
techniques, as well as more incisive hypotheses. 8 
Third, data have been gathered recently concerning the pro-
bability of technical completion of R and D projects in various 
firms. Also, data have been gathered concerning the probability 
of commercialization (given technical completion), and the proba- 
bility of economic success (given commercialization) for each firm. 
These probabilities reflect how efficient and productive a firm's 
innovative activities are, as well as the inherent riskiness of 
its R and D portfolio. Attempts have been made by Mansfield and 
Wagner [59] to construct econometric models to explain the large 
differences among firms in the size of these probabilities. Al-
though the results (some of which are discussed in section 8) 
8 This should not be interpreted as a criticism of existing studies. 
In an area that is as poorly understood as this one, a sensible 
first step is to gather some reliable descriptive material. What 
I am suggesting is that, at this point, further replications of 
such descriptive studies are likely to encounter sharply dimin-
ishing returns. More attention should be focused now on the for- 
mulation of more sophisticated analytical techniques and hypotheses. 
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seem quite encouraging, existing work does little more than scratch 
the surface. Much more work is needed. 9 
5. The Adequacy of the Rate of Innovation 
Turning now to the second set of questions put forth in sec-
tion 2, to what extent is the rate of innovation in particular 
firms or larger sectors of the economy what it should be? This 
is a very difficult question, and one that has received relatively 
little attention. First, consider this question from the view-
point of a single firm. Various groups within the firm look dif-
ferently at the desirability of a rapid rate of innovation. Top 
management will view innovation differently, depending on its pre-
ference for, or aversion toward, risk. To the production people, 
innovation may represent a threat that disrupts the established way 
of doing things, and is resisted [10]. The marketing people may 
as Schon [99] points out, try to make safe statements within their 
own professional territory, and push off as much uncertainty as 
they can on to the R and D people. The R and D people have a vested 
interest in change, but even they may balk at taking big risks. They 
may prefer to work on relatively minor projects where there is a 
reasonably high chance of technical success. The firm's workers may, 
9Another area that needs attention is the study of the small improve-
ments that Arrow [3], Hollander [36], and others have shown to be 
so important. Researchers tend to concentrate their attention on 
the big innovations, and pay too little attention to these small 
improvements that, over a period of time, frequently are as impor-
tant as the big innovations. 
of course, view innovations, particularly those that are labor-
saving, with distrust. Given the fact that each of these groups 
within the firm may have quite a different idea of what is the 
optimal rate of innovation, it is clear that the answer to this 
question will vary, depending on how one weights various parts 
of the firm. 
If we regard the views of top management as being of parti-
cular significance (since top mangement is in charge of the firm's 
total operations), there frequently seems to be a feeling among 
such managers that their firm's rate of innovation is less than it 
should be, given the amount that they invest in innovative acti-
vities and given their objectives. A variety of reasons is given 
for this, but one of the most important is that the marketing and 
production departments of the firm are unable or unwilling to 
utilize the output of the R and D department effectively. For 
example, according to the R and D executives of 18 major firms, 
the probability of technical completion, the probability of com-
mercialization (given technical completion), and the probability 
of economic success (given commercialization) would be 10-25 per-
cent higher, on the average, if the marketing and production peo-
ple did a better job of exploiting R and D output [59]. 
While this may be one important barrier to a more adequate 
rate of innovation, there are many others as well. For example, 
marketing and production people often retort that the R and D 
department carries out projects that are too far removed from the 
realities of the market place. Since many of these other factors 
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are discussed in section 7, we shall not take them up here. For 
present purposes, the principal point is that, judging from small 
surveys and impressions gained from conversations with firms, many 
managers seem to feel that their firms' rate of innovation 	not 
what it should be. (And judging from [45], the same is true in 
the United Kingdom.) But there is very little hard evidence con-
cerning the extent of this dissatisfaction, how widespread it is, 
or how justified it may be. 
Next, let's consider this same question from the point of 
view of society as a whole. Because the results of research are 
often of little direct value to the sponsoring firm but of great 
value to other firms, there is good reason to believe that, left 
to its own devices, a market economy would allocate too few re-
sources to R and D. Also, because research and development is 
risky for the individual firm, there is good reason to believe 
that a market economy would under-invest in innovative activities. 
These defects of the market mechanism have been recognized for 
many years. For example, A. C. Pigou [84] described them in the 
1920's. 	In recent years, they have been discussed at length by 
Arrow [2] and Nelson [75]. 
However, since our nation already supplements the market's 
provision of resources for innovative activity in a variety of 
ways, the relevant question is not whether the market mechanism 
requires supplementing, but whether the type and extent of supple-
mentary support provided at present is too large or too small, 
and whether it is allocated properly. Most of the economists that 
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have studied this question seem to be of the opinion that we may 
be underinvesting in particular types of R and D in the civilian 
sector of the economy, and the estimated marginal rates of return 
from certain types of civilian R and D seem very high. The major 
studies in this area are by Griliches [28, 29], the Automation 
Commission [85], Mansfield [51], Minasian [62], and Nelson, Peck, 
and Kalacheck [76]. Although the evidence from practically all 
of the available studies seems to point in the same direction, it 
should be recognized that this evidence is very weak. For a de-
tailed description of the nature and weaknesses of this evidence, 
see [56], a paper which was devoted largely to this subject. 
In the previous two paragraphs, I have assumed implicitly 
that more output is a good thing. In recent years, some economists 
have argued that we are rich enough, that economic growth is likely 
to be accompanied by higher levels of environmental pollution and 
other disamenities, and that it is foolish to grasp for more output. 
Although the anti-growth economists, led by E. J. Mishan [63], have 
had an undeniable impact, economic growth remains a goal of practi-
cally all governments of the world. Whether or not economic growth 
is worth its "costs" is a political question which must be settled 
by the peoples of the world. Thus far, they seem to have opted on 
balance for growth. 10 At the same time, however, many observers 
101n addition, of course, Jay Forrester, Dennis Meadows, and their 
colleagues have made some well-publicized studies of "the limits of 
growth." These studies have been criticized severely by economists. 
For a discussion of both the views of Forrester and Meadows and 
those of Mishan, see Solow [103]. 
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feel that fuller account should be taken of the divergences between 
the private and social costs of introducing various kinds of new 
technology. This feeling is, of course, at the heart of the recent 
discussions of technology assessment. 
Another factor that has loomed large in recent discussions of 
the socially optimal rate of innovation is the deficit in our bal-
ance of payments. According to many observers, our technological 
lead over many foreign countries has shrunk considerably in recent 
years, due in part to the fact that Western Europe and Japan have 
recovered completely from World War II. Some observers, such as 
Boretsky [7], regard this reduction in our technological lead as 
having been an important factor leading to the deterioration in 
our balance of payments. This may be true, although many other fac-
tors certainly were important as well. However, despite some argu-
ments to the contrary, the fact that an industry is finding it 
increasingly difficult to compete with foreign producers is not an 
adequate social justification for more R and D -- or other forms 
of investment in innovation -- in that industry. Additional R and 
D may not have much of a pay-off there, or even if it does, the 
additional resources may have a bigger pay-off somewhere else in the 
economy. 11 
11For some discussions of the relationship between innovation and 
foreign trade, see Cooper [17], Gruber, Mehta, and Vernon [30], 
Hufbauer [37], Keesing [40], Mansfield [53], National Academy of 
Engineering [67], National Bureau of Economic Research [71], National 
Bureau of Standards [72], OECD [78], and Vernon [107]. 
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6. 	Needed Research Concerning the Adequacy 
of the Rate of Innovation 
Based on the discussion in the previous section, it is clear 
that far too little is known about the optimal rate of innovation 
for particular firms or larger segments of the economy. Much of 
the existing literature consists of rather superficial attacks on 
technological change or one-sided accounts of the benefits of inno-
vation. In part, the lack of better information in this area is 
due to the inherent difficulty of the problems, as well as the fact 
that, in the final analysis, the socially optimal rate of innova-
tion is as much a political as an economic question. Nonetheless, 
it seems to me that at least four types of studies would be extremel 
useful in promoting a better understanding of the questions in this 
area. 
First, attempts should be made to obtain better estimates of 
the social rates of return from innovative activities of various 
kinds. Lacking such estimates, it is extremely difficult to formu-
late public policy concerning technological change. The estimation 
of social rates of return is a very difficult task, because innova-
tions generally result in benefits and costs of many sorts that do 
not accrue to the innovator. For example, a new product is likely 
to result in uncompensated benefits to firms and consumers that use 
the new product; it may result in uncompensated benefits and costs 
to workers and suppliers of inputs used by the industry producing 
the new product; it may trigger or suggest improvements in other 
industries or it may have adverse effects on them; and it may have 
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adverse or positive effects on other public groups through its 
environmental or other impacts. 
Although the problems involved in estimating the social returns 
from various kinds of innovations are formidable, they do not seem 
insurmountable, particularly when one recognizes that even rough 
estimates would be useful for many purposes. Although its is doubt-
ful that we will be able to make very accurate estimates, there is 
no reason why intensive research should not enable us to make esti-
mates of social rates of return that are far better than are cur-
rently available. After all, in many other areas of economics, 
worthwhile attempts have been made to make such estimates. And in 
this area, Griliches [28] and others have already achieved some 
success. 12 Much more work needs to be done. Moreover, as stressed 
in section 4, we need better estimates of the private rate of return 
from innovative activity of various sorts. Such estimates would go 
a long way toward indicating what rate of innovation is optimal from 
the point of view of the individual firm. 
Second, studies are needed of the ways in which firms trade off 
various kinds of risk in their decision-making regarding innovation. 
There are at least three kinds of risk: (1) the chance that a pro-
ject will not be technically completed, (2) the chance that a pro-
duct, if technically completed, will not be commercialized, and (3) 
the chance that a project, if commercialized, will not be economi-
cally successful. Based on detailed studies we have made of partic-
lar firms (and the results of internal audits made by other major 
12As part of the project cited in note 	we are beginning to do 
some pilot studies in this area. 
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firms), I suspect that some firms tend to make an improper (from 
their own point of view) trade-off between these types of risk. 
The people who choose projects sometimes focus too much attention 
on the first type of risk; and to reduce this type of risk, they 
pick many relatively unambitious projects. Unfortunately, however, 
since such projects tend to have high levels of the second and 
third types of risk, this choice of projects may not be optimal 
from the overall point of view of the firm. Very little work has 
been carried out to test, modify, and extend hypotheses of this 
sort. Yet such work obviously is needed if firms are to get the 
most out of their investments in innovation. 
Third, studies are badly needed of the optimal extent and pat-
tern of international specialization with respect to technology. 
Most countries cannot hope to have strong capabilities for innovation 
in most areas of technology, because of their limited R and D (and 
other) resources. To what extent should a country specialize in 
particular areas of science and technology? What determines the 
particular areas that a country should specialize in? As Pavitt 
[80] and others have pointed out, a certain amount of specialization 
seems essential, even for a big country like the United States. But 
the optimal strategy -- for a single country or for broader groups 
-- has not been studied in any real depth, even under highly simpli-
fied conditions. It is, of course, a much more difficult problem 
than the relatively simple, static problem regarding specialization 
and trade with respect to goods. This question is of fundamental 
importance, and deserves much more attention than it has received. 
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Of course, related to this question are a host of questions con-
cerning international technology transfer, the multinational firm, 
and so on, some of which are discussed in [52]. 
Fourth, more work is needed to develop more satisfactory meas-
ures of the rate of innovation. At the firm level, we are begin-
ning to get data based on counts of innovations (weighted or un-
weighted) carried out by particular firms. At the firm and industry 
levels, attempts have been made to estimate the rate of technical 
change by shifts over time in the production function. But these 
methods clearly are crude at best. Inherently, the construction of 
measures of the rate of innovation is a very difficult task, and I 
doubt that we will obtain really satisfactory measures in the fore-
seeable future. But I think that considerable improvements can be 
made. My guess is that what is needed is some hard work by someone 
with a strong interest in economic theory and econometrics who is 
at the same time willing -- and open-minded enough to really find 
out something about the nature of industrial innovation. 13 
7. 	Factors Influencing the Rate of Innovation  
Turning now to the third set of questions put forth in section 2, 
what factors influence the rate of innovation? Obviously, there are 
a host of factors that have an influence, including the nature and 
extent of a nation's scientific capability, 14 the size and quality of 
13For a discussion of some of the problems, see Kuznets [43]. 
14For some data bearing on the role of science in technological 
(continued on page 24.) 
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its educational system, the nature of government policy regarding 
technological change (including regulatory policies, tax policies, 
patent policies, procurement policies), the attitudes and strength 
of labor unions, and the quality and attitudes of management. Also, 
reasonably full employment, coupled with a high rate of investment, 
tends to promote innovation (and the rapid and relatively painless 
adaptation of the labor force to technological change), and pro-
grams that spread more equitably the social costs of technological 
change -- for example, retraining programs that help displaced work-
ers -- reduce resistance to innovation. 
Basically, the rate and direction of industrial innovation 
depends on the extent to which various kinds of new technology are 
stimulated by changes in product demand, changes in input proportion 
and availability, and other factors influencing the profitability of 
technical change. The effects of these factors have been discussed 
by Habakkuk [31], Hicks [35], and others. In this paper, my task 
is to focus on factors operating at the level of the firm (or the 
industry), not on the broad factors listed in this and the previous 
paragraph. Even when the topic is cut down in this way, my task is 
not an easy one, since there are so many factors that could be in-
cluded. Without making any pretense that the following discussion 
is any sense exhaustive, I shall attempt to describe -- as briefly 
as I can -- what we know about the effects of six important factors 
on the rate of innovation. 
14 - continued 
innovation, see Sherwin and Isenson [101], Illinois Institute of 
Technology Research Institute [38], and Price and Bass [86]. 
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The first factor is the way in which the firm couples R and D 
on the one hand, with marketing and production, on the other. Many 
studies, including Freeman [22], National Academy of Sciences [68], 
Mansfield, Rapoport, Schnee, Wagner, and Hamburger [57], and Law-
rence and Lorsch [46] indicate that effective innovation requires 
a close coupling of these functions. Although it would be an exag-
geration to say that we understand this factor in detail, there 
seems to be general agreement among managers concerning its impor-
tance, and the available studies seem to bear this out. Moreover, 
a fair amount is known about the techniques that firms use to pro-
mote a closer coupling of these functions. However, very little is 
known about the cost- effectiveness of particular techniques of 
this sort. 15 
A second factor that seems to influence a firm's rate of inno-
vation is its organization. According to Burns and Staulker [11], 
innovation is less likely to occur in firms where problems and 
tasks are broken down into specialities and where there is a strict 
vertical chain of command, than in firms where there is no strictly 
defined hierarchy, where communication resembles consultation rather 
than command, and where individuals have to perform tasks in the 
light of their kriowledge of the tasks of the whole firm. Many 
15Much of the literature in this area suffers from the fact that it 
does not even attempt to address the sort of question that, to an 
economist, would seem basic: What are the costs and benefits of 
particular actions? Instead, much of it is essentially descrip-
tive or an account of unverified "wisdom." 
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observers, like Schon [99], are impressed by the difficulty of 
carrying out radical innovations in the large, established firm, 
their feeling being that such innovations tend to be spearheaded 
by new firms and "invaders" from other industries. 16 A number of 
large firms -- Du Pont, Exxon, ICI, and others -- are trying to 
obtain some of the advantages of the small firm by creating a num-
ber of teams in their development department that operate somewhat 
like small firms [83]. Like most other areas of organization the-
ory, the results in this area are often qualitative and descriptive, 
and lines of causation are difficult to establish. Existing know-
ledge is far from adequate. 
A third factor that influences a firm's rate of innovation is 
the way it manages its R and D and innovative resources. For exam-
ple, some firms allow projects to run on too long before evaluating 
their economic (as distinct from their technological) potential. 
Judging from detailed data for 16 major firms, a firm's probabili-
ties of success (both technical and economic) seem to be directly 
related to how quickly it evaluates the economic potential of pro-
jects [59]. Also, some firms and government agencies, according to 
Klein [42] and others, tend to suppress and underestimate uncer-
tainty, and they do not run parallel approaches in many cases where 
16Also, studies by Schon [99] and others conclude that the exist-
ence of a champion, a missionary, a zealot who fights strongly --
and sometimes not in strict accord with the "rules" -- for an inno-
vation is an important contributor to the application of new tech-
nology. Thus, it is sometimes argued that organizations that can 
tolerate or nurture such individuals may tend to be most innova-
tive. For a somewhat more cautious view, see National Academy of 
Sciences [68]. Also, see Morrison [64]. 
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they should do so. According to still other observers, there is 
frequently a tendency for firms to devote too large a part of their 
resources to developments arising from their own laboratories and 
to neglect or resist developments that are "not invented here." 
This may be a particularly troublesome tendency because, according 
to many studies [65, 57], external sources of technology are fre-
quently of great importance in the innovation process. Our know-
ledge of the importance of these and other such problems -- and 
the best ways to overcome them -- is extremely limited. All that 
we really have at present are some clues, many of which are based 
on little more than visceral reaction by managers, engineers, and 
management scientists. Similarly, despite the pioneering work of 
Pelz and Andrews [82], Gordon, and others, our understanding of 
the determinants of scientific and engineering creativity and pro-
ductivity is limited. 17 
A fourth factor that may influence a firm's rate of innovation 
is the extent to which it uses various analytical techniques for 
the management of innovation that have come into prominence in 
recent years. Among such techniques are PERT and related sched-
uling methods, project selection methods based on sophisticated 
quantitative comparisons of costs and benefits, and technnological 
forecasting methods (discussed in section 11). Although there is 
a large volume of literature on such analytical techniques, it is 
17For a review of the findings of the behavioral science litera-
ture concerning the factors influencing the performance of scien-
tists and engineers, see Martino [60]. 
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not clear that they really have found very extensive use. More-
over, when they have been used, it is not at all clear what their 
effects have been. In view of the large errors in the estimates 
used in the project selection techniques, and the shortcomings of 
the models themselves, it would seem advisable for firms to use 
these techniques with considerable caution. [57]. 
A fifth factor that influences a firm's rate of innovation is 
the size and sophistication of the relevant market. The scale of 
the market influences the extent to which the firm can spread the 
fixed costs of developing and introducing an innovation. Also, 
the sophistication of market demand obviously influences the rate 
of innovation. For example, the large government demand for ad-
vanced electronic components, scientific instruments, and elec-
tronic computers certainly promoted innovations in those areas in 
the United States. In recent years, many European observers at- 
tributed the "technology gap" partly to differences in the size and 
sophistication of markets [80]. Of course, it should be recognized 
that the relevant market is not necessarily the national market. 
Tariffs and other barriers can be overcome, although this often is 
not easy. Pavitt [80] has done some work in this area, but his 
findings are not easy to interpret because his sample is so small 
and other factors are not held constant. 
A sixth factor that may influence the rate of innovation is 
the availability of risk capital. Innovation is often a risky busi-
ness; and as noted above, radical innovations frequently are the 
product of small businesses run by people with little knowledge of 
the market for venture capital. On the other hand, the financial 
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institutions, wealthy individuals, and others who are in a position 
to put up the money typically have relatively little appreciation 
of technical matters, and there are enormous problems in making a 
proper appraisal of such new ventures. It seems likely that the 
rate of innovation depends on the size of the pool of venture cap-
ital, and on the efficiency and imagination with which it is lent 
out. But little is known beyond this. According to the Charpie 
report [18], "the alleged absence of potentially available ven-
ture capital is not really the problem," but as the authors of 
the report would be the first to admit, their evidence is not very 
strong. 18 
8. 	Needed Research Concerning Factors Influencing  
the Rate of Innovation 
Based on the discussion on the previous section, it seems clear 
that existing knowledge concerning the factors influencing the rate 
of innovation, although more extensive and reliable than what was 
available a decade ago, is still too weak to provide the information 
needed by public and private policy makers. There are a large num-
ber of studies that are well worth carrying out. Three kinds of 
studies that I regard as being of particular interest are as follows: 
First, very detailed studies might be made of the innovative perfor-
mance of a variety of firms in the same industry. Data might be 
obtained from the firms themselves concerning the innovations they 
18Also, see Charpie [15]. 
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introduced, the percentage of their R and D projects that were 
successful, the profitability of their new products, and many 
other such variables. Based on these performance measures, an 
attempt might be made to relate a firm's innovative performance 
to the characteristics of its organization, its decision-making 
process, its personnel, and so forth. Although correlation does 
not prove causation, it should be possible to test many relevant 
hypotheses, at least partially, in this way. Some attempts [59] 
have been made to carry out studies of this sort, but they have 
done little more than scratch the surface. 
Second, studies might be made of the effects of changes in 
organization, corporate strategy, personnel, and a variety of 
other factors on a firm's innovative performance. It is fairly 
common for a firm to undergo a major change in organization or 
tactics. Yet there have been few attempts to get detailed infor- 
mation from such firms concerning various measures of their innova-
tive performance before and after the change, and to compare the 
difference in performance with other reasonably comparable firms 
that did not experience the change in organization, tactics, etc. 
Mansfield and Wagner [59] attempted one such study, but it is based 
on only a few firms. Much more work of this sort is needed. 
Third, it is high time that we obtain reliable and comprehen-
sive information regarding the extent of the venture capital that 
is available, the criteria used by investors to determine whether 
or not they will invest in a particular project, and the experience 
of various innovators in obtaining such capital. Some people claim 
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that there is insufficient capital of this sort. The Charpie 
report [18], on the other hand, concludes that more than $3 bil-
lion of potentially available venture capital exists in this coun-
try. It seems to me that this is a researchable subject, and 
that more work on it is needed. For one thing, it would be very 
interesting to review the records of various investors to see the 
nature of the projects that were turned down. To what extent does 
it appear that good bets were rejected? Of course, no one can 
predict with accuracy what would have happened if a project had 
been approved, rather than rejected; but with the advantages of 
hindsight, it might be possible in many cases to reach a reason-
able consensus. On this basis, it might be possible to'estimate 
more precisely than is now possible the probability that a good 
project will be turned down, as well as the probability that an un-
successful project will be accepted. This is an area that has been 
discussed ad nauseum, but with few facts. It should be possible at 
this point to obtain much better information on this topic than cur-
rently exists. 
9. 	Size of Firm, Market Structure, and  
the Rate of Innovation  
Traditionally, economists have tended to argue that economic 
efficiency is promoted by competition. For example, Adam Smith 
wrote -- about two centuries ago -- that "monopoly . . . is a great 
enemy to good management." In recent years, however, some econo-
mists, led by Joseph Schumpeter [100] and John Kenneth Galbraith 
[24], have argued that a competitive economy is likely to be 
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inferior in a dynamic sense to an economy including many imperfect-
ly competitive industries (i.e., monopolies, oligopolies, etc.). 
It is easy to grant that a certain amount of market imperfection 
may promote the rate of innovation. But some of these economists 
go beyond this to say that the "modern industry of a few large 
firms [is] an almost perfect instrument for inducing technical 
change [24]." 
If true, this is an extremely important point. But is it true? 
Does the evidence indicate that an industry dominated by a few giant 
firms is generally more progressive than one composed of a larger 
number of smaller firms? Based on the studies of Jewkes, Sawers 
and Stillerman [39], Hamberg [32], Mueller [65], and others, it 
appears that the role of the small firm or the independent inventor 
may be very important at the stage of concept formation and the ini-
tial, relatively inexpensive stages of R and D. Moreover, although 
the development of these ideas often requires more resources and 
different kinds of management skills than some of these small firms 
have, the investment required for development and innovation is sel-
dom so great or so risky that only the largest firms in the industry 
can do the developing or the innovating. For example, our studies 
of the drug, steel, petroleum, and coal industries indicate that 
the firms that carried out the largest number of innovations -- rel-
ative to their size -- were not the very biggest firms. Indeed, in 
the steel and drug industries, they tended to be surprisingly small 
firms [51, 57]. Table 3 summarizes some of our results. 
According to studies made by Scherer [94], Mansfield [51], 
Grabowski [27], and others, it also appears that the largest firms 
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TABLE 3. 	RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SIZE OF FIRM AND INNOVATIVE 
PERFORMANCE, STEEL, PETROLEUM, COAL, DRUG, AND CHEMICAL 
INDUSTRIES, UNITED STATES. 
Did the largest four 	Size of Firm 
firms accounts for a that carried out 
bigger share 	of inno- the most innova- 
vations than their 	tions (relative 
Industry 	Time Period 	market share? a 	to its size) 
pn and steel 1939-58 No Relatively small 
troleum 1939-58 Yes About 6th largest. 
Luminous Coal 1939-58 Yes About 6th largest. 
tiical Drugs 1950-62 No About 12th largest. 
urce: 	[51] 	[57] 	[58] 
aInnovations are weighted by economic importance (as measured by sales 
the case of products and cost reductions in the case of process). Assets 
re used as a measure of firm size in the chemical industry; sales or ca-
city were used in the other industries. 
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generally do not spend more on R and D, relative to their size, 
than somewhat smaller firms. There seems to be a threshold effect. 
A firm has to be a certain size to spend much on R and D, as de-
fined by the National Science Foundation. But beyond a certain 
point, increases in size no longer bring any disproportionate rise 
in R and D expenditures. This seems to be true in all industries 
studied, with the exception of chemicals. 	Of Course, the thres- 
hold varies from industry to industry, but, according to Scherer 
[94], increases in size beyond an employment level of about 5,000 
employees is generally not accompanied by a more than proportional 
increase in innovation inputs or outputs. Thus, the evidence does 
not seem to indicate that giant firms devote more resources, rela-
tive to their size, to inventive and innovative activities than 
their somewhat smaller competitors. Moreover, there is some evi- 
dence that, per dollar of R and D, the biggest firms get less inven-
tive and innovative output than smaller firms. Scherer [96] and 
Mansfield [52] review this evidence in some detail. 
From the point of view of anti-trust policy, it is particularly 
important to explore the relationship between the extent of concen-
tration in an industry and the industry's rate of technological 
change. Far too little work has been carried out in this area to 
support firm or confident conclusions. But certain patterns are 
beginning to emerge. For example, our studies seem to indicate 
that innovations are not utilized and accepted more rapidly in more 
concentrated industries than in less concentrated industries. On 
the contrary, it often appears that innovations spread more rapidly 
in less concentrated industries [58]. In general, most studies of 
the relationship between industrial concentration and the rate of 
technological change seem to conclude that a slight amount of con-
centration may promote more rapid invention and innovation. Very 
fragmented, splintered industries like construction do not seem to 
be able to promote a rapid rate of technological advance. But be-
yond a moderate amount of concentration, further increases in con-
centration do not seem to be associated with more rapid rates of 
technological advance. In part, this is because of the accompany-
ing decrease in the number of independent sources of innovation. 
Thus, the available evidence does not seem to indicate that we 
must permit considerable concentration in order to proinote rapid 
innovation. 19 
In addition, three other points should be noted. First, there 
is evidence that new firms and firms entering new markets play a 
very important role in the promotion of technological change. Exist-
ing firms can be surprisingly blind to the potentialities of new 
ideas. They can become bureaucratized and tradition-bound. An 
important way that their mistakes and inertia are overcome in our 
economy is through the entry of new firms. Moreover, there have 
been many cases where the threat of entry by new firms or firms in 
other industries has stimulated existing firms to carry out signif-
icant technological advances. 
19 For relevant discussions, see Comanor [16], Fellner [21], 
Hennipman [34], Maclaurin [50], Pavitt [80], Peck [81], and 
Schmookler [98], as well as those cited in the text. 
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Second, it is generally agreed by economists that the ideal 
market structure from the point of view of stimulating technological 
change is one where there is a mixture of firm sizes. Complemen-
tarities and interdependencies exist among larger and smaller firms. 
There is often a division of labor, smaller firms focusing on areas 
requiring sophistication and flexibility and catering to specialized 
needs, bigger firms focusing on areas requiring larger production, 
marketing, technological resources. There seem to be considerable 
advantages in a diversity of firm sizes, no single firm size being 
optimal in this respect. Moreover, the optimal average size is 
likely to be directly related to the costliness and scope of the 
inventions that arise. However, in general, these factors do not 
mean that the very biggest firms in an industry are required to pro-
mote rapid technological change. 
Third, cases sometimes arise where industries are composed of 
such small firms or markets are so fragmented that technological 
change is hampered. Firms cannot afford to do much R and D, and 
they may find it difficult to use new techniques. The risks involve 
in innovation are too great for any single firm. In such cases, it 
may be good policy to supplement the R and D supported by the pri-
vate sector. Of course, a good example of this is in agriculture, 
where the government has supported a great deal of R and D for many 
years. However, it is important to recognize that we know very lit-
tle about the frequency with which such cases occur. Much of the 
available evidence is qualitative and.by no means unambiguous. 
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10. 	Needed Research Concerning Size of Firm, 
Market Structure, and Innovation  
Based on the discussion in the previous section, it is evi-
dent that, although we are beginning to assemble the data and tech-
niques needed to answer the important questions in this area, we 
still have a long way to go before we can be confident of the an-
swers. Studies of many kinds are needed. Three types of studies 
that, in my opinion, would be very useful are as follows: First, 
we need more information concerning economies of scale in particu-
lar types of R and D. There are many reasons for thinking that 
there are economies of scale in R and D up to some point -- "lump-
iness" of capital equipment used in R and D, advantages from spe-
cilization of labor, reduction of risk due to the law of large 
numbers. However, we know very little, industry by industry, con-
cerning the extent of these economies of scale for particular types 
of work, or about the size of R and D establishment beyond which 
further increases in size bring little or nothing in the way of 
further efficiencies for the type of work in question. 
Second, we need to know much more about the costs of technologi-
cal innovation in various industries. A number of recent studies 
have focused attention on "technological thresholds" -- i.e., min-
imum sizes of firm -- that must be achieved before a firm can be a 
successful innovator. For example, in the electrical equipment indus-
try, Freeman [23] has presented evidence indicating that these thres-
holds are very high. 20 It seems obvious that they are lower in many 
20Freeman defines the threshold as the minimum R and D expenditure 
per year, rather than the minimum size of firm. Clearly both 
measures are useful. 
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other industries, but we know little about their size or rates of 
change. As Pavitt [89] remarks, "few generalizations can be made 
about the thresholds necessary for effective industrial innovation." 
In considerable part, this is because we have so little data con-
cerning the costs of innovation in various industries. Clearly, 
such costs are greatly in excess of R and D costs alone, but beyond 
this, little is really known. 
Third, we need detailed data identifying the major innovations 
that have occurred in recent years, as well as the innovator in 
each case, for many more industries. As matters stand, we have such 
data for only about a half dozen industries. Clearly, much more 
such data are needed. Further, it would be useful if more attempts 
were made to estimate the relationship between size of firm and inno-
vative performance among particular types of innovations. It seems 
likely that this relationship will vary in a particular industry, 
depending on the characteristics of the innovations. Although the 
overall relationship between size of firm and innovation has been 
studied (in the small number of industries for which data are avail-
able), no attempt has been made to classify innovations in various 
ways, and estimate the relationship in each class. Such studies 
might shed considerable new light on the subject. 
11. 	Technological Forecasting21  
Turning to the fifth set of questions put forth in section 2, 
21 In the next two sections, I have borrowed freely from parts of [51 
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what is the current state of the art with respect to technological 
forecasting? It is generally agreed that technology is a difficult 
variable to forecast, because there is so much uncertainty concern-
ing what will be produced by R and D efforts, and concerning what 
break-throughs will occur, and when. How do the people engaged in 
technological forecasting go about making their forecasts? Accord-
ing to various surveys, as well as the leading texts on technolog-
ical forecasting [8, 14, 79], simple intuitive projections seem to 
play a very important role in exploratory technological forecasting. 
For example, suppose that a firm or government agency wants to fore-
cast the maximum speed of commercial aircraft in 1985. One way of 
obtaining such a forecast is simply to ask an expert, or group of 
experts, to guess as best they can what the maximum speed will be 
at that time. Certainly, this approach is straightforward enough 
and relatively cheap. But it runs into a number of difficulties. 
First, technologists are no more in agreement about the future than 
economists are, the result being that the answer is likely to vary, 
depending on the choice of expert. Second, even when based on the 
opinion of distinguished experts, such forecasts can contain large 
errors. For example, Vannevar Bush predicted in 1945 that a 3,000 
mile rocket would "be impossible for many years." [52]. 
To cope with some of the problems involved in simply asking 
a group of experts for a consensus guess, Helmer and Gordon, while 
at the RAND Corporation, formulated a technique, known as the Delphi 
method, which attempts to utilize expert opinion more effectively 
[33]. For example, to forecast the maximum speed of commercial 
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aircraft in 1985, users of the Delphi method would ask a number of 
experts to formulate separate and independent estimates. Then the 
median and interquartile range of the estimates would be communi-
cated to each of the experts, and they would be asked to reconsider 
their previous answers and revise therri if they wanted to. Then thos 
people whose answers lie outside the interquartile range would be 
asked to state why they disagree to this extent from the other mem-
bers of the group. Then their replies would be circulated among 
the group, and the members would be asked once again to make a fore-
cast. This iterative process would continue until there was a rea-
sonable convergence of the individual forecasts. 
The Delphi method has been used in fields as diverse as defense 
pharmaceuticals, political science, and educational technology. 
According to its developers, it is a useful tool for technological 
forecasting. However, it is important to recognize the obvious fact 
that the results of the Delphi method can be no better than the fore 
sight of the individual experts. And as noted above, this foresight 
can be very imperfect. Moreover, by relying so heavily on a consen-
sus, the Delphi method assumes that collective judgment is better 
than individual judgment. This is a dangerous assumption, as evi-
denced by the many important technological advances that have been 
made by individuals and groups that acted contrary to prevailing 
majority -- and elite -- opinion. 22 
22Another well-known technique based on subjective estimates is the 
"cross-impact method," also pioneered by Gordon and Helmer. Acord-
ing to this method, one estimates the effects of one event on the 
probability of occurrence of other events. Then one goes through 
(Continued on page 41.) 
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Another technique that plays an important role in exploratory 
techological forecasting is simple trend extrapolation [48, 14]. 
For example, to forecast the maximum speed of commercial aircraft 
in 1985, one could obtain a time series of the maximum speed of 
such aircraft at various points in history, and project the histor-
ical trend into the future. In fact, this simple sort of extrapo- 
lation technique has been used in the Defense Department, where much 
of the work on technological forecasting originated. It has also 
been used in commercial work of various kinds. Of course, economists 
themselves have long used such techniques. For example, about 20 
years ago, John Kenrick discussed the use of such crude techniques 
to forecast productivity change in the American economy [41]. 
The problem with naive extrapolation techniques of this sort 
is that, unless the fundamental factors determining the technological 
parameter in question operate much as they have in the past, previ-
ous trends will not necessarily be a good guide to the future. For 
example, a host of factors, including the allocation of R and D 
resources and the pressure of environmental concerns, may see to it 
that the maximum speed of commercial aircraft increases at quite a 
different rate than it has in the immediate past. Or take the case 
of productivity increase. There is considerable evidence that pro-
ductivity increase has not occurred at a constant rate in the United 
States. The moral, well known to economists, is that a naive pro-
jection of historical trends is a dangerous business, particularly 
when long-term forecasts are being made. 
22 - continued 
a Monte Carlo process to estimate the unconditional probabilities of 
occurrence of various events. See T. Gordon and H. Becker [26]. 
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Besides trend extrapolation, the technological forecasters 
have adopted another old favorite of the economic forecasters -- 
lead-lag relationships. For example, to forecast the maximum speed 
of commercial aircraft in 1985, one could plot the maximum speed of 
commercial aircraft against the maximum speed of military aircraft. 
Finding that commercial speeds have lagged military speeds, one 
might be able to use this relationship to make the desired forecast. 
Of course, here too the problem is that the historical relationship 
may not continue into the future. For a discussion of these and 
other technological forecasting techniques, see Roberts [88]. 
Finally, there has been some experimentation with somewhat 
more sophisticated models. Input-output analysis has been used by 
Carter [12] and others to forecast future input requirements. At 
present, its use is still in its infancy, and all that can be said 
is that it represents a promising area for research. Also, econom- 
etric models of aggregate output, which include R and D expenditures 
have been used for certain kinds of technological forecasting, as 
we saw in section 5. In addition, econometric models of the rate 
of diffusion of innovations are beginning to be used for certain 
kinds of technological forecasting by government agencies and busi- 
ness firms. For an account of the accuracy of some forecasts of the 
rate of diffusion of numerically controlled machine tools, these 
forecasts being made on the basis of my own model, see [55]. 
12. Needed Research Concerning Technological Forecasting  
Based on the discussion in the previous section, it seems fair 
1 29 
to say that most of the techniques commonly used for technological 
forecasting seem crude, even by the standards of the social and 
management sciences. In view of this crudeness, it seems unlikely 
that the results can be at all accurate. But as matters stand, one 
cannot even be sure of this, since there have been no studies meas-
uring the track record of various kinds of technological forecasting 
techniques. Such studies seem to be called for. It would be useful 
to have some idea of how well these techniques have performed under 
various circumstances, and of which sorts of techniques seem to do 
better under particular kinds of circumstances. Without such infor-
mation, it is hard for anyone to make decisions concerning the types 
of exploratory forecasting activities that are worth carrying out. 
To prevent misunderstanding, I want to add that there is no 
doubt that technological forecasting is a necessary part of the 
decision-making process in firms and government agencies. Just as 
there is no way to avoid forecasting the economic future -- explic-
itly -- so there is no way to avoid forecasting the technological 
future. But this does not mean that it is necessarily worthwhile 
for a firm or government agency to support any formal work in tech-
nological forecasting. Whether or not it is worthwhile to support 
such work depends on whether -- under the particular set of circum-
stances facing the firm or agency -- the potential gains seem to 
outweigh the costs. 23 And•given the lack of reliable data regarding 
23Thus, Quinn is, of course, quite correct in stressing that tech-
nological forecasts need not be completely, or even very, accurate ' 
to be useful. The correct test is whether their value exceeds their 
cost. See J. Quinn [87]. 
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the likely gains from various kinds of technological forecasting, 
this is not an easy comparison to make. 
In my opinion, the emphasis at present ought to be on studies 
leading toward a better basic understanding of the process of tech-
nological change. Until the fundamental processes are somewhat bet-
ter understood, it seems unlikely that much improvement will occur 
in exploratory forecasting techniques. The area that is perhaps 
best understood at present is the diffusion process -- and this is 
the area where forecasting currently seems most effective. Need-
less to say, I am not suggesting that a moratorium be declared on 
technological forecasting until we understand the basic processes 
more thoroughly. What I am suggesting is that more emphasis be 
placed by researchers and practitioners on the accumulation of the 
basic knowledge that is required if this field is to become more of 
a science and less of an art. 
13. 	Conclusions  
In conclusion, recent studies of industrial innovation have pro 
vided us with a much fuller understanding of some of the leading 
questions concerning the innovation process. But despite the pro-
gress made in the last 10 or 15 years, we still know very little 
about many of these questions. This is no criticism of the people 
working in this area. Given the inherent difficulty of the problems 
and the few people working on them, a great deal has been accomplish 
In view of the importance of the questions in this area, more 
research is badly needed. There is no indication that these ques-
tions are impervious to research. On the contrary, the research 
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carried out in the past 10 or 15 years has resulted in consider-
able progress. But much more work is needed. In this paper, I 
have tried to indicate specific types of studies that might be 
carried out. This is merely a sample of the kinds of work that 
are needed -- and a sample that obviously reflects my own interests 
and biases. But hopefully it may be of use as an indication of 
where we stand in this area and what needs to be done. 
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CHAPTER 9 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN FIRMS 
AND INDUSTRIES 
An Assessment of the State of the Art 
Richard S. Rosenbloom 
This paper considers the base of knowledge that might illu-
minate the ways in which technological innovation is or could be 
influenced by public policies and the administrative practices 
of firms. It is directed toward readers interested in discover- 
ing which are the major forces stimulating and guiding the behav-
ior of firms with respect to the creation and utilization of new 
technology. 
A better understanding of the processes of innovation is 
necessary if society is to be able to influence them. The exist-
ing base of knowledge offers relatively little that is directly 
useful for policy makers, but it provides an extensive foundation 
for research that would do so. The "state-of-the-art" invites 
a policy-oriented synthesis, one built on a conceptual framework 
that would interlink currently disparate traditions of inquiry. 1 
We will argue that the concept of corporate strategy provides a 
useful - and unexploited - framework for a policy-oriented research 
on technological innovation. 
Dr. Rosenbloom is David Sarnoff Professor at the Harvard 
Graduate School of Business Administration. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the benefit of numerous discussions of this 
topic and of drafts of this paper with W. J. Abernathy, D. Bodde, 
M. Horwitch, H. Kolodny, I. Kusiatin and C. K. Prahalad. 
1Although various segments of the literature on innovation will be 
(Continued on page 2.) 
The forces influencing the development of technology have 
been analyzed at different levels of aggregation, ranging from 
studies of entire societies to examination of minute particulars 
of a single innovation. Table 1 suggest five levels of analysis, 
with examples of work at each level. At the upper end of this 
range, historians, economists, anthropologists, sociologists, and 
others have identified social and cultural forces interacting with 
science and technology and have examined the nature of some of 
those interactions. For example, the eminent sociologist, Robert 
Merton, tells us that "the substantial and persistent development 
of science occurs only in societies of a certain kind, which pro-
vide both cultural and material conditions for that development."
2 
Merton stresses that there are "reciprocal relations between science 
as an ongoing intellectual activity, and the environing social and 
cultural structure," and "that the nature and extent of these inter-
changes differ in various societies, depending on the state of 
1 (continued) 
discussed below, no effort is made to offer a complete survey of 
the foundations of the field. James Utterback, "Innovation in 
Industry and the Diffusion of Technology," Science, Vol. 183, 
pp. 620-626 (February 15, 1974), reviews the results of numerous 
studies of innovations. Gerald Zaltman, Robert Duncan, and Jonny 
Holbek, Innovations and Organizations (John Wiley, 1973) is a 
recent and useful summary of social and behavioral aspects of inno-
vation within formal organizations. Edwin Mansfield, The Economics  
of Technological Change (W. W. Norton, 1968) is a standard work 
on its subject. Everett Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, Communicatio] 
of Innovations (The Free Press, 1971) surveys and synthesizes a 
wide range of research emphasizing socio-cultural aspects of the 
adoption and diffusion of innovations. A comprehensive survey has 
been prepared as the final report of the project to which this paper 
has been contributed. 
2
Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science, Chicago and London, 
The University of Chicago Press, 1973. 
their science and of their institutional systems of economy, 
politics, religion, military, and so on." 3 
Nathan Rosenberg, writing from the perspective of an economic 
historian, explains the relationship of technology to American 
economic growth in strikingly similar terms.
4 
Technological change, 
in his framework, is both situational and environmentally (socially) 
influenced. That is, a given change is viewed "as a successful 
solution to a particular problem thrown up in a particular resource 
context. "5 Rosenberg's careful review of the American experience 
shows how an "economic matrix" of demand pulls and supply con-
straints (or their absence) shaped the main paths of historical 
change in technology. 
An improved understanding of the paths of historical change 
at the level of entire societies is valuable in its own right and 
offers a helpful background for policy research and the delibera-
tions of policymakers. But it can offer few affirmative prescrip-
tions for policy and action. Policy-oriented research must be 
directed at smaller units of social organization, addressing such 
questions as the following: 
Do the various sectors of industrial societies differ systematically 
in their capacity to generate or accept technological innovation? 
What are the causal factors? In what terms can the apparent differ-
ences between local governments, farms, and manufacturing firms be 
3Ibid., p. 176. Emphasis in original. 
4Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and American Economic Growth, 1972. 
5 Ibid., p. 21. 
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TABLE 1 
Alternative Levels of Aggregation in  
Studies of Technological Development  
I. 
Level 
Illustrations of Research at This Level 
Authors* Typical Variables 
Society as a whole Merton Values, norms 
II. Sectors Rosenberg Factor costs 
Industries Schmookler Demand 
Scherer Market structure 
IV. Firms Mansfield Size of firm 
Woodward Organization structu 
V. Innovations Myers and Marquis Sources of informati 
Mansfield Investment and profi 
ability 
*Citations to writings by these authors are provided in footnotes 
accompanying the subsequent text of this paper. 
usefully explained? What about differences within a sector, for 
example, between manufacturing industries such as furniture, petrolel 
and electronics? Or, taking even narrower segments, within a given 
industry, how to explain the differing capacities for, and receptiv-
ities to change among firms? 
Important differences do exist. Scholars from severaldisciplin( 
have sought explanation through the "lenses" of their respective fie: 
For example, Rosenberg calls attention to the variation in technolog-
ical change across industries: 6 
... technological change is not something which has emerged 
in a random way from all sectors of the economy. It is, rather, 
the result of certain acquired problem-solving skills which in 
our history, have been heavily concentrated in specific sectors 
6Op. cit., p. 53. 
of the economy. Throughout the early stages ... these skills 
were heavily concentrated in metallurgy, machine tools, steam 
power, and engineering; later, in large part, as a result of 
advances in science, this focus shifted to chemistry-based, 
electrical- and electronic-based and, more recently, biology-
based industries. 
Rosenberg's analysis depicts the influence of economic factors, 
particularly the role of market prices, relative factor costs, and 
limitations of supply. Another influential economic variable is 
growth in demand, which Schmookler has shown is directly related 
to the intensity of technological development. 7 But Rosenberg's 
observation, quoted above, also draws our attention to non-economic 
factors. Such factors as the development of science, the education 
of engineers, and the availability of particular kinds of problem-
solving skills are recognized as interacting with economic deter-
minants of the pattern of change. 
In the next two sections of this paper we will discuss the 
traditions of research on innovation in firms and industries (levels 
III-V in Table 1). The scope of our inquiry is intended to be broad 
enough to include the full range of relevant factors while, at the 
same time, maintaining a focus on issues that are pertinent to 
policy-makers and administrators. We shall begin at the most con-
crete level: studies of particular innovations. 
II. INNOVATIONS 
An examination of recent traditions of research at this level 
suggests the following generalizations. First, among these scholars, 
there is a useful and widely shared paradigm of the innovation pro-
cess. Despite variations in terminology and the minor particulars 
1 47 
7Jacob Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 196b. 
lU 
of definitions, there is consensus on the distinctions to be made 
between stages in the process embracing the creation of ideas, the 
demonstration of their practicality, their development for and intro-
duction to routine use, and their diffusion within a population of 
users. Second, there are useful taxonomies identifying and describ-
ing elements of this process, associated activities and outcomes, 
and the kinds of situations in which innovations - arise. Third, 
empirical research using these conceptual tools has discovered 
certain characteristic patterns in the dynamics of innovation and 
has helped to delineate several of the embedded micro-processes, 
such as information flow. 
A dominant theme in recent studies of technological innovation 
has been the idea that "innovation is not a single action but a 
total process of interrelated subprocesses." As Myers and Marquis 
put it: 8 
It is not just the conception of a new idea, nor the invention 
of anew device, nor the development of a new market. The 
process is all these things acting in an integrated fashion 
toward a common objective. 
Systematic research on the innovative process is comparatively 
recent. A necessary first step in any field of inquiry, of course, 
is the development of generally accepted categorizations of the 
phenomena of interest - a shared taxonomy is a requisite for the 
cumulation of research. There now is a widely shared taxonomy for 
the tasks which constitute the process of innovation; one statement 
of this scheme is offered by Utterback,' who groups the activities 
8Successful Industrial Innovations by Sumner Myers and Donald G. 
Marquis, National Science Foundation (NSF 69-17), 1969. 
into three constituent phases:
9 
Generation of an idea involves synthesis of diverse (usually 
existing, as opposed to original) information, including 
information about a market or other need and possible tech-
nology to meet the need. 
Problem-solving includes setting specific technical goals and 
designing alternative solutions to meet them. 
Implementation consists of the manufacturing engineering, 
tooling, and plant and market start-up required to bring an 
original solution or invention to its first use or market 
introduction. Diffusion takes place in the environment and 
begins after the innovation is first introduced. 
Given a useful classificatory scheme, the next logical step 
is to try to observe the characteristics of elements of that scheme 
as they are found in the real world. In this way one can build up 
a picture of the process in some detail. The problem, of course, 
is that innovation occurs in different ways under different circum-
stances; it is not a process that is capable of deterministic des-
cription. The response has been to seek descriptions identifying 
central tendencies, based on observation of the relative frequen-
cies of occurrence of various characteristics associated with 
elements of the innovation process. For example, the taxonomy may 
be viewed as dividing innovation activities temporally, into sequen-
tial "stages" marked by critical events, such as the demonstration 
of feasibility or the first introduction to use on commercial scale. 
Within this framework, empirical research gives us estimates of 
the characteristic duration of each stage. Both Lynn, in a study 
of 20 innovations, and Enos, in a study of 35 outside the petroleum 
industry, found that an average of 14 years elapsed between invention 




and commercialization of innovations introduced in the years 
following World War 11. 10 Other descriptive studies treat such 




adoption rates in the diffusion of innovation;
13 and the linkage
14 
of scientific discovery to technological innovation. Studies 
of this sort provide the basis for a kind of "demography of inno-
vation." 
The base of knowledge useful for understanding the demography 
of innovation has been growing rapidly in recent years. Utterback's 
recent review article
15 
identifies 17 studies which have documented 
the characteristics of more than 2000 innovations. Consistent pat-
terns have emerged from these studies despite their difference's in 
time period, scope, methodology, and definitions. The patterns dis-
close central tendencies (e.g., long time lags between invention 
and commercial use) but also large variations (e.g., a range of 3 to 
79 years, with standard deviation of 16 years in those time lags in 
10
"Invention and Innovation in the Petroleum Refining Industry," by 
John Enos, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 
229-321; Technology and the American Economy, National Commission on 
Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, Washington, Governmeni 
Printing Office, 1966, p. 4. 
11Jewkes, Sawyers, and Stillerman, The Sources of Invention, Toronto 
and New York, Macmillan, 1958. 
12
W. Mueller, "The Origin of the Basic Inventions Underlying Dupont': 
Major Product and Process Innovations, 1920 to 1950, "The Rate and  
Direction of Inventive Activity, National Bureau of Economic Researcl 
1962, and Myers and Marquis, op. cit. 
13
Mansfield, The Economics of Technological Change, op. cit., pp. 
114-119. 
14 "Interactions of Science and Technology in the Innovative Process: 
Some Case Studies," Final Report to the National Science Foundation 
by Battelle Columbus Laboratories, March 19, 1973. 
15.
Innovation in Industry," op. cit., Table 1 
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35 innovations studies by Enos). 	One naturally asks: to what 
extent can the variations be given systematic explanation? 
The simplest level of explanatory research observes an associ-
ation between variation in the characteristic of interest (e.g., 
time lags) and variation in other observable characteristics. Lynn, 
for example, shows that the time lag is less for consumer products 
than for industrial goods, 17 while Enos sorts the data a different 
way and concludes that "mechanical innovations appear to require 
the shortest time interval with chemical and pharaceutical innova-
tions next. Electronic innovations took the most time."
18 
Although 
many findings are based on simple classifications of this sort, some 
studies employ more complex and powerful multivariate statistical 
tools. Mansfield, for example, uses a regression model to demon-
strate the relationship between the rate of diffusion of an inno-
vation and its profitability and required investment.
19 
Explanations of this sort treat the stages of the innovation 
as a sequence of "black boxes." The mechanisms which could account 
for observed relationships remain mysterious, or are inferred from 
general premises, such as the expectation that individuals and firms 
will seek to maximize profits. Another strategy of research is to 
delve into the black boxes, making explicit the micro-processes of 
innovation, in order to describe and perhaps explain innovative out-
comes more adequately. 
16 
Enos, op. cit., pp. 305 - 309. 
1 
7National Commission, op. cit., p. 4. 
18Op. cit., p. 309. 
19 Edwin Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technological Innovations, 
New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1968, Chapter VII. 
1 G 
One of the most widely quoted descriptive studies of this sort 
is the study of 567 industrial innovations initiated by Sumner Myers 
and the National Planning Association and subsequently reported by 
Myers and Donald G. Marquis.
20 
 Myers collected data on innovations 
judged to be commercially successful and important to the innovating 
companies, but of a scale and complexity that classes them as "incre 
mental" changes (as opposed to those new products and processes that 
may launch a new industry). 
The analysis by Myers and Marquis centers around an information 
flow model of the innovative process. They identify the source of 
the technology, that is, whether or not it was original to the inno-
vating firm; factors leading to the initiation of the innovation, 
including technological, market, production, and administrative 
forces; a number of characteristics of the acquisition and utiliza-
tion of information used in innovation; the cost of development; 
and the innovation's impact on the production process. For the most 
part, the findings of Myers and Marquis are demographic rather than 
explanatory. Their results do suggest that the characteristics of 
information flow vary among kinds of innovations and industrial 
settings. But their work offers no higher-level explanation, or 
theory, of why these variations are observed. 
One of the most ambitious efforts to explicate the most influ-
ential administrative factors within the innovation process is the 
study of success and failure in industrial innovation (SAPPHO) 
20Successful Industrial Innovation, op. cit. 
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conducted at the University of Sussex. 21 
	
Introducing their find- 
ings, the SAPPHO investigators observe: "Typically, studies of 
innovation have highlighted 'single factors' in the process, on 
which the ultimate success is believed to have hinged. Accepting 
that innovation is a complex sequence of events, involving scienti-
fic research as well as technological development, management, pro-
duction, and selling, it was felt that those single factor inter-
pretations were less than satisfactory..."
22 
Project SAPPHO identified and evaluated 29 pairs of innovations 
in two industries - chemicals and scientific instruments. Each 
pair was selected to provide one successful and one unsuccessful 
attempt to introduce comparable innovations. Interviewers documented 
201 characteristics of each case and then compared the members of 
each pair to establish whether and in what way they differed on each 
characteristic. 
The SAPPHO study offered five principal conclusions concerning 
factors contributing to successful innovation. Three pertain to 
the innovating organization's relations with its external environ- 
ments. Successful innovators had significantly better understanding 
of user needs, paid more attention to marketing tasks, and made more 
effective use of external technical resources. Two other organiza-
tional characteristics seemed consistently and strongly associated 
with success: more efficient performance of development tasks and 
the assignment of responsibility to a more senior executive. 
21Center for the Study of Industrial Innovation, University of Sussex, 
Success and Failure in Industrial Innovation, A. B. Robertson, 
et al., 1972. 
22 
Ibid., p. 5. 
Despite its large data base and imaginative use of multi-
variate statistical techniques, the SAPPHO study has little explan-
atory power. The findings identify instrumentalities associated 
with success, but like those of Myers and Marquis, they are not 
supported by adequate theory. Are characteristics such as "the 
use of external information sources" of inherent significance, or 
are they merely artifacts of more fundamental factors? One can-
not tell. Nor can one safely say how far these findings can be 
generalized. Significant differences were found between the two 
industries studied but they cannot be explained within the SAPPHO 
framework. Finally, these findings cannot easily be operation-
alized, e.g., it helps little to advise managers to be "more effi-
cient" in development tasks. 
Although the descriptive paradigm of the innovative process 
is relatively well developed, even at the level of some constituent 
microprocesses such as information flow, no framework has yet 
emerged to tie together the factors which are offered in explana-
tion of variations in innovative outcomes. As the Sussex group has 
argued, single factors are inadequate to provide explanations. The 
multiple factors recognized so far in explanatory research have 
often been defined eclectically and adventitiously, with interde-
pendencies assumed away or simply left unexplained. But common-
sense observation tells us that many of these factors almost cer-
tainly are linked systemically. It is unlikely, for example, that 
an organization's awareness of user needs and its concern for mar-
keting tasks are independent factors. 
Some of these shortcomings could, in principle, be alleviated 
155 
by a larger scale of inquiry. The methodology of SAPPHO could 
be employed on a larger sample structured to yield data about the 
pertinent characteristics of innovations, firms, and industries. 
As a practical matter, if one were to account for differences 
between product and process innovations of several levels of com-
plexity within enough industries to permit examination of more 
than a single characteristic of the industries, the task would 
become unmanageably large. More fundamentally, larger data bases 
are a poor response to the inherent lack of explanatory theory. 
A more attractive approach, in my opinion, is to seek an 
integrative theory rather than to try to embrace, empirically, all 
of the plausibly significant descriptive variations between cases. 
The principle of parsimony suggests that we should seek a framework 
that captures those systemic relationships in terms that would 
focus empirical examination on a few fundamental variables. A con-
cern for utility of findings implies further that the framework 
should treat variables that can be influenced by decision-makers 
in the real world, that is, characteristics that are "malleable." 
In summary, research at this level of aggregation, in which 
the primary unit of analysis is a particular innovation, has con-
tributed a useful body of descriptive findings, but only limited 
explanatory findings. In my opinion, extensions of this tradition 
of research, whether by enlarged scope or more powerful technique, 
are unlikely to alter that conclusion. For more adequate explana-
tion, we shall have to move the focus of inquiry to higher levels 
of aggregation, where we can build on available theoretical frame-
works pertinent to the behavior of firms and industries. 
1 
III. FIRMS AND INDUSTRIES 
As we shift the focus from the characteristics of particular 
innovations to the "innovativeness" of firms or industries, the 
metrics of research become more complex. There is no widely 
accepted measure of the innovativeness of an organization or indus-
try. It is widely believed, however, that there are substantial 
differences among firms and industries in this respect. Strong 
support for this view can be found in the data on industrial R&D 
expenditures - a commonly used proxy for innovative effort. 
In the United States, the performance of R&D is heavily con-
centrated in six industries and within these industries is concen-
trated among the largest firms. Thus, according to a recent sur-
vey by the National Science Foundation, 20 companies spend more 
than half of all the funds expended for R&D within industry and 
100 firms account for more than three-fourths of industrial R&D 
performed. 23 Six industrial categories stand out as "R&D inten-
sive." Table 2 lists these industries and gives 1971 data for 
expenditure of company funds on R&D by the largest firms (by 
sales $) in each industry. The 48 corporations representing the 
eight largest in each industry accounted for slightly more than 
half of all company funding for R&D reported in 1971. 24 
23Research and Development in Industry, 1971, NSF 73-305. The 100 
companies with the largest R&D programs accounted for 39% of net 
sales and 38% of total employment of all R&D performing companies. 
Expenditures for industrial R&D totalled $18.3 billion in 1971, of 
which $10.6 billion (58%) was company runds. 
24If one included the 20 largest firms in each industry, the total 
R&D spending would increase by $1 billion. R&D expenditure for 
the 9th-20th companies represent a smaller percentage of sales than 
for the largest firms in each industry, but still more than for firms 
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There are two well-developed streams of inquiry into the dif-
fering innovative behavior of firms and industries. One, by econ-
omists, examines the technological implications of firm size and 
industry market structure. The other, by behavior scientists, 
examines the relationship between technology and the design of 
organizational systems. In some cases these are alternative expla-
nations of the same phenomena. In part IV we shall suggest an 
effort to explore the linkages between these modes of explanation. 
But first, let us look at each separately. 
The most pertinent lines of economic inquiry deal with the 
technological implications of differing firm sizes and industry mar-
ket structures. There is disagreement concerning both the magnitude 
and character of the effects of these variables. 25 Most of the empir 
ical research centers on the quantitative aspects of the presumed 
relationship, that is, on rates of change, rather than on the char-
acter of the technology or on the mechanisms by which the rate or 
character of change might be influenced. Most of the quantitative 
research, moreover, necessarily measures R&D spending or produc-
tivity change as surrogates for innovation. 
Up to a point, increasing firm size seems to be associated 
with greater R&D intensity. Scherer notes that companies with 5000 
or more employees are more likely to engage in R&D and to do it more 
(24 cont.) the largest firms report company R&D expenditures of close 
to 2% of sales (rubber products, SIC 30, and Stone Clay and Glass, 
SIC 32). The aggregate dollar expenditures by the top 8 firms in 
those industries are much smaller($171 million and $109 million) than 
the amounts spent in the industries in. Table 1. 
A large aggregate expenditure($344 million) is reported for the 
eight largest petroleum firms, but this accounts for less than 1% 
of their sales. 
25A useful and comprehensive summary is given by F. M. Scherer, 
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Chicago, Rand 
McNally, 1970, Chapter 15. 
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intensively than their smaller counterparts. He suggests that a 
firm size of roughly $75 million to $200 million seems to be "good 
for invention and innovation." 26 But the most pertinent comment 
on the quantitative studies remains Markham's apt conclusion: 
"Clearly, any answer to how inventive and innovative efforts are 
affected by firm size hangs on an extraordinarily slender reed that 
may alternatively bend upward or droop downward, depending on the 
species of statistical zephyrs blowing at the time." 27  
The quantitative studies of the relationship of market con-
centration to inventive or innovative effort appear to exhibit 
greater statistical consistency - confirming the conjecture that 
R&D efforts, at least, are more intense in highly concentrated 
industries. Other interindustry differences confound the analysis, 
however. Thus, when an index of technological opportunity is taken 
into account, the correlation with concentration is greatly weak- 
ened. 28 Scherer suggests, nevertheless, that "a modest degree of 
oligopoly is beneficial in fields of limited technological opportu- 
nity." 29  As Markham observes, however, the difficulty with these 
analyses is more conceptual than statistical. 30 No theory explains 
why some oligopolies are innovative in technology and others not; 
for example, the synthetic fiber and cigarette industries have sim-
ilar high concentration ratios and quite difference behavior. Corre-
lation alone fails to "explain" the differing behavior of firms 
26
Ibid., p. 361. 
27J. W. Markham, "Market Structure, Business Conduct, and Innova-
tion," American Economic Review, May 1965, pp. 323-32. 
28Scherer, op. cit., p. 374. 
29 Ibid., p. 376. 
30 ---- 
Markham, op. cit., p. 331 
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and industries. 
The empirical analyses of the relationship of firm size and 
market structure to technological innovation have recently been 
reviewed once again by Jesse Markham. After a careful appraisal 
of a baker's dozen of such studies, he reaches conclusions similar 
to those of his 1965 appraisal, summing up as follows: 31 
If, as economists assume, business outlays are at least 
in some sense governed by their profitability, data are 
beginning to suggest that large vertically integrated 
companies with large relative market shares have a great-
er incentive to invest in R&D than other firms. However, 
the really important questions of why R&D spending appears 
to be more profitable for such firms is as yet unanswered, 
except for perhaps suggesting the hypothesis that firms 
having those characteristics have a strategic advantage 
when it comes to exploiting the results of industrial R&D. 
Technical and economic forces, while undoubtedly influential, 
are by themselves, unlikely to provide an adequate explanation of 
the differences between firms and industries. Administrative fac-
tors also can impact on innovative effort and effectiveness. A 
progression of studies in the field of organizational behavior 
indicates that technology is closely interdependent with the admin-
istrative characteristics of organizations. 
The central ideas of the organizational studies are these: 
First, that there is no one "best way" to structure an organization; 
rather, what is best in a particular case is contingent upon the 
task of the particular organization. This contingency theory 
obtained its fullest statement in the work of Lawrence and Lorsch,
32 
31Jesse W. Markham, "Market Concentration and Innovation," unpub-
lished draft, March 1973. 
32Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Organization and Environment: 
Managing Differentiation and Integration, Boston, Division of 
Research, Harvard Business School, 1967. 
but it was foreshadowed by others, including Woodward and Burns, 
to be discussed below. Second, the differing characteristics 
of technologies employed in the operations of firms may condition 
the effectiveness of alternative organizational forms. A third 
idea, implicit in the first two, is that firms with certain organ-
ization structures may have more difficulty than others with the 
adoption of technological change. 
A seminal work in this line of inquiry was Joan Woodward's 
study of 110 English manufacturing firms. 33 Woodward found that 
a series of measures of organizational structure bore no general 
relationship to a firm's size or its success. Patterns emerged 
only when firms were classified by types of production •e.g., 
unit and small batch; mass production), revealing a direct rela-
tionship between these measures of technology and the organiza-
tional variables. Within each technological category the more 
successful firms exhibited the same organizational characteristics, 
leading Woodward to conclude that "one particular form of organ-
ization was most appropriate to each system of production." As 
this implies, technical change that altered the basic method of 
production led to fundamental organizational change, although such 
change, in Woodward's experience, was generally responsive to 
emergent problems rather than a planned concomitant of the tech-
nical change. 
Woodward's findings have been tested by a series of other 
33lndustrial Organization: Theory and Practice, Oxford University 
Press, 1965. 
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studies in the United States and the United Kingdom, with mixed 
results. 34 There is no consensus on an appropriate metric for 
"technology," nor on which characteristics of "structure" are 
likely to be related to it. Size of firm is a confounding fac-
tor in these studies and the lack of an accepted larger theoret-
ical framework has added to the difficulty of interpreting empir-
ical results. 
Another influential early study, by Burns and Stalker, inves-
tigated the interaction of technology and organization in vari-
ety of manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom. 35 Burns argues 
that choice of the appropriate organizational system is dependent 
on characteristics of the task (especially rates of change in tech-
nology and markets), the informal system (particularly the indivi-
dual commitments to personal, political, or status goals); and the 
quality of leadership. Idealized systems of management, dubbed 
"mechanistic" and "organic," are defined as polar types. In stable 
task environments, firms employ mechanistic systems, in which 
there is a steep hierarchy, formal rules and procedures, jobs are 
defined from above, and spans of authority are narrow and sharply 
defined. Organic systems, with contrasting characteristics, pre-
vail in environments of rapid change. When firms with mechanistic 
organizations tried to exploit more rapidly changing technologies 
and entered new, more dynamic markets, they were generally unable 
to make the necessary adjustments in organization. 
34An excellent review of this literature is given by Pradip N. 
Khandwalla, "Mass Output Orientation of Operations Technology and 
Organizational Structure," McGill University, Faculty of Management, 
Working Paper, 1973, pp. 1-8. 
35Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation, London, 
Tavistock Publication, 1961. 
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Lawrence and Lorsch developed a more comprehensive framework 
for analysis of the relationship of organization to environment. 36 
At the core of their "contingency theory" of organization design 
is the notion that a successful organization achieves a "good fit" 
within each subunit (e.g., sales department, factory, etc.) between 
(a) characteristics of the tasks implicit in the segments of the 
external environment with which that unit interacts; (b) character-
istics of the formal structure of the units; and (c) characteris-
tics of the personal orientation of the managers in the subunit. 
In empirical studies of firms in the plastics, food, and container 
industries, they tested this idea using measures of environmental 
diversity and uncertainty, degree of formality of structure, and 
three measures of managerial orientations, 37 with results that 
tend to confirm the basic contingency hypothesis. 
High performing organizations were found by Lawrence and 
Lorsch to have a higher degree of differentiation between units 
than others in the same environment and also to achieve a higher 
degree of integration across units. By integration they mean "the 
quality of the state of collaboration ... required to achieve unity 
of effort" - a result that obviously grows more difficult to achieve 
with greater differentiation. Although high integration seems 
required for success whatever the characteristics of the environment, 
the particular patterns of collaboration required and the mechan-
isms (through formal structure or modes of conflict resolution) 
which will achieve them appear to vary with environment. 
36
Organization and Environment, op. cit. 
37
They measured the "time orientation" of managers in terms of the 
(continued on page 22.) 
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Emerging from these studies is the notion that the individual 
firm, defined by its purposes, tasks, and administrative design, 
can most usefully be viewed as an open system in continuing inter-
action with its environment, defined in terms of economics and 
technology. Richard Normann focuses this idea specifically on 
technological innovation in products. 38 He suggests that a product 
defines the type of relationship that exists between a firm and a 
segment of its environment. He argues that a product ties the 
firm to a specific portion of the environment, namely "the domain, 
which is that part of the environment ... with which the organiza- 
tion is in more or less constant interaction." The characteristics 
of successful products must be consonant with the needs and values 
of the domain and, according to Normann, can also be considered 
"a mapping of the value and power structure of the organization." 39 
 Product variations may not alter this relationship, but "reorienta-
tions" (i.e., the addition of new dimensions, or radical changes 
among them) or the introduction of new kinds of products often will 
lead the firm into new domains, with generally profcund consequences 
for the value and power structures, as well as the formal design, 
of the organization. 
37 (continued) 
degree of immediacy of feedback expected as a consequence of action 
and further classified managers as "task oriented" (primarily con-
cerned with technical content of job) or "socially oriented" (pri-
marily interested in relations with other people). A third measure, 
which they termed "goal orientation," was not found to be related to 
environmental uncertainty. 
38Richard Normann, "Organizational Innovativeness: Product Variatio: 
and Reorientation," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 16, pp. 
203-215, (June 1971). 
39 Ibid., pp. 205-206. For example, the power and size characteris-
tics of automobiles made in Detroit can be viewed either as conse-
quences of a certain market segment's preferences or of the ideology 
of managers of "The Big Three." 
IV. THE NEED FOR SYNTHESIS 
We have mentioned only a small part of the research in micro-
economics and in organization theory that bears on the interaction 
of social, economic, and behavioral characteristics of particular 
organizations with their creation or use of technology. Two cen-
tral tendencies can be discerned in recent research of this kind. 
In one mode, the tools and outlook of economics prevail; the pro-
blems addressed are predominantly those of the public policy-maker; 
and the substantive focus is on the external environment of the 
organization, with simplifying assumptions about the behavioral 
processes inside the "black box" of the firm. In the alternative 
mode, the tools and outlook are those of organizational behavior 
(sociology, psychology, cultural anthropology, social psychology); 
the problems are those of the managers of organizations; and the 
substantive focus is on the "inner environment" of life in organ-
izations, with simplifying assumptions about the processes gener-
ating events in the external environment. 
The two modes of inquiry have been linked by concern for inter-
related problems, but by little else. For most of these scholars, 
the problematics of technological innovation have been pursued as a 
secondary concern in work aimed at contributing to the empirical or 
theoretical basis of the economics of firms and industries or the 
design of organizations. Research in which understanding the pro-
blem of innovation has been central to the investigator's purposes 
has tended to draw unevenly from these discipline-oriented modes. 
Even when there is comprehensive attention to findings of both 
1 65 
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sorts - as in the report of the SAPPHO study - intellectual syn-
thesis has been frustrated by the lack of an adequate integrative 
theoretical structure. 
An intellectual synthesis is needed, in my opinion, if pol-
icy-research on technological innovation is to develop findings 
whose normative implications could confidently be adopted by pol-
icy-makers and administrators. This is not to say that it is 
unhelpful to have research conducted in the modes identified above; 
on the contrary, without such work there would be little founda-
tion for the needed synthesis. Nor does it mean that economists 
should try to become organizational theorists, or vice versa. 
What we do suggest is that policy-oriented research must find a 
framework that is capable of embracing several kinds of varia-
ables: economic and social factors both within the firm and in its 
external environment. 
Consider the implications of the view of the firm as an open 
system in continuing interaction with its environment. Clearly, 
this suggests that external forces, e.g., the behavior of a com-
petitor or the needs of customers, might explain much of the observ-
able behavior of firms in the tasks of innovation. Public policies, 
of course, are an important influence shaping the environments for 
most firms. But internal characteristics are also important, for 
example, organization structure or the kind of technology employed 
in existing operations. 
The top managers of a firm can influence both its internal 
characteristics and the environments affecting it. For example, 
managers, by shaping strategy to lead the firm into new environmentE 
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alter the firm's domains (in Normann's sense). 40  Product policy 
is not the only sphere in which this power resides, although it 
is probably the most potent. Financial policy can expose the firm 
to the fluctuations of uncertain short-term sources or insulate it 
by reliance on retained earnings. Manufacturing policy can be 
used to integrate backward to stablize access to materials or tech-
nology. Procurement can choose between spot (uncertain) or con-
truactual (more stable) sources. Changes which lead the firm into 
an environment with new (to the firm) characteristics will evoke 
pressure for changes within the firm. 
To a limited, but still significant degree, managers also can 
alter the characteristics of a given environmental domain. For 
example, as an alternative to forward integration into final mar-
kets, materials producers can educate and otherwise influence the 
behavior of fabricators (their customers)• 41 Automotive manufac- 
turers stabilize the environment of their assembly plants by the 
franchise system for dealers, which permits them to "push" cars 
onto dealers' floors both stimulating sales effort and smoothing 
short-term fluctuations in consumer demand.
42 Contractual agree-
ments for procurement, and leasing policies for certain producers' 
goods, may have analogous effects. 
The "open system" view of the firm consequently implies that 
explanations of innovative behavior may be seriously misleading 
40 This point is made most clearly by Charles Christenson, "The Con- 
tingency Theory of Organization: A Methodological Analysis," Har-
vard Business School, Working Paper 73-36. Using rigorous analysis 
of the "open system" premises of the Lawrence and Lorsch work, he 
shows that the apparent normative implications of the idea of "good 
fit" may be misleading. 
41E. Raymond Corey, The Development of Markets for New Materials, 
Boston, Harvard Business School, Division of Research, 1956. 
42 See Lawrence J. White, The Automobile Industry Since 1945, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971, Chapter 9. 
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if they take into account only characteristics of its internal 
organization or only aspects of its external environment. Both 
must be considered. For example, the research discussed in the 
preceding section shows that the structural characteristics with-
in organizations in the real world will be correlated with the 
characteristics of their particular environments. Hence an observ-
able relationship between an environmental characteristic and inno-
vative behavior may be heavily conditioned by the organizational 
characteristics associated with that environment. The converse is 
also true. To develop a sound understanding we must treat both 
organization and environment explicitly and carefully. 
How are we to bring both organizational and environmental con-
texts simultaneously into the perspective of applied research on 
the innovation process? I do not see great promise in the kind of 
eclectic empiricism by which long lists of economic, social, behav-
ioral, and other "factors" in the environment of innovations are 
identified and then sorted out by multivariate statistics. The 
needed synthesis should be sought at a higher level of abstraction. 
In my opinion, the concept of corporate strategy framework might 
make it possible to reduce the multitude of apparently relevant 
"factors" to a parsimonious few. 
V. STRATEGY 
"Corporate strategy is the pattern of major objectives, pur-
poses, or goals, and essential policies and plans for achieving 
those goals, stated in such a way as to define what business the 
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company is in or is to be in and the kind of company it is or is 
to be." 43 In these words Kenneth Andrews summarizes the main points 
of the concept of strategy that has been built up over more than a 
decade by the contributions of a group of scholars located primarily 
at the Harvard Business School. 
The framework for study of corporate strategy developed by 
this group embraces both the formulation and implementation of 
strategy, which are treated as interacting administrative processes. 
Emphasis on this interaction has been a distinctive characteristic 
of the Harvard group, whose research and writings define and explore 
the implications of the subtle interplay between the processes of 
formulation and implementation. 
Strategy formulation results in the top management's commit-
ment to a set of goals, policies, and programs that match the organ-
ization's distinctive resources to perceived opportunities in a 
changing environment. Profit objectives are made explicit and the 
means of financing matched to the implied balance of risks and 
returns. Commercial goals are set, defining market segments and 
channels, and the products or services (functionally defined) to be 
offered. The core idea in the establishment of an economic stra-
tegy for the firm is the careful assessment and subsequent matching 
of (environmental) opportunity and (organizational) capability. 
The process of implementation creates the organizational con-
ditions necessary for realization of a chosen strategy. It defines 
the structure of the formal organization, its information and control 
43Kenneth Andrews, The Concept of Corporate Strategy, Chicago, 
Dow-Jones-Irwin, Inc., 1971, p. 28. 
17 , 
systems, and the "style" of management direction. Implementation 
changes the capabilities of the organization; environmental factors 
change autonomously and in response to corporate initiatives; both 
kinds of change create a need for continuing reassessment and refor-
mulation of strategy: 
An example cited by Bower illustrates the concept of strategy 
at a concrete level: 44 
In 1964 Crown Cork and Seal was a major producer of 
metal cans and crowns. Broadly speaking, its strategy 
was "to be a world-wide manufacturer of cans sold as pack-
ages (rather than metal containers) to meet the marketing 
needs of the container customer using strength in special-
ty markets of the U.S. to achieve a stable domestic base 
for international growth." Given resources far more lim-
ited than those of its competition, these objectives were 
to be achieved by a lower level strategy: "To be a man-
ufacturer of a narrow line of containers for technolog- 
ically 'hard to hold' products achieving growth by bring-
ing existing products to new markets and by rapid adap- 
tation, development, and marketing of competitors' inven-
tions. In turn, these objectives were to be achieved 
by a series of subsidiary functionally oriented policies 
which capitalized on the agility small size gave Crown, 
the near homogeneous quality of most container products, 
the high cost of transporting empty cans, and the high 
cost of changing over fabricating machines. Crown's pol-
icies were 1) to modernize plants, 2) installing multi-
ple lines of fabricating machinery requiring infrequent 
changes in set-up, 3) which permitted rapid customer 
service, which 4) was reinforced through geographic dis-
persion of plants to sites near customers, which 5) 
together with plant flexibility provided a basic selling 
point of service and low transport costs for exploitation 
by 6) a customer-oriented sales force responsible for 
accounts rather than products. These in turn were sup- 
ported by 7) a limited number of industry specialists and 
8) and applications-oriented R&D group which allocated 60% 
of its funds to test packaging for new products. 
One should expect the interaction of Crown Cork's strategy and 
its innovative behavior to be substantial. Since the generation of 
44J. L. Bower, "Strategy as a Problem Solving Theory of Business 
Planning," unpublished working paper, Harvard Business School, 1967, 
pp. 17-18. 
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ideas is influenced by contact with areas of need, it is signi-
ficant that the character and intensity of relevant contracts will 
be determined largely by the commitment to decentralized plants 
and a customer-oriented sales force. The allocation of resources 
to development was shaped directly by corporate goals and the deci-
sion to emphasize new uses for existing technology and rapid adop-
tion of competitors' inventions. An aspect of implementation, the 
structuring of R&D efforts in relation to other organizational 
units, such as plants and sales offices, will create linkages and 
barriers that are significant in the transfer of technology and 
the introduction of innovation. 
This brief illustration is suggestive of the ways in which 
the concrete implications of a particular strategy can influence 
the allocation of resources to and the effectiveness of mechanisms 
for various kinds of technological development within the firm. 
The other cases, the logic of a strategy, by itself, will lead a 
firm to engage in, or disengage from a business field in a way 
that has important consequences for the development of technology 
in the society at large. 45 
The advent of the diesel railroad locomotive is a case in 
point. It is a classic example of the overthrow of a tight oligo-
poly by an outsider backing a superior technology. The three 
American manufacturers of locomotives followed identical strategies 
which embraced a single technology - steam - and emphasized the 
45
Bower calls attention to the more general implications of a global 
strategic choices and uses GM's withdrawal from the airframe indus-
try as an example (Ibid., p. 17). 
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marketing of individualized designs for each customer and thus 
custom manufacture of the product. All three producers remained 
wedded to that strategy to its conclusion, which saw them with-
drawing from locomotive production. 
The outsider, as is well known, was the General Motors Corpo-
ration. GM's entry into this field arose from the fortuitous (for 
GM shareholders and for the U.S. economy) coincidence of several 
factors. One was the interest in diesel technology of GM's tech-
nical genius, Charles Kettering. The GM technical organization 
experimented with diesels throughout the 1920's, but Kettering's 
intense interest seems to have stemmed from his purchase of a 
diesel-powered yacht in 1928. Kettering developed no new princi-
ples, but he perceived that the two-cycle diesel could be devel-
oped into a practical large engine meeting the power-weight require-
ments necessary for economic railroad operation. A second factor 
was the willingness of Kettering's backers in GM to stick with the 
project until the practicality of the concept could be demonstrated 
(Sloan puts this in 1930) and solutions found for the many detailed 
engineering problems encountered prior to production of a working 
full-scale engine (produced for the Chicago Fair in 1933). Third 
was the ability of GM to acquire, in 1930, the Winton Engine Com-
pany, a leading manufacturer of large diesel engines, and the Elec-
tro-Motive Engineering Company, an engineering, design, and sales 
organization that had a close business relationship with Winton. 
These organizations, acquired at a time when Kettering had demon-
strated the practicality of his engine, but had built no commercial 
scale engine of the new design, provided the muscle and bone of 
GM's future Electro-Motive Division. 
But more than good fortune was involved, for chance favors 
the prepared organization, as it does the prepared mind. The 
strategy articulated for GM by Sloan and his associates in the 
1920's, and the new structure they created to implement it, pre-
pared GM for the diesel opportunity and thus had a powerful influ-
ence on the course of this important technological innovation. 
First, the new structure of decentralized, largely autonomous oper-
ating divisions meant that the GM central office staff had the 
freedom from operating pressures to evaluate ventures that were as 
different from automobiles as refrigeration, aviation, and, of 
course, diesel locomotion. The same structure meant also that a 
segment of GM's technical staff, the Research Laboratory under 
Kettering, had a similar freedom. It is pure speculation, but one 
wonders whether the idea would have arisen at all in GM if the cor-
poration had retained the then more conventional functional organ-
ization form. 46 
While GM's structure may have created the opportunity for a 
non-automotive venture to gain serious attention, GM's strategy cer-
tainly shaped the new venture in two significant ways. First, it 
sanctioned the patient support of Kettering's development work and 
the investments in Winton and Electro-Motive. GM, over the years, 
has made many different products, but its sales have always been 
46Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure, Cambridge, 
Press, 1962, Chapter 3, describes Sloan's reorganization of GM in 
1925-27. 
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overwhelmingly from automotive goods. When it has diversified, 
the scope has been limited; as Sloan puts it: "We have never 
made anything except 'durable products,' and they have always, 
with minor exceptions, been connected with motors." 47 Even within 
these narrow boundaries, the diesel venture, in 1930, appeared as 
opportunity to be pursued. As Sloan recalls, "We were not at this 
point certain about the future of the U.S. automobile market.... 
We had a natural interest in any enterprise within our scope that 
offered us a reasonable opportunity to diversify." 48 
GM applied to this business the design, manufacturing, and 
service policies of its automotive business, rather than following 
the then established practices of the trade. This was the second 
way in which GM's strategy influenced the venture. GM built stand-
ard locomotives, priced them lower than the traditional custom 
designs, produced them in volume to realize economies that would 
make the lower price profitable, and established a service organi-
zation and stocks of standardized repair parts to back up its sales. 
As a consequence of this strategy, GM had both the motive and the 
staff to conduct R&D aimed at continuing improvement, unlike the 
steam manufacturers which were organized to build to customer spe-
cifications. 
After some experimentation with passenger locomotives, the stra-
tegy was put to the test in 1935, when GM offered a standard diesel 
47Alfred Sloan, My Years With General Motors, p. 341. This descrip-
tion of the origins of GM's diesel locomotive business is taken from 
Sloan's account. 
48 Ibid., p. 346, emphasis added. 
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switching engine, priced 10% below its steam counterpart. GM 
began production on 50 units ($3.6 million worth) before receiving 
a single order. The engine sold easily. Deliveries began in May 
1936; within seven years GM had delivered 768 switchers and had 
cut the price a further 20% to pass along operating economies to 
its customers. Soon after World War II the steam locomotive, and 
more important, the companies making steam locomotives, had passed 
from the industrial scene. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We began this paper with the assertion that the existing base 
of knowledge concerning technological innovation "invites a policy-
oriented synthesis." We are prepared now to identify a direction 
for inquiry that seems promising as a way of producing such a syn-
thesis. 
Implicit in our discussion has been a view of technological 
change that should be made explicit. Technological change is 
defined here as the introduction to practice of new and more useful 
ways of serving human purposes. Technological change is both spe- 
cific and diffuse. 	Specific, identifiable changes in goods or tech- 
niques, such as the diesel locomotive, the tear-top beverage can, 
or magnetic encodation of checks, symbolize the power and perva-
siveness of innovation. Also important are the myriad of minor 
changes, so diffuse as to be largely unidentifiable, that in the 
aggregate account for an appreciable fraction of measured produc-
tivity improvement. 49 
49 See Samuel Hollander, The Sources of Increased Efficiency, 
(continued on page 34.) 
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In principle, we can speak of "an innovation" as the basic 
unit of technological change. 50 This basic unit of analysis, 
however, embraces a wide range of magnitudes of scale and complex-
ity. The use of the Concorde in place of the 707 and the use of 
an aluminum bolt in place of a steel bolt are both "innovation." 
Every innovation implies a prior sequence of tasks concerned with 
idea generation, problem-solving (development), and implementation. 
This conception of the process of innovation, too, embraces sit-
uations varying greatly in scale and complexity. One innovation 
may be conceived, developed, and put into practice by an individual 
in one place within a single day; another, like the SST, may be the 
result of activities spanning decades in time, continents in space, 
and involving tens of thousands of individuals. Yet we may say 
that the characteristics of all innovations are influenced not only 
by factors inherent in the innovation process but also by what 
Merton has called "the environing social and cultural structure." 
Policy-makers affect the outcomes of the innovation process 
largely by influencing its environing social and cultural structure. 
Research that identifies the influence on innovation of malleable 
elements of that structure is, therefore, most relevant for policy 
purposes. 
The collection of forces outside the process of innovation that 
influence its behavior or outcomes we shall call its "context." The 
49 (continued) 
Cambridge, MIT Press, 1965; and John Enos, Petroleum Progress and  
Profits, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1962. Some diffuse changes benefit 
society but are overlooked in the conventional measures of produc-
tivity, since they occur in government organizations or within 
households. 
50Donald G. Marquis, "The Anatomy of Successful Innovations," 
Innovation, No. 7 (November 1969), pp. 28-37. 
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structural context is the enduring pattern of social, economic, 
and political forces that impinge on the process in every situation. 
In the case of the GM diesel development, the structural context 
included such factors as GM's decentralized organization, the 
existence of a central research laboratory, and the oligopolistic 
structure of the locomotive industry. 
Structural context can be defined at several levels of aggre-
gation;the immediate work group, a larger organizational unit or 
department, the corporation, and industry, or a whole society. A 
division into two categories organizational and environmental - 
will be sufficient for our purposes. Since the activities in the 
process of innovation commonly take place within multi-member organ-
izations, 51 the characteristics of the organizational milieu, its 
"internal environment," if you will, constitute a coherent set of 
forces. We shall refer to them, collectively, as the organizational  
context. They include, among other factors, the organization's goals, 
formal structure, leadership, and resources. The formal boundary 
of the organization defines the distinction between organizational 
context and the remaining contextual forces, including external 
technical and economic factors, as well as social, political, and 
other structural forces. 52 Collectively, these constitute the envi-
ronmental context. They include, among other factors, technological 
51Individuals may continue to account for inventions of significance 
and many adopters of innovation are individuals or small proprie-
torships (farms, retail stores, etc.) but the diverse skills and 
greater financial strength of larger organizations are needed almost 
without exception, for development and commercialization of techno-
logy of any great significance. 
52 This  . is not an unambigous boundary (e.g., as when several organ- 
izations collaborate on an innovation) but it is of heuristic value, 
(continued on page 36.) 
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trends, government policies, competitive behavior and demand trends. 
The core of the idea just advance arose in Joseph Bower's 
study of planning and investment in a large multiproduct manufac-
turing corporation. His observation of the persistent influence 
of organizational or structural forces on the technical, economic, 
and political acts of managers led Bower to the hypothesis that 
general managers could manipulate those forces to evoke desired 
behavior. 53 There is a great deal to support the hypothesis, both 
with respect to resource allocation within firms and more generally, 
with respect to innovative behavior. Bower's analysis required 
attention only to what we have called the organizational context, 
but students of technological innovation will need to enlarge the 
notion, recognizing the impact on innovation of contextual forces 
outside the firm, as well as those within it. 
The viewpoint toward the innovation process stated above is 
illustrated schematically in Figure 1. Technological change, the 
"dependent variable" of primary interest, is viewed as the result 
of a social process, which is customarily described as comprising 
three phases of tasks. 54 Those tasks in the process of innovation, 
in turn, interact with their context, which may be roughly differ-
entiated into forces within the organizational system performing 
52 (continued) 
at least, to distinguish characteristics intrinsic to organizations 
from those in their general environment. 
53Joseph L. Bower, Managing the Resource Allocation Process, Boston, 
Division of Research, Harvard Business School, 1970, p. 318. 
54Progress in the problem-solving and implementation tasks of inno-
vation requires the establishment and maintenance of organizational 
commitment; these behavioral factors are listed along with the 
strictly technical-economic tasks in Figure 1. 
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the tasks of innovation and those external to that system. 
How are the rate and character of technological change influ-
enced by factors in the organizational and environmental contexts 
of business? As the reader will have observed, this more precise 
restatement of the question posed in the first paragraph of the 
paper directs our attention to the sets of factors shown on the top 
half of figure 1. They can meet the test of malleability, since 
the elements of the organizational context are within the control 
of corporate management, while external factors are influenced 
both by corporate behavior and public policy. To clarify the rela-
tionship among these factors, however, and to meet the test of par-
simony, we need a higher level integrative framework. We propose 
that that purpose can be served by the concept of corporate stra-
tegy, as defined in Part V. 
The strategy framework is particularly appealing because it 
integrates in two relevent dimensions. First, the concept of 
strategy formulation calls for a perspective that cuts across the 
boundary of the organization, matching capability (an aspect of the 
organizational context) with opportunity (an aspect of the environ-
mental context). Unlike the modes of inquiry discussed in Part III, 
the strategy framework demands explicit attention to technical, 
economic, social, political, and behavioral considerations simul-
taneously, as it embraces factors within the firm and external to 
it. In the second dimension, i.e., within the organizational con-
text, the concept of strategy implementation requires the transla-
tion of higher level strategic abstractions into more concrete and 
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implemental terms. It is this aspect of strategy that gives 
shape to the organizational context. The twin concepts of formu-
lation and implementation might be the basis for development of a 
theory of the linkage between organizational context and environ-
mental context. 
Research within the broad framework of corporate strategy 
could perhaps begin to clarify the apparent interactions among 
organizational goals, structure, and leadership as influences on 
technological innovation. All three factors have appeared in past 
research as influential variables. Any combination of the three 
might explain, for example, why a large firm might counter a com-
petitor's large R&D investment by increased advertising, acquisi-
tion of a new product line, or other methods not imitative of the 
competitor. 55 
Commitment to different goals clearly is one factor explaining 
different technological strategies by firms in similar environments. 
From Bower's description of Crown Cork's strategy one can readily 
see why, historically, they did not imitate American Can's initia-
tive in establishing a central corporate R&D laboratory. Leadership 
also is a significant variable affecting innovative performance. In 
defining the determinants of organizational design (and, by implica-
tion, of effectiveness in adaptation to innovation), Burns and 
Stalker list "relative leadership capacity of top people" as one of 
three main factors. 56 Argyris argues that "openness" or "authenticity" 
55Markham raises this possibility as an illustration of the limita-
tions of using market structure as a primary explanation of innova-
tive behavior. See "Market Structure," op. cit., p. 326. 
56Management of Innovation, op. cit., Chapter 6. 
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of behavior facilitates risk-taking and problem-solving, character-
istics that are essential for innovation. 57 More generally, the 
behavior of key individuals appears significant in most histories 
of innovation. But individual behavior is greatly conditioned by 
other elements of organizational context, including structure. 
The implication of the preceding is that one should attempt 
to keep purpose, structure, and leadership in view simultaneously 
when analyzing the organizational context of innovation. As already 
noted, much of the research on innovation acknowledges the signifi-
cance of these elements of strategy, but none makes explicit use 
of a framework incorporating several of these elements in concert. 
Systematic work on corporate strategy, on the other side, has paid 
uneven (and generally little) attention to technology and virtually 
none to the concepts or findings of the several traditions of resear 
on technological innovation. Ansoff's discussion of corporate stra-
tegy does not integrate technology as an element, although he sub-
sequently devotes many pages to planning for R&D. 58 An article by 
Cohen and Cyert setting forth a conceptual framework for strategy 
formulation makes no mention whatever of technology. 59 Andrews, sum 
marizing the framework developed by the Harvard group, discusses 
technology, but in far too limited a scope. He recognizes techno-
logical change as an important determinant of opportunity: "From 
57Chris Argyris, Organization and Innovation, Homewood, Illinois: 
Irwin-Dorsey Press, 1965. 
58H. Igor Ansoff, Corporate Strategy,New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965. 
Interestingly, this book has no index entry for "technology." 
59Kalman J. Cohen and Richard M. Cyert, "Strategy: Formulation, 
Implementation, and Monitoring," Journal of Business, Vol. 46, 
pp. 349-367, 1973. 
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the point of view of the Corporate Strategist, technological devel-
opments are not only the fastest unfolding but the most far reach-
ing in extending or contracting opportunity for an established com- 
pany.. 60  But technology is treated as something outside the firm, 
apparently autonomous in its unfolding. 
Technology, however, is neither autonomous nor wholly "outside" 
the control of managers. It is more useful to view it as interact-
ing with the firm, part of its capability, shaped by, as well as 
a shaper of, corporate action. At times, to be sure, its principal 
significance is as part of the environment, when it emerges as a 
threat or an opportunity to which the firm must respond strategically. 
In other cases as, for example, in GM's development of the diesel 
locomotive, the technological capability of the firm conditions its 
strategic commitments. In still other cases, as in the Crown Cork 
example, a certain posture toward technology is one of the strategic 
tasks implied by the implementation of a defined strategy. 
One is tempted to conceptualize strategy as a unitary variable 
to be introduced into empirical studies. James Utterback, in an 
unpublished paper, has suggested precisely this, in a proposal that 
a firm's "competitive strategy" (e.g., cost-minimizing or sales-
maximizing) be treated as an explicit variable. 61 Bruce Scott and 
his associates have developed an appealing scheme to classify firms 
according to the character and extent of their integration and diver-
sification ("strategy") and their formal structure. 62 Although 
60Kenneth Andrews, op. cit., p. 60. 
61 "The Process of Innovation in Firms with Differing Competitive 
Strategies." September 1973. 
62Bruce R. Scott, "The Industrial State: Old Myths and New Real-
ities," Harvard Business Review, March-April 1973, pp. 133-148. 
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concerned with issues other than technological innovation, Scott 
does offer the conjecture that firms in one category - diversi-
fied strategy with divisional structure - are better equipped than 
others to exploit the results of R&D. Andrews' definition of cor-
porate strategy, cited above, is, admittedly, diffuse, in compar-
ison with the crisp classificatory schemes suggested by Utterback 
or Scott. Strategy, however, is a multidimensional concept which 
still requires the careful, clinical appraisal of specific situa-
tions (as in the Crown Cork example); much rich detail can be lost 
in premature efforts to construct a single simple scale. It is 
appealing to think that the introduction of a powerful and over-
looked variable will shed important new light on our subject, but 
I doubt that any single variable would have such an impact. 
The argument of this paper is that the concept of strategy 
offers a framework which can help us to design empirical studies 
which might generate "explanations" of the process of technolog-
ical change in firms and industries using only a few highly salient 
variables. Whether this argument is correct or not is an empirical 
question which deserves to be answered. 
Chapter 10 
REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY USED TO STUDY 
THE BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF THE INNOVATION PROCESS 
Charles F. Douds 
and 
Albert H. Rubenstein 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to assist in the overall task 
of improving the Research and Development/Innovation (RD/I) pro-
cess, with which the Office of National R&D Assessment and many 
other parts of the National Science Foundation and the whole gov-
ernment are concerned. 
In order to help improve the knowledge base for such improve-
ments in the RD/I process, we must also improve the research pro-
cess which generates knowledge about the factors influencing its 
outcomes, and the consequences of its outcomes. If we are to 
increasingly substitute credible research findings for ad hoc 
opinions as the basis for this improvement (through policy-making 
or organizational design and management procedures), we must im-
prove the ways in which innovation research is structured, data 
are collected, and inferences are made. It is not obvious that 
descriptive studies alone, no matter how rigorous and credible, 
will provide a sufficient basis for improvement of innovation. 
We certainly need careful analytical and normative studies that 
Drs. Douds and Rubenstein are in the Program of Research on 
the Management of Research and Development, Department of Indus-
trial Engineering and Management Science, of the Technological 
Institute of Northwestern University. 
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examine the nature of the process and its connections with the 
rest of society. However, our best chances for improvement of 
the process lie, we believe, in a healthy interaction between 
such normative/analytical studies and empirical studies of how 
the process actually works in the "real world." 
Given this premise--the need for both kinds of studies in 
effective interaction--our task in this paper is to examine the 
methods used in conducting the empirical research component of 
the total research effort on the innovation process. 
If we are to substitute results from the research process 
for rules of thumb and private experience as a basis for policy 
formation and innovation process design, we want assurance that 
these results are produced in a manner that provides high credi-
bility, replicability, and communicability--important character-
istics of "good" scientific results. 
Unfortunately, we are far from this situation at present. 
The field of innovation "research" is currently diverse, loose, 
full of gaps and contradictions. It is not cause for discourage-
ment, however, for many science-based fields such as engineering 
and medicine have been or still are in this condition. Much of 
the disorder in "our" field--studies of the innovative process--
is due to lack of standard or even fully-disclosed methodology 
for conducting studies, collecting data, and making inferences 
from the findings (despite the complex trappings of statistical 
tests and analytical methods). 
In addition, there is the persistent problem of "amateurism" 
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or lack of adequate training among many of the people who conduct 
or attempt to conduct innovation studies. This is a situation 
which is not tolerated in other fields, where adequate training 
is expected as a sine qua non before an experimental or field 
investigation is undertaken. 
The deceptive thing about our kind of research is that, for 
some people, all that appears to be involved in data gathering is 
"writing down a list of interesting questions for a questionnaire 
(or interview) and mailing it out (or interviewing some people)." 
A lot of bad and useless data are collected in this way, and a lot 
of time and patience are expended by respondents with little pro-
mise of a useful payoff to either themselves or society. 
In this paper we describe the range of different method-
ologies used in the study of the innovation process: in particu-
lar, the behavioral aspects of that process -- the decisions made, 
the information exchanged, the attitudes expressed, and the non-
technical as well as technical results achieved. For example, a 
major consequence of a particular innovation project started in 
the R&D laboratory of a company may be the realization that the 
company's product lines or production processes are technically 
or economically obsolete and that an intensive program of improve-
ments is needed. The consequences of an innovation project either 
initiated by or involving the marketing department may be indica-
tions of the way in which selling or servicing of the company's 
products needs to be improved. Either or both of these conse-
quences may lead to changes in personnel, skills, decision pro-
cesses, attitudes, power relations, etc. 
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Our procedure in this paper is to present a set of factors 
for classifying existing and future studies of the innovation 
process and then to present a set of criteria for evaluating a 
sample of extant studies in the context of "scientific studies 
of the innovation process." 
Our purpose in this evaluation is less to evaluate the spe-
cific studies, per se, in terms of their intrinsic scientific 
merit, than to examine them as candidates for contributing to 
the body of knowledge needed for improvement of the innovation 
process. That is, the emphasis is on the factors involved in 
assessing their credibility and usefulness as a basis for policy-
making, organizational design, or management in the innovation 
process. While this paper is not, and cannot be, a text on field 
research methods, we hope that it will contribute to improving 
the research situation in the field of innovation studies. 
THE SITUATION AND THE NEED 
The innovation process is central to the advancement of an 
economy. Through innovation, change is brought about. Discov-
eries in science and technology through a variety of processes 
are singled out, combined, revised, transformed, commercialized, 
etc., with a variety of impacts on the society. For a variety 
of motives, individuals, organizations, and governments desire to 
exert some degree of influence over the process of innovation in 
its many forms. One major focus is on technological innovation--
devices, machines, chemicals, drugs, etc.--that have demonstrable' 
economic and/or social consequences. But upon what do decision 
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makers base their actions when they seek to affect the process? 
This question, easily asked, is not so easily answered. 
Philosophers and historians have made observations on various 
aspects of the process for many years. Economists have sought to 
examine the effects of technological innovation on primarily the 
macro-aspects of economies. "Science policy" has become a spe-
cific focus of concern in governmental circles and among asso-
ciated specialists. This upsurge of interest and concern has 
focussed increased attention on our understanding--or lack there-
of--of the innovation process. 
Three distinct, but overlapping, areas of innovation-related 
activity by students of the innovation process can be distin-
guished (Rubenstein, 1973): 
1. Research, of a descriptive, theory building nature. Its 
main task is to explain and provide a basis for predicting the 
behavior of individuals, organizations, industries, etc., in-
volved in innovation and the outcomes of the process. 
2. Policy formulation, of a prescriptive nature. Its main 
task is to set standards and criteria; to indicate what courses 
of action are desirable and "correct"; and to provide guidelines 
for legislation and other kinds of social decision making. 
3. Design, of actual, on going organization strategies, 
structures, and processes. It involves the implementation of im-
plicit or explicit policy recommendations based on implicit or 
explicit theories, models, or hypotheses about the relationships 
among the variables believed to be operating and manipulable in 
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the process. 
These distinctions indicate the potential importance of 
research on the innovation process. Design actions are being 
taken by government and private organizations continually. Deci-
sions by executives related to the innovation process are based 
upon direct reasoned experience, beliefs about what ought to be 
done, observation of the behavior of their peer groups, and pre-
dictions of the consequences of such actions. Such decisions are 
a part of "political" processes--using the term in its broadest 
sense. If the information input taken into account in such de-
cisions is based primarily upon the experiences of specific indi-
viduals or speculative theorizing, then the quality of the result-
ing programs will rest solely upon the idosyncratic character-
istics of the decision makers involved. Except fortuitously, 
the results can be no better than the insights and "gut feelings" 
of the decision maker in the midst of the pressures of political 
processes of which he is part. To the extent that he draws upon 
policy recommendations formulated by others, a degree of objec-
tivity apart from the political processes of firms and govern-
ments may be attained. But clearly, policy formulation decisions 
must themselves draw upon external information sources if they 
are not also to be speculative or idiosyncratic. 
Design of policies and systems intended to affect innovation 
is going on continuously. But much of it is unsystematic, cut 
and try design which involves little systematic analysis of the 
likely effects of different design configurations on the outcomes 
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of the innovation process itself or likely side effects on the 
participating organizations, other sectors of the economy, and 
society as a whole. 
There is a large amount of literature on policy for this 
area, but very little of it is based on such theory and research 
results as exist. In addition, many of the policy prescriptions 
are in direct conflict with each other, with equally distin-
guished observers and practitioners in disagreement over basic 
issues. 
It is not too surprising that this should be the situation. 
There has been little systematic, basic research on the actual 
behavior of individuals, groups, or organizations, and on the 
consequences of that behavior for effective innovation. There 
is an abundance of material that relates to this problem area, 
but characteristic of a newly-developing field, there is rela-
tively little "proven knowledge" as yet. Much of the lore is 
contained in the experience- and intuition-based "wisdom" liter-
ature. 
FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE* 
The approaches reflected in the literature of the field can 
be seen to take three forms: the discursive approach; the case 
study approach; and the field study research approach. Each con-
tributes to the search for knowledge--the "truth-seeking" pro-
cess. Each has sets of procedures or methodologies that guide it. 
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* Adapted from Douds (1971). 
The Discursive Approach  
There is an abundance of writing of a discursive nature 
about the R&D/innovation process. It contains a wide variety of 
material serving many purposes--speeches, conference papers, etc. 
Much wisdom garnered from the practical experience of managers 
and administrators is contained in it. Many propositions or the-
ories are implied. But as the implicit propositions are col-
lected from various sources, one finds many inconsistencies or 
contradictions. Some of these represent viable differences in 
explanations of the way the phenomena work, and as such they 
are of great interest for more structured research. Unfortu-
nately, these interesting propositions derived from practical 
experience are immersed in a mass of other propositions stemming 
from non-experientially based sources--observations of "experi-
ence" that do not accord with what actually took place, wishful 
thinking, etc. Part of the literature is also persuasive in na-
ture, intended to advocate a particular cause, budget item, organ-
izational approach, or specific decision. 
The methodology of this literature is very diffuse. If a 
consistent basis exists at all, it is a methodology of "exposi-
tion and rhetoric." This literature, particularly the "wisdom" 
literature, provides one of several starting points for the truth-
seeking process. It is not amenable to a structured analysis for 
the verifiable "truths" it may contain, for it is not organized 
for verification, but it does serve many useful functions. It 
draws attention to the field, creates awareness of the importance 
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of problems in the area, stimulates action, and can provide in-
sights and propositions that are amenable to test and potential 
verification by more "scientific" methods. 
The Case Study Approach  
Typically, case studies provide a narrative description of 
the circumstances involved in given situations or events. They 
generally deal with specific, limited sets of events. 	Histor- 
ical and biographical literature is also of this character. Some 
valuable insights, especially with regard to the individual, are 
provided by historical and biographical literature and case stud-
ies', but little of this material lends itself to generalization 
to a larger population. It can provide the source of some pro-
positions capable of being tested, but the outcomes reported in 
case studies often are those of unique, and sometimes unusual 
cases. One should hesitate to base actions of any magnitude on 
generalizations drawn only from one or a limited number of such 
reports where the structure of the methodology does not involve 
a priori propositions to be tests or a reasonable a priori frame-
work for guiding data collection and testing speculations or hypo-
theses. 
Cases of innovation often appear in a form that can be char-
acterized as "technologic chronologies" wherein the emphasis is 
on chains of concepts, discoveries, successes, failures, and 
other events described in terms of the science and technology in-
volved, moreso than the people, management, and organizational 
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factors involved. This type is well illustrated by the "TRACES" 
report (IIT, 1968). It traces, primarily, the chronology of the 
scientific concepts and technological accomplishments leading up 
to the six innovations selected for the study. The chain of 
events is traced back into the last century to show the relative 
contribution to the innovations of scientific to technological 
inputs. It appears that, in part, this project was stimulated 
by one of the findings of Project Hindsight (Sherwin and Isenson, 
1966) , namely, that the ratio of scientific to technical inputs 
in a number of key events for weapon system innovations was low 
over the time span considered. The TRACES report notes the dif-
ficulties in determining what events are to be included in the 
chronology. It is not surprising that they find a much higher 
ratio of relevant events than in Project Hindsight. The case 
studies and charts do illustrate well the diversity of inputs 
and some of the missed opportunities which could possibly have 
led to the innovation at an earlier time. 
Lipetz (1965) has prepared a compilation of about 320 case 
histories of scientific and technological activity. He notes a 
number of difficulties in assembling the studies and hence with 
interpreting them, originating with the varied intentions of 
their authors. This difficulty with inference is illustrated by 
the two sets of case studies above: Project Hindsight and the 
subsequent TRACES report, each funded by different organizations. 
Whereas in the discursive approach there is little evidence 
of a paradigmatic truthseeking methodology, in case studies there 
does often tend to be evidence of structured approaches. However, 
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they are many and varied depending, in part, upon the purposes 
for which the case was prepared as well as the background and 
training of the case writer. 
In this early stage of the innovation research field, it is 
appropriate that case studies be of a chronological, narrative 
character, given that there is little theory upon which to draw 
and that there is a great deal of uncertainty about the nature 
of the phenomena involved. They are more useful if they also 
treat the behavioral, organizational, and environmental aspects. 
However, the insights obtained are strongly dependent upon the 
training, skill, perceptiveness, and other such personal charac- 
teristics of the case writer, as well as the reader. In the dis-
cursive literature the writer often seeks to persuade the reader 
to some attitude or action. The writer's role is intentionally 
an active one. In this "midway" literature--midway to providing 
the verifiable predictive capability associated with scientific 
theory and engineering practice--the case writer's role is not 
intended to be active. But it must necessarily be so, for he 
can report only a finite amount of information from the greater 
possibilities of what could have been reported. Such cases can 
help to structure a field. One can discover factors common to 
several cases, and relationships among these factors may be sug-
gested. A single case may suggest an important element or rela-
tionship not reported in other cases. Case study information may 
be of use in generating alternatives for action as well as propo-
sitions for testing. Case studies do not provide tests of pro-
positions and, in aggregate, form a somewhat hazardous basis for 
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determining the frequency of occurrence of various factors. One 
usually has little information available to determine how the 
sample of cases examined compares to the population of potential 
cases, and infrequently knows the methods and criteria used to 
select the material reported. There may also be a bias present 
in many case studies: it is hardly worth the considerable effort 
required to collect the data unless the case is notable in some 
regard. 
Price and Bass (1969) reviewed several key studies of tech-
nology transfer. Most of these include case study descriptions 
(e.g., MAB, 1966; Sherwin and Isenson, 1966; IIT, 1968) as well 
as analysis, to a varying extent, of variables quantified to some 
degree. This latter aspect is an important first step in studies 
oriented toward prediction. 
However, the case study can serve other functions. It can 
serve as a device around which to center a learning experience. 
If this is to occur for the reader, it usually happens in a struc-
tured, classroom situation. But it can also serve in the same 
manner for the authors, particularly when several work together. 
This is clearly evident in the report of the Materials Advisory 
Board and is specifically noted by M. Tannenbaum: 
...the Committee is convinced that we, as indi-
viduals, have been by far the greatest benefi-
ciaries of the studies which have led to this-
report. The generation and discussion of these 
cases was an intensive learning experience.(MAB, 1966, p.2 
There is another use of the case study approach. One may 
have a theoretical model that structures or explains the relation-
ship between certain conditions or variables in a range of situ-
ations. This model is more than a listing of factors-to-note 
existing prior to, or developed during, a case study. The case 
is prepared paying particular attention to the factors contained 
in the model. The input filter is made explicit, and the reader, 
as well as the author, can judge if the model does not fit the 
situation. If it does not fit, then the model must be reworked. 
If it fits, then further studies testing the model may be worth-
while. If it appears to fit the situation, at best it can only 
be said that it fits this one situation. 
This is the approach adopted by Nelson (1962) wherein he 
articulates not only the technological concepts involved in the 
invention of the transistor but also some aspects of the manner 
in which the individuals involved worked together, the coupling 
of the groups, and the role of the managers and managerial policy 
involved. Marschak (1962) takes a similar approach in presenting 
an extensive case history of a complex systems development pro-
gram (also in the Bell Laboratories) to test the viability of a 
single hypothesis. A number of other propositions concerning 
the management and behavior of systems development are derived 
from the case history. Several other case studies concerned 
with the development of complex weapons systems are presented in 
Marschak, Glennan, and Summers (1967, Chap. III). These reports 
include less successful, as well as more successful, cases. 
It is to be noted that extreme cases are particularly useful 
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in generating insights or "concept-testing" propositions and 
models. Parallel cases with different outcomes provide similar 
opportunities if they have been developed comparably. However, it 
is extremely difficult to determine when cases are truly "parallel" 
and to assure that their preparation is comparable. 
Parallel cases have particular value in that they can provide 
an explicit basis for comparison. It is through such comparisons 
that meaningful "information" is extracted from "data." A single 
case, or a set of single cases, provides a great deal of data to 
the reader. The basis for inference is necessarily left implicit. 
Information is extracted by unstructured comparisons the reader 
makes between the data of the case and other data available to him 
from his background, other cases, etc. Parallel cases if selected, 
for instance, on the basis of differing outcomes with analogous 
initial conditions, can point the way to variables that may be as-
sociated with the differing outcomes. They can make a significant 
contribution to theory building where propositions are formulated 
in such a manner that they can be tested and generalized beyond 
the immediate set of cases. 
The Field Study Approach  
The field study approach, as being used here, refers to 
those research activities developed with a structure that is often 
intended to permit generalization beyond the immediate sources of 
information. Ideally, data are obtained from a representative sam-
ple of a population in such a manner that inferences drawn from 
the sample observed can be attributed to the population as a 
whole. In practice, there are considerable difficulties relating 
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both to theory and feasibility that limit the researcher's 
approach to this ideal. 
Data may be collected from institutional records, publica-
tions, questionnaires, interviews, observation by a trained ob-
server, and other methods limited only by the ingenuity and 
resources of the researcher. They are "hard" data in that they 
are collected in a systematic manner, supposedly are not dependent 
upon the idiosyncratic characteristics of the data collector, and 
(theoretically) are reproducible within an acceptable error tol-
erance. 
In the early stages of the development of a field of re-
search it is appropriate to seek to identify the key variables 
which are involved in the phenomena. Such studies typically are 
concerned with "state" variables. They may reveal factors that 
are important in the process, but they reveal little about how 
the process works. Variables of potential interest are identi-
fied by a variety of means including: prior studies in related 
fields (Folger and Gordon (1966) is an illustration); case stu-
dies (the MAB (1966) report is of itself a brief case study of 
this process); the "wisdom literature", and personal observation 
or experience. Myers (1966) contains many propositions derived, 
from a combination of all three sources. Means are then found 
to collect data on the variables and to analyze them. A whole 
repertoire of specialized techniques for "instrumentation," 
"measurement," and analysis to provide meaningful findings is 
available in the behavioral sciences, just as there are instru- 
ments, measurements and techniques appropriate to the investigation 
of other scientific disciplines. The results may be presented 
as straightforward statistical tabulations, which sometimes are 
quite revealing of themselves, or they may be analyzed for sta-
tistical correlations or causality. Correlations based on vari-
ables that are typically included in such studies may indicate 
important relations between the inputs to the process and the 
process and the outputs of the process, but more often than not 
they fail to explain the process. For some purposes, the infor-
mation provided by studies that stop at this point is sufficient. 
However, if the process dynamics or cause and effect are to be 
determined, more elaborate research designs are required. 
A great number of disciplines can contribute to our under-
standing of the innovation process. Each discipline and area of 
specialization has developed its own variations of the truth-seek-
ing process. Some of them address a very macro level (e.g., eco-
nomic theory) and others a very micro level (e.g., personality 
theory). Useful propositions and research methodologies are 




Business and public admin-
istration 
Economic development 




History of science and 
technology 




Sociology of innovation 
Etc. 
In these and related disciplines there are a few major stra-
tegies represented in the literature: 
- Abstract speculative theorizing without recourse 
empirical data 
- Manipulation of large amounts of data abstracted from 
the "real world"--e.g., data on exports, license fees, 
patents, etc. 
- Mathematical model building 
- Simulation in laboratories or by computer 
- Survey research by mass questionnaire or interview 
administration 
- Field studies of single cases 
- Comparative field studies 
- Longitudinal, or "real time," behavioral studies 
- Field experiments. 
A major difference among these general strategies centers 
around the extent to which they directly deal with the dynamics 
of the behavioral processes--attitudes, decisions and actions--
in situ where the actual technological innovations, transfer, 
and utilization are taking place--in contrast to operating at 
one or more levels of abstraction from the actual phenomena as 
they are occurring. 
Even limiting our concern, as we are here, to those general 
strategies that utilize studies of behavior in the innovation  
process, there is still a wide range of methodologies that are 
employed. Some are traditional to a particular discipline; 
others are adapted or invented to fit the needs of a particular 
problem. The net result is that while many studies make a con-
tribution to the theory building and verification of a particular 
discipline, an overall understanding of the dynamics of the so-
cial and organizational process of innovation does not clearly 
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emerge. Such understanding could contribute directly to policy 
formulation and provide a more informed basis for the organiza-
tional or political decision maker. 
The issue to be explored in the remainder of this paper is 
concerned with the possible effects of the methodologies used in 
empirical, behavioral studies upon their results: their commu-
nicability, quantifiability, reliability, and validity or gen-
eralizability. 
FIELD RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
A great variety of approaches is used in designing field 
studies. There are no firm rules as to which method is the most 
appropriate. Many factors affect the selection of the method. 
We can distinguish at least three types of factors. Those con-
cerned with: 
- the nature of the phenomena being investigated and 
the purpose of the study. 
- the decisions made in the field by other people. 
- the resources available to the researcher. 
The resources of the researcher include money, time, and tal-
ent. Even with the talent to design the best possible study, it 
is of little value if the researcher is not in a position to fol-
low through with it because of inadequate funding, other commit-
ments for his time, unavailability of appropriately trained staff, 
etc. 
When data are to be collected in the field, decisions are 
involved that the researcher does not make. He can only seek to 
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influence organizations to allow him access, and once having 
gained access, to obtain the cooperation of the many people that 
may be involved. Another aspect in some types of studies is that 
in order to carry them out certain types of events have to occur 
to obtain the requisite data. These events may occur at infre-
quent, unpredictable intervals. More likely, events may occur 
during the course of a study, such as an economic crisis or com-
pany reorganization, that introduce dominating changes in the 
variables being observed. The practicalities of field research 
almost inevitably compromise the research design and implementa-
tion to some degree. 
Clearly, the nature of the phenomena to be investigated 
affects the design of the research. In many fields, major break-
throughs have required the development of new methodologies, 
techniques, and instruments. There is a wide variety of specific 
methodologies, designs, and techniques used in the study of phe-
nomena related to organizations. However, it is not a reasonably 
well-organized and codified assemblage such as the chemist has at 
his disposal. The techniques come from a variety of academic 
disciplines, each with its own preferences and styles of research. 
As Vroom notes: 
One cannot help being struck by the fact that there 
is substantial disagreement among contributors (to 
organizational research) on such matters as the 
boundaries of the field of inquiry, the most press-
ing problems for study, and the relative usefulness 
of different research methods or theoretical sys-
tems. ...(I)t can be argued that different contrib-
utors are working from vastly different sets of 
architectural plans and that many are ignorant of 
or unsympathetic towards the activities of large 
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segments of other contributors. 
(1967, p. ix) 
The status of the situation with regard to substantiated know-
ledge about the R&D/Innovation process seems to be little differ-
ent, However, there are some general comments that can be made 
about the applicability of the several broad types of research 
strategies. We shall consider: 
- Field surveys 
- Comparative case studies 
- Field studies 
- Longitudinal studies 
- Field experiments 
As a field research strategy, a survey is particularly appro-
priate when relatively little is known about a situation. Sim-
ply obtaining data about that situation may enable some order to 
be given to it. Surveys can be relatively cheap and can sometimes 
be performed relatively quickly. 
A straightforward survey* is designed to produce data. It 
does not produce information. "Information" in the sense of "mean-
ing" requires that a basis for comparison, contrast, or evidence 
of change exists. In a survey, as we are using the term, this basis 
for comparison is left up to the individual--the author and the 
reader. When there is little knowledge in a field and a survey is 
conducted, "information" is obtained in the sense that there is a 
change from having no data to having data. But inferences about 
relationships contained within the data are obtained on the basis 
of the user's background, training, and insight. Another user 
will not necessarily arrive at the same conclusions. The remainder 
*It should be noted that there are other types of surveys, intended 
for other purposes, that do not necessarily have the limitation des-
cribed here. 
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of the techniques listed above involve features to overcome this 
limitation. 
A mass of data, numbers or prose, contains a great deal of 
variation. When we are looking for a particular message--that a 
relationship noted elsewhere or hypothesized to be operating exists 
in the current data--much of this variation constitutes "noise" or 
error for our purpose. Diamond illuminates this point well: 
Error embraces every sort of variation in the phenomena 
which we are observing, except what results from the one 
source which is the object of our study at the moment, 
and which we try to bring into prominence by the design 
of our investigation. It includes all the accumulated 
effects of other influences, whether suspected, under-
stood or not understood.(1959, p. 6) 
Error does not carry any recognizable badge, for when we 
change our point of view, to focus on a different prob-
lem, what had been error may become information, and 
what had been information may become error.(p. 7) 
The strategies listed above provide alternative ways of han-
dling the error that will be present in the data. We commonly 
attempt to sort out the information from the error in a given set 
of data by applying statistical techniques. This presumes that 
we have preconceived ideas of what we are looking for, no matter 
what the source of the ideas--experience and intuition or care-
fully developed theoretical reasoning. But there is a great deal 
involved in research methodology other than just analytical tech-
niques for data. 
Statistical method is only one of several ways by which 
we strive to isolate information -- the perceived effect 
of the experimental (or hypothesized) variable -- from 
error -- the contamination which enters our observations 
because of the uncontrolled effects of other influences. 
The first, and no doubt the most important way, is by 
the clear formulation of our problem, which tells what 
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kinds of data most deserve our attention. Then come 
the efforts at experimental control, by which we hope 
to eliminate some extraneous factors and to limit the 
scope of _others. (p. 7) 
If we succeed uncommonly well in our efforts to elimi-
nate error, the outcome of the investigation may be 
so clear that there will be no need for statistical 
analysis. ... (T)he correct appraisal of information 
must be preceeded by an appraisal of potential error. 
Experimental technique and research design strive  
to reduce error; statistical technique measures the 
error which remains. (p. 8) 
The single case study approach is appropriate to use in pre-
liminary tests of some theories. This choice is possibly most ap-
propriate to use in preliminary tests of some theories. This 
choice is possibly most appropriate as a preliminary exploration 
of theories explaining processes. It can provide a preliminary 
indication of possible substantiation for the theory, as we des-
cribed earlier. When a comparative  case study strategy is chosen, 
an explicit basis for comparison is built into the research design. 
Information about the theoretical model is extracted from tha dif-
ferences in the events occurring in the hopefully parallel situa-
tions. However, our confidence that the differences cannot be ex-
plained in other ways depends heavily on personal evaluation. When 
there is a relatively well-developed theory prior to the design of 
the study, the research problem can be clearly formulated, and pro-
cedures for obtaining the data most deserving of attention can be 
worked out. 
Field studies are frequently used to investigate one or a num-
ber of specific propositions that can be expressed in a relatively 
simple form--one or several variables are hypothesized to be asso-
ciated with one or a few other variables. If these relationships 
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are essentially concerned with the state of a system, rather than 
its processes, a cross-sectional field study is usually appropri-
ate. Much of the field research in the literature is of this form. 
This strategy choice also has the advantage to the researcher of 
making his resource requirements much more predictable than the 
strategies discussed below. It should also be noted that field 
studies can vary greatly in complexity, depending upon the number 
and nature of the variables involved as well as the complexity of 
the hypothesized relationships. 
Field studies may range from tentative explorations of hypo-
theses to rigorous hypothesis-testing efforts. That is, their 
intellectual underpinnings may range from weak and diffuse, as in 
the early stages of development of theory and understanding, to 
strong and well-developed at later stages. In either case, the 
intensity of the initial design effort is important, because of 
the uncertainties about the phenomena in the early stages of de-
veloping understanding, and, as understanding matures, the neces-
sity to rigorously eliminate other explanations--rival hypotheses. 
The methods used for extracting information in field studies 
as they are commonly reported in the literature primarily empha-
size the statistical data analysis aspect. A wide range of these 
techniques may be applied, but nevertheless the initial design of 
the study can have a major influence on the amount of error in the 
results. The general lack of replication of field studies limits 
the generalizability of the findings about'the propositions and 
theories being tested. 
207 
20 
Longitudinal studies are needed when a process explanation is 
to be investigated thoroughly. Since a longitudinal study extends 
through time, and many phenomena having to do with people and their 
institutions involve time spans of many months or years, the resource 
investment in a longitudinal study can be considerable. With ade-
quate design, process hypotheses can be investigated with cross-
sectional field study strategies. While this strategy compresses 
the duration of the study, it inherently limits the over-all con-
fidence that can be placed in the results since different people, 
organizations, products, etc. are used to obtain information about 
different sequences in the process. The longitudinal study, by fol-
lowing the focal unit in time, overcomes this limitation. However, 
the resources required to support it imply that it should be used 
primarily in the later stages of theory testing. (There may be 
some phenomena that can only be brought to light by looking at long 
actual time spans. This, of course, is the particular skill of the 
historian.) 
A major weakness of cross-sectional field studies is that, in 
general, cause and effect relationships cannot be ascertained. 
While it may be possible to determine that two variables are asso-
ciated, it cannot be determined that a change in one (which may be 
subject to change through managerial action or policy implementa-
tion) leads to a change in another (a sought-for outcome). For 
instance, it is fairly well established that job satisfaction and 
enhanced productivity tend to be associated, but it is uncertain 
to what extent improving satisfaction improves productivity, or 
how improved productivity causes increased satisfaction. (There 
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is evidence for both.) Longitudinal studies and field experiments 
often allow cause and effect to be determined, since the sequence 
of events is observed. 
Field experiments are appropriately used when cause and ef-
fect relationships are to be determined and when there are well-
identified alternative explanations of phenomena. Two general 
types of field experiments can be identified: 
- Natural experiments 
- Administrative experiments 
Natural experiments capitalize on "spontaneous" events. Adminis-
trative experiments here refers to an experiment that is concep-
tualized and deliberately planned out beforehand so that one or 
more variables are caused to change with others being controlled 
in some fashion. An organizational manager (administrator) is or-
dinarily involved in the planning, perhaps as the experimenter. 
As an aside, it should be noted that the word "experiment" is 
used in a variety of ways. It may be used in the sense of personal 
learning, as when an individual experiments with a new pocket cal-
culator. To a more knowledgeable observer, the results of his 
actions are fully predictable, but the user is uncertain of the 
forthcoming results. Another sense refers to making changes where 
the concern is with the utility of the intended outcome in socio-
economic settings. It is the action testing of the manager as he 
institutes a new order procedure, for instance. The third sense, 
the one that is used here, is concerned with proposition testing 
to establish cause and effect relationships or to enhance the con-
fidence in theory. (Doud, 1972) 
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By natural experiment we refer to a situation where a change 
occurs in an organization (or relationship between organizations) 
without deliberate intervention by an "experimenter." More parti-
cularly, the change occurs in a situation where on-going data is 
already being collected, so that measurements of the consequences 
of the change and other impinging factors can be made as they oc-
cur, or soon after. The observed change, the outcomes of interest, 
and other possible reasons for the actual outcomes, can be related 
to each other at least in time sequence, if not in terms of direct 
causality. This is in contrast to the typical managerial "experi-
ment" where, even if the outcomes are measured well, the factors 
that might be significantly influencing or "causing" the outcomes 
are not known. The deliberately-made change may be only one of the 
possible explanations for the observed outcome. In some cases, the 
change in observed outcome might have occurred even if the deliber-
ately-made change had never taken place; or the change might have 
occurred sooner, later, or in different form. 
The essence of conducting a natural experiment is to be pre-
pared to observe and capitalize on changes and variations that oc-
cur in an on-going situation that is being observed. This means 
that various types of data must be collected often enough so that 
a basis for comparison exists to permit extraction of information 
about the influence of factors operating in the situation. (Doud, 
1973) 
Administrative experiment refers to the situation where the 
experimenter has sufficient control to deliberately introduce 
changes. As Campbell and Stanley (1963) point out, in experimental 
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design in the sense of Fisher (1925, 1935) the experimenter has 
complete control of the situation. He can schedule treatments 
and measurements for optimal statistical efficiency, with complex-
ity of design emerging only from that goal of statistical effi-
ciency. However, the extent of control that can be achieved in or-
ganizational experiments is vastly different from that in, say, 
agriculture. Discussing the problems of experimentation in the 
field, Campbell and Stanley point out a variety of necessarily 
more complex designs needed to control for various threats to the 
internal and external validity, and hence the generalizability, 
of the findings. They term the type of experiments that can be 
performed in the field "quasi-experimental designs." 
One of the more significant reasons for the paucity of true 
experiments, or even quasi-experiments, in organizations-is the 
difficulty the external researcher has in securing and maintain-
ing the cooperation of the organization. The chances of carrying 
through the experiment are far greater when a manager in the organ-
ization is the experimenter. Managers are constantly experimenting 
(action testing), but without deliberate (quasi-) experimental de-
signs (hypothesis testing). Thompson (1969, 1974) has initiated 
a program to train research and engineering managers in transfer-
ring their technical methodology skills to administrative experi-
mentation. 
Specific examples of these several strategies as they are 
followed, and elaborated upon in practice,'will be discussed in 
the following sections. Both the methodological strengths and 
weaknesses of particular studies will be given. The reader should 
note that we arc of praising or criticizing the studies per se, 
but rather we an: using them as examples of the strengths and 
faults of the many studies listed in the bibliography, rather than 
commenting on each study. Certainly we must be able to assess 
reported work adequately; but it is also important that work not 
yet started be done well. 
FIELD SURVEY 
Litvak and Maule (1973) conducted a survey of "Some Character-
istics of Successful Technical Entrepreneurs in Canada" because 
there were no data available about the founders of small technolog-
ically-based Canadian firms. The Canadian government was develop-
ing policy and legislation intended to stimulate innovation in 
Canada, and there were questions about how appropriate it was, were 
intended beneficiaries aware of it, etc. Some of the data obtained 
directly answered such questions. Other data obtained would enable 
the reader to infer answers or to infer certain relationships be- 
tween sets of variables. 
There are at least two basic issues in a survey whether it con-
tains factual data (e.g., age of respondent, annual sales of the 
firm), opinion questions, or both. One issue involves the way the 
respondents interpret and answer the survey questions. This con-
cerns the reliability of the set of answers. The issue of relia-
bility involves such problems as: 
-Will the same person answer the questions the same way 
on a second administration? 
-If the wording of a question is varied somewhat, will the 
same person still answer much the same as before? 
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-Will different people interpret the same set of 
questions the same way as each other? 
The first question involves the stability of the responses over 
time. The second and third questions involve whether or not it 
is getting at the meaning the researcher intends. There are a 
variety of techniques used to enhance and measure the reliability 
of data collection instruments. Standard research methodology 
textbooks often discuss the measurement of reliability at length. 
However, perhaps the most fundamental and best method of initially 
enhancing reliability of self-administered questionnaires, the 
form typically used in surveys, is for the researcher to person-
ally administer the questionnaire to a limited number of people in 
pilot tests. Discussion with the respondents and examination of 
responses will often reveal needed improvements. 
It seems to be characteristic of survey reports to not mention 
any aspect of reliability or to footnote that the instrument was 
pilot tested. (This is the case for the Litvak and Maule report.) 
It could be that such preliminary work is taken as a sine qua non  
of a professional conducting a survey. However, not all profes-
sionals reporting surveys are professionals in survey technique. 
A second basic issue in surveys is how representative the 
findings are of the sample of respondents and of the whole popula-
tion. The first aspect is simply handled by reporting the numbers 
or percentages of respondents giving various answers. Character-
istic of most survey reports, Litvak and Maule include a variety 
of tables and give quantitative data in the text up to the point 
where the environment for entrepreneurship is discussed. Evidently 
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this section is based upon a number of open-ended questions con-
cerning opinions about availability of venture capital, accessi-
bility to special government innovation-stimulating programs, etc., 
and measures which should be taken to promote entrepreneurship. 
While the absence of quantitative data perhaps makes the section 
more readible, it provides no basis for the reader to evaluate 
the statements presented. 
A second aspect of representativeness, concerning general-
izability to the whole population, involves procedures used to 
obtain the sample of respondents. Unfortunately, in field studies 
it is often not clear what the population is. Hence the many 
available, well-documented, techniques cannot be readily applied. 
There may be other reasons why the sampling technique may be less 
than "ideal." When a sample cannot be taken using statistical 
techniques, the reader can still judge for himself how to evaluate 
the data in terms of the intended population if the basis for se-
lection is revealed. The Litvak and Maule report simply states 
that questionnaires were mailed to 76 "selected entrepreneurs 
throughout Canada" without indicating the basis for selection or 
what "throughout" meant. 
One other problem of generalizability involves those people 
who do not respond to mailed questionnaires. Often, a mail re-
sponse rate of 20% to 40% is obtained, depending upon subject mat-
ter, length, etc. After a follow-up letter, Litvak and Maule 
obtained a response of 56%, perhaps indicating the importance the 
respondents gave to the subject matter in a 10-page questionnaire. 
Even with such a relatively high response rate, there still remains 
the question: Are the non-respondents different from the respond-
ents in a characteristic way that introduces biases into the data? 
The usual ways of answering this question are either to continue 
the follow-up efforts, or to contact a sample of the non-respond-
ents by phone or in person and ask a few key questions that should 
reveal their lack of representativeness if it is present. 
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
Here we shall consider the use of case histories in pairs and 
in parallel. This may be done by bringing together diverse case 
studies after the histories have been compiled or by collecting 
data about parallel cases within a pre-structured framework. Work 
by Marschak, which includes most of the necessary comments on 
strengths and limitations, will illustrate the former strategy, 
and an article by Krytbosch will illustrate the latter. 
Again, we wish to remind the reader that the strengths and 
weaknesses of the examples discussed here are illustrative of what 
is found in the literature. Similar criticism and praise could be 
given for any other published study. The ones discussed here were 
chosen only because they illustrate various points we wish to make. 
In an earlier section we discussed the general characteristics 
of case studies. We noted that in terms of the testing of hypoth-
eses, individual case studies have serious limitations. When case 
studies are used in groups, these limitations may be alleviated to 
some degree. Marschak in "Strategy for R&D" (Marschak, Glennan, 
and Summers, 1967) presents a number of similar cases about the 
development of radars, jet engines, and aircraft to illuminate two 
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hypotheses. The first is that "Major uncertainty, at least in the 
earlier phases of development, is a natural and inevitable property 
of a program that seeks a real technical advance." (p. 50). The 
second hypothesis is a lengthy one concerning the effect of uncer-
tainty and its consequences on making heavy or light commitments 
in the early phases of development.* 
Finding that major uncertainty occurs in all the case his-
tories, it appears reasonable to conclude that the first hypoth-
esis would be supported in a field study designed for statistical 
hypothesis testing. "Predictions about the effort required to 
make a given design attain a specified performance are subject to 
large errors, especially at the start of development." (p. 136) 
Indeed, a statistical test of the data would probably turn out to 
be unnecessary if such a field study were carried out, especially 
since the hypothesis borders on being tautological. 
Marschak noted that the second hypothesis is harder to formu-
late and test for the following reasons: 
1) In the first place, few of the programs fall close 
to one or the other of the two extremes. Those that 
do not are not relevant to the hypothesis. It requires 
* "When the predictions available at the start of a development 
program are used as the basis of heavy commitments to a highly 
specified design, then in the fortunate cases when the predictions 
turn out to be correct, time and money may have been saved com-
pared with the postponing of such commitments until later in de-
velopment. If the predictions are seriously wrong, however, 
costly revisions will be required. The initial uncertainties of 
development are such that the gains due to heavy initial commit-
ments in the fortunate cases are outweighed by the costly revi-
sions of the unfortunate cases." (p. 50) 
some subjective interpretation, moreover, to place 
even the less ambiguous programs in one category 
or the other. 
2) A second difficulty in testing the proposed hypoth-
esis is that of grouping the projects studied into 
significant pairs. In such a pair one project is 
of the inflexible type and the other of the flex-
ible type while both are similar with respect to 
the circumstances that might explain major dif-
ferences in the projects' total experiences... 
(and) both achieve the same order of technical ad-
vance. ...We can hope to approximate this ideal 
test only very crudely. 
3) Finally, if the histories presented are to support 
the hypothesis they either should be roughly a ran-
dom sample from each of the areas of technology or 
they ought to cover these areas completely. Since 
histories often take a great deal of effort to com-
pile, one has to strive for the former alternative. 
The preceding histories, however, were not chosen 
at random--they were largely chosen because the 
programs seemed interesting and their study prom-
ised to be feasible. (pp. 138-9) 
Marschak also notes that the studies differ from one another in 
scope and style for several reasons: they were prepared by sev-
eral different authors; the availability of historical material 
varied considerably; and military security or company confiden-
tially prevented inclusion of all the available material. (p. 50) 
He concludes with respect to the second hypothesis: "Some 
of the histories, then, fall into pairs that support the proposed 
hypothesis and others do not. None appears to fall into pairs - 
that directly conflict with the proposed thypothesis...." (p. 139) 
It is clear that there remains a great deal of uncertainty 
about the hypothesis. In fact, from an earlier comment of Marschak, 
it appears that examination of at least some of these case his-
tories may have been the origin of the hypothesis: 
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Chronologically these (cases) are the earliest research 
efforts in the book. The case histories were done at a 
stage in the total RAND program on R&D management when 
hypotheses were more crudely stated than today. Indeed, 
the case studies were perhaps the crucial step in the 
formulation of conjectures as to what constitutes good 
or bad development. Because of their place in history 
of RAND thought on development, the questions posed dur-
ing the collection of data and the format for the pre-
sentation of the data are not the same as if the studies 
were started afresh today. (p. 3) 
It is not surprising then that the cases do lend support to the 
hypothesis since they evidently provided its origin. The narra-
tive is not clear on the point of how many of the case histories 
were involved at the time the hypothesis was formulated. But this 
is characteristic of the approach of the historian. He cannot re-
play history. But when it comes to being able to make odds on 
future outcomes, tests of a priori propositions are to be preferred 
to a posteriori deductions. Nevertheless, such hypotheses do have 
their utility: 
We note, finally, that even if the project-history approach 
falls far short of confirming a hypothesis, it may still be 
useful to the policy-maker. For the policy-maker, unlike 
the student of R&D, must make decisions here and now. ... 
Although he cannot be certain his choice is the correct one, 
such studies can make his uncertainty a great deal smaller. 
(p. 139) 
We have noted that the comparative case study is useful for 
probing theoretical formulations. Kruytbosch (1972) examines the 
theory of bureaucracy favored by many sociologists and raises ques-
tions about its ability to explain the effectiveness of groups. 
In an innovation-producing firm--a large aerospace company--he com-
pares the history of two groups doing similar work through two re-
organizations. The first brought the groups into being. The second 
moved one group in its entirety into a position at least as strong 
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as it had before; the second group was disbanded and the indivi-
duals relocated in two different divisions. 
The study is not detailed enough to compare the groups on 
multiple dimensions of productivity and effectiveness. Data were 
collected by interview on two occasions separated by a number of 
months. However, on the single criteria of survival as a measure 
of leadership and group effectiveness, Kruytbosch notes that 
clearly one group was effective and the other was not. 
The groups are compared on the basis of a number of factors: 
preexisting social ties, internal social system including cohe-
siveness and morale, character of the leader, technique of admin-
istration, etc. As the author notes: "A hardly startling impli-
cation would be that a cohesive work team organized around a 'hot' 
technical specialty and spearheaded by astute leadership is an ef-
fective anchoring device for R&D personnel in the industrial envi-
ronment. Obviously this is subject to a number of conditions such 
as the state of the art, the state of the relevant sector of the 
economy, and so on." The comparisons that can be made on specific 
points can help to clarify how this happens, although such infer-
ences are left to the reader. Kruytbosch does explicitly point to 
one aspect evidenced in his study that has been neglected in the 
literature on bureacracy and leadership style although it was noted 
many years ago: 
D. Pelz's two-decade-old study (1955) opened up a per-
spective regarding supervisory practices as taking place 
within a larger organizational system context. He found 
that worker attitudes and performance were more strongly 
related to perception of their supervisor as having in-
fluence on departmental decisions up the line than to any 
variations in conventional management practices. The study 
suggested that the way a work unit is tied into the 
larger organizational structure may be a crucial 
variable in group stability and performance. 
The case serves to support the proposition arising from Pelz's 
data and the limitations of bureucratic theory. It gives rise to 
broad questions for theory and research: "The material developed 
in this study suggests that a question facing students of organ-
ization is how to develop models of large-scale organizations de-
picting fluid, loosely coordinated, open-ended arenas within which 
groups ... range rather freely and develop their productivity, 
or fail, and regroup into new constellations." While raising such 
questions, the case material is not used in the paper to develop 
new specific hypotheses (which is certainly the author's preroga-
tive). 
We have already noted the difficulty in using material from 
a variety of cases to test hypotheses and theory, especially when 
the separate cases all deal with "successes" or out-of-the-ordinary 
events. Comparative cases such as this provide a rich source for 
obtaining insights. It is unfortunate that there are so few truly 
parallel cases available developed on comparable bases with reason-
able documentation of a number of variables and parameters in the 
situation. 
FIELD STUDIES 
The number of field studies of the research and development/ 
innovation process is quite a bit greater than other types of stud-
ies--survey, longitudinal, or field experiment. The IEEE Tran-
sactions on Engineering Management has made a consistent effort 
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to publish such work since 1960. From that year through 1973 about 
42 articles containing field data more or less closely related to 
the RD/I process appeared. Thirty-seven of these were field stud-
ies developing or testing propositions or instruments. In this 
section we will consider some of the characteristics and criteria 
relevant to evaluating field studies. Rather than reviewing par-
ticular studies, as we are doing in other sections where there 
are very few of each type, we will provide a few tabulations of 
particular aspects of the field studies appearing in the Transac-
tions to give some appreciation of the state of the art in field 
research. We limit this survey to the Transactions because it is 
the professional refereed journal with the longest history of spe-
cialization in studies of the RD/I process. The Bibliography 
lists all of the articles surveyed from the Transactions plus a 
number of others published in other refereed journals. Our inten-
tion was to include all those relevant to behavioral aspects of 
RD/I that we could find within the resources available to us for 
preparation of this paper. 
We have noted that a field study may serve a number of pur-
poses. Most studies in one fashion or another seek to add to our 
knowledge of factors involved in the RD/I process and relationships 
existing that interrelate these factors. Other studies occasion-
ally report a pilot test of a design or the development of a meas-
ure for a single variable of particular concern. In any of these 
cases, the reader implicitly has two general questions that he 
evaluates. 
One concerns the utility to him of the subject matter. This 
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question depends solely upon his own interests and concerns; only 
he can determine the criteria to apply. The question is central 
to the researcher, of course, for if he can do research that will 
be perceived as being of high utility to increased understanding 
or solution of a relevant, important problem, he will be making a 
significant contribution. 
The other general question concerns the believability or cred-
ibility of the results to the reader. The question is complex. 
There is no one right way. In general, one asks that he not depend 
solely upon intuition. One looks for data, in one or more of many 
possible forms, from which information about the factors, variables, 
and interrelationships can be extracted. One looks for internal 
consistency and consistency with prior related work (or explicit 
reformulation). It is not enough that the results of the study--
the "information"-- be interesting. We would suggest that a major 
factor determining credibility concerns the design and execution of 
the research--the methodology and the procedures employed. The fol-
lowing questions provide one framework in which to evaluate the 
confidence, the believability one can place in the results of a 
field research project. Because there are so many ways that field 
research can be done well, the questions are intended to provide a 
broad perspective. The results of a study with:a sample size of 
three are not necessarily to be discounted. Results with a statis-
tical confidence level of 0.001 are not necessarily meaningful. 
(Winch and Campbell, 1969) No meaningful, broadly applicable, 
guidelines can be given that deal with specifics of this sort. A 
great many broad, as well as specific, issues are involved. The 
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questions suggested here, and a few specific points to be raised, 
may assist in the assessment of sets of, or particular examples of, 
field research studies. 
1. What was it that structured the design of the study? 
The initial aspect of this question involves the connection 
of the study with prior work. It may be rooted in one or more 
specialized disciplines--psychology, sociology, economics, history 
of science, etc. The context of RD/I may have appeared to the in-
vestigator to provide characteristics suitable for testing some 
particular theoretical aspect in one discipline, or the disciplines 
may have appeared to the investigator to provide aspects of theory 
applicable to the phenomena. The difference between these two ap-
proaches can be considerable. On the one hand, there may be the 
test of a theory perhaps largely irrelevant, though not obviously 
so, to RD/I. On the other hand, the theories or hypotheses may be 
central to RD/I. At another level of consideration, one researcher, 
through lack of familiarity with the phenomena, may overlook im-
portant aspects of the theory. 
The connection of the study with prior work may be less close 
than implied above. It may involve the exploration of an area in 
which there has been little prior work. This may be from the 
standpoint of the phenomena concerned or the application of a par-
ticular type of theory; the researcher is exploring new fields. 
Practically, we should also note that a study labeled "exploratory" 
may mean, in some cases, that it is the researcher himself who is 
new to the field. Both human propensities and the diffuse nature 
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of the literature in this field make it difficult to avoid "re-
inventing the wheel." 
It is also possible that there will be no connection to prior 
work expressed. One reason that this may happen is that the pro-
ject involved research on a practical problem of concern to the 
author. This can be the case when he is an engineer, scientist, 
or manager in an organization involved in the RD/I process. While 
he may be short on theory, he is likely to be very familiar with 
many practical aspects of the phenomena. 
The other aspect of this question deals with the concrete man-
ifestation of what structured the study,as expressed in its report. 
Typically, in a refereed publication, there will be a reasonably 
clear statement of purpose. But there may not be an explicit state-
ment of the researchable questions addressed. It is here that the 
researcher has the opportunity to sort out those parts of the pro-
blem that can be based on measurable, empirical data and those that 
can be based only on judgement, experience, wisdom, or intuition. 
Kerlinger (1965, pp. 19-20) provides three criteria for a good 
research question: (a) It should express the relation between two 
or more variables. (b) The research problem should be stated 
clearly and unambiguously in question form. A statement of purpose 
alone is not adequate. "Questions have the virtue of posing prob-
lems directly. The purpose of a study is not necessarily the same 
as the problem of a study." (c) The question should at least 
imply the possibility of empirical testing. "A problem that does 
not contain implications for testing its stated relation or rela-
tions is not a scientific problem. This means not only that an 
actual relation is stated, but also that the variables of the re-
lation can somehow be measured. Many interesting and important 
questions are not scientific questions simply because they are 
not amenable to testing." 
Taking a much less stringent set of criteria and asking if 
the researchable questions could reasonably be inferred (and set-
ting aside marginal cases or those studies that involve the eval-
uation of a technique), of 37 field studies relevant to the RD/I 
process appearing in the Transactions from 1960 through 1973, 57% 
contained explicit or reasonably implicit researchable questions 
or a clear statement of purpose. (16% were set aside.) Only 27% 
contain explicit question statements, and not all of these would 
satisfy Kerlinger's other criteria. (Of course, we have no way of 
knowing how many of the studies developed unreported explicit re-
searchable questions during the early course of their work and how 
many of the reported questions were developed after the study was 
complete.) While the absence of explicit researchable questions 
does not necessarily mean poor research, lack of encouragment to 
use this approach can lead to ill-defined or poorly formulated re-
search. The record implies that we have considerable room for 
improvement.* 
*Examination of articles relevant to the RD/I process in other 
publications indicates that the pattern above exists elsewhere. 
Figures were not tabulated for other publidations in part because 
of differences in editorial policies between publications, dif-
ferences in policies through time in a given publication, and 
because different aspects of the same research project may be 
presented in more than one publication. 
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2. Are the nature of the information to be derived and the  
characteristics of the study design evident? 
At this point we are simply asking if the author, going beyond 
the statement of the problem, makes clear specifically what infor-
mation is sought and the nature of the method for attaining it. 
One method of making clear exactly what information is sought 
is to state one or more a priori hypotheses or propositions. How-
ever, if little is known about the phenomenon, one may be seeking 
to initially discover what factors are present and then what re-
lationships may exist among them. One may also be reporting work 
on the measurement of a particular concept or variable. Various 
types of propositions can still be used to more clearly structure 
the research design in such cases, but the necessity for doing so 
is less. 
Again, taking a not-too-stringent view as to what constitutes 
a clear proposition statement, in the Transactions from 1960 through 
1973, only 24% of the articles reporting field studies of the RD/I 
process had reasonably clear statements of propositions or hypoth-
eses. (16% were set aside because they involved evaluation of a 
technique or instrument, or because they were considered marginal.) 
Thus, in 54% of the cases it becomes much more difficult to deter-
mine what information was sought. This leads one to wonder how one 
can judge whether the overall methodological design was appropriate 
to the problem. The information discovered and reported may be of 
value, but this depends upon the purpose to which it is put. There 
is a difference between information suggestive for further research 




Given the premises of a study, the design basis for extract- 
ing the information may or may not be evident. To adequately eval-
uate the findings one needs to know: 
- What were the variables ? 
- What was actually measured (the indicators of the 
variables)? 
- How were the indicators measured? 
Measurement can take many forms, since research may appropriately 
involve thoughts, feelings, decisions, etc., as well as more con-
crete evidence and results of behavior such as forms of contracts 
signed or pieces of equipment delivered on particular dates for 
given costs. Measures can be relatively "hard"--such as the dates 
when equipment was due and when it was actually delivered--or judge-
mental--such as classifying the feelings described in interviews about 
how the designers and customers felt when the delivery was due but 
the equipment was not ready. Of course, just because the data are in 
numeric form does not mean that they are more desirable than if they 
are of another sort, as we shall consider below. The question being 
asked at this point is: Was the design basis for selecting the de-
sired data made explicit so that the overall structure of the research 
project can be determined? This is important in assessing the meaning 
of whatever was discovered. 
3. How does one know what was actually measured? 
The variables of a study involving social and organizational 
behavior are often convenient constructs rather than physical en-
tities. In natural phenomena there are no such physical entities 
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as "gross national product," "leadership style," etc., though our 
training and discipline may have brought us to the state where such 
concepts take on a reality and life of their own. But through 
various operations we can invest such concepts with meaning and 
usefulness. 	In general, it is necessary to measure something 
other than the named variable itself. Some other indicator, or 
set of indicators, must be used as a surrogate for the given con-
cept. 
Perhaps the simplest way to show what was measured is to pre-
sent the instrument itself. Unfortunately, the expense of publi-
cation or sometimes proprietary concerns mitigates against this 
being commonly done. For other types of measures--for example, 
Apstein's (1965) measure of the "effectiveness of military labora-
tories" where judgements are made in a particular manner by a num-
ber of qualified judges--the procedure to arrive at the measure-
ment may be described. As important as the measures are to the 
credibility of the results of a study, it is surprising that the 
behavioral science community, as scientists, accepts any reports 
that do not make clear the content of the basic operations in-
volved in reported measures. 
Because this question is so vitally important, most articles 
do provide at least some indication of the substantive content of 
the measures, at least for key variables. This at least shows 
what the indicator was for that variable. But a number of ques-
tions remain. The central question is: Are we measuring what we 
think we are measuring? The question leads to the nature and 
meaning of ones variables, the concept of validity which also 
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involves the related concept of reliability.* 
When only the indicator or procedure for measuring a variable 
is presented, with no other data, one must deal with "face" or con-
tent validity. Face validity implies that the relevance of the 
measuring instrument to what one is trying to measure is apparent 
"on the face of it." The issue can only be resolved as a matter 
of judgement. In making this judgement, two major questions must 
be answered: "(1) Whether the instrument is really measuring the 
kind of behavior that the investigator assumes it is, and (2) 
whether it provides an adequate sample of that kind of behavior" 
(Selltiz, et al, 1965). The assumption, that the behavior or pro-
perty being measured in a test is actually that behavior, is most 
likely to be met in proficiency and achievement measures such as 
those of mechanical skills. When other types of constructs are 
involved, Peack (1953, p. 285) notes that "More often than not, 
additional meanings are smuggled in and the assumption is made 
that the observations are, in fact, interpretable as a sample of a 
known universe..." 
Content validity is determined in terms of the question: Is 
the content of this scale or test representative of the universe 
of the content of the property being measured? Such universes of 
content items exist only theoretically, so content validation con- 
sists essentially in judgement (Kerlinger, 1965). Content validity 
and face validity are essentially the same, raising the same ques-
tions and utilizing the same methods of judgemental processes. 
*Portions of this section are adapted from Douds (1970) 
Regardless of whether or not an indicator adequately measures 
the concept it is supposed to, there is always some degree of un-
certainty in any measurement. In order to adequately interpret 
the results obtained from a series of measurements, an estimate of 
this uncertainty is needed. Reliability coefficients for an in-
strument provide this measure. They indicate the stability, con-
sistency or predictability of the response to an instrument or 
method of measurement. This consistency may involve the responses 
from one item to the next within a given instrument (inter-item 
reliability), from one occasion to another (test-retest reliabil-
ity), or from one measurement form to another (equivalence). For 
the first two types, two forms of the same scale, or multiple 
forms--depending upon the particular reliability measure used--are 
created and the consistency of response determined by comparing 
one set with another. This provides a coefficient of inter-item  
reliability. The correlation between the scores of a test given 
at one time and the same test given after an interval indicates 
how stable the scores are, and so provides a coefficient of (time) 
stability. Reliability measured on the basis of one administration 
indicates inter-item stability. Both inter-item and stability meas-
ures provide an indication of the error of measurement. Reliabil-
ity measured on the basis of equivalence between different forms 
of measurement merges into the concept of validity, as we shall 
consider shortly. 
In the 37 articles from the IEEE Transactions of Engineering 
Management, not one provides a reliability coefficient and only 
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two provide some form of evidence concerning the reliability of 
their measures. (In three of the articles a reliability measure 
could be considered unnecessary.) It is notoriously difficult, 
but not impossible, to establish a reliability measure for certain 
types of data collection procedures such as interviewing and par-
ticipant observation. However, for many forms of questionnaires 
it is quite easy to calculate a reliability coefficient such as 
Cronbach's alpha (1951). Computer programs are readily available 
and employed as one of the authors and colleagues did in a study of 
factors affecting communication between R&D groups (Douds, 1970). 
Since many field studies do utilize questionnaries, it is to be 
hoped that reliability coefficients will come to be more frequently 
reported so that better informed judgements can be made about the 
quality of the data. 
If the reliability of a measure is low, it is not at all certain 
what is being measured. The "noise" (error) is obscuring the "sig-
nal" (the desired measure). At this point two questions arise: 
How can we get a better measure of the signal? Are we measuring 
what is intended? But on the other hand, if we succeed in getting 
a measure with a high reliability coefficient, we can only say that 
we are getting a strong signal--we still cannot be sure that we are 
measuring what we intend. It is difficult to get measures of high 
reliability (and not always desirable to do so because of other 
attendant phenomena), especially when studying organization pro-
cesses. 
Both of these difficulties may be alleviated by the use of 
231 
multi.le measures. If one has a number of quite different indi-
cators for a given variable, any one of which has a relatively 
low reliability, but all of which "point in the same direction"--
that is, they are all moderately correlated---we can then feel 
more comfortable with and certain of a variable than if we have 
but a single measure, even if it is of high reliability. Speaking 
of interviews and questionnaires, Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and 
Sechrest (1966) note: 
But the principal objection is that they are used  
alone. No research method is without bias. Inter-
views and questionnaires must be supplemented by 
methods testing the same social science variables 
but having different methodological weakness. (p.1) 
They primarily address the issue in the remainder of their book of 
finding a variety of measures for given phenomena, measures that 
are unobtrusive so that the process of making measurements does 
not disrupt or change the phenomena observed as the conventional 
techniques of interviewing, observation, and questionnaires can do. 
The final aspect we shall consider, related to the question, 
"How does one know what was measured," is the notion of construct  
validity. Here we are specifically asking, Have we measured the 
concept of the variable that we intended to measure? Does our men-
tal construct hold up when we measure it? Any given concept can 
be defined as being related to certain concepts and distinctly 
different from others. 	This insight, in conjunction with the 
notion of capitalizing on methodological weaknesses by utilizing 
different methods with different types of weaknesses has led to a 
method for establishing construct validity. 
Construct validity is of central concern to the development 
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of theory. Cronbach and Meehl (1955) first made the concept of 
construct validity explicit, although it has been implicit in the 
history of science. As long as the concept of phlogiston was as-
sumed to be a necessary constituent of all combustible bodies, pro-
gress in the fields we now know as chemistry and thermodynamics 
was limited. The introduction of new, more stable constructs in-
tegrated into a theoretical structure that allows a variety of new, 
"substantiable" predictions to be formed, is a major goal of scien-
tific activity. The definitions of such constructs imply sets of 
propositions about their relations to other variables. "Thus, in 
examining construct validity, it is appropriate to ask such ques-
tions as: What predictions would one make, on the basis of these 
sets of propositions, about the relationships to other variables of 
scores based on a measure of this construct? Are the measurements 
obtained by using this instrument consistent with these predic-
tions?" (Selltiz, et al, 1965, p. 159). Consequently, construct 
validation involves not only the measuring instrument, but the 
underlying theory. This being the case, the operations involved 
become involved and extremely time consuming. It becomes difficult 
to disentangle the validation of a construct, the instrumentation 
of its measures, and the theory of which it is a part. 
These difficulties were mitigated and the notion of construct 
validation made more operational within the life span of a re-
searcher by Campbell and Fiske (1959). They have provided a spe-
cific technique, the multitrait-multimethod matrix, that provides 
a quantitative focus on the adequacy of the measure of the con- 
struct in question, before hypotheses involving other variables 
are considered. This approach partially disentangles the vali-
dation of constructs from the total research process involved in 
attempts to validate a theory. At least from a theoretical point 
of view, it is reasonable to ask just what the meaning is of a 
proposition supported by field data if the concepts in the vari-
ables have not been validated? One can only proceed on little 
more than faith that the concepts are meaningful in the real-world 
phenomena, that the measures actually used do have some tenable 
relationship to the variable, and that they have some reasonable 
degree of stability over time. This in addition to a number of 
assumptions about the parameters of the situation, most of which 
were not measured (and in practice most of which could not be 
measured). 
Campbell and Fiske propose two major requirements to be met 
in validating a construct: 1) To demonstrate that the different 
independent measurement methods for the same construct are con-
vergent; and 2) To demonstrate that the measures of a construct 
("trait") discriminate it from other constructs ("traits") from 
which it is intended to differ. Instruments can be invalidated 
by too high correlations with scales for other variables. The 
first shows convergent validity of multiple methods; the second 
shows discriminant validity among various constructs and methods. 
More than one construct and more than one method have to be em-
ployed in this validation process. The relation among the con-
structs can be shown in what Campbell and Fiske call a "multi-
trait-multimethod matrix," presenting all the intercorrelations 
for each of several traits measured by each of several methods. 
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Several criteria are provided to guide estimation of the construct 
validity. 
Campbell and Fiske observe that 
...reliability and validity can be seen as regions 
on a continuum. Reliability is the agreement be- 
tween two efforts to measure the same trait through 
maximally similar methods. Validity is represented 
in the agreement between two attempts to measure 
the same trait through maximally different methods. 
A split-half reliability is a little more like a 
validity coefficient than is an immediate test-
retest reliability, for the items are not quite 
identical. A correlation between dissimilar sub-
tests is probably a reliability measure, but is 
still closer to the region called validity. 
Some evaluation of validity can take place even 
if the two methods are not entirely independent 
(1959, p. 83). 
Such is the case in the example of the use of the multitrait-
multimethod matrix provided in Douds (1970). In his example, the 
"multitraits" involved are four task interdependence factors, and 
the "multimethods" are responses to two separate instruments. The 
questionnaires have some items in common so they were not com-
pletely independent. Nevertheless, their use illustrates the ap-
plication of the technique and provides some indication of conver-
gent and discriminant validation of the constructs involved. 
If we are to develop theories of research and development-
innovation process, theories that are meaningful and ultimately 
useful in practice, attention is going to have to be paid to vali-
dating our constructs and our instruments. From the current state 
of the literature in this regard, any improvement would be welcome. 
235 
4. What is the basis for confidence in the results? 
In the quest for information about the processes operating 
in the RD/I process and verification of our beliefs, we find two 
distinct approaches being taken. The previous section has em- 
phasized an empirically-based challenging of concepts and findings 
through measurement procedures. We do not wish to emphasize it 
unduly for there is a long tradition producing useful results that 
utilizes intellectual reasoning based on observation, compilations 
of data, or historical documents. Even those who would take a 
strictly statistical approach are advised by a statistician: 
We must use all available weapons of attack, face 
our problems realistically and not retreat to the 
land of fashionable sterility, learn to sweat over 
our data with an admixture of judgement and intuitive 
rumination, and accept the usefulness of particular 
data even when the level of analysis available for 
them is markedly below that available for other data 
in the empirical area. 
(Binder, 1964, quoted in Webb, et al, 1966) 
At one extreme, as a method of analysis for elucidating in-
formation from the error contained in our data, is the purely sta-
tistical approach; at the other is pure reasoning. In practice, 
when doing field studies, neither extreme is likely to be found. 
But most of the published studies employing empirical data tend 
in one direction or the other. When "reasoning" is the basis for 
extracting information from the data, the methodological design 
basis tends to be left implicit in published reports. When some 
type of statistical analysis is used, the design basis tends to 
be more explicit. However, it should be noted that the methodology 
can be explicitly designed in either case. 
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In the 37 field studies from the Transactions 27% used reas-
oning as a basis for establishing their findings. An analytical 
design was present in 68% of the cases. The remaining two cases 
(5%) presented data with an implicit design, but the relationship 
between the data and what was said was sufficiently unclear that 
they could not be classified. 
The set of studies from which these tabulations have been 
derived is presented in Table 1. Each study has been coded for the 
characteristics we have considered here: presentation of explicit 
(or implicit) researchable questions; reasonably clear statement of 
propositions; and the design basis for extracting information from 
the data collected. The citations for these studies are given in 
the bibliography. 
LONGITUDINAL STUDIES 
Longitudinal studies extend through time with some selected 
focal units--persons, ideas, projects, groups, etc.--as the sub-
jects of measurement. Observations are made at repeated times of 
inputs to the focal unit or states of the unit, conditions existing 
in and around the unit, and outputs of the unit. With sufficient 
frequency of appropriate measurements, the dynamics of the process 
or processes giving rise to the observed states may be determined. 
"Observed states" may include outputs of the focal unit (e.g., 
patents, reports, product items), or they may be states of the 
focal unit itself (e.g., attitude toward computer terminal use, 
status of work on an idea, level of productivity). 
A longitudinal study could appear to be similar to a case 
237 
TABLE 1 - SOME METHODOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED 
RD/I FIELD STUDIES 

















Krohn, 1961 Y 	 Y 
Taylor, Smith & Ghiselin, 1961 
Storer, 1962 
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Knight, 1965 Y Y 
Apstein, 1965 
	
Y 	 N 
Rubin, Steadry & Willits, 1965 
	
N Y 
Davis, 1965 ' 
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Eyring, 1966 Y N 
Andrews, 1967 
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Stephenson, Gantz & Erickson,l971 I N 
Roberts & Wainer, 1971 
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Holland, 1972 N Y 
Wolek, 1972 
Gemmill & Thamhain, 1973 
	
N 	 N 
Aram & Javian, 1973 
	
N Y 
Y = Yes, present 
N = Not present 
I = Implied 
E = Explicit design 
R = Reasoning/implicit 
? = Uncertain 
(1) Generalizations discussed 
(2) Develops measure of productivity 
(3) Evaluation of a technique 
(4) Notable/unique design 









































study, but a case study may be developed either retrospectively 
after all events have transpired, in real time as the events occur, 
or overlapping both periods. The data for a longitudinal study 
are primarily collected in "real time" so that the measures taken 
are not unduly changed by the distortions that are likely with the 
passage of time. 
A case study, roughly speaking, is primarily descriptive and 
retrospective-- it is often a narrative account with supporting 
data of a series of related events presented as one body, the 
case itself. A longitudinal study may be less concerned with "the 
case" (if one is evident) or multiple cases. It focuses on the 
phehomena. A longitudinal study, as we are using the term, is 
more like an exploratory or proposition-testing field study in 
that it seeks to discover or explain a phenomenon by establishing 
support for relationships among two or more variables. It is sub- 
ject to the same research design problems--including: measurement, 
reliability, meaningful extraction of information from data, and 
validity of inferences--which we have previously considered. Its 
special property is that it is possible with proper design to de-
termine that one type of event (or a particular combination) pre-
cedes an effect. Oftentimes this will allow inferences about 
cause and effect relationships to be made. But when this is done, 
the nature of the process by which such inferences are made is 
crucial. They must be evaluated with particular care. 
In this sense of being able to provide support for inferences 
about relationships among variables, the design considerations for 
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a longitudinal study are like those of a field study. The key fea-
ture distinguishing the longitudinal study from the field study, 
of course, is that in the field study the state of a number of fo-
cal units is determined at one point or in one limited period in 
time, whereas in the longitudinal study the states of the focal 
units are measured repeatedly. In the field study, the focal units 
are often selected so that they will be at different stages of ma-
turation, development, etc., because there must be variance in at 
least one of the variables if one hopes to show an association with 
another, dependent, variable. The focal units may have arrived at 
the states measured in the field study in many different ways. One 
can only hope that the statistical design for selecting the sample 
(which often cannot be actually realized in practice) is adequate 
to cancel out this potential source of error (differences in state 
of the focal unit) in the inferences made from the data. The long-
itudinal study, on the other hand, contains data that can poten-
tially reduce this source of error, if they are properly utilized. 
The data for a longitudinal study are primarily collected in 
real time-- that is, more or less as the events are occurring. This 
"more or less" involves a difficult, basic methodological choice 
in the design of longitudinal studies. In general, it is not pos-
sible to take measurements continuously in a practical situation 
involving the behavior of individuals. The researcher would like 
to obtain measurements whenever "significant" events occur in most 
types of studies -- "significant" events in the sense whatever is 
involved makes a difference to the outcomes, the dependent variables, 
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being observed. But the time of occurrence of these events may 
not be at all predictable, and the cost of making repeated meas-
urements in terms of annoyance to the participants, reactive, ef-
fects of measurements, etc. may be appreciable. The costs may 
even be high enough to threaten the continued cooperation of the 
participants. The costs to the researcher in time and funds may 
also be appreciable. The trade-off is between the costs of col-
lecting unncecessary data and not getting data that may be impor-
tant to the results, plus the costs of upsetting or straining the 
field site relationships. Procedures can be devised to make the 
trade-offs acceptable. Many techniques have been tried and many 
are yet to be devised. Their application in any given situation 
has to be examined with care. As yet there are no established 
rules to determine when the application of any particular one is 
appropriate. 
An alternative approach is to collect data at regular inter-
vals. If the nature of the phenomena involved is such that changes 
cannot take place rapidly, then this choice is appropriate, but in 
studies of behavior this assurance is rarely present. However, in 
field situations, regularly scheduled data collection by the re-
searcher may be the practical choice. In evaluating the results 
of a study one must consider the inaccuracies of data with varying 
times between the occurence of events or changes in the situation 
and the time when the data are collected. Even if the instrumenta-
tion is reliable, the quantity measured may have changed from the 
value it had at the time it would have been desirable to measure 
it. Again, there are no specific rules as yet to evaluate the 
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choices in designing the methodology or evaluating the results. 
Many factors are involved--the nature of the variables, the na-
ture of the phenomena, characteristics of the instruments, char-
acteristics of the participants, etc., and the overall, combina-
torial effect of these in the context of the methodology and pro-
cedures chosen as well as their individual features taken one at 
a time. 
The time span covered by a longitudinal study may vary con-
siderably. The defining characteristic is that the change in a 
phenomenon through time is measured. If appreciable change can 
occur in a few days and enough measurements are made to determine 
that the change has (or has not) occurred, such a study could be 
considered to be a longitudinal study. Common usage would seem 
to be that if a study in organizations is called "longitudinal," 
time spans on the order of months or years are involved. One of 
the authors (Rubenstein) is involved in a longitudinal study of 
the development of the information-seeking styles of potential 
medical researchers. It has involved collecting data from medical st 
students at four to six month 'intervals over a three-year time span. 
A major problem in this type of study is the loss of subjects, not 
only from such factors as changing schools or unwillingness to con-
tunue cooperation, but in this particular case the uncertainty as 
to how many and which students will go into the focal area of medi-
cal research (Rubenstein, 1970). 
On the other hand, for some phenomena a longitudinal study 
may involve only two, widely separated data points. Again, loss 
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of respondents is a major problem and a potential threat to the 
validity of the findings. Farris (1969) attempted to determine 
to what extent certain factors preceded high technical performance 
by individual engineers and scientists, and to what extent were 
the levels of these factors the consequences of prior performance. 
Among the factors were high involvement in their work, high in-
fluence on their work goals, contact with a relatively large num-
ber of colleagues, a diversity of work activities, etc. The study 
involved a replication of Pelz and Andrews' original work (1969) 
in three of the original laboratories obtaining new information 
from 151 engineers. The original data was collected in 1959 and 
the replication was carried out in 1965. Farris tests six hypo-
theses and reports his surprise in finding that, "in every in-
stance performance was found to be related significantly to sub- 
sequent levels of the organizational factor with which it was asso-
ciated. In no instance was an organizational factor more strongly 
related to subsequent performance than to previous performance." 
Farris notes that in our performance-oriented society, we have 
tended to view performance as the end result of other conditions, 
not as a cause of the conditions, and correspondingly have done 
little research from this standpoint. However, he does not dis-
cuss the potential threats to the validity of his study. He does 
not mention, for instance, what proportion of the original respon-
dents he had in his second sample. Conceivably, many of those peo-
ple that left the organizations could have done so for reasons re-
lated to the factors under study. The period from 1959 to 1965 
was a "sellers' market" for engineers. 
Since the findings of this study are surprising and are po-
tentially useful to management, it would appear to be one of the 
many areas in the R&D/Innovation process where it would be worth-
while to set up longitudinal studies. In this particular case, 
one including a wider range of data collection methods to help 
insure that one measures what he thinks he is measuring, some-
what more frequent data collections, and tracking of a sample of 
the individuals who leave the firms, would be helpful. 
FIELD EXPERIMENTS 
As of the beginning of 1974, the literature reflects very 
little interest in carrying out field experiments on the R&D/Inno-
vation process, despite the great need for more credible evidence 
on how the process works. The process of experimentation, when 
well performed, enables one to probe propositions, hypotheses, and 
theories very deeply, for the essence of experimentation-- in the 
scientific sense-- is to minimize and, hopefully, eliminate other 
possible explanations for the findings. In some areas of science 
it is possible to do this by controlling all conditions (tempera-
ture, pressure, etc.) so that only the theory being tested can 
adequately explain the results-- rival explanations are gradually 
eliminated by making comparisons among quantities of data col-
lected with well-understood instrumentation by trained observers 
often over long periods of time. In the sciences dealing with 
human behavior-- e.g., economics, anthropology, sociology, etc. --
the threats to validity of findings are so numerous that in general 
it is not possible for the researcher to control all the factors 
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that may be influencing the results obtained. A similar situation 
prevails in agronomy and zoology. In fields such as these, mean-
ingful techniques for experimentation have been developed by using 
the technique of randomization (with statistical analysis of data) 
to allow the uncontrolled variables to "average each other out." 
However, in the social setting it is often not possible to em-
ploy random selection of people, groups, or organizations. Even 
when it is possible to do so, the simple knowledge that one has 
been designated as a member of an experimental or control group 
may of itself influence the results should it become known. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to carry out experiments in so-
cial settings. In one sense, managers are constantly "experiment-
ing," in the sense that they are constantly making administrative 
changes in the design, configuration, and procedures of their or-
ganizations to obtain desired end results. They manipulate inde-
pendent variables to obtain specific outcomes. The experimenter 
in the tradition of science manipulates independent variables in 
order to understand their relationship with the dependent (out-
come) variables.. (Of course, the researcher may desire a particu-
lar end result on occasion, and a manager may sometimes be con-
cerned with just understanding.) There are many opportunities 
for gaining knowledge of how innovation processes, for example, 
operate by incorporating experimental-type designs in the day-to-
day actions taken by organizational managers and government admin-
istrators. 
For this type of situation,a "quasi-experimental" design 
approach has been described by Donald T. Campbell: 
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The phrase "quasi-experimental design" refers to 
the application of an experimental mode of analy-
sis and interpretation of bodies of data not meet- 
ing the full requirements of experimental control,... 
Unplanned conditions and events may also be ana- 
lyzed in this way where an exogenous variable has 
such discreteness and abruptness as to make appro-
priate its consideration as an experimental treat-
ment applied at a specific point in time to a spe-
cific population. When properly done, when atten-
tion is given to the specific implications of the 
specific weaknesses of the design in question, 
quasi-experimental analysis can provide a valuable 
extension of the experimental method (1969 p. 259). 
The crux of his approach lies in the analysis of threats to the 
validity of the findings: 
Too often a scientist trained in experimental meth-
odology rejects any research in which complete con-
trol is lacking. Yet in practice no experiment is 
perfectly executed, and the practicing scientist 
overlooks those imperfections that seem to him to 
offer no plausible rival explanations of the re-
sults. In the light of modern philosophies of 
science, no experiment ever proves a theory, it 
merely probes it. Seeming proof results from that 
condition in which there is no available plausible 
rival hypothesis to explain the data. The general 
program of quasi-experimental analysis is to spe- 
cify and examine those plausible rival explanations 
of the results that are provided by the uncontrolled 
variables. A failure to control that does not in 
fact lend plausibility to a rival interpretation 
is not regarded as invalidating. (p. 259) 
Campbell and Stanley (1966) present eight generic dimensions of 
threats to internal validity and four dimensions of threats to 
external validity. Internal validity deals with the nature of the 
findings themselves: Did in fact the experimental treatments make 
a difference in a specific case? "Internal validity is the basic 
minimum without which any experiment is uninterpretable." (p. 5) 
External validity is concerned with the question of the extent to 
which the findings can be extended to other settings -- their gen-
eralizability and representativeness. The threats to validity are 
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briefly described in Table 2. Campbell and Stanley provide 12 
experimental designs applicable to different types of situations 
with different patterns of validity threats. Since the specific  
rival hypotheses will differ in differing specific situations, 
there is the possibility of being able to select a design for a 
given experiment that has minimal weaknesses. 
There are very few administrative or natural experiments in 
the literature on R&D/Innovation. A natural experiment was ana-
lyzed by Hill (1970). He shows a deleterious effect arising from 
the introduction of an autocratic/authoritarian leadership style 
into an applied science laboratory located in Australia. The sup-
porting agency measured the performance of the laboratory prima-
rily by its output of publications. Hill used the annual reports 
of the laboratory for a 13-year period to obtain measures of pub-
lication output, authorship, and staff turnover. The laboratory 
had been under one director for six years when he then brought in 
an associate director. The scientists were administratively di-
vided into two groups, one half reponsible to the director, the 
other half to the associate director. As part of a study of group 
structures in R&D labs, Hill spent several weeks living in the 
laboratory. During this time he collected data by interview and 
observation on the leadership styles of the two men in addition 
to data on the scientists' groups. The natural experiment analy-
sis was conducted following year 13. 
The introduction of the associate director with his different 
style of leadership constituted the experimental treatment. The 
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TABLE 2 -- DIMENSIONS OF THREATS TO VALIDITY 
THREATS TO INTERNAL VALIDITY 
History: Other specific events in addition to the exper-
imental variable occurring between a first and second 
measurement. 
Maturation: Processes within the respondents that are a 
function of the passage of time per se (not a specific to 
the particular events), including growing older, growing 
hungrier, growing tireder, etc. 
Testing: The effects of taking a test a first time upon 
subjects' scores in subsequent testing. 
Instrumentation: The effects of changes in the calibration 
of a measuring instrument or changes in the observers or 
scorers upon changes in the obtained measurements. 
Statistical Regression: Operating where groups of sub-
jects have been selected on the basis of their extreme 
scores. 
Selection: Biases resulting in differential recruitment 
of respondents for the comparison groups. 
Experimental Mortality: The differential loss of 
respondents from comparison groups. 
Selection-Maturation Interaction: In certain of the quasi- 
experimental designs, such as the non-equivalent control 
group design, an interaction of maturation and differ-
ential selection is confounded with, that is, might be 
mistaken for, the effect of the experimental variable. 
THREATS TO EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
Reactive or Interaction Effect of Testing, in which a 
pretest might increase or decrease the respondents' sen-
sitivity or responsiveness to the experimental variable 
and thus make the results obtained for a pretested popu-
lation unrepresentative of the experimental variable for 
the unpretested universe from which the experimental 
respondents were selected. 
Reactive Effects of Experimental Arrangements, which pre-
clude generalizations about the effect of the experimental 
variable for persons being exposed to it in nonexperimental 
settings. 
Interation effects between selection bias and the experi-
mental variable. 
Multiple-treatment Interference, a problem wherever multiple 
treatments are applied to the same respondents, and a parti- 
cular problem for one-group designs involving equivalent 
time samples or equivalent materials samples. 
Source: Campbell and Stanley, 1966; Campbell, 1968. 
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continuity of research project areas and men assigned to them 
enabled Hill to divide the publication and turn-over data into 
two groups for comparison over the entire 13-year time span. If 
the scientists had been assigned at random to the two directors, 
this would be closer to a classic experimental design. However, 
since the assignments were based on research areas, the differen-
tial factors operating in the two groups are not accounted for 
either by randomization or control. The design is then Campbell 
and Stanley's "#10 - nonequivalent control group" with time series 
data. (1966) 
The director was characterized "as generally democratic in 
the way he dealt with people, participating to an extent but al-
lowing them freedom in their own decisions on the direction of 
their research." (Hill, 1970, P. 14) The associate director, on 
the other hand, was characterized as autocratic. He "sought to 
control the fine detail of his subordinates' research. He chose 
the division's scientific projects and then dictated what each 
scientist was to do; he sought to control projects whose research 
discipline was outside his own professional knowledge and dictated 
courses of action his subordinates considered entirely incompetent; 
they would carry out the research he requested and bring him neg-
ative results only to be told to vary conditions in a minor way 
rather than abandon the project." (p. 14) 
The time series data show an almost immediate effect on pub-
lication rate and a less pronounced effect after some time delay 
on turnover. This latter variable tends to be a conservative mea-
sure because of the small number of research positions available 
in Australia to scientists in their disciplines. The motivation 
to leave has to be relatively large compared to the United States. 
Hill advances a number of rival hypotheses to'explain these 
data. For instance, the associate director might not have been a 
highly competent scientist to begin with, but from the information 
available this does not appear to have been the case. The evi-
dence is that he was a good scientist in his field. In keeping 
with the spirit of the quasi-experimental method, Hill in examin-
ing a variety of alternative explanations, is able to fairly well 
dismiss some, while others remain as potentially viable alterna-
tives. However, he does not explicitly analyze these in terms of 
the internal and external threats to validity. His discussion 
focuses mostly on the question: To what extent do these observed 
results come from the change in this one variable in this particu-
lar case?, i.e., internal validity. The questions relating to 
external validity--generalizability---are not considered in the 
same manner. It is clear, of course, that the social system of 
Australia and the institutional system of science there are lim-
iting factors of unknown magnitude. 
Proposal solicitations appear to be a useful context in which 
to establish experimental designs. A given proposal request pro-
vides a common problem or set of sub-problems, that are worked on 
in parallel by several organizations. The variance arising from 
different task characteristics is reduced, thereby minimizing one 
significant area for rival explanations. 
Allen and Marquis (1964) performed a study that is essentially 
a natural experiment in which they compared the effects of prior 
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experiences or knowledge of given problem areas to success in 
solving a set of problems. The problems were six technical com-
ponents required in proposals submitted by eight companies to two 
government proposals requests. A total of 26 possible solutions 
were involved. 
The "experimental treatment" was the existence or absence of 
specific prior experience or knowledge in the technical area. 
This could potentially constitute a "biasing set" to the solutions 
the companies eventually came up with. The proposal evaluators 
judged whether or not each proposed solution was successful. While 
the design is not such that rival hypotheses are removed, the data 
clearly indicate that having prior experience, per se, does not 
necessarily lead to successful solutions. "Prior experience only 
with a technique which is not appropriate for the present problem 
usually results in a unsuccessful solution (negative biasing set). 
However, if such laboratories consider more than one alternative 
approach, the probability of success is increased from zero to one 
half." On the other hand, a positive biasing set can be introduced 
when the laboratory has had only prior experience with a technique 
appropriate to the given problem. The effects of experience and 
knowledge are similar. 
Administrative experiments can take a number of forms: the 
experimenter may in fact be the administrator; the experimenter 
may be an administrator and a researcher working together; the 
experimenter may be an outsider working with the permission of an 
administrator; etc. An experiment of the latter form is reported 
by Rubenstein, Rath, et al. (1973) on behavioral factors influencing 
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the adoption of an experimental information system. The research 
sites were 12 medical groups (matched by specialty). The treat-
ment involved installing a new "state-of-the-art" scientific and 
technical information system, including facsimile and other spe-
cial communication equipment in six research hospitals. The equip-
ment was directly linked to a research library with a specially 
trained librarian to handle the physicians/researchers' information 
requests. The system was designed to be at the forefront of the 
art, and also to be economically feasible if the hospitals chose 
to continue its use after the experiment was completed. 
A number of factors affecting internal and external validity 
were considered in the design of the experiment: 
First, because the research was designed to study 
group reactions to the introduction of a new infor-
mation service, unrelated sets of researchers and 
clinicians were rejected in favor of well-defined 
work groups. Second, because specific organiza-
tional constraints often affect information-seek-
ing behavior, groups were selected from several 
hospitals. Third, groups were chosen from more 
than one discipline because an individual's spe-
cialty may also influence his information needs 
and searching habits. Last, because it was a mat-
ter of speculation whether an individual's orienta-
tion (clinical, research, or supervisory) affects 
his information-seeking style and thus his reac-
tion to new services, groups were selected in 
which individuals of all three orientations were 
included. (p. 30) 
Ninety-nine individuals in 12 groups, two in each hospital, parti-
cipated in all phases of the experiment. The first phase of the 
study consisted of a questionnaire filled out by each participant 
giving data about his personal background, organizational environ-
ment, and present habits of information-seeking. The second phase 
was the introduction of the advanced information retrieval system 
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for seven weeks with all activity on it being monitored in detail. 
Forty people used the system, submitting a total of 141 requests. 
Many of these requests were for reprints of anywhere from ten to 
30 articles. The last phase, six months after the system was dis-
continued, was an evaluation by each person of the system and 
his use of it. The results of the experiment provide useful in-
formation on a number of aspects of individuals' patterns of 
information-seeking and some information about the effect of group 
structure (cohesiveness, presence or absence of information gate-
keepers and their use/non-use of the system as contrasted to super-
visors' use/non-use of the system) on the groups' use of the sys-
tem. 
Complete randomization was not practical in the study. How-
ever, the three orientations of the individuals provide a basis 
for establishing comparisons to extract information from the data 
and to reduce some of the threats to validity. While all indivi-
duals had the opportunity to expose themselves to the experimental 
treatment -- i.e., to make use of the system-- some did not, while 
others did to varying extents. This provides another basis for 
comparison. The behavioral data measured were use of the system. 
Due to the study design, it is not possible to make comparisons 
between people who had the opportunity to decide whether or not 
to use the system -- those included in the 12 experimental groups --  
and control groups of those who continued their normal informa-
tion-seeking style with no outside influences. To include such a 
"pure" control group would have required a quite different mode 
of data collection. However, in testing the hypothesis concerning 
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group structure a basis of comparison is built into the design 
with those groups serving the function of a "control" that had 
a low degree of cohesiveness and neither a gatekeeper or a super-
visor that were users of the system. In addition, the experi-
mental treatment (the new system) was introduced on an alternating 
ON-OFF basis, in which one set of groups constituted "controls" 
while the other set was receiving the treatment. ,Beyond the first 
cycle, of course, such an arrangement is subject to a number of 
threats to validity identified in Table 2. 
In terms of Campbell's threats to validity, the following 
points may be noted. History would appear to be fairly well 
accounted for by including groups from a number of hospitals. How-
ever, all were in the same city and so a common event could have 
occurred (e.g., a professional society meeting in one of the spe-
cialties). Maturation over seven weeks for mature professionals 
would not appear to be a significant factor. Since there was no 
repeated administration of the same questionnaires,  testing would 
not appear relevant. Instrumentation, however, is more of a prob-
lem. Most of the questionnaries were devised for the study, al-
though they were based upon prior work on information-seeking 
behavior. (Trueswell, Rath, and Rubenstein, 1968) Selection  
biases are more difficult to assess. However, since the experi-
ment dealt with intact groups, the dominant bias would be the fac-
tors involved in the willingness of the individuals and groups to 
participate. Experimental mortality arose because 11 group members 
declined to participate beyond the first questionnaire. (The total 
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membership of the groups was 110.) Also, high turnover and other 
factors led to 48% of the initial respondents not completing the 
final evaluation questionnaire. 
Of the four threats to external validity, only the multiple-
treatment interference does not apply since there was no multiple 
treatment. Reaction or interaction effects of testing arise be-
cause of initial phase of the research with its initial negotia-
tions with the groups, questionnaries, and interviews. Reactive  
effects of experimental arrangements are clearly illustrated by the 
five respondents who said they felt they should use the system just 
to cooperate in the experiment. Other respondents gave this reason 
along with other reasons. Interaction effects between selection  
bias and the experimental variable may be present because of the 
groups' initial willingness to cooperate. The attitude and impor-
tance of information-seeking to these groups as compared to others --
other kinds of scientists, engineers, etc. -- have been investigated 
by the Northwestern group (Trueswell, et al, 1968; Werner, 1969; 
Kegan, 1969; Thompson, 1970; Moor, 1972), but comparisons have not 
yet been made. From this cursory evaluation it would appear that 
the internal validity of the design is reasonable, but that the 
external validity is limited. However, considerably more informa-
tion than is presented in the article and a more thorough analysis 
than we have performed here are needed to make a more detailed 
assessment. Our purpose here has been only to illustrate a few 
specific instances of threats to validity. 
Administrative experiments may also be carried out by managers 
within a firm. In an article written for managers, Meyer (1969), 
25( 
then General Electric's Manager of Personnel Research, reports a 
series of studies he performed with the cooperation of George 
Litwin of Harvard Business School. In an experiment conducted 
in a large engineering department they attempted to see if they 
could "...help change the climate of an organization, as perceived 
by its employees, from a negative to a positive one." They found 
that it was possible to create a change towards a more favorable 
one, although the mechanisms by which it was achieved were some- 
what different , from what they had anticipated. The study is not pre-
sented in enough detail to analyze it fully from a "truth-seeking" 
viewpoint, but it does illustrate the following points to conclude 
our discussion of administrative experimentation: 
1) Perhaps, most important, administrative experiments can 
be performed in operating organizations. 
2) Useful results can he obtained. Meyer notes that the 
positive results were encouraging and that further experiments were 
planned. 
3) Administrative experiments can be facilitated by using an 
outside consultant--in this case a university-based researcher. 
4) Communication of the results of the experiment to others 
so that society can benefit, either from the utility of the experi-
mental treatment or the contribution to understanding of organi-
zational functioning, can be a problem, Results may be reported 
inadequately or not at all because managers are not used to such 
writing; because the company considers part of the data embar-
rassing or the results to give them competitive advantage; because 
the consultant considers the techniques proprietary; and for other 
reasons. 
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If more emphasis is placed upon administrative experimentation 
and interest continues to develop, as it seems to be doing, we can 
look forward to the problem of communication of results diminish-
ing and to more reasonably designed experimental tests subjecting 
our commonly-accepted managerial beliefs and theories, as well as 
the controversial ones, to the relative rigor of verification in 
practice. 
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ASSESSING THE KNOWLEDGE OF INNOVATIONS IN NEGLECTED SECTORS; 
THE CASE OF RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION 
W. Paul Strassmann 
Those sectors of the economy that have been relatively neg-
lected by analysts of technological change are not necessarily 
those that have had the fewest technological advances. The neg-
lected sectors may be those where change has been difficult to 
codify and to measure, and therefore to analyze at an abstract 
level. They will be those sectors where advances are qualitative, 
indirect, and somewhat intangible, making it difficult to aggre-
gate and even to compare one case with another. Indeed, studies 
of these sectors are likely to be case studies or collections of 
cases, often chronological, with few abstract and sophisticated 
hypotheses under test. 
Analysis of technological change will be most sophisticated 
where the individual discoveries or adaptations have common ob-
jective dimensions other than those of the innovators or adopters. 
One such dimension is the relation between physical output in 
pounds, gallons, calories, kilowatts, etc., and inputs in similar 
units. Another dimension puts the changing input-output ratio in 
terms of money, net costs, and revenues. These are vulnerable to 
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extraneous economic trends, but still manageable. Manufactur-
ing, agriculture, mining, transportation, and power generation 
are all sectors with technological changes that raise produc-
tivity in such comparable, measurable ways. Consequently, tech-
nological change in these sectors, especially manufacturing, 
has been studied with ever-increasing sophistication, to a point 
that one even has to remind oneself that technological change is 
not synonymous with advances in manufacturing. 
The true output from manufacturing should not, of course, 
be seen as a flow of objects with price tags, but as the flow of 
services from the accumulating stock of such objects. The prag-
matic turn of mind that rejects this proviso is the same that 
steers researchers away from spending time on almost untestable 
theories about innovations in sectors that directly produce ser- 
vices with these qualitative, somewhat intangible characteristics. 
However, the problems and opportunities for society and inventors 
may be in those sectors even if they do not pay off conveniently 
for general technological analysts. 
Thus, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, we need 
better medical care, better systems for paying and collecting 
bills, better postal services, better garbage collection, better 
education, and other improved service activities that have little 
common with the physical production of mining, agriculture, and 
manufacturing. The dominant share of our productive activities, 
whether measured in man-hours or as GNP, is now devoted to these 
sectors. There would be no harm in understanding the innovation 
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process here a little better. A problem with studying techno-
logical change in these neglected sectors is that they are poorly 
understood in their non-technological aspects as well. Their 
more qualitative, less physical output makes them difficult to 
analyze in all respects. 
As an illustration, I would like to discuss the sector to 
which I have devoted some years: residential construction. This 
sector is a kind of halfway house. It does produce physical ob-
jects, and these even have a crude common denominator, the area 
of floor space. At the same time, no one loses sight of the flow 
of services in the form of shelter and amenities that dwellings 
are supposed to yield over an extended period of time, and every-
one knows that these are interrelated with trends in the urban 
setting. 
Technology and the General Understanding  
of the Housing Sector  
The role of housing expenditures in the consumer's budget 
and the role of construction in the economy as a whole are both 
poorly understood. We do not know exactly what determines the 
volume of expenditures, nor how these are related to net social 
benefits. We do not know how far actual benefits diverge from a 
feasible optimum using the existing technology. 
The sector is poorly understood compared with others, mainly 
because of its complexity. Consumers may not only be renters buy-
ing a flow of housing services; they may also be investors who 
regard the dwelling as a reserve of savings. Durability causes 
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stock-flow analytical problems. Production must always be ap-
praised in terms of its effect on existing dwellings and their 
changing uses. Some analogies with the economics of machinery 
and transportation equipment may apply, but the immobile attach-
ment of a building to a site raises a host of unique problems. 
For one thing, if the commodity is immobile, then its producers 
and consumers must go to it, instead of the reverse. Moreover, 
the product cannot be appraised abstracting from questions of 
land use, public utilities, and urban design. In addition to 
complexity, both instability and shifts from site to site have 
rendered data collection difficult and discouraged research. 
When behavior in a sector as a whole is largely unexplained, a 
single facet like technological innovation is likely to remain 
undeciphered. 
The results of both of these analytical failures are per-
vasive housing problems throughout the world. In developing 
countries the urban population is projected to rise by one bil-
lion from 1960 to 2000 or four times the rise from 1920 to 1960. 
The rate of-building minimally acceptable dwellings is less than 
one-third of what it should be. As a result shanty-towns with-
out water, sewer systems, etc., are doubling in size every four 
to six years and will soon shelter most of the population. Cities 
like Calcutta are said to be threatened with collapse -- a state 
that some observers say would be hard to tell from the present 
state. 
High rents, overcrowding, lengthy waiting periods, and numer-
ous inconveniences keep housing close to the top of complaints in 
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developed countries. In Tokyo in 1970 some 813,000 households 
lived in one-room apartments. Blocks and blocks of boarded-up 
housing, new and old, 'are typical of large American cities. But 
the average Russian family is said to have only one-fourth of the 
space as the American. Some private construction and ownership 
is even encouraged in the Soviet Union to help reduce shortages. 
Housing is the sector where private capital persists the longest 
and reappears first in planned economies, and it is the sector 
where planning is accepted first in market economies. In this 
sector, remedies lag and mistakes fester in the form of ugliness, 
pollution, disease, and psychoses. As Churchill said, "We shape 
our buildings; thereafter they shape us." 
Not all of these urban problems have a technological facet; 
and when they do not, they simply cannot be solved with an inven-
tion, a material, or a design. Where a material change can be 
part of the solution for a more general problem, the material 
innovation must be contrived in terms of prevailing tastes and 
laws and the process for changing these. Otherwise, we sink mil-
lions into Pruitt-Igoes that must be detonated. Or we attempt 
Operations Breakthrough that break down. Families in the 1970's 
detest "Industrialized Modular Housing" as much as they did "Pre-
fabricated Housing" in the 1940's. Following the trend, some 
universities discontinued their "Industrialized Housing" courses. 
Instead of technological faith in specialized experts, we 
hear of rebellion against dependence "on contractor-oriented bu-
reaucratic systems... a breaking wave of reaction against author-
itarian solutions to technocratically posed problems."
1 People 
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are encouraged to lay their own concrete blocks, row on row. 
Of course, it is easier to crowd another mobile home in the slot 
between two others. In a decade or so, salvaging abandoned mo-
bile homes may be a regular industry. For a while, some archi-
tects favored homes with disposable, modular parts or "cartridges" 
that could be plugged in and out. As Julius Stulman put it, in 
Creative Systems in Housing, World Institute Council, 1971, there 
will be a "flow of precision, factory-built houses and housing 
complexes [whose] cartridges can be replaced periodically with 
listed trade-in values, incorporating new developments of sci-
ence and materials." Environmentalism seems, fortunately, to 
have kept that idea from getting on the ground. 
A popular diagnosis of inefficiency and failure in build-
ing is that the industry was bypassed by the Industrial Revolu-
tion. Although false, the diagnosis has better durability than 
some houses. Carpenters and bricklayers do not make houses in 
the same way as they did in the eighteenth century. Building 
codes, restrictive trade unions, and dull, portfolio-guarding 
bankers do inhibit change but not in the form of a super cookie 
cutter that could plunk down a condominium every thirty seconds. 
There has been a steady series of innovations that let us build 
expensive but inadequate housing more efficiently. Ingenious fix-
tures and components can be assembled in ways that, although bas-
ically conventional, would have astonished us a generation ago. 
For example, in the Lansing area, Dr. Hugh Spall found that the 
most significant innovations in single-family housing were roof 
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trusses, thin coat plaster, oversized bricks, power nailers, fin-
ger jointed wood, prefinished mouldings, prehung doors, and cri-
tical path scheduling.'2 In those European countries that took 
to industrialized panel building in a major way, adding innovation 
after innovation, the finding seems to be that innovations in 
conventional building occurs at a rate that keeps the productiv-
ity of the two approaches within ten percent of one another. 
There are better explanations for the inadequate amount and 
direction of technological change in dwelling construction. One 
is what Professor Marion Bowley has called "the System". The 
"System" is not a way of building at all but a set of barriers 
among materials producers, designers, builders, owners, and, in 
the case of Britain, quantity surveyors. The Industrial Revolu-
tion had transformed building with innovations that too often 
caused fraud and catastrophe. Separation of powers with legal 
checks and balances restored predictability and safety but para-
lyzed many types of innovation. Architects no longer designed 
building in terms of marginal savings in construction methods or 
materials production but merely became experts in the art of 
arranging space and appearances. 
A Digression on the Industrial Revolution  
One problem, therefore, is defining technological change in 
building methods too narrowly, as a way of fabricating a product 
without considering the urban context and complexities of habita-
tion. The other "knowledge gap" is a simplistic or false view of 
the historical sequence of events. A simplistic explanation of 
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the way we arrived at the present can inspire simplistic and fu-
tile plans for the future. In the following paragraphs, I shall 
present a summary sketch of the interrelation between technolo-
gical and organizational development in the industrial Revolution. 
Thorough research will be needed to substantiate, to modify, or 
to refute this suggested interpretation. 
The British Industrial Revolution after 1750 inspired some 
technological changes based on advances in knowledge and others 
consisting of empirical factor substitutions. As usual, the fac-
tor substitutions depended on relative price changes of materials 
and labor, and among materials. Customers for eighteenth century 
buildings were willing to save money with substitutes of cheap 
materials and cheap methods. Molded clay, or terracotta, espe-
cially in the form of "Coade Stone" after 1769, was a substitute 
for repetitive stone ornaments carved at high cost. After 1815, 
with improved iron-making and less military demand, cast iron 
ornaments replaced terracotta. Stucco was a cheap substitute for 
dressed stone. Colored gypsum plaster imitated marble, and John 
Nash even painted cast iron columns to look like stone. 
If traditionalism could not withstand economic substitutions 
in ornamentation, it was unlikely to stop less visible changes, 
particularly in buildings used for production. English cotton 
mills began to use cast iron columns for interior supports in the 
1790's. In 1801 for the Salford Mill, Boulton and Watt made com-
plete interior frames with a forerunner of the I-beam, the inverted 
T-beam. By 1830 such frames were common in both England and France. 
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Cast glass was introduced to England from France in 1776, and 
in 1847 the firm of Hartley made the unremarkable but popular 
innovation of leaving glass unpolished for roofs of factories 
and railway stations. All these changes were strictly empirical. 
New knowledge, especially a theory of structures, was mainly 
developed in France and often inspired by problems of domes and 
bridges. Builders of Roman baths and medieval cathedrals did not 
know much about stresses, strains, and the strength of materials. 
The Greek or Gothic appearance of mid-nineteenth century build-
ings does not, however, prove that building techniques were un-
changed. Embedded behind the cast iron facade were great advances 
in knowledge. 
Much of this knowledge was first developed in order to build 
better bridges. Urbanization and larger volumes of trade made 
the old bridges inadequate, extravagant, or dangerous. Gautier's 
early eighteenth century Trait( des Ponts still cited tradition as 
sufficient justification for the proportion between arches and sup-
porting piers, though he urged les savants to study the problem 
scientifically. By 1729 Bernard Forest de Belidor's La Science  
des Ingenieurs supported traditional methods with a simple theory 
of statics. Robert Hooke in England had shown that the distortion 
in any material is proportional to the force producing it, but 
this principle did not acquire importance until much later. By 
the late 1700's, the discipline of structural mechanics had been 
created out of these beginnings, complete with mathematical ex-
pressions for critical loads, the static equilibrium of shearing 
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forces, and the elastic behavior of materials. 3 In 1770 Emiland 
Marie Gauthey designed a materials testing machine to help apply 
these theories to the reconstruction of the dome of Sainte Gene-
vieve in Paris, later the Panthgon Francaise. Thus knowledge, 
developed in bridge building and at the gcole des Ponts et Chaus- 
sees, began to spread to other types of structures. As in many 
industries, major theoretical and experimental advances, together 
with economic changes, accelerated around the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury. 
One should note, however, that these theories and tests im-
proved and rationalized types of construction after they were 
already being built. Theories did not come first. This sequence 
of theory after practice was repeated for iron construction around 
1830 and for reinforced concrete around 1875. New materials with 
unfamiliar properties came into use and led to structural theories 
that meant greater safety and economy. In 1826-1830 Eaton Hodg-
kinson and William Fairbairn carried on experiments and developed 
theories about inverted T-beams. 4 But by this time internal struc- 
tural cast iron frames were already fairly common in England. 
Science followed invention faster in the case of concrete re-
inforcement. Inventions do not really have a precise beginning, 
but if we take 1867, the date of Josephy Monier's main patent, as 
the beginning of reinforced concrete, then only ten years elapsed 
until the publication of Thaddeus Hyatt's report on the relation 
of bar reinforcement to location and loads of structural parts. 
Changes in technique affected not only large public structures. 
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The technology of ordinary housing was also transformed. The 
two-story wooden and brick houses of the past century may look 
like eighteenth century houses, but they result from a production 
process thoroughly overhauled. Cheaper iron for tools, especially 
for saws, as well as for nails and bolts, made possible a large 
number of changes in carpentry. More efficient mechanical sawing 
greatly reduced the cost of thin boards. Sawn softwood took the 
place of axe-dressed hardwood. The major invention of balloon 
framing could follow as a result, and is generally attributed to 
Augustine D. Taylor of Chicago in 1833. This most common type of 
wooden American house therefore could not even exist in the eight-
eenth century. Hammering was not transformed, but what was being 
hammered was different. 
In a similar sense, bricklaying was not transformed, but 
brickmaking was. In the early nineteenth century, clamp-burning 
of bricks took the place of more primitive kilns. In the 1830's 
came pugmills for grinding the clay and mechanical wire-cutting 
of extruded clay into bricks. Experiments were conducted with 
pressed and molded bricks and various forms of drying. By 1856 
more than 230 patents had been granted for brickmaking in England. 5 
It may be suggested that brickmaking is not really a part of the 
building industry. And it isn't. But it was. In the eighteenth 
century, bricklayers often made their own bricks. 6 
	
vertical dis- 
integration of building from material making was one of the con-
sequences of the Industrial Revolution. As we shall see in the 
next section, these changes in organization associated with inno-
vation first led to progress, then stagnation. 
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Changes in Organization  
Designers, constructors, and materials producers were not 
yet separate and insulated occupations rigorously prevented from 
much coordination around 1800. Nor had restrictive building codes 
and trade unions come into existence. As a result experimenting 
was easy, and major and minor catastrophes followed -- usually at 
the expense of others, often insurance companies. Failures nat-
urally led to further research, experiments, and theories. Re-
sulting knowledge was often converted into standardized tables 
of correct practice for a kind of self-policing. Building codes 
are these formulations turned into laws, often written under pres-
sure from insurance companies. 
The dates of these steps vary with the sector of the indus-
trial. For concrete in the United States, for example, the self-pol-
icing stage did not come until the foundation of the American So-
ciety of Testing Materials (1902), the American Concrete Institute 
(1905), and the Portland Cement Association (1916). Britain had 
no rules governing the use of reinforced concrete until 1913. Amer-
ican codes acquired their ulta-conservative characteristics after 
the collapse of an eight-story hotel at Benton Harbor, Michigan, in 
the course of construction in 1924. 
Restrictive trade union practices were unimportant as Indus-
trial Revolution gathered momentum. The Webbs observed that, 
during the eighteenth century there is, as we shall see, 
no lack of information as to combinations of workmen in 
nearly every other skilled trade...But of combinations 
in the building trades we have found scarcely a trace 
until the end of that century. 7 
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Even the rule of seven years' apprenticeship was being abandoned. 
Seven years had been excessive, anyway. Speaking of bricklayers, 
Adam Smith gave up his normal caution and said flatly that he 
considered "no species of labor more easy to learn. " 8  Since spe-
culative builders could lower standards of all types, in the words 
of Postgate, "the trade was soon flooded with cheap and half-skilled 
labor which was content with rates prevailing in other trades." 9 
In 1815 Thomas Cubitt started to employ his craftsmen on an ordi-
nary time basis to work on whatever jobs he had for them. 10 Labor 
was less involved in production decisions during this period than 
was the case either earlier or later. 
Inflexibility due to lack of coordination among specialized 
building professions ("the system" according to Marion Bowley) 
was not yet a problem during the Industrial Revolution. Such spe-
cialization was only beginning in those years and was itself a 
product of the new methods and the greatly increased scale of 
building. In the eighteenth century some building experts like 
Batty Langley could still label themselves as "carpenter and arch-
itect," but the trend was against designs by craftsmen. 11 After 
Andrea Palladio's work was translated into English in 1715, the 
view spread that unschooled craftsmen could not attain the schol-
arly and esthetic level of true architects. 12 When four archi-
tects were included in the Royal Academy in 1768, one could say 
that the profession had at last been officially recognized in Eng-
land. An architects' club was not formed until 1791, however. 
This club became the British Institute of Architects in 1834 and the 
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R.I.B.A. (Royal Institute of British Architects) in 1866. 
The architects' efforts to keep others out of designing did 
not mean simultaneous and voluntary withdrawal by architects from 
organizing site-work. This withdrawal came about with the rise 
of general contractors, a rise that has been described by M. H. 
Port. 13 In the latter eighteenth century, building by measure 
had replaced the ancient system of material purchases by the owner 
and paying workers or master tradesmen piece rates or daily wages. 
By 1784 such direct labor payments were unusual. 14 Building by 
measure, the new system, meant that master craftsmen worked for 
the owner or architect and added a percentage (usually 15 percent) 
for profit -- a cost-plus system. General contracting then took 
its place in the first third of the nineteenth century. But not 
until 1887 did the R.I.B.A. prohibit architects from profit-making 
positions in building. However, the trend had been in this direc-
tion for some decades, and the prohibition merely formalized ac-
cepted standards. 
Speculative builders, of course, used their own designs. These 
builders were rejected as legitimate designers by architects and 
were also not allowed in the official organization of general con-
tractors. It is possible, however, that theirs was the largest 
volume of business. In France the Corps des Ingenieurs des Ponts  
et Chauss4es had developed a system of general contracting in the 
eighteenth century. 
Meanwhile a special profession of measurers also emerged in 
England. During the mid-eighteenth century, the builder would 
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employ one measurer for drawing up his bills and the owner would 
employ another to check on the first. These measurers were at 
first paid by the day•and, beginning in the 1760's, by commission. 
Since there was no agreement on either costing or physical measur-
ing, the owner's measurer could easily come to lower figure than 
the builder's measurer. As a result, law suits were common, and 
the profession of measurer was despised as unproductive and dis-
honest. This system of paying by measure gave way to general con-
tracting in the 1820's, but the hated measurers survived in Eng-
land by becoming an independent profession of quantity surveyors. 
Before construction began, the surveyor would draw up lists of 
quantities on which builders could bid, each using his own price 
estimates. A Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors was founded 
in 1868, and by 1907 its members were barred from employment by 
building firms. Architects had been barred from measuring quan-
tities as early as 1834. 
We had, therefore, in the Industrial Revolution, not only a 
process of technological advance and occupational specialization 
in building, but also one of erecting barriers between specialities. 
These barriers were not only monopolistic conspiracies but nomi-
nally guarantees of competence, impartiality, and honesty. Both 
the specialization and the barriers were needed because both ig-
norance and fraud were problems. With more complex buildings for 
unprecedented uses, one man's knowledge was not enough for ef-
ficiency at design, sitework, and materials production. The bar-
riers among specialities were a system of frontiers that could be 
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policed to reduce fraud in buying materials, in hiring and super-
vising workers, and in other aspects of designing and contracting. 
But specialization with permanent barriers implies a static 
situation. It implies that coordination is no problem, that con-
sultation is not needed as a continuing activity, that the inter-
relations among the sectors of the building process are given, not 
changing. Only if these assumptions are true, can barriers be con-
sistent with maximum efficiency. If the assumptions happen to be 
false, then acting on them can make a potentially dynamic sector 
technologically rigid. 
By the mid-nineteenth century given types of buildings were 
no doubt safer and built at lower cost. But this achievement came 
at the price of a complex and rigid system of organization that 
has only begun to loosen up. By 1900 architects no longer knew 
with accuracy what alternative designs would cost, and they had 
little stake in keeping costs as low as possible. Hence innova-
tions in techniques tended to come less often, and if so, from 
engineers, speculative builders, or manufacturers not bound by 
"the system." That "system," however, was a response to the dra-
matic but uncertain effects on building of the Industrial Revolu-
tion. 
Recent Trends  
Breakdown of the "system" is underway in many countries, un-
fortunately with a considerable revival of fraud. Performance 
standards in building codes and government technical institutes as 
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monitors of the building process (e.g., the French Agreement sys-
tem) are progressive substitutes for the inhibiting approach of 
the system. 
Government-sponsored building research in industrialized coun-
tries began in the first quarter of this century. One might there-
fore suppose that a study of technological change could center on 
the work of these public building research institutes, that their 
annual reports, documents, and in-house histories would almost be 
a ready-made account of achievements and failures, together with 
explanations. In the United States, however, that is not the case. 
Public research . was allowed as a support for private enterprise 
and as a safeguard for the public, but not as a progenitor of in-
novations. To be safe from private and Congressional attack, the 
Building Research Division of Standards must insist that it "does 
not develop new products, materials, or systems for commercial 
use, nor establish the performance limits that determine their ac- 
ceptability for particular applications.u 15  
The National Bureau of Standards began testing building ma-
terials shortly after its establishment in 1901. These activities 
were expanded and broadened with the creation of a special Division 
of Building and Housing in 1921. The Division was supposed to en-
courage simplification and standardization, to promote better and 
municipal building codes, and to coordinate scientific, technical, 
and economic building research. The aims were mostly wishful pre-
ambling. After being renamed "Building Technology Division" in 
1947, research did become more profound, and even invention and 
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development were allowed "to serve the special needs of the Gov-
ernment." 
The Building Research Division, as it was recently named, is 
allowed to "study new technical processes and methods of fabrica-
tion of materials in which the Government has a special interest," 
as well as basic and applied research, "including demonstration of 
the results of the Bureau's work by exhibits or otherwise as may 
be deemed most effective." It "seeks to promote economy and ef-
fectiveness in the design, construction, and use of buildings and 
in the manufacture of building materials and systems." Neverthe-
less, the fiction has been maintained that new inventions and con-
struction methods were not generally being developed. 
One may reasonably ask what innovation involves besides de-
termining the performance needs of occupants, the diagnosis of 
flaws in current practice, the analysis of alternatives, and the 
development of tests and standards for application. Perhaps it is 
a patent, a brand name, and a label. The problem with such govern-
ment research is that if it's bad, it's a waste of taxpayer's mon-
ey; and if it's good, it threatens private enterprise, or may seem 
to. The conflict should not be exaggerated, however. The American 
Concrete Institute, the Common Brick Manufacturers' Association of 
America, fire insurance companies, the Porcelain Enamel Institute, 
and others have often cooperated with the Bureau of Standards with 
research associateships and other measures. 
Government may help with relatively small technicalities but 
must not attempt anything major, except with strict complicance with 
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private interests. Otherwise the trade associations approach 
their favorite Congressmen in order to forestall, paralyze, or 
terminate a program. All this is not just speculation. It actu-
ally happened to the Civilian Industrial Technology Program during 
1961-63. John Kenneth Galbraith, Jerome Wiesener, Richard R. Nel-
son, and others had taken one look at dwelling construction and 
concluded that failure to make radical building innovations was a 
curious oversight whose correction was long overdue. The program 
they launched was ended by a small group of Congressmen. Dorothy 
Nelkin's The Politics of Housing Innovation is not as broad as 
its title would suggest, but it does document well this one case. 
A series of similar studies would be useful. 16 
A more important reason for technological failure in over-
hauling dwelling construction methods is failure to consider "ex-
ternalities," that is, a "four-walls-and-roof" approach. An ar-
ray of dwellings succeeds or fails in part because of nearby.amen- 
ities, transportation facilities, and public utilities of all types. 
Raw shelter is a temporary and fragmentary answer to the search for 
housing. The provision of all these utilities is not a once-and-
for-all investment in "infrastructure," a durable foundation for 
whatever else one might like to build or do. If anything, the need 
for utilities will rise exponentially and undergo qualitative trans-
formation, thus calling for both organizational and technological 
innovations. As an example, consider garbage -- or euphemistically, 
solid waste. If it is not to be incinerated or hand-carried, should 
it be ground and flushed, compacted and rolled, or sorted out and 
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and recycled? The banning of 2,200 incinerators in Washington, 
D. C., left the city with 500 additional tons of waste per day to 
dump somewhere, somehow. Better dwellings and efficient utilities 
must be designed in terms of one another. A city is not a mere 
accumulation of disconnected pieces, but a system of interrelated 
cells. 
The cells, or households, of the urban system are not, how-
ever, homogeneous. Bachelors, aged couples, families with babies, 
etc., have different needs, and these life-cycle aspects are only 
the beginning of the differentiation that people seek in their 
habitats. Where there is freedom to move, any technology that ig-
nores these differential wants is a recipe for vacancy. Success-
ful design minimizes neither vacancy rates nor cost -- except in 
terms of differential demands for quality. A zero vacancy rate 
would mean that every chain of moves would have to be totally pre-
arranged and completed in a single day. For such precision and 
speed, minimal differentiation among houses would maximize their 
transferability or liquidity. Variety complicates choice and de-
lays moves, but it may be worth its price, part of which society 
pays in the form of vacant dwellings. Among the variations that 
people seek are those of density; any dispersion immediately raises 
land, transport, and other costs. Technological change in housing 
must raise variety and quality, as sought by the occupants, and 
not merely lower cost, as defined by engineers. 
Innovations that do nothing to lower costs of walls, windows, 
and roofs will continue to appear, therefore, and should indeed be 
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welcomed even where there are housing shortages among the poor. 
Such innovations may raise the convenience of fixtures, improve 
air circulation, heighten safety, or merely alter appearance. Per 
se. they do not imply anything one way or the other about correct-
ing housing *shortages. 
Mass-produced Housing  
A thorough study, which rather unexpectedly discovered the 
complexities of the housing innovation process, was prepared by 
the Committee on Industrialized Housing of the National Academy 
of Engineering during 1970-1972. This Committee was set up to 
assess the role that large American corporations might play in 
the provision of housing through the development of a sophisti-
cated mass production technology. Its technical staff came from 
government, universities, and some of the largest corporations. 
Over 700 housing systems and sub-systems were codified as analy-
tical source material. The committee developed a process model 
focusing on constraints that have to be eroded to let large cor-
porations or consortia enter the housing field. 
The assumption was that, given housing needs, government sup-
port, and changing attitudes, the time had come to use corporate 
skills to develop an industrialized delivery system for housing. 
The large companies had the capital, sophisticated management, and 
technicians to turn housing into high-volume production components, 
both cheaper and more profitable for the expanding, restructured 
markets. Had not the Europeans already developed highly integrated, 
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low-cost systems? Had the automobile not shown what mass produc-
tion, quality control, less skilled labor, and sophisticated de-
livery scheduling could do? The committee was prepared to go on 
to an implementation phase after a preliminary testing of these 
and other assumptions. 
With no deep literature on the nature of innovation in this 
neglected sector to draw on, the committee had to discover the 
lay of the land for itself. It concluded that for the 1970's in 
the United States, "an improved technology yielding only increased 
production can, at best, reduce costs to the consumer by less than 
ten percent." Investment in novel productive capacity to restruc-
ture the industry could improve quality, but was not needed other-
wise, and would in fact be so unprofitable as to be "extremely dis-
couraging." The problem was that, 
The Committee found institutional constraints inhibit 
high-impact technical response to the housing problem. 
Recent similar findings in such diverse areas as pub-
lic transportation, shipbuilding, resource allocation, 
and health care reinforce emerging private and public 
awareness that exotic technical solutions cannot, by 
themselves, be expected to resolve socially-based prob-
lems. 
Unlike housing, the automobile was a highly autonomous sub-
system free to move about on a vast public infrastructure. Housing 
can function only if external supporting systems are created, and 
mass-produced housing involves, not just the narrow strips that 
roads consist of, but land development on an enormous scale. Euro-
pean New Towns have government support for integrated finance and 
land development that is not matched by American policy. What 
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progress has been made in more intelligent zoning, state-wide 
building codes, and less restrictive trade union practices, is 
no more than a small, initial step. Moreover, the European stand-
ards of density, quality and amenities simply do not fit current 
American tastes and social problems. The committee does not men-
tion it, but the most successful American application has been 
the Larsen Nielsen System in Puerto Rico, where people cannot yet 
afford to be as choosy as North Americans but where building wages 
are a multiple of those in Latin America. 
Like the companies that have been "shaken out" of the indus-
trialized housing field (or dream), the committee had to learn 
that housing innovation takes more than tooling up for making ob-
jects of good design at a rate of thousands per week. Given the 
rate of progress in complementary activities, the volume of any 
one housing prefabricator is not likely to exceed a few thousand 
per year for a long time. 
One company that was "shaken out" of mass-producing modular 
housing was the Fruehauf Corporation. Its president, Robert D. 
Rowan, knows the pitfalls of the innovation process firsthand: 
They are savings to be made in mass producing housing. 
Unfortunately, these savings are dissipated by the cost 
of protecting modules against weather and protecting 
them for shipment. Then there is the cost of transpor-
tation to the site. By the time you are through, you 
have dissipated much of the savings derived through mass 
production. Also conventional construction today is far 
more efficient than it used to be, especially in the con-
struction of townhouses and condominiums -- the type of 
housing in which we were interested. Another problem 
we had was that our house was too good. We were deter-
mined not to build the slums of the future, and...we 
were in a position to give a 40-year guarantee against 
faulty workmanship. 
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We discovered the wife really bought the house and she 
wasn't interested in quality, but rather in the cup-
board space, closet space, color of drapes. In addi-
tion, the more we got into this, the more we realized 
that we were limited in the number of designs we could 
produce. Obviously, the term 'massproduce' indicates 
some consistency or conformity, and we found that peo-
ple aren't willing to buy... And if we couldn't mass 
produce, we couldn't generate the cost reductions. 
I've concluded, therefore, that the future isn't mod-
ular housing, but modular components. For example, a 
bathroom... 
Some of our major customers, like Sea Land and Sea 
Train, were running complete ships [to Vietnam]. Their 
containers began disappearing and when they investi-
gated, they found that people were living in them. 
This gave us the idea. In examining the construction 
techniques of modular housing, and on containers, we 
found they were very similar...In looking back on 
what we tried to do, our first mistake was limiting 
ourselves to townhouses. We could have produced indi-
vidual homes or condominium apartments without a great 
deal of alteration, and certainly if we get back into 
housing it will be on the basis of covering the entire 
industry rather than the very small part that we were 
initially involved in. The lesson has been costly 
for us. We invested $7 million in this venture. 16 
Diffusion  
Obviously, the characteristics of innovators, information 
transmitters, and influential opinion leaders can be studied and 
classified without considering the changes themselves and their 
repercussions. An example of such a study is, The Adoption and 
Diffusion of New Architectural Concepts Among Professional Arch-
itects, by Charles W. King and Thomas E. Ness of the Graduate 
School of Industrial Administration, Purdue University. A search 
of the Diffusion Documents Center, Michigan State University, 
showed that virtually no comprehensive research had focused on the 
change orientation or the process by which architects adopted new 
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concepts. Consequently, a questionnaire with over 600 items was 
developed and filled out with the cooperation of 120 practicing 
architects in the greater Chicago area. The answers were then 
sorted out with Cross Classification, Regression, and Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis. Case studies of (1) high strength, low 
alloy, weathering steel; (2) prestressed concrete; (3) foamed 
plastics; and (4) school construction systems were also under-
taken. 19 In general, however, specific innovations were not part 
of the interviewing procedure because "it would have required an 
almost exhaustive survey of the characteristics of such innova-
tions." 
The conclusion of the study was that innovators, transmitters, 
and influentials, compared with their less active counterparts, 
had a stronger professional architectural orientation; were wealth-
ier; more cosmopolitan; more exposed to selected printed media; and 
had a less favorable attitude toward television, radio, and adver-
tising. It is asserted that this sort of information will be use-
ful to salesmen of new building materials, which may very well be 
true; but more doubtful is whether it will, as is also suggested, 
help the building industry catch up with Henry Ford. This diffusion 
study should be compared with the one by Spall cited above. 
Spall interviewed the managers of 20 firms building single- 
family houses in the Greater Lansing Area, meaning 27 percent of the 
total number of firms. After determining the characteristics of the 
managers and the firms, Spall asked whether each of eight innovations 
were used or not, and why. The list, given above, was compiled from 
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the literature and from consultations with experts. These eight 
were specified as the most important introduced in the previous 
25 years. A similar approach was used by Strassmann in Peru and 
by James Spillane in Iran and Colombia. Using multiple regres-
sion analysis, Spall concluded that the entrepreneur's extent of 
accepting these eight innovations was not correlated with his years 
of formal education, his experience in the industry, his subjective 
receptiveness to innovations, the size of his firm and usual vol-
ume of business, nor the possibility of increased competition. 
Acceptance or rejection depended purely on estimates of profits 
from adoption. This estimate depended in part on whether the man 
was building custom-designed houses or speculative dwellings for 
the mass market. Differences in uncertainty did affect the chance 
of adoption, not in an absolute or binary sense, but through changes 
in profit estimates. 
The Housing Stock and Research Priorities  
Normally we associate research and development or technological 
change with the production of better, cheaper, and more goods. But 
dwellings are a stock, and the services that flow therefrom may be 
enhanced either by additions to the stock or by its preservation. A 
desirable form of R&D would therefore concern itself with improving 
the durability and maintainability of structures. Maintenance, how-
ever, is not only a question of design, but a human, social thing. 
It must be learned and desired, and destructive urges must be over-
come; and, where appropriate preconditioned values are lacking, 
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these must be instilled. A way of doing this is to give families 
a high stake in preservation through ownership. Another way is to 
give developer-managers a stake in better occupant selection by de-
ferring and raising some payments for construction for a half dozen 
years. 20 
A dwelling will lose value if its supply rises relative to 
demand. But what causes this shift; is it good or bad; and should 
it be fostered or hindered by R&D? A house may look unfashionable 
and have obsolete but functioning fixtures. If it is filtered to 
the poor, they get a bargain that may be unbeatable by new bricks 
and mortar. But if deterioration does impair functioning and if 
its prevention is expensive, then the bargain will be temporary. 
The quality of the dwelling will rot to match the poverty of occu-
pants, and the city will rot with its dwellings. Causes of obso-
lescence, deterioration, disposability, and abandonment must be 
analyzed with a partly technological, partly social scientific re-
search program. 
Not enough is known about the potential of dwellings and their 
occupants to specify federal research priorities in detail. A myr-
iad of detailed innovations have been tried in recent decades with-
out overcoming basic housing problems. They add up to a demonstra-
tion that partial solutions will not be good enough. Housing looms 
too big in the budget, on the landscape, and in the national economy 
to respond to marginal tinkering here and there. Fundamental tech-
nological innovations must be sought in terms of who are to be occu-
pants, where, and who is to release resources for construction and 
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maintenance, and how. 
Conclusions  
Dwelling construction has characteristics that do not apply 
to the other neglected, less physical, economic sectors. For one 
thing, the physical aspect of structures is so pronounced that 
some countries define industry as the combination of manufacturing, 
mining, and construction. The way structures are designed and set 
up is easily studied out of context with the superficial conclusion 
that building has never fully experienced an Industrial Revolution. 
To experience one, "institutional barriers" must be removed. 
But the bull-fence-cow metaphor is inadequate. Certainly there 
are arbitrary, obsolete, and vested-interest-serving barriers to 
change. Many of these, however, were a response to complexities, in-
direct repercussions, and dangers that became painful in the course 
of the Industrial Revolution and that simply will not go away. On 
the contrary, everyone knows that they grow more serious as popula-
tion and productivity grow. 
In this type of neglected sector, technological change is not 
just a question of having or not having "barriers." It is a question 
of solving social organizational and technical problems in terms of 
one another. Once we had to learn from Veblen, Redlich, and Passer 
that invention and innovation were not, as Schumpeter saw them, sepa-
rate technical and business activities. Engineer-entrepreneurs 
brought both technical and commercial insight into the development 
of a new product from the outset. 21 Now social and political in-
sights need to be brought in as well. 
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In housing, health, education, and other public services such 
technical-commercial-social-political problem solving has, in fact, 
been under way, though, perhaps at an inadequate pace. The process 
is not being analyzed comprehensively because elegant, testable 
tools of analysis are not easily fashioned for what is clearly an 
interdisciplinary task. Practitioners from each discipline mod-
estly obey the imprints they received in graduate school infancy. 
In economics the tendency is to divert attention from diffuse social 
repercussions and conflicts with models that treat inventions them-
selves as so many manufactured objects pouring out of innovation 
factories. This diversion of attention inhibits what is nominally 
promoted, better technological change. 
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DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL R & D 
ASSESSMENT: COMMUNICATION AND INNOVATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 
by 
Everett M. Rogers with John Dudley Evelandl 
In short, while Rogers' diffusion model may 
be useful in understanding the adoption of simple 
innovations among aggregates of individuals, it 
appears to be of little value for explaining the 
implementation of organizational innovations. 
(Neal Gross and others, 1971, p.22) 
Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find 
everything he encounters needs pounding. 
(Abraham Kaplan, 1963, p.3) 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this essay is (1) to briefly describe the 
so-called "classical diffusion model", and (2) to discuss its 
particular applicability to national R & D assessment, a current 
problem of interest to the National Science Foundation. We argue 
that there are severe limitations in the classical diffusion model, 
due to several of its implicit assumptions (which have only re-
cently been recognized), and so major modifications must be ef-
fected before it can be fruitfully applied to broader fields than 
were originally intended. One of the most important modifications 
is necessitated by the fact that technological innovations often 
1Professor of Journalism and Population Planning, and 
doctoral candidate in Public Health, respectively, University 
of Michigan. .We wish to thank the following colleagues in the 
Innovation Group at the University of Michigan for their critical 
review of an earlier draft of this paper: Michael Moch, Herbert 
Schuette, Jack L. Walker, Kenneth Warner, and Sidney Winter. 
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diffuse to, and within, organizations, so we must be centrally 
concerned with how organizational structure affects diffusion. 
This broadening of the new diffusion approach to incorporate 
fuller consideration of organizational variables is the general 
theme of the present paper. 
So essentially we intend to bring about an intellectual 
merger between two "invisible colleges" of social science re-
searchers: (1) those investigating the diffusion of innovations, 
and (2) those studying organizational behavior. 2 The former 
field is represented by some 2,400 research publications dealing 
with how an innovation (defined as an idea, object, or practice 
perceived as new by the relevant unit of adoption) is communicated 
via certain channels over time to members of a social system. 3 
 Only some 373 of the 2,400 diffusion publications (about 17 per 
cent) deal with how innovations are adopted by an organization. 
Unfortunately, "treatments of innovations vis-a-vis organizations 
tend to follow the individual-oriented approaches" (Zaltman and 
others, 1973, pp.10-11). In almost all of these 373 researches, 
sample survey data are gathered via mailed questionnaires from 
only the chief executive of the organization (such as a school 
superintendent, a factory manager, etc.). As a result of this 
methodological approach, we have gained considerable knowledge 
about how innovations spread from organization to organization, 4 
such as from hospital to hospital, but we lack an understanding 
2One attempt at intellectual intergration of these two fields 
has recently been made by Zaltman and others (1973). 
3These studies are synthesized by Rogers with Shoemaker(1971) 
4To be more specific, we understand something about certain 
characteristics of organizations that are related to "innovativeneE 
as a general concept. We do not yet have the type of comparative 
(continued on page 3) 
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of how communication and decision-making processes are involved 
in innovation within organizations. Such intra-organizational 
innovative behavior cannot be understood properly if it is only 
viewed through the eyes at the top. 
In this paper, we recommend a new approach to studying the 
innovation process in organizations, one that is less "macro" 
in scale and that takes organization structure more fully into 
account. Such perspective borrows directly from the consider-
able behavior science literature on organizational behavior and 
change. These researches usually consist of intensive case studies 
of one (or at most several) organizations, with main focus on the 
organization's structure and how it affects human behavioral 
change. 
In this essay we shall bring these two invisible colleges 
together. We begin with a review of the classical diffusion 
model, featuring some of the implicit biases/assumptions in 
diffusion research, and pointing out alternative methods for 
overcoming them in future studies. 
THE CLASSICAL DIFFUSION MODEL 5 
The study of the diffusion of new ideas really began in 
the late 1930's when sociologists investigated the spread of 
hybrid seed corn from agricultural scientists to Iowa farmers. 
4 (Continued) studies which would enable us to draw con-
clusions about "innovativeness" in relation to specific activities 
or resources in cross-context organizational settings. 
5The main ideas in the following section are adapted from 
Rogers and Shoemaker (1971), where a more detailed treatment of 
this sketchy description of the diffusion model can be found. 
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Today, 2,400 research publications later, we understand a great 
deal more about the way in which new ideas diffuse among such 
varied audiences as physicians, Colombian peasants, suburban 
housewives, industrial plant managers, and Australian aborigines. 
Central to the investigation of diffusion are four key 
elements: (1) an innovation, (2) communicated via certain 
channels, (3) to members of a social system, (4) who adopt it 
over a period of time. 
1. The Innovation  
An innovation is an idea, practice, or object perceived 
as new by the relevant unit of adoption. 6 It matters little, 
as far as human behavior is concerned, whether or not an idea 
is "objectively" new as measured by the lapse of time since its 
first use or discovery. It is the perceived newness of the idea 
for the receiver that that determines his reaction to it. If 
the idea seems new and different to the individual, it is an 
innovation. 
"New" in an innovative idea need not just be new knowledge. 
An innovation might be known by an individual for some time, that 
is, he is aware of the idea, but he has not yet developed a favor-
able or unfavorable attitude toward it, nor has he adopted or 
rejected it. So the "newness" aspect of an innovation may be ex- 
pressed in knowledge, persuasion, or regarding a decision to use it 
, i 6The wording of this definition implies that the unit of 
adoption might be an individual (as in most past diffusion researct 
or an organization (Zaltman and others, 1973, p. 10). 
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Characteristics of Innovations  
It should not be assumed, as it often has in the past, that 
all innovations are equivalent units of analysis. This is a 
gross oversimplification. While it may take an educational in-
novation like modern math only five or six years to reach com-
plete adoption, another innovation like team teaching may re-
quire several decades to reach widespread use. The several 
characteristics of innovations, as perceived by the receivers, 
contribute to their differential rate of adoption. 
1. Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation 
is perceived as better than the idea it supercedes. 
The degree of relative advantage may be measured in 
economic terms, but often social prestige factors, 
convenience, and satisfaction are also important com-
ponents of relative advantage. Again, it matters 
little whether or not the innovation has a great deal 
of "objective" advantage, as judged by experts in the 
field. What does matter is whether or not the individ-
ual perceives the innovation as being advantageous. 
The greater the perceived relative advantage of an in-
novation, the more rapid its rate of adoption. 
2. Compatability is the degree to which an innovation is 
perceived as consistent with the existing values and 
past experiences of the receivers. An idea that is not 
compatible with the prevalent values and norms of the 
social system will not be adopted as rapidly as an in-
novation that is compatible. The adoption of an incom- 
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patible innovation often requires the prior adoption 
of a new value system. 
3. Complexity is the degree to which an innovation is 
perceived as difficult to understand and use. Some 
innovations are readily understood by most member of 
a social system; others are not, and will therefore, 
be adopted more slowly. 
4. Trialability is the degree to which an innovation may 
be experimented with on a limited basis. New ideas 
which can be tried on the installment plan will gen-
erally be adopted more quickly than innovations which 
are not divisible. Essentially, an innovation that is 
trialable represents less risk to the individual who 
is evaluating it. 
5. Observability is the degree to which the results of 
an innovation are visible to others. The easier it is 
for an individual to "see" the results of an innovation, 
the more likely he is to adopt. 
The five attributes of innovations just described do not 
constitute a complete list of those innovation qualities affecting 
rate of adoption, but they are the most important characteristics, 
past research indicates, in explaining the rate of an innovation's 
adoption. 7 
Both the "advantage" and "compatibility" dimensions contain 
a large component which may be called the degree to which the 
7 Zaltman and others (1973, pp. 32-50) suggest numerous 
other attributes of innovations such as point of origin, gateway 
capacity, etc. when the innovations are diffusing within organ-
izations. 
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innovation is perceived as implying a commitment to further 
change, which in turn requires an understanding of the relative 
threat of change implied by the innovation. Our language for 
describing this phenomenon is much more developed for individual, 
than for organizational, psychology. 
We should stress again that all these characteristics of 
innovations are perceptual quantities. The same concrete re-
ferent may be perceived quite differently on any or all of these 
dimensions by different individuals. Within the organization, 
there may be as many sets of perceptions of a proposed innovation 
as there are individuals in the organization. This phenomenon 
makes the assumption of the equivalence of innovations even more 
hazardous in the case of organizational studies than in the 
study of individuals. 
Given that an innovation exists, and that it has certain 
attributes, communication between the source and the receivers 
must take place if the innovation is to spread beyond its in-
ventor. Now we turn our attention to this second element in 
diffusion. 
2. Communication Channels  
Communication is the process by which messages are trans-
ferred from a source to a receiver with the intent to change his 
behavior. The communication channel is the means by which the 
message gets from the source to the receiver. 
Diffusion is a subset of communication research that is 
concerned with new ideas. The essence of the diffusion process 
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is the human interaction by which one person communicates a new 
idea to one or several other persons. At its most elementary 
form, the diffusion process consists of (1) a new idea, (2) an 
individual who has knowledge of the innovation, (3) another 
individual who is not yet aware of the new idea, and (4) some 
sort of communication channel connecting the two individuals. 
The nature of the social relationship between the source and 
the receiver determines the conditions under which the source 
will or will not tell the receiver about the innovation, and 
the effect that the telling has. 
The communication channel by which the new idea reaches 
the receiver is important in determining his decision to adopt 
or reject the innovation. Usually the choice of communication 
channel lies with the source and should be made in light of the 
purpose of the communication act and the audience to whom the 
message is being sent. If the source wishes to simply inform 
his receiver about an innovation, mass media channels are often 
most rapid and efficient, especially if the audience is large 
in number. Mass media channels are all those means of transmitting 
messages that involve a mass medium, such as radio, television, 
film, newspapers, magazines, etc., which enables a source of 
one, or a few individuals, to reach an audience of many. 
On the other hand, if the source's objective is to persuade 
the receiver to form a favorable attitude toward the innovation, 
an interpersonal channel is more effective. Interpersonal  
channels involve a face-to-face exchange between two or more 
individuals. 
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So the source should choose between mass media and interper-
sonal channels on the basis of the receiver's stage in the innov-
ation-decision process. This brings us to discussion of a third 
element in diffusion, time. 
3. Over Time  
Time is one of the most important considerations in the 
process of diffusion. The time dimension is involved (1) in the 
innovation-decision process by which an individual passes from 
first knowledge of the innovation through its adoption or re-
jection, (2) in the innovativeness of the individual, that is, 
the relative earliness-lateness with which an individual adopts 
an innovation when compared with other members of his social 
system, and (3) in the innovation's rate of adoption in a social 
system, usually measured as the number of members of the system 
that adopt in a given time period. 
The Innovation-Decision Process  
The innovation-decision process is the mental process 
through which an individual passes from first knowledge of an 
innovation to a decision to adopt or reject, and to confirmation 
of this decision. We conceptualize four main functions in the 
process: (1) knowledge, (2) persuasion (attitude formation and 
change), (3) decision (adoption or rejection), and (4) con-
firmation. 
The innovation-decision can take a negative turn; that is, 
the final decision can be rejection, a decision not to adopt an 
innovation. Or another decision can be made at a later point in 
time to discontinue or cease the use of an innovation, after pre-
viously adopting it. 
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The last function in the innovation-decision process is 
confirmation, a stage at which the receiver seeks reinforcement 
for the adoption or rejection decision he has made. Occasionally, 
however, conflicting and contradictory messages reach the receiver 
about the innovation, and this may lead to discontinuance on one 
hand, or later adoption (after rejection) on the other. 
Innovativeness and Adopter Categories  
Innovativeness is the degree to which an adopting unit is 
relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than the other members 
of his system. It is handy to refer to a particular individual 
as in the "late majority" adopter category, or as an "innovator" 
or "laggard". This shorthand notation saves words and contributes 
to clearer understanding. For diffusion researches show clearly 
that each of the adopter categories have a great deal in common. 
If a receiver is like most others in the late majority category, 
he is below-average in social status, has little use of mass 
media channels, and secures most of his new ideas from peers via 
interpersonal channels. Adopter categories are the classifications 
of members of a social system on the basis of innovativeness. 
The five adopter categories are: (1) innovators, (2) earlyadopterE 
(3) early majority, (4) late majority, and (5) laggards. 
These categories, clearly, have full meaning only when 
applied to successful innovations - those which eventually receive 
acceptance by most or all of the population. There has been 
little research done on failed innovations, a broad spectrum in-
deed, which might extend from the Nehru jacket to "PPBS". For 
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example, we do not know whether the characteristics identified 
previously as important to the adopter category of an individual 
in the context of a successful innovation, are applicable in the 
same fashion in the case of failed innovations. Understanding 
the failure of innovation seems as important as understanding 
success, since at the moment of initiation of an innovation its 
eventual success or failure is not known. The fact that little 
is known about failed innovations reinforces the point that 
past research about innovations has tended to the normative, 
dealing only with "good", "desirable" innovations. While in-
novativeness is a useful characteristic, it may eventually need 
to be supplemented with a measure of the success in judging the 
value (for the individual or the organization) of the proposed 
innovation. Such a concept of "judgemental innovativeness" may 
be more useful as we seek to develop a general theory which can 
deal equally well with successes and failures in the innovation 
process. 
Obviously, the measure of innovativeness and the class-
ification of the system's members into adopter categories are 
based upon the relative time at which an innovation is adopted. 
Rate of Adoption  
There is yet a third specific way in which the time dim-
ension is involved in the diffusion of innovations. Rate of  
adoption is the relative speed with which an innovation is 
adopted by members of a social system. This rate of adoption 
is usually measured by the length of time required for a certain 
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percentage of the members of a system to adopt an innovation. 
So we see that rate of adoption is measured for an innovation or 
a system, rather than for an individual. Innovations that are 
perceived by receivers as possessing greater relative advantage, 
compatibility, etc., have a more rapid rate of adoption. 
There are also differences in the rate of adoption for the 
same innovation in different social systems. What is a social 
system? 
4. To Members of a Social System  
A social system is defined as a collectivity of individ-
uals, or units, who are functionally differentiated and engaged 
in collective problem-solving with respect to a common goal. 
The members or units of a social system may be individuals, in- 
formal groups, complex organizations, or sub-systems. The social 
system analyzed in a diffusion study may consist of all the 
peasants in a Latin American village, a mental hospital, farmers 
of an Ohio county, medical doctors in a large city, or members 
of an aborigine tribe. Each unit in a social system can be func-
tionally differentiated from every other member. 
The defining feature of such a system is the interaction  
between its component elements; it is not necessary for such in-
teractions to be consciously purposive for a system to exist, al-r 
though the existence of common objectives simplifies the detection 
of interactions for the analyst. It should be noted that the 
term "structure" has multiple acceptable meanings; the commun-
ication model discussed here emphasizes communication structure, 
which is not necessarily equivalent to either the role structure 
or the formal authority structure, although it may correlate 
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highly with them. The terminology of "open systems theory", 
with its emphasis on the permeability of system boundaries, 
allows the development of very flexible and useful analytical 
models (Katz and Kahn, 1964). 
It is important to remember that diffusion occurs within 
a social system, since the social structure of the system affects 
the innovation's diffusion patterns in several ways. Further, 
the social system constitutes a set of boundaries within which 
innovations diffuse. In this section, we shall deal with how 
the social structure affects diffusion, the roles of opinion 
leaders and change agents, and, lastly, types of innovation-
decisions. 
Opinion Leaders and Change Agents  
Very often the most innovative member of a system is 
perceived as a deviant from the social system, and he is accorded 
a somewhat dubious status of low credibility. His role in dif-
fusion (especially in persuading others of the innovation) is 
therefore likely to be limited. On the other hand, there are 
members of the system who function in the role of opinion leader. 
They provide information and advice about innovations to many 
others in the system. 
Opinion leadership is defined as the ability to informally 
influence individuals' attitudes or behavior in a desired way 
with relative frequency. Thus, it is a type of informal leader-
ship, rather than being a function of the individual's formal 
position or status in the system. Opinion leadership is earned 
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and maintained by the individual's technical competence, social 
accessibility, and conformity to the system's norms. Several 
researches indicate that when the social system is modern, the 
opinion leaders are quite innovative, but when the norms are 
traditional, the leaders also reflect this norm in their behavior. 
By their close conformity to the system's norms, the opinion 
leaders serve as an apt model for the innovation behavior of 
their followers. 
It should be noted that the direction of casuality is not 
certain. Opinion leaders may be leaders because they conform, 
or they may conform because they are leaders. We do not clearly 
understand how much flexibility a leader may have to change his 
approach without moving from "leader" to "crank" roles. In short, 
we are not sure how much the normative structure of a given 
system may be modified with regard to innovation by an individual, 
or what the correlates of such modification might be. 
In any system, naturally, there may be both innovative and 
also more traditional opinion leaders. So these influentials can 
lead in the promotion of new ideas, or they can head an active 
opposition. In general, when leaders are compared with their 
followers, we find that they: (1) are more exposed to all forms 
of extra-system communication, (2) are more cosmopolite, (3) have 
higher social status, and (4) are more innovative (although the 
exact degree of innovativeness depends, in part, on the system's 
norms). 
Opinion leaders are usually members of the social system 
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in which they exert their influence. In some instances, in-
dividuals with influence in the social system are professionals 
representing change agencies external to the system. A change  
agent is a professional who influences innovation-decisions in 
a direction deemed desirable by a change agency. He usually 
seeks to obtain the adoption of new ideas, but he may also attempt 
to slow down diffusion and prevent the adoption of undesirable 
innovations. Change agents often use opinion leaders within a 
given social system to prime the pump of planned change. There 
is research evidence that opinion leaders can be "worn out" by 
change agents who over-use them. Opinion leaders then are per-
ceived by their peers as too much like the change agents; thus, 
the opinion leaders lose their credibility with their former 
followers. 
Types of Innovation Decisions  
The social system has yet another important kind of in-
fluence on the diffusion of new ideas. Innovations can be 
adopted or rejected by individual members of the entire social 
system. The relationships between the social system and the 
decision to adopt innovations may be described in the following 
manner: 
1. Optional decisions are made by an individual re-
gardless of the decisions of other members of the 
system. Even in this case, the individual's de-
cision is undoubtedly influenced by the norms of 
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his social system and his need to conform to 
group pressures. The decision of an individual 
to begin wearing contact lenses instead of eye 
glasses, an Iowa farmer's decision to adopt 
hybrid corn, and the adoption of contraceptive 
pills are examples of optional decisions. 
2. Collective decisions are those in which individuals 
in the social system agree to make by consensus. 
All must conform to the system's decision once it 
is made. An example is flouridation of a city's 
drinking water. Once the community decision is 
made, the individual has little practical choice 
but to adopt flouridated water. 
3. Authority decisions are those forced upon an 
individual by someone in a superordinate power 
position, such as a supervisor in a bureaucratic 
organization. The individual's attitude toward 
the innovation is not the prime force in his adoption 
or rejection; he is simply told of, and expected to 
comply with, the innovation-decision. Few research 
studies have yet been conducted of this type of in-
novation-decision, which must be very common in an 
organizational society such as the U. S. today. 
Collective decisions are probably much more common than 
optional decisions in bureaucratic organizations, such as factories 
hospitals, schools, or labor unions, in comparison with other 
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fields, like agriculture, where innovation-decisions are usually 
optional. 
In the transference of the innovation diffusion model from 
the level of the individual to the level of the organization, we 
have sometimes given in to a too-close parallelism. The question 
of the definition of "adoption" is subject to this problem. The 
usual approach has been to make adoption a "0-1" variable - either 
the innovation is adopted or it is not, and the only problem is 
the definition of the exact moment when the change from "0" to 
"1" takes place. Even in the case of the individual, the process 
consequences of an adoption predicated on "malicious obediance" 
will be rather different from those based on a whole-hearted in-
ternalization of the innovation. On the organizational level, 
the variability of both the degree and content of adoption be-
comes an important factor. 
Moreover, this variability is often weighted. The con-
sequences of lower implementation or internalization of an in-
novation are more evident and severe in some parts of an organ-
ization than in others. For example, the adoption of a new con-
traceptive method by a family planning clinic clearly depends 
much more on the physicians than on the receptionists. If we . 
continue to regard adoption for analytical purposes as a dichotomous 
variable, we are forced to develop some criteria as to the allo-
cation of this weighted variability. 
Clearly, it is not usually sufficient to say that adoption 
takes place at the moment when the leader so decides. Particularly 
in the cases of collective and authority decisions, where there 
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is an implication of group activity in the adoption process, 
the simple dichotomous approach which we carry from individual 
studies tends to obscure some very important features of the 
process of adoption. In an organizational context, the decision 
to adopt an innovation, and the implementation of the decision, 
may be two quite different things. 
Generally, the fastest rate of adoption of innovations can 
be by authority decisions (depending, of course, on whether the 
authorities are traditional or modern). In turn, optional de-
cisions can be made more rapidly than those of the collective 
type. Although made most rapidly, authority decisions are 
more likely to be circumvented, and may eventually lead to a 
high rate of discontinuance of the innovation. 8 Where change 
depends upon compliance under public surveillance, it is not 
likely to remain once the surveillance is removed. 
The type of innovation-decision for a given idea may change 
or be changed over time. For instance, automobile seat belts 
during the early years of their diffusion, were installed in 
private autos largely as optional decisions. Then in the 1960's 
many states began to require, by law, installation of seat belts 
in all new cars. In 1968, a federal law was passed to this effect. 
Then in 1974, all new autos were required to have an ignition/seat 
belt interlock system to prevent starting the motor until the seat 
8 So authority innovation-decisions often result in a rapid 
rate of adoption, but in a relatively low quality decision, that 
can not effectively be put into action, at least over an extended 
period of time. 
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belt is fastened. So an optional innovation-decision became 
a collective (or an authority) decision. 
LIMITATIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CLASSICAL 
DIFFUSION MODEL 
In the previous section, we summarized the main elements 
in the classical diffusion model. Here we shall criticize 
this model from the viewpoint of what types of behavior it 
has not been able to help us understand, especially from the 
viewpoint of our central concern in this essay with the process 
of technological innovation (which coincidentally is the main 
focus of the National Science Foundation's National R & D 
Assessment Program). 
Origins and Background of the Diffusion Model 
In any given field of scientific research a major break-
through occurs from time to time. This "revolutionary par-
adigm" (or major reconceptualization) constitutes a new way of 
looking at some phenomenon, and usually sets off a furious 
amount of intellectual effort (Kuhn, 1962). Promising young 
scientists are attracted to the field, either to advance the 
revolutionary paradigm with their research, or to disprove 
certain aspects of it. Gradually a scientific consensus about 
the field is developed. Eventually, perhaps after several 
generations of academic scholars, this "invisible college" com-
posed of researchers on a common topic reaches a point at which 
few findings of an exciting nature emerge, and the field begins 
to decline in scientific interest (Crane, 1972). Or is splinters 
into numerous invisible colleges, each of which grows around a 
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new revolutionary paradigm. 
This is the normal path of science. Research on the dif-
fusion of innovations has followed these stages rather closely, 
although the final stage of demise has not yet set in (Crane, 
1972). The revolutionary breakthrough occurred in the early 
1940's when two rural sociologists, Bryce Ryan and Neal Gross 
(1943), investigated the diffusion of hybrid seed corn among 
Iowa farmers. 9 "The hybrid corn study is undoubtedly the most 
widely known rural sociological inquiry of all time, and even 
today it ranks as a classic study of diffusion" (Rogers with 
Shoemaker, 1971, p.54). 
The hybrid corn study set forth a new approach to the 
study of communication and change in human behavior. Within 
a few years, its leads were being followed up by an increasing 
number of scholars. By 1950 there were 73 diffusion publications; 
by 1960, 508; by 1970, 1,970; and there are over 2,400 today. 
At first, most diffusion researches were completed by rural soc-
iologists who investigated the diffusion of agricultural in-
novations in the United States. But soon, the diffusion approach 
was being pursued in other fields: Education, anthropology, 
communication, marketing, economics, and medical sociology. 
Each of these disciplines conducted diffusion research in a 
somewhat specialized way, without much interchange with other 
9Perhaps some question might be raised as to whether formu-
lation of the diffusion approach truly consituted a paradigm, or 
only a "quasi-paradigm". The conceptualization was rather dis-
tinctive for its time in the social sciences, and it certainly set 
off a great number of following researches. 
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diffusion research traditions. In the early 1960's, each 
of these diffusion traditions operated as a separate invisible 
college, and the total field of diffusion was relatively un-
integrated. About this time, however, a major intellectual 
watershed ocurred in diffusion research, and thereafter it 
proceeded in a different manner. 
By the mid-1960's, the old boundaries between the diffusion 
traditions began to break down. It became apparent that the 
diffusion of innovations was a general process, independent of 
the various disciplines involved in its study, the different 
types of innovations being analyzed, or the variety of research 
methods utilized to investigate diffusion. By the early 1970's, 
Rogers with Shoemaker (1971, p.47) concluded: "Diffusion re-
search is thus emerging as a single, intergrated body of con-
cepts and generalizations, even though the investigations are 
conducted by researchers in several scientific disciplines". 
So the scientific field of diffusion research emerged as 
an invisible college. This was not an entirely beneficial de-
velopment however, concepts, methods, and interpretations can 
become stereotyped. Scientific standardization is not always 
a blessing. We feel this to be especially true in the case 
of the some 373 diffusion research publications dealing with 
the adoption of inovations by multi-member units such as or-
ganizations. The structural distinctiveness of organizations 
as units of innovation decision-making has not been fully realized 
(as we discuss later in some detail). These organizational in-
novativeness studies were much (too much) influenced by previous 
research on single-member units. The reciprocal flow of im- 
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provements, modifications, and amplifications in the diffusion 
model, resulting from diffusion research in organizations, has 
not yet occurred. The present essay, of course, aims to rectify 
this situation. 
Questionable Assumptions of the Classical Diffusion Model 
We have already mentioned that diffusion scientists in-
vestigating organizational innovativeness assumed that an ident-
ical approach could be utilized as had been followed in the 
earlier diffusion studies where individuals (like farmers) were 
adopting units. We shall amplify on the seriousness of this 
assumption shortly, after specifying certain other questionable 
assumptions of diffusion research, as it has developed until 
today. 
Assumption #1: The innovation is advantageous for  
all adopters. 
The classical model assumed that everyone should adopt, 
that diffusion rates should be rapidly increased, and that re-
jection was an undersirable an/or irrational decision. 1° This 
pro-change bias may have been justified in the case of many of 
the agricultural innovations that were originally studied, and 
which strongly flavor our conception of the diffusion process. 
After all, hybrid corn was a highly profitable innovation for 
farmers. 
10A fundamental reason, we believe, for this pro-change bias 
in diffusion research is due to the tendency for diffusion re-
searchers to look at the process from the source's viewpoint, rath€ 
than from the receiver's. This taking of the source's viewpoint 
in turn may stem from the sponsorship of most diffusion research 
by sources of innovations (that is, by change agencies). 
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But many innovations do not have such a universal use-
fulness. Some new ideas are the result of behavioral science 
research, rather than biological or physical science investi-
gation. The innovation may not even have a physical referent, 
or object. And such innovations may only be appropriate for 
adoption by some individuals, and by some organizations. 
The implication for future research is to study the dif-
fusion of a wider range of innovations, including some that 
should be rejected by some units. Diffusion research would thus 
shed its pro-change bias. And our focus should be upon how 
innovation-decisions are made (and by whom), with what criteria, 
and to what consequences. 
Further, we need to understand the motive for adopting an 
innovation. Among U. S. farmers, an economic motivation is the 
paramont thrust for adopting innovations. But what benefits 
are perceived for adoption of an innovation by a hospital ad-
ministrator? Improved patient care? Prestige? Mohr (1969) 
concludes from his study that: "A great deal of innovation in 
(health] organizations, especially large or successful ones, is 
'slack' innovation. After solution of immediate problems, the 
quest for prestige rather than the quest for organizational 
effectiveness or corporate profit motivates the adoption of most 
new programs and technologies." Mohr subsequently suggested 
that the organization's perceptions of "risk" and "threat" may 
be important in understanding how 'slack' is translated into 
actual innovative behavior. 
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The salience of the prestige motive has also been found 
by Becker (1970) among local health departments, and infered 
by Walker (1969) in his investigation of the diffusion of in-
novations among American state governments. 
One important dimension may be the location of the inno-
vation on then -transitive-reflexive" continuum. "Transitive" 
innovations are those directly related to the provision of 
services to clients, while "reflexive" innovations are those 
related more to the internal operation of the organization, 
which are not visible to clients. These terms are adapted from 
Mohr (1973). Part of the effect of this dimension may lie in 
the degree of threat and of commitment to change (as we noted 
earlier) implied by the innovation. The effect of incorportating 
this intervening dimension into an analysis is to allow a more 
precise understanding of just how an innovation interacts with 
the needs of an organization. 
In suggesting that not all innovations should be adopted 
by all organizations, we imply that there are some criteria by 
which this judgment can be made, by either the organization or 
the research analyst. In turn, this raises questions as to the 
specificity and objectivity of such criteria - as well as their 
origin. 
Assumption #2: Cross-sectional data-gathering at one  
point in time is sufficient for study of a process like diffusion. 
We stress that diffusion is a process, meaning that it is 
continuous through time, never ending and never beginning. Dif- 
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fusion, like other processes, flows like a temporal stream. Some-
one has suggested that all processes should always begin and end 
with the word "and", implying that no process ever begins, as 
there is always something that precedes it. No experience ever 
ends; something always follows it. 
However, for heuristic purposes of understanding we often 
find it convenient to "freeze" the action in this continuous 
"film", and isolate certain elements or variables in the dif-
fusion process. Most social science research methods are better 
suited to obtaining snapshots of behavior, rather than moving 
pictures, which would be more appropriate for determining the 
time-order of the variables. Correlation analysis of one-shot 
survey data is overwhelmingly the favorite methodology of dif-
fusion investigators. 11 Essentially, this amounts to making the 
diffusion process "time-less". It is convenient for the re-
searcher, but intellectually deceitful to the process he is in-
vestigating. 
Speaking about the studies of organizational diffusion, 
Hage and Aiken (1970, pp.28-29) critically note that: 
The current state of knowledge about organizational 
behavior is based to a great extent on cross-sectional 
studies, that is, studies which examine the relationships. 
11There are more appropriate research methods for studying 
the processual aspects of diffusion: Field experiments, long-
itudinal panel studies, and simulation. All such approaches rest 
on the necessity for gathering data from the same (or similar) 
respondents at several points in time. One of the few organizational 
diffusion studies to gather data at even.two points in time is 
Hage and Dewar (1973). 
among various organizational characteristics at some 
given point in time. While such studies are important 
and have provided a much better understanding of organi-
zational behavior, at the same time they fail to sensi-
tize the student of organizations to the ongoing process 
of change in organizations. Organizations seldom stand 
still...A temporal perspective, one in which the focus 
of attention is not only on the interrelationships of 
parts of organizations, but more importantly on changes 
in these interrelationships, is ultimately necessary 
for a more complete understanding of organizational 
behavior. 
A further problem with the cross-sectional survey data is 
that it is unable to answer many of the "why" questions about 
diffusion. 12 The one-shot survey provides grist for description, 
of course, and enables a type of correlational analysis: Various 
independent variables are associated with the dependent variable 
(usually innovativeness). But little can be learned from such 
a correlational approach about why a particular independent 
variable covaries with innovativeness. 
"Such factors (as wealth, size, cosmopoliteness, etc.) may 
be causes of innovation, or effects of innovativeness, or they 
may be involved with innovation in cycles of reciprocal casuality 
through time, or both they and the adoption of new ideas may be 
caused by an outside factor not considered in a given study" 
(Mohr, 1966, p.20). Future research must be designed so as to 
probe the time-ordered linkages among the independent and de-
pendant variables. And one-shot surveys can't tell us much about 
time-order. 
12Although it may be possible to infer certain of the 




A critic of the diffusion field may be correct when he 
judged it to be "A mile wide and an inch deep". 
Assumption #3: Innovation decisions are made by in-
dividuals, not organizations.L 3  
Almost all diffusion research in the past has ignored the 
effect of organized structure. 14 Hospitals, schools, and factories, 
of course, are organizations, even though farmers are not. But 
even when medical, educational, and industrial diffusion has 
been investigated, it has not been studied within the organ- 
ization. Instead, the process has been studied as if innovations 
diffused only from organization to organization, and did not also 
have to be implemented within the organization. For example, most 
educational diffusion has been analyzed with the school system 
as the unit of analysis. So the school is typically considered 
as a parallel unit to the farmer. Likewise with hospitals, in-
dustrial firms, and other organizations. They have all been re-
duced to "individuals" on the Procrustean bed of diffusion re-
search. 
Becker (1970) studied the diffusion of health innovations 
among 95 local health departments in three states. But the 
health department was the unit of analysis, and the innovations 
(measles immunizations and diabetes screening) were studied as 
13An organization is a social system composed of individuals 
working toward an objective that they seek to attain through their 
collective efforts. 
14Except for a recent handful of studies of organizational in-
novativeness, which incorporate such organizational variables as 
centralization, formalization, etc. as independent variables; for 
an illustration, see Hage and Aiken (1970). 
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they spread from department to department. The data for each 
organization were gathered from the director of the local de-
partment. This research approach, also followed by most other 
scholars of organizational innovativeness, tells us much about 
the process of organization-to-organization diffusion, but 
nothing about the intra-organizational process. In essence, by 
this most typical diffusion research approach, organizations 
are artificially de-structured or de-organized. It is almost 
as if, by heuristic means, the health departments and other 
agencies were removed from their organizational contexts. Thus, 
the classical diffusion model is made to fit the research task, 15 
 rather than vice versa. 
Needed is another type of research style in which we seek 
to understand how innovations spread within an organizational 
structure (Table 1). Such a design would call for a more com-
plete merger of organizational theory and the diffusion model. 
We would study how organizational structure affects the diffusion 
of innovations. The new ideas would then be something like 
tracers, coursing through the structure. We predict the results 
of such study would illuminate new aspects of organizational 
structure and functioning, as well as highlight needed modi-
fications in the diffusion model. In a later section, we shall 
describe a possible research design for a study of innovation in 
organizations. 
15Availability of a research technique or a conceptual 
model encourages its further use. This is Kaplan's (1964, p.28) 
"Law of the Instrument", which we stated at the beginning of this 
essay: "Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that every-
thing he encounters needs pounding". Give social scientists the 
classical diffusion model and they find that it can be applied 
to organizations as it was to individual units of adoption. 
Table 1. While Much Research Has Studied Individual 
Innovativeness, the Innovation Process Within 
Organization Has Been Almost Completely Ignored 
by Diffusion Researchers. 
Process Being 	 Unit of Analysis 
Investigated 
Individual 	 Organization 
1. Innovation Process 	About 40 or 50 
(e.g., stages and role in 	Researchers 	 Almost none 
this process). 
2. Diffusion Process 	Most of the 2,400 
(e.g., correlates of diffusion reports 	About 373 
innovativeness, opinion 	 publications 
leadership patterns, etc. 
329 
330 
It is important to remember that the open-system models 
of organizational structure and function which we are using 
allow us to treat the distinction between two organizations, 
as a variable quantity dependent on the purposes of the analysis, 
rather than as a single-valued either/or function. Thus, the 
distinction which we have drawn here between "inter-" and 
'intra-organizational approaches is a matter of degree, not 
a firm distinction in kind. What is important is the degree 
to which the system which we make the object of our primary 
concern is tied to its environment - what Mott (1972) called 
the "relative degree of system closure" - and the nature of the 
structures and processes which implement that connection. 
While we criticize the approach which treats innovation 
decisions at the organizational level as simple extensions of 
the individual-level model, we should not forget the fact that 
organizations are composed of individuals, not solely of ab-
stract forces. It is sometimes useful to distinguish between 
the class of "innovations-within-the-organization", those in-
novations which require primarily the action (or inaction) of 
individuals acting as individuals (such as the institution of 
a new incentive pay system), versus the class of "innovations-
of-the-organization", those which require organization, or 
system, level activity but no direct activity on the part of most 
members (such as the institution of a computerized billing pro-
cess). In a sense, this distinction represents an aspect of 
the "reflexive-transitive" dimension noted previously; it should 
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be used as a variable continuum rather than an analytically 
neat dichotomy. Again, as in the case of the "inter/intra" 
distinction, this break is useful only to help us focus our 
attention at particular aspects of the general system. 
Now we turn to an overview, and critique, of some 373 
organizational innovativeness researches. 
RESEARCH ON ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATIVENESS 
Our concern in the present section of this essay is with 
the 373 publications reporting the results of research on 
organizational innovativeness, which are a sub-set of the some 
2,400 documents dealing with the diffusion of innovations 
(Figure 1). Most of these 373 publications are relatively late 
on the diffusion research scene, and are heavily influenced by 
their non-organization intellectual ancestors. 16 
Organizations are obviously important in modern societies. 
In fact, they are "the major mechanisms for achieving man's goals 
(Hage and Aiken, 1970, p.5). So an understanding of the inno-
vation process in organizations is a very fundamental piece of 
knowledge. And it certainly is a crucial basis for comprehending 
the nature of technological advance in. modern American society. 
That is why we give so much attention to research on organiza-
tional diffusion in the present essay. 
16 Interestingly, a few of the very first diffusion research 
even prior to the Ryan and Gross (1943) study of hybrid corn, were 
investigations of organizational innovativeness. Examples are McVoy 
(1940) and Pemberton (1936). Then the organization was largely 
forgotton as a unit in diffusion research until about the mid-1960's. 





Figure 1. The 373 Organizational Innovativeness Publicatior 




Lack of Research on Innovation in Organizations 
Hage and Aiken (1970, p.xii) list three general research 
questions to guide the study of innovation in organizations. 
The first two deal with determining (1) what organizational 
characteristics, and (2) what environmental factors account 
for variations in organizational innovativeness. In the main, 
the 373 organizational diffusion publications (mentioned pre- 
viously) have tried to answer these two interrelated questions. 
Hage and Aiken's third question is: "What is the process of 
adopting new programs or other changes (that is, innovations] 
in organizations?" Almost no studies have dealt with the in- 
novation process in organizations: "There have been few studies 
of the actual process of change in organizations" (Hage and Aiken, 
1970, p.xv). In fact, these authors can only provide one case 
illustration of this type of research in their book. Actually 
there are very few others (Table 1). 
The large-sample survey researches were actually only studies 
of organizational innovativeness, but not of organizational in-
novation. There is a very important difference. The large-
sample surveys mainly compared the various organizational units 
(that were their respondents) on innovativeness; they searched for 
correlations between selected (and often rather stereotyped) in-
dependent variables with innovativeness. As stated previously, 
these 373 studies of organizational innovativeness tell us very 
little, or nothing, about the process of within-organization in-
novation. As we noted earlier in this essay, "innovativeness" 
when treated as an abstract quality, apart from the context of 
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specific innovations, is not very meaningful because of the num- 
ber of possible relevant dimensions of innovations and their 
highly perceptual quality. This problem greatly complicates the 
comparison of various studies; the detection of general, rather 
than situation-specific, factors seems to be very much a matter 
of the particular analyst's perspective. 
Diffusion from Organization-to-Organization 
We have been rather critical in this essay of the large-sur-
vey studies of organizational innovativeness. They have only 
provided a general picture of the variables associated with 
innovativeness, and have not really dealt with the problem of how 
innovations diffuse from organization-to-organization. But in 
the past several years, some beginnings have been made to deal 
with this issue. 
Walker (1969) studied the innovativeness of American states 
on the basis of their time of adoption of 88 innovative programs-
such as having a Board of Health, slaughterhouse inspection, and 
a gasoline tax. The large population, industrialized, and ur-
banized states are most innovative: New York, Massachusetts, 
California, New Jersey, and Michigan. In each region of the 
United States certain states emerged as opinion leaders; once 
they adopted a new program, other states in their "league" fol-
lowed along. If an innovation was first adopted by other than 
an opinion leader state, it spread to other states slowly or 
not at all. Thus, a communication structure seemed to exist for 
innovation diffusion among the states. 
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In a further analysis, Walker (1971) utilized sociometric 
data from personal interviews with state officials in ten states 
to actually determine the communication flows, patterns of 
sociometric opinion leadership, and clique-like networks among 
the American states. The innovative states tended to be the 
"national league" opinion leaders, but state officials also 
tended to look to their immediate neighbors when searching for 
guidance about innovations; "State administrators communicate 
most readily with their counterparts in states that they be-
lieve have similar resources, social problems, and administrative 
styles" (Walker, 1971, p.381). For instance, Iowa officials 
followed Michigan's and California's lead, although they were 
much influenced by Wisconsin. 
Becker (1970) gathered sociometric data about organization-
to-organization diffusion, for a high-risk and a low-risk health 
innovation from 95 directors of local health departments in 
three states. He found that "Earliest adopters of the easily 
accepted program [measles immunizations] were opinion leaders, 
while pioneers [of the more risky innovation, diabetes screening) 
were found to be marginal to their groups." This research re-
sult is parallel to comparable findings from diffusion research 
among individuals (Rogers with Shoemaker, 1971). 
"Contrary to the current view in diffusion research liter-
ature, time of adoption is more likely to be a cause than a 
result of centrality in information networks" (Becker, 1970). 
So the health professional's innovativeness determined his pop- 
ularity as an opinion leader, rather than vice versa. "A desire 
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to maintain or increase prestige (tempered by the risks of 
adoption) motivates the professional to seek...innovations" 
(Becker, 1970). We are not entirely convinced that Becker's 
survey data allow him to come to these cause-effect conclusions, 
but in any event his investigation does demonstrate the utility 
of incorporating sociometric data in studies of organizational 
- innovativeness. This approach begins to allow us some limited 
insight into the over-time process of organization-to-organization 
diffusion. Unfortunately, Becker was forced to assume the 
rather important reductionism that the director of a local health 
department somehow "represented" his entire organization in the 
sociometric relationships that he provided as data. This is 
doubtful in the case of any organization, other than very small-
sized units, and is rather dubious in the case of local health 
departments which often range in size up to several hundred em-
ployees. But nevertheless the potential of sociometric data in 
providing insight into organization-to-organization diffusion 
was clearly demonstrated. 
Future research is needed to confirm the suspicion suggested 
by the work of Walker (1969) and Becker (1970), that patterns of 
opinion leadership exist in the diffusion of innovations among 
organizations, just as among individuals. Such research should 
also address the major problem, not directly explored in either 
of these studies, of possible interactions between leadership and 
structural variables, which might produce patterns of innovation 
behavior different from what might be suspected on the basis of 
additive modelling alone. 
Sources of Data 
In addition to its lack of concern with (1) the innovation 
process within organizations, and (2) organization-to-organ-
ization diffusion, the studies of organizational innovativeness 
suffer as a result of the type of data that is typically gathered 
by the researcher. Usually, he sends a mailed questionnaire to 
the top man in the organization, or else interviews him personally. 
All data about the organization's innovativeness, its structural 
characteristics, and the leader's characteristics are obtained 
from him. Naturally the researcher only gains a picture of organ-
izational innovativeness as seen from the top. Obviously the 
perceptions and viewpoints of the various members of the organ-
ization cannot be incorporated in the analysis, because they 
have not been measured. Obviously one cannot adequately study 
the process of innovation in the organization with just one mem-
ber's viewpoint of the process. 
But the usual studies of organizational innovativeness do 
enable us to know "a little about a lot". A large sample of 
organizations can be studied when there is only one respondent 
for each organization. Such studies are relatively cheap in 
date-gathering cost per organization. 
A very few recent researches have incorporated data from 
numerous individuals in each organization. For instance, Kaluzny 
and others (1973) gathered data via personal interviews (with 
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the administrators only), and via mailed questionnaires with 
the following respondents in each of 68 hospitals in New York 
state: 
1. The administrator, assistant/associate administrators, 
and department heads. 
2. A sample of the hospital trustees. 
3. A sample of all the physicians in each hospital. 
Hage and Dewar (1973) also gathered data from several in-
dividuals in each of the 16 organizations which they studied. 
The usual sources of data (from only the chief executive 
of the organization) pose special problems for the measurement 
of innovativeness, which is the most common dependent variable 
in these studies. Mohr's (1969) approach to operationalization 
is fairly typical. His 93 directors of local health departments 
were asked which of a number of innovative programs their agency 
had adopted; more innovativeness "points" were awarded to health 
departments which had adopted more innovations from the list. 17 
There is a logical difficulty in using retrospective data 
about innovativeness in analysis which includes independent 
variables which are measured cross-sectionally (Kaluzny and others, 
1973). In essence, one is correlating yesterday's innovativeness  
with today's independent variables. In many cases, the problem 
17Mohr also constructed another measure of organizational 
innovativeness based on the number of man-years (or dollar-
equivalents) added to the department for innovative programs in 
the previous five years. This variable seems to be a measure of 
"organizational resources devoted to innovativeness". 
339 
may be even more severe; the correlation is between today's 
variables and the post hoc, selective, cognitive-dissonance-
reducing perception of yesterday's innovativeness. Success is 
likely to be remembered much more than failure; even the organ-
ization's files may be purged or records of innovations that did 
not work out. The past constantly tends to be reinterpreted in 
terms of the present or the anticipated future. As we noted 
earlier, innovation diffusion is a highly time-dependent pro-
cess, and it is very difficult to analyze it with data gathered 
at only one point in time. However, the solution is certainly 
not to measure the dependent variable at -b land the independent 
variables at t2. 18 
A number of possible sources of data about innovativeness 
can be tapped: 
1. Published records on time of adoption of the in-
novations, an approach used by Walker (1969). 
2. Agency records, such as the notes kept from regular 
staff meetings, where innovation-decisions are discussed. 
3. Personal interviews (or mailed questionnaires) with 
executives in the organization, or with all of the members. 
4. Observation and inspection of the innovation's adoption. 
The latter sources/methods of data-gathering are probably 
more accurate, but they are also more costly to obtain. Needed 
is the incorporation of several, or all, of these four approaches 
18Although the reverse procedure might occasionally be 
appropriate: To measure the independent variables at t 1 and the 
dependent variables at t2 as in Hage and Dewar (1973). Some 
understanding of the meaning of the amount of time lapsed would 
seem to be mandatory in this case. 
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in the same study, so that more precise data will be available 
on the ,relative costs and accuracy of each. This is the multi-
operational approach (Sieber, 1973). 
Individual Versus Organizational Characteristics 
and Innovativeness 
There are two broad classes of independent variables that 
have been used to predict organizational innovativeness: (1) in-
dividual characteristics of the organization's leader or leaders, 
and (2) organizational characteristics like size, decentralization, 
and system openness. 
Many studies of innovation have focused on 
individuals rather than on organizations. However, 
individuals may have a substantial influence on the 
adoption of new means and goals by organizations. 
The influence of top managment, for example, was 
found by Burns and Stalker (1961) and by Mytinger 
(1968) to be highly significant for the innovative-
ness of the organizations they led...It is therefore 
entirely possible that the same factors that seem 
to cause farmers and doctors to innovate for them-
selves might also cause executives to innovate, or 
at least try to innovate, for their organizations 
(Mohr, 1966, pp.20-21). 
The research question that remains to be fully answered in 
future investigations is: To what extent is the degree of inno-
vativeness of organizations a function of (1) the personal char-
acteristics of individual executives, versus (2) the structural  
characteristics of the organization? Even though a full answer 
is not yet available, recent research offers some insight. 
First of all, we must point out that the question of indi- 
vidual versus organizational variables in explaining organizational 
innovativeness is something of a phony issue. Obviously both 
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sets of independent variables would be expected to co-vary with 
innovativeness, and the two are interdependent in their relation-
ship with innovativeness. The interaction of structural and in-
dividual variables is illustrated by Mohr's (1969) study of 
local health departments: "When resources are high...a unit 
increase in health officer motivation [an individual variable]... 
has about 41/2 times the effect upon innovation, as it does when 
resources are low". 
So multivariate statistical tools should be utilized in or-
ganizational innovativeness studies to entangle the joint effects 
of individual and structural variables on the dependent variable. 
And the effects seem to be complementary, rather than competitive. 
Hage and Aiken (1970, pp.122-123) conclude their investigation 
of innovativeness in 16 rehabilitation agencies by stating that 
"structural properties were much more highly associated with pro-
gram change that is, innovativeness] than attitudes toward 
change Eof the executives3. This implies that the structure of 
an organization may be more crucial for the successful imple- 
mentation of change than the particular blend of personality types 
in an organization." This conclusion may be somewhat overenthus-
iastic, considering that the relative contribution of individual 
and organizational variables to explaining innovativeness depends, 
in part, on how precisely such individual and organizational 
variables are measured. Hage and Aiken (1970) express a strong 
anti-psychological bias in their intellectual position, and as 
both are sociologists, one might surmise that their measurement 
of structural characteristics would be more thorough than their 
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operationalization of the individual variables. 19 
The question of the relationship between leader variables 
and structural characteristics is complicated by a serious pro- 
blem - as yet to be addressed in research - of the possible inter-
action over time of the leader and his structure. In short, 
leaders tend to be modified by the organizations in which they 
,function, and in turn shape and modify the structural character-
istics of the organizations. We would expect, for example, a 
leader with democratic beliefs to move the whole organization 
in more democratic directions, regardless of the specific con-
nection with innovation. In practice, this might lead to a 
common store of variability which some studies might tap as 
structural, some as leader - but which should be understood to 
result from a common phenomenon. 
Hage and Dewar (1973) provide a novel test of the importance 
of leadership versus organizational variables in predicting in-
novativeness. Using data gathered from 16 rehabilitation agencies 
in 1964, they predicted innovativeness (measured as the number 
of innovations adopted from 1964-1967) with (1) the attitudes of 
the executive director, (2) the attitudes of the executive director 
and all formal leaders (department heads) in his agency, the for-
mal elite inner circle, (3) the attitudes of the executive di-
rector, and all agency members who said they participate in de- 
19 In fact, other researchers like Mytinger (1968) found that 
individual leader characteristics are of considerable importance in 
explaining organizational innovativeness. Most researchers report 
that the individual variables make at least some contribution to 
predicting organizational innovativeness, the exact contribution de 
pending in part on exactly which leader variables are measured. Un 
doubtedly considerable improvement could be made both in the con-
ceptualization and the measurement of individual variables to be 
related to organizational innovativeness. 
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cisions, the informal elite inner circle, and (4) all members 
of the agency. Correlations with innovativeness were .60, .45, 
.69, and .34, respectively. Structural variables like com-
plexity, decentralization, and formalization were correlated 
.45, .33, and -.07, respectively. 20 
So it appears that (1) leader attitudes toward change 
predict organizational innovativeness about as well (actually 
somewhat better) than do organizational structure variables, 
(2) the executives attitudes predict innovativeness better than 
all members' attitudes, and about as well as the informal elite 
circles. Perhaps the agency director typically surrounds himself 
with a set of elite with attitudes toward change rather similar 
to his own. 
When organizational structural variables and size are con-
trolled, the executives' personal characteristics tend to be less 
important as predictors of organizational innovativeness. For 
example, Veney and others (1971) reported that organizational 
variables accounted for 41 per cent, contextual variables 21 for 
31 per cent, and the administrators' personal characteristics for 
only 5 per cent of the variation in organizational innovativeness 
in a national sample of 480 hospitals. The hospital administrators' 
20A serious methodological problem in this study, as in many 
others, is the question of multiple causation - in short, the degree 
to which the structural variables of the model are tapping the same 
basic source of variability (a general case of the problem noted 
above). This is a common and troublesome problem. Use of part-
correlations and multiple analyses of variance can help, and step-
wise regression procedures can bring the problem to the surface; 
Mott (1973) includes a section on this problem. Another problem 
is the degree to which their findings are generalizable to other types 
of organizations. Again, this problem is not unique to research on 
innovation in organizations. 
21The contextual variables included the population size of the 
community served, its median income, etc. 
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personal variables included formal education, cosmopoliteness, 
attitude toward change, and tenure. Naturally there are problems 
of classifying exactly which variables are executives' personal 
characteristics, and which are organizational structural variables, 
in these studies. For instance, the executives' cosmopoliteness 
(in the eyes of one researcher) may be considered the organizations 
openness by another scholar. 
"Is Cinnovativeness due to the man, the agency, or the 
place? No one of these can be said to play in singular role" 
(Mytinger, 1968, p.7). The innovativeness of 40 local health 
departments in California was related (1) to their bigness in 
staff and budget, (2) which in turn rested on the size of the com-
munity they served, and (3) the cosmopolitness, accreditation, 
and status among his peers of the health officer. Overall, "This 
study suggests that size - size of community and size of Cthe 
health department - is perhaps the most compelling concomitant 
to innovativeness" (Mytinger, 1968, p.7). 
Similar evidence for the importance of size as a predictor 
of organizational innovativeness is provided by Mohr (1969), Kal-
uzny and others (1973), Mansfield (1963), and several others. 
Why do researches consistently find that size is one of the best 
predicitors of organizational innovativeness? First, size is a 
variable that is easily measured, and presumably with a relatively 
high degree of precision. 22 So size has been included for study 
22Although if we regard the organization as a sum of roles  
rather than individuals - a point of view consistent with open-
system theory - the actual size of the organization is not neces-
sarily equal to the number of individuals in it. Not all individ-
uals have an equal number of roles or interactions with other roles 
and thus contribute unequally to the overall dimensions. 
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in almost every organizational diffusion investigation (and, in 
fact, in almost every single-member diffusion study). 
Secondly, size probably is a surrogate measure of several 
dimensions that lead to innovation: Total resources, slack re-
sources, organizational structure, etc. These intermediate 
variables have not been clearly identified, nor adequately measured 
in most researches. Undoubtedly these unidentified/unmeasured 
variables are a fundamental, and intellectually deceiving, reason 
for the size-innovativeness research "finding". Few scholars have 
much theoretical interest in size as a variable. We urge that 
once its effects on innovativeness (although the intervening 
variables) are isolated and understood, size should be dropped 
from further study, or at most relagated to being only a control 
variable. 23 
In fact, size was an obvious variable for study in the large-
sample survey researches on organizational innovativeness. In 
the intensive studies of organizational innovation that we recom-
mend for future research, which might be conducted in only a very 
small number of organizations, size could easily (and probably 
must be) used only as a control variable. For example, in a com-
parative systems analysis of a pair of organizations (one of which 
is highly innovative, and one of which is non-innovative), they 
might simply be matched so as to be similar in size (thus removing 
its effect). 
23Hall and others (1967) showed that size alone was a poor pre-
dictor of structural variables but confirmed that it was associated 
with many other factors, and thus would play a "stand-in" role in 
any analysis in which it was included. 
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So good-by size. Or at least turn it over, and see what's 
underneath. 
Structural Characteristics and 
Organizational Innovativeness 
A recent, and we feel healthy, trend in organizational 
innovativeness research is the inclusion of independent variables 
measuring certain dimensions of the organization's structure: 
Centralization, complexity, formalization, openness. Figure 2 
shows some of the main structural variables, plus the individual 
variables, that we expect to be associated with organizational 
innovativeness. We divide these variables into three classifi-
cations: Individual characteristics, internal structural char-
acteristics, and external structural characteristics. 
Hage and Aiken (1970) have played a key role in specifying 
the main internal structural variables that are related to or-
ganizational innovativeness, and their concepts have been picked 
up by other scholars (for example, Kaluzny and others, 1973). 
It should be noted that under open-systems terminology the 
term "structure" can have many meanings. The "control" or 
"authority" structure, which is usually operationalized as "the 
structure of the organization" because of tis public, available 
character, is not necessarily fully equivalent to the "communica-
tion structure" or the "role structure", and is quite different 
from "normative structure". Thus the term, while vital, has an 
ambiguous set of referents, and it is always necessary to identify 
which sort of structure is being described. The selection of a 
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I. 	INDIVIDUAL (LEADER) CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Attitude toward change (+) 
etc. 
II. INTERNAL STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Centralization (-) 
2. Complexity (+) 
3. Formalization (-) 
4. Communication integration (+) 
5. Organizational slack (+) 
III. EXTERNAL STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 




Figure 2. Paradigm of Independent Variables Related 
to Organizational Innovativeness. 
Source: Becker and Whisler (1967); Hage and Aiken (1970). 
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structure for study is normally a function of the type of analysis 
to be undertaken. The specific aspects of structure described here E. 
in theory applicable to almost any notion of structure, although it i 
only through specific operationalization that they acquire replicablE 
and reliable meaning. 
Centralization is the degree to which an organization's power 
and decision-making are concentrated in relatively fewer individuals 
(Hage and Aiken, 1970, p. 38). Centralization has usually been found 
to be negatively associated with innovativeness; that is, the more 
power is concentrated in an organization, the less innovative it tend 
to be. The range of new ideas in an organization seems to be restric 
when a few central leaders dominate the scene. The initiation of 
innovativeness in a centralized organization is less frequent than ir 
a decentralized agency, but centralization may actually encourage the 
implementation of innovations, once the innovation-decision is made.` 
In a centralized organization, top leaders are poorly positioned to 
identify operational problems, or to suggest relevant innovations to 
meed these needs. 25 
A future research directiOn on innovation in organizations 
could be to determine how effective participatory management styles 
(a move toward greater decentralization) are in encouraging 
organizational innovativeness. 
24This is the basic structural dilemma posed by Wilson (1966, 
pp. 193-218): Decentralization and other structural variables that 
facilitate the initiation of innovation in an organization, tend to 
impede the innovation's implementation. Sapolsky (1967) found ev-
idence to support Wilson's theory in a study of innovation in de-
partment stores. 
25Gordon and others (1974) found that for their sample of hos-
pitals, the average innovativeness scores of the decentralized hos-
pitals were about 2.5 times greater than those of the centralized 
hospitals; the data are still being examined for specific findings. 
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Complexity is the degree to which an organization's members 
posses a relatively high level of knowledge and expertise, usually 
measured by the members' range of occupational specialties and 
the degree of professionalism (training) of each. We generally 
expect that complexity is positively related to innovativeness, 
as the members supposedly have a wider grasp of innovations. 
Formalization is the degree to which an organization has 
codified its jobs by means of rules. Such formalization acts 
to limit the range of latitude available to the organization's 
staff in deciding about innovations. 
Communication integration is the degree to which the members 
of a system are interconnected by interpersonal communication 
patterns. 26 New ideas can flow more easily and rapidly among 
an organization's members if it has higher integration, and so 
we expect this variable to be positively related to innovativeness. 27 
 Aiken and Hage (1972) found innovativeness to be moderately re- 
lated to the number of inter-organizational linkages, although 
there seemed to be no detectable relationship with the number of 
boundary-spanning roles in the organization. Aiken and Hage (1968) 
furhter noted that organizations with larger numbers of joint pro-
grams with other organizations tended to be more innovative. 
26Communication integration is usually measured by means of 
the matrix multiplication of sociometric data about communication 
flows or patterns among the members of an organization. Detail on 
computer matrix multiplication procedures for measuring communi-
cation integration is provided by Guimarrges (1972). 
27We expect vertical communication integration to be es-
pecially important in innovation in organizations, as is sug-
gested by Aiken and Hage's (1971) findings on upward communication 
flows, which can carry feedback to executives from the operational 
level. 
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The role of boundary-maintenance and boundary-spanning was noted 
in particular by Thompson (1962, 1967), although not fully tested. 
Organizational slack is the degree to which uncommitted 
resources are available to the organization. This structure 
variable is expected to co-vary positively with organizational 
innovativeness: "Slack provides a source of funds for innova-
tion that would not be approved in the face of scarcity..." 
(Cyert and March, 1963, pp.278-279). Rosner (1968), in a study 
of hospitals, and Mohr (1969) in an investigation of health de-
partments, found slack to be associated with innovativeness. 
One other structural variable which has not usually been 
treated along with these others, but which probably has effects, 
is efficacy - the degree to which an organizational process is 
seen as being under technical control, subject to rational (i.e., 
cause-and-effect) transformation. This concept has been de-
veloped by Scott (1972), and represents a more sophisticated 
version of the "technology" variable discussed by Thompson (1967). 
Most industrial production processes are high in efficacy; on the 
other hand, a process such as teaching reading is fairly low. 
The problem is complicated by the fact that organizations cus-
tomarily have many processes with varying degrees of efficacy in 
operation at the same time. It should be possible to include 
some assessment of efficacy in relation to the processes affected 
by particular innovations; however, it is reasonable to suspect 
that efficacy may have some major multiplicative/interactive 
effects which it is dangerous to discard or handle only through 
controls. 
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Among the external structural characteristics of an or-
ganization, we suggest openness as a variable likely to be 
associated with innovativeness. Openness is the degree to which 
an organization engages in an exchange of information with its 
environment. Individuals who provide an organization with open-
ness are called "cosmopolites". In most structures they are con-
centrated at the very top and the bottom. At the top, executives 
have wide travel and other types of contact with other organ-
izations; they are in a position, to obtain new ideas from sources 
external to the organization. 
In contrast, individuals near the bottom of the organizational 
heirarchy also have a certain degree of cosmopolitness, as they 
deal with the operational aspects of environmental change. For 
instance, the lower-level workers deal most directly with customers 
and clients, with incoming materials and energy. 
The openness of a system increases the chances that an inno-
vation, or the need for an innovation, will enter the organization. 
"The interaction between the organization and its environment is 
crucial to the innovation process" (Zaltman and others, 1973, 
p.120). Utterback (1971) concluded his study of 32 innovations 
in the instrument industry by stating that: "The greater the 
degree of communication between the firm and its environment at 
each stage in the process of innovation, other factors being equal, 
the more effective the firm will be in generating, developing, and 
implementing new technology". Similarly; a study of innovativeness 
in 16 American and European steel companies found a correlation 
of .77 with the frequency of communication with the firm's envir-
onment (Miller, 1971, p.114). 
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Incidentally, Mott (1972) treated system openness as a 
dependent variable, resulting in his model from the degree of 
routine structure imposed by the organization on its input/output 
processes. He hypothesized a general trend toward system closure, 
or structuring of I/O, which is halted at a certain point by the 
exhaustion of efficacy, or technology (which we discussed pre-
viously), which requires the organization to rely on the environ-
ment. This formulation is obviously a highly dynamic process, 
with openness continually adjusting itself in response to or-
ganizational and environmental counter-pressures. Whenever we 
use openness in a predictive model, thus, we should be aware that 
it is in turn partly the product of our dependent variables, and 
subject to continual dynamic adjustment. This dynamism is cer-
tainly not confined to system openness, but it may be a more 
prounounced phenomenon than in the case of some of the more formal 
system characteristics such as centralization. 
Our general paradigm of the main variables related to or-
ganizational innovativeness (Figure 2) raises the issue of the 
relative importance of the internal versus the external structural 
variables. As was the case with structural and individual variable 
there is probably a synergistic interaction between the internal 
and external variables. In terms of a research question for future 
inquiry: What portion of innovations in an organization are im-
ported from the organization's environment, and what share are  
invented through creative processes with the organization?  
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Our paradigm (Figure 2) is one attempt, based on past re-
search and on theoretical considerations, to formulate a frame-
work for the main classes of independent variables that are re-
lated to organizational innovativeness. "Badly needed is a the-
oretical framework which brings together the external and in-
ternal factors, the structural and psychological factors, and 
certain factors which have not even received mention up to this 
point" (Becker and Whisler, 1967). We agree. Now it needs to 
be adequately tested. 
THE INNOVATION PROCESS 
This essay has questioned the intellectual value of the 
many past studies of organizational innovativeness, and in the 
previous section suggested some more profitable directions in 
which such research should proceed. Mainly, however, we recom- 
mend an entirely different approach to innovation in organizations. 
We refer to this relatively unexplored area as the "innovation 
process". We define the innovation process as the sequence of 
events from perception of a need in an organization, to consequences 
from the innovation after it is adopted to meet this need. 
We see the innovation process as much larger in scope than 
the diffusion process; in fact diffusion is but one of the five 
stages in the innovation process. One of the main shortcomings  
of past research on the diffusion of innovations is that it only  
dealt narrowly with the diffusion stage, and thus only considered  
a rather limited part of the entire process of innovation. 
Now we move to describing the five stages in the innovation 
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process, showing how they must be modified somewhat in an or-
ganizational context, and then describing an approach to future 
research on the innovation process in organizations. 
Stages in the Innovation Process 
How is a new technological idea born, developed, diffused, 
adopted, and eventually replaced by another innovation? This 
innovation process is usually described as a series of stages. 
1. Need (and idea generation). This stage consists 
of the recognition that a need for new information exists, 
that a perceived problem could be overcome by an innovation, 
that a "performance gap" exists between actualities and 
expectations (Zaltman and others, 1973, p.2). 28 
2. Invention. A new idea is created, perhaps by re-
combining other ideas. 
3. Development. At this phase, often called "R & D", 
the invention is converted into a form that has greater 
potential utility. 
4. Diffusion. The new idea, now called an "innovation", 
is spread throughout a system of units that adopt it. 
5. Consequences. The innovation leads to various direct 
effects, and various indirect effects of these effects, some 
of which were originally intended and anticipated. 
280ur emphasis on need as a stage in the innovation process 
illustrates the "demand" aspect in the diffusion of innovations, 
just as the change agent and other communication channels represent 
the innovation "supply" aspects. Delbecq and Van de Ven (1971) 
noted the role of clients in making demands for innovative services 
and other behaviors in organizations. 
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Then, of course, this innovation process may re-cycle, as 
new needs arise and are recognized; some of these needs may result 
from the consequences of the earlier innovation. 
Naturally, the delineation of these stages is only heuristic, 
intended to facilitate descriptive understanding. The sequence 
is not invariable - in the case of organizations particularly, 
the actual "invention" may well precede the identification of 
needs, and in fact partly stimulate it. The stages may take place 
within the organization or partly in its environment. In short, 
our model requires a good deal of interpretation to be useful in 
specific investigative cases. 
The need-identification phase of the innovative process is 
particularly important, and very little studied or understood. 
In a sense, the "decision that a decision is needed" is in it-
self a process with "stimulation/initiation/etc." phases - al-
though in this case the subject matter of the decision is purely 
conceptual/abstract rather than concrete/real. The output of 
this process is the organization's frame of reference in which 
actual innovation proposals are then considered and evaluated 
against the explicit or subconscious criteria resulting from the 
"decision-to-decide" phase. The effectiveness of the first phase 
is crucial to the effectiveness of any subsequent innovation-
decisions. The evaluation of this process by the researcher is 
particularly difficult because of the inherent difficulty of 
working with abstractions and because of the high threat to the 
organization associated with too-close investigation of their 
workings. Eventually, an explicit model of this part of the in-
novation process should be developed and explored in relation to 
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subsequent behavior. 
The Innovation Process in Organizations 
When we look at the innovation process in an organizational 
context, the exact stages from need to consequences must be mod-
ified somewhat. Table 2 shows the variety of terms that have been 
used by various authors for their conceptualized stages in the 
innovation process. A great deal of consensus about the meaning 
of each of these stages is evident. As our point of comparison 
in this section, we utilize Roger with Shoemaker's (1971, p.276) 
conceptualization of the collective innovation-decision process. 
1. Stimulation is the stage in the innovation process 
at which someone becomes aware that a need exists for a 
certain innovation in an organization. 
2. Initiation is the stage in the innovation process 
at which the new idea receives increased attention from member 
of the organization and is further adapted to the needs of 
the system. 
3. Legitimation is the stage in the innovation process 
at which an innovation is approved or sanctioned by those 
who represent the organization's norms and values, and who 
possess formal and informal power. 
4. Decision is the choice to act by the members of the. 
organization. 
5. Action/implementation is the overt behavior involved 
in effectuating the decision to adopt the innovation. 
Certain individuals often play each of the specialized roles 
that correspond to each stage in the innovation process. For 
Table 2 Comparison of Stages in the Innovation 













1. Stimulation 1. Evaluation 1. Stimulus 1. 	Knowledge- 
awareness. 
2. Initiation 2. Initiation 2. Conception 2. Attitude 
toward the 
innovation 
3. Legitimation 3. Proposal 
4. Decision 3. 	Decision 
5. Action/ 
Implementation 3. Implementation 4. Adoption 4. 	Initial 
implementation 





example, stimulators are often very cosmopolite and may only 
be temporary members of the organization. A different set of 
individuals usually Ore initiators. And legitimizers. Research 
might be directed to identifying who plays each of these roles 
for a particular innovation, and whether an innovation would die 
in mid-process if one of these roles were not played, and a 
,stage was hence skipped. 29 Identifying these roles is not easy, as 
Langrish and others (1972, p.14) warn: "Innovation is almost 
by definition a corporate and collaborative effort, and it is 
correspondingly difficult to disentangle the roles played by 
particular individuals." 
Needed Research on the Innovation Process in Organizations 
As stated previously, we lack an empirically-based under-
standing of how communication and decision-making are involved 
in the innovation process within organizations. Needed is a 
different type of research design than utilized in the past 
research on organizational innovativeness, one in which we 
learn "more about less," through detailed observation and in-
terviews with personnel at various hierarchical levels in a 
very small number of organizations. This approach would allow 
the research to focus on certain of the concepts from the study 
of organization behavior, such as organizational slack, formal-
ization, openness, communication integration, etc. These var- 
iables are frequently encountered in the field of organizational 
29Note our earlier discussion of the necessity for a theory 
of innovation to be able to deal with failure as well as success. 
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behavior, but have not often been used as predictors of innovation 
in an organization. So the proposed research would represent a 
hybrid merger of two research traditions, both of which have made 
a partial contribution to understanding the nature of communication 
and innovation in organizations. 
There is a further major advantage implicit in the present 
proposal in that diffusion research in the past has focused on 
the decision-making aspects of innovation-adoption, but it has 
almost totally ignored the consequences/effects of such innovation. 
Obviously, innovations are adopted in order to attain certain de-
sired and expected consequences; adoption is motivated by a need-
sensing process by which the organization becomes aware of a per-
formance gap between actuality and what is possible. But past 
diffusion research has largely stopped at the point of decision, 
ignoring the implementation of the innovation and its consequences. 
In the case of the innovation process in an organization, imple-
mentation is especially important; often the implementers are a 
different set of individuals from the decision-makers. And many 
innovation-decisions, once made, are never fully implemented. 
This process emphasis of the study offers a nubmer of special 
advantages. Not only are we interested in assessing the effective-
ness of the actual innovation-decision phases; the effectiveness 
of the preceding concept-formation and need-identification phases 
can also be treated. With such a time-process emphasis, it is 
possible to consider models in which the content of the outcomes 
of the earlier phases of the process are predictive variables at 
the later phases. It is also possible to consider that different 
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combinations of structural and leader characteristics act in 
different ways at different stages - a set of hypotheses testable 
only through dynamic research approaches. 
Thus, the proposed research design is distinctive in two 
major senses: (1) appropriate independent variables that indicate 
various dimensions of organizational structure are incorporated 
in our paradigm (rather than only the personal characteristics 
of the individual decision-maker, as in many individual-unit 
diffusion researches), and (2) we focus on how innovation decisions 
are implemented in an organization, and with what consequences 
for the organization's performance and effectiveness (Figure 3). 
Obviously no one wants to promote the adoption of innovations 
by organizations just for the sake of innovation. But this is 
the implicit message of the organizational innovativeness studies, 
which all use innovativeness as their dependent variable. Seem-
ingly, the more innovativeness, the better. 
Instead, we feel that a more appropriate assumption in such 
researches should be to understand the process of organizational 
innovation so that eventually organizations can be more responsive 
to their needs. Rather than focusing on innovativeness per se, 
these investigations should study how needs are recognized, and 
transmitted into decisions to adopt appropriate innovations, 
which have certain consequences in imporved organizational per-
formance. So the ultimate dependent variable should be "organi-
zational effectiveness" in its broadest sense (similar to the con-
struct of Mott, 1973), involving elements of production (output), 
adaptability, and flexibility - in short, the basic purpose for 
which organizations exist - while "innovativeness" becomes an 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 	IMMEDIATE 	 ULTIMATE DEPEN- 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  ---4DENT VARIABLE  
Definition of sit-
uation; formation of 
criteria of need 
against which to 
evaluate innovations 
Implementation 










III. External structural 
characteristics 
(openness; efficacy) 




toward change, etc.) 
Decision to adopt 
an innovation 
Figure 3 Paradigm of the Usual Diffusion 
Research Design (within dotted 
boundaries) and a Proposed Design 
for Research on the Innovation 
Process in Organizations. 
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intermediate dependent variable, meshing with the need-identifi-
cation process to lead to effectiveness. The innovation process 
thus can be seen as part of the whole spectrum of organizational 
activity, rather than an isolated phenomenon out of a system con-
text. 
As argued previously, a fruitful type of research for pro-
viding understanding of the innovation process in organizations 
is an in-depth comparative systems analysis of one or two pairs 
of organizations, one of which is highly innovative and one of 
which is not. Thus in each pair, the organizations differ widely 
on the main variable of interest, innovativeness. The basic re-
search approach is then to identify and specify the various in-
dependent variables related to innovativeness; by analyzing or-
ganizations that are at the extremes on the continuum of innov-
ativeness, isolation and identification of the independent var-
iables is facilitated. 
Naturally, each of the two paris of organizations should be 
of similar size, engaged in the same funcion, and otherwise matched 
on "control" variables that are not of important theoretical in-
terest in explaining innovativeness in organizations. The central 
research question here is: "What are the main organizational 
structure variables that lead one organization to be more innova-
tive than another?" 
Earlier, we demonstrated why we also intend to investigate 
the implementation process in organizations by which innovation 
decisions are put into action, and with what effects/consequences 
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for organization performance (Figure 3). This focus calls 
for an in-depth and over-time analysis of how the need for an 
innovation occurs in an organization, how the innovation is 
searched for and how it enters the organization, how the innov-
ation-decision is made and by whom, how the implementation pro-
cess occurs and with what consequences for organizational per-
formance and effectiveness. This is essentially a "tracer" 
type of study of innovation. We suggest utilizing the following 
sources of data in each organization of study: (1) observation, 
(2) personal interviews with members of the organization at 
various levels in the hierarchy, (3) access to records, pub-
lications, and other written sources in the organization, and 
(4) discussions with knowledgeable individuals who are outside 
fo the organization but who have contact with it. 
There are several possible units of analysis in research on 
the innovation process in organizations: 
1. The organization, as when one might compare the 
process of innovation in one organization with that in 
another organization. 
2. The roles played by individuals, or sets of in-
dividuals, in the innovation process. For example, stimulators. 
3. The decision to adopt an innovation. 
4. The innovation, by tracing its path through 
the structure of the organization. 
We have called for a kind of "micro"-level research on the 
innovation process in this essay. Research on a fundamental pro-
cess like innovation is needed at the micro level, so that the 
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corresponding macro level can be more thoroughly understood, and, 
if desired, altered through the public policy process. 
Thus the central question for future research is to determine 
the nature of communication and innovation in organizations, and 
in this way learn more about how bureaucratic organizations could 
become more responsive to appropriate change. 
We close with these words from Machiavelli (1947, p.15): 
"It must be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to 
plan, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage, 
than the creation of a new system." 
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Chapter 13 
TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING LITERATURE: 
EMERGENCE AND IMPACT ON TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
James R. Bright 
SECTION 1: WHY TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING IS  
OF GROWING IMPORTANCE 
Society long ago learned the value of anticipating the char-
acter, intensity, and timing of major environmental forces in 
social and economic activities. Forecasts of the weather, agricul- 
tural production, population growth, industrial production, markets, 
sociological change, government spending, economic conditions, po-
litical attitudes, and many other attributes of future conditions 
are regarded as essential to planning wisely or to dealing effec-
tively with coming changes. The wisdom of trying to anticipate 
these things that influence the future is well proven, even though 
forecasts are almost certain to lack perfection. 
Strangely, society has been very slow in coming to grips with 
the forecasting of technology. It has been clear for two decades 
and quite apparent to thoughtful men for about 100 years that techno-
logy is one of the dominant forces in the world. Why have we been 
so slow to realize the need for systematic ways to think about the 
technological future? We have the astonishing situation in which 
the National Science Foundation--the custodian and guide to the 
Nation's technical future--has done little to improve insight and 




methodology for anticipating that technological future until the 
early 1970's. 
WHY TECHNOLOGY IS OF INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE 
Today, one of the most powerful forces in our environment-- 
and at times by far the most important for many firms, institutions, 
nations, and society at large--is technology. And the power of 
technology for good and bad is growing. Its increasing impact 
stems from the following factors. 
The degree of advance in the technical capability of many new 
devices and materials over their predecessors often is in multiples 
of improvement--and not a few percentage points. These gains in 
performance are - so great that they abruptly and drastically alter 
the means, effects, time, or costs of doing things. Thus they dis-
turb, for better or worse, existing practices, institutions, and 
human activities. For example, consider the speed of commercial 
computation by computer systems. (See Exhibit 1) 1  Notice that the 
degree of advance is in multiples of previous performance and not 
in percentage points. The same phenomenon appears in many other 
things--speed of transportation, power of explosives, energy stor-
age, miniaturization of electronic circuits, the impact strength 
of plastics, and the speed of typesetting. 
The rapidity of introduction of technical successors seems to 
be increasing in many fields. Therefore, each technology concept. 
tends to have a shorter marketplace life because of prompt chal-
lenge from a new and superior technology. The phenomenon is most 
Date 
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apparent in the extremely short marketplace lives (one to two 
years) of various solid-state electronic components, but it is 
also shown in many other products, where a given design has a 
life of nearer to five years than the ten years of a decade ago. 
The size of resources required often is so great that the 
R & D funding capacity of individual firms and even an entire 
industry is exhausted. The American SST is a case in point, and 
the British-French Concorde transport has required two nations to 
combine their resources. Rolls Royce and Lockheed represent two 
instances in which the financial demands of a single technical 
advance have been staggering. 
Technology is a national resource: in the 1960's both society 
at large and governments began to recognize that they can and 
must marshal technological resources for national purposes other 
than war. This possibility had long been recognized in technical 
circles. 	Now environmental qualities, food supply, the general 
quality of life--and to explore space and the oceans has become 
widely accepted and demanded. Thus technology is being called 
upon more frequently and more Beverly to serve public needs. 
Technology assessment has resulted from concern over the neg-
ative effects of technology on the environment and society. This 
concern has grown since the late 1960's. Of course, alarm about 
men, machines, unemployment, and skills is an old worry, going 
back more than two hundred years. The new development is intense 
concern about other effects of a technology, such as the pollution 
associated with a production process or product use and the delayed 
consequences of technology as it affects the environment years 
later or as it leads to new social problems. There are vigorous 
arguments that technology is responsible for generating wastes 
that contaminate the environment, destroy or harm plant and 
animal life, and ruin the aesthetic qualities of the countryside, 
the shorelines, the rivers, and all else on which our eyes rest. 
Even our ears are not free from the assault by the noises of 
technology. 
These concerns have brought national attention to technology 
assessment. As of late 1973, the President's Council for Envi-
ronmental Quality has been established; the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency has been established, environmental impact statements 
are required in many major programs, and new environmental con-
trols have been proposed and adopted by many agencies. Since 
1969 the first factories have been legally closed for producing 
noxious fumes, noise, and stream pollution. The Office of Tech- 
nology Assessment has been staffed to serve Congress. It is clear 
that society intends that technology will be held accountable for 
its total impact. Therefore, technology assessment is becoming a 
requirement of technology proposals. Assessment requires antici-
pation, hence, a need for technology forecasting. 
IS A FORECAST OF TECHNOLOGY NECESSARY? 
Since governments and firms have been making hundreds of thou-
sands of plans for at least several hundred years without much ex-
plicit technology forecasting, why can't society get along as it has 
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in the past? Consider what this posture really means. 
One implication is that the future contains no significant  
technological change for the particular institution. This may be 
a realistic and useful assumption for many activities in the one-
to five- year time span. After all, new technology generally re-
quires five to fifteen years to diffuse throughout society on a 
significant scale; hence, a company has time to recognize and 
adjust to technical progress. Economists, who traditionally work 
heavily with one- to three-year projections, have been able to 
ignore technology changes safely (in most cases) for this reason. 
This assumption is not satisfactory for production activities 
based largely on technology changes--electronics, drugs, plastics, 
computers, aerospace, and energy conversion. It also is a bad 
posture for relatively stable industries that are suddenly inun-
dated with new technology in their production processes, materials, 
competition, or distribution procedure. This is currently the 
case in the materials field--steel, wood, paper, and textiles--and 
in some service industries such as food, education, and health. 
An alternative implication of not forecasting is that anything  
of technical significance can be recognized and dealt with after it  
has materialized and been proven. This, too, is sometimes a satis-
factory approach. It has the advantage of certainty and avoidance 
of false trials. It also has some serious drawbacks--the loss of 
lead time, of patent position, and possibly of public image. Far 
more serious, at times, is the fact that the firm, agency, or na-
tion may meanwhile commit itself to products, processes, capital 
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expenditures, and even personnel, which makes it very difficult 
to shift directions at a later date. 
Another hazard, with potential for horrendous economic errors, 
lies in the response once the decision is made. First, there is 
the "crash" program to catch up at any price. And the price of 
buying in late is very high. Second, is the timing fiasco. By 
the time the organization does catch up, the seller's market may 
be gone. The "bandwagon" atmosphere, coupled with the high cost 
of haste and bad timing, leads to painful experiences. Material-
ization of technology as the only trigger to action is dangerous. 
The issue, therefore, is not whether any particular techno-
logical changes will affect institutions seriously, but whether 
to arrive at this conclusion by ignorance, neglect, wishful think-
ing, or explicit reasoning. 
Widespread awareness of the growing force of technology and 
increasing concern over its impact means that forecasting of tech-
nological development and consequences is absolutely essential. 
Why, then, would one not make use of the traditional forecasting 
procedure--the opinion of the technical expert? 
THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN EXPERT OPINION 
Interaction of Technologies. The use of an expert's opinion 
may be very logical but is becoming an increasingly dubious proce-
dure. One reason is that the former ability of a competent techni-
cal man to assess progress in his special field is disappearing 
because of the growing interaction of technologies. For instance, 
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if one wanted to forecast the future of computer technology, should 
his "expert" be an arithmetic logic mathematician, a solid-state 
physcist, a memory systems designer, a manufacturing process engi-
neer, an electronic circuit engineer, or some other specialist? 
Obviously, none of these is adequate because single field know-
ledge is no longer capable of assessing total improvement in these 
technical devices. Technical progress is multidisciplined, but 
technical experts are not--at least to the same degree. 
The obvious improvement to an individual expert is to form a 
committee. However, even if one assembles a group representing 
the appropriate technical experts, opinion alone is becoming less 
satisfactory. The reason is that much technology change is be-
coming less autonomous. New technology is stimulated by inter-
actions with social conditions, political actions, economic con-
ditions, and ecological pressures. One can hardly expect the 
technical experts also to be competent forecasters in all these 
nontechnology spheres. Consider forecasting the emergency of the 
SST airplane, of a new detergent, of the antiballistic missle sys-
tem. Are the controlling forces to be found only from the study 
of technology? Exhibit 2 suggest five environments that inter-
act with each other to influence technical progress. 2 Man must 
learn how to think logically about the future impact of these 
interrelationships, their evolvement, and their impingement on 
each other. 
Furthermore, there is a vast and often unappreciated distinc-




























NOTE: Within each environment are individuals and organizations, 
whose value systems may be changing at the time and perhaps in a 
vastly different manner than in other parts of the system. 
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and forecasting technology in use. Technical knowledge alone can-
not possibly provide a correct basis for predicting the timing of 
the emergence and impact of new technology. The delay of the sup-
port for the American SST, the demand for automotive power are 
examples of technology influenced by developments in other envi-
ronments. These influences are not necessarily within the exper-
tise of the technical experts. 
Value Changes. Behind these environmental relationships is 
another kind of change only beginning to be dimly understood. 
This is the changing value system in our society. Values are vir-
tually a no-man's land to most, and one can hardly expect today's 
technical expert to intuitively and correctly weight the value sys-
tems that will prevail a decade or more from now. Yet these value 
systems often will determine what technological choices society 
will support and how society will evaluate the relative merits of 
the products of technological effort. 
Lack of Forecasting Methodology. Finally, we must recognize 
that methodology for technology forecasting has not been taught in 
any engineering school or in any scientific course until, perhaps, 
1969. Therefore, past forecasting by expert opinion has largely 
(but not always) rested upon individual knowledge, experience, be-
lief, and intuition. As a result, many scientists, engineers, and 
inventors of unquestioned technical competence have produced aston-
ishing prediction errors. It is equally true that experts have 
had many successes. But the significant point is that the fore-
cast user has no way to assess the knowledge, the rationale, the 
assumptions, and the range of considerations that underlie the  
technical opinion. Therefore, the prediction that one gets from 
opinion is of highly uncertain quality, and it cannot be tested 
and evaluated. It is not a satisfactory basis for decisions 
committing major resources of an institution. 
Given these difficulties, it should be clear that society 
badly needs something better than opinion for forecasting techno-
logy. 
SECTION 2: WHAT IS TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING AND 
HOW IS IT BEING APPLIED? 
Technology forecasting is defined as a quantified 
prediction of the timing and of the character of the 
degree of change in attributes of technology associated 
with the design, production, and use of devices, materials, 
and processes, according to a specified system of data 
and/or reasoning. 
The prediction may or may not include an estimate of probabil-
ity or confidence in the amount of change or its timing. In some 
cases, relative need, importance, or usefulness can be quantified 
and used as the basis of the forecasting procedure. 1 
The key distinction of this definition is that the forecast is 
reproducible through a system of logic; thus it differs from opin-
ion and prophecy in that is rests upon an explicit, stated set of 
relationships, data and assumptions. The reasoning procedure 
yields relatively consistent results independent of the analyst. 
Another definition often offered basically reflects the first 
sentence above but then adds: . . . that can be achieved with a  
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specified level of support. 2 We must regard this, at best, as 
only a conditional forecast because an important philsophical dif-
ference is implied. The first definition is a statement of what  
will occur. The latter definition is a statement of what is pos-
sible under various degrees of effort. This avoids the forecast-
ing issue, and is more properly planning rather than forecasting. 
Nevertheless, it is a very useful aid to future thinking by de-
cision makers and planners. 
Admittedly, the line between forecasting and planning is 
very difficult to draw, particularly because the ultimate goal of 
most forecasting is as an aid to planning. Rather than argue over 
the definition, we should realize that these two concepts are often 
confused or intertwined--the prediction of what will materialize and 
the conditional statement of possibilities. 
What rationales underlie the arguments that technology fore-
casting is possible by other than opinion? There are at least three 
that seem to have logical foundations: 
The first is that technological attributes, as measured by par-
ameters such as strength, pounds per horsepower, speed, abrasion 
resistance, eta., usually grow in an orderly manner over time or 
through experience (meaning "cumulative production"). The underly-
ing hypothesis is that there is a consistency or pattern in techno-
logical changes and abrupt, major deviations are not common. Con-
sistency provides a basis for trend extrapolation from past data. 
This is called "exploratory forecasting". 
The second rationale is that technology responds to needs, to 
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opportunities and to the provision of resources. If these sup-
porting forces and definitions of goals can be identified, then 
the technological progress can be anticipated as a response to 
that pressure and support. Years ago, this rationale may have 
seemed quite theoretical. However, it has increasing validity 
because of a growing political willingness to use national re-
sources to support the technology leading to desirable social 
goods. Man-on-the-moon-by 1970 and energy-independent-by-1980 
are typical definitions of national goals. The formalization of 
technology assessment in a new congressional office will surely 
establish new goals and restraints for some technolgoy. This 
societal change justifies the goal-oriented or normative fore-
casting, at least in some technical areas. The goals of the 
Environmental Protection Agency on air quality provide the basis 
for normative forecast. 
The third rationale is that successful forecasting of new 
technology can be done through monitoring the process of technolog-
ical innovation--a process taking time that is measured in years 
and decades. Signals of this progress can be identified and mon-
itored as the innovation moves through the stages identified in 
Exhibit 3. 
SOURCES OF CONFUSION AND CRITICISM 
Technology forecasting often has been misunderstood or rejected 
for reasons that fall in the following categories: 
Misunderstandings about the Output of TF  
EXHIBIT 3 
LEVELS OF EMERGENCE AND IMPACT 
Level 1. 	That certain knowledge of nature or scientific under- 
standing will be acquired by . . . 
Ex. We will know the cause of cancer by 1980. 
Level 2. 	That it will be possible to demonstrate a new technical 
capability on a laboratory basis by . . 
Ex. We will have drug to control cancer in mice by 1982. 
Level 3. 	That the new technical capability will be applied to a 
full-scale prototype or under conditions of field trial... 
Ex. We will have experimental success in curing cancer 
in people by 1985. 
Level 4, That the new technology will be put into first operational 
use or will be commercially introduced (the first sale) 
by . . . 
Ex. A drug for cure of cancer will be commercially intro-
duced about 1987. 
Level 5. 	That the new technology will be widely adopted as meas- 
ured by such things as number of units in use, units 
of output of the new technology, dollars or sales gen-
erated, or any measures expressing the use of the new 
technology relative to competitive technology by . . . 
Ex. Cancer curing drugs will be used in 90 percent of all 
cancer cases by 1988. Or, sales of cancer-curing drugs 
will account for 30 percent of drug industry income by 
1988. 
Level 6. 	That certain social (including economic) consequences will 
follow the use of the new technology by . . . 
Ex. Reduction of death from cancer will add five years to 
the average life-span by 1990. 
Level 7. 	That future economic, political, social, ecologic, and 
technical conditions will require the creation or intro-
duction of certain new technical capabilities by . . . 
Ex. Elimination of cancer as major cause of death will 
mean that the replacement of deteriorating organs with 
mechanical substitutes will become the major medical need 
by the year 2000. The increased elderly population will 
require vastly expanded retirement communities. 
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People interested in technical progress have different goals 
and concerns; hence, they look to TF for different information and 
sometimes for totally illogical things. Some expectations com-
monly encountered are: 
TF can "Tell us what business we should be in in 1985". Surely 
this calls for a decision, based upon forecasts of many aspects of 
the future, including assumptions about politics and economics, as 
well as the firm's resources, its alternatives, and the managerial 
skills and goals of its leaders some ten to fifteen years hence. 
A point to stress is that the output of TF is data about technology  
--not a decision about management alternatives. 
TF attempts to predict profitability of great new inventions. 
This simply is not so. True, everyone would like to have such pre-
dictions, but these are predictions about technical unknowns and 
their economic aspects, including the general economic climate, 
markets, and the economics of present and potential technical alter-
natives. TF contributes to such a forecast, but more than techno-
logy is involved in reaching a forecast of profits. 
TF tries to predict "scientific breakthroughs." No technology 
forecasting methodology has been presented with claims of predicting 
"breakthroughs". TF may, however, point to the need for a "break-
through" or the likelihood of technology reaching a threshold of 
great technical significance. While popular and purportedly serious 
writings may include many predictions about "breakthroughs", inspec-
tion shows that these are based on opinion or prophecy, not on meth-
odology. Until 1972 no technology forecasting methodology was 
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presented with claims of predicting "breakthroughs". However, it 
was seen that TF may point to the need for a "breakthrough" or 
the likelihood of technology reaching a threshold of great techni-
cal significance. This was precisely the use of a TF (based on 
trend extropolation) the Avionics Laboratory of the USAF in 1952. 
Exhibit 4 shows the curve that was used to point out to Air Force 
Management that the current 5% failure rate in vacuum tube cir-
cuitry meant that the B-58 "would never fly". 3 It was statis-
tically impossible to keep this many circuits operational and a 
new technology was needed. This study led the Air Force to fund 
$10 million for research on solid state circuitry. In 1958, Kilby 
at Texas Instruments produced the first integrated circuit out of 
this funding effort. Here was a forecast that influenced innova-
tion and economic progress. 
Martino has explicitly challenged the generally accepted notion 
that we cannot predict some "breakthroughs". He defines them as 
"something which appears to transcend prior limitation". He argues 
that there are precurser events in science which long foreshadow 
the coming of radical new advances. By using monitoring systems to 
detect and follow signals of technological change it should be pos-
sible to avoid many (although not all) technical surprises. To sup-
port his idea he developed the "signals" for the coming of atomic 
power, as beginning with Einstein's 1905 paper on mass-energy equiv-
alence, and followed by a long and totally visible set of events 
leading to chain reactions in 1942; and by similar data on the lasar, 
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His prediction process rests upon the definition of a breakthrough 
as "technology coming into operational use", as distinct from the 
discovery of a new scientific principle. Given this caveat, he 
defends his point soundly. 4 The same technique was proposed by 
Bright, in 1964, on the ICBM as the replacement for the bomber. 5 
 However, he did not reach back into science and attack the "break-
through" syndrome as does Martino. 
TF is  just another name for something that economists have  
been doing all along. Without denegrating the work of economists, 
we suggest that this is a gross misunderstanding of content and 
purpose of TF. It is true that economists have been deeply con-
cerned about technology for decades. 6 It is also true that some 
of the techniques of TF, particularly trend extrapolation, have 
long been used by the economists. The distinction lies in the pa-
rameters and the purposes. The economist usually works with eco-
nomic parameters of a technology, such as cost or investment. 
Dollars do not measure technical capabilities such as the number 
of electronic circuit functions per square inch. And it is a fal-
lacy of great and insidious reasoning, frequently perpetuated by 
politicians, popular journalists, and vested industrial interests, 
that technical performance and achievement is necessarily propor-
tional to funding. Doubling investment in research in drilling 
techniques does not necessarily double the rate at which a drill 
penetrates the earth's mantle. Dollars are sometimes valid in 
measuring the diffusion or amount of a technology in use. They 
are not valid in measuring the rate of emergence of technology 
from idea to physical reality; nor do they bear systematic rela-
tionship to the amount of advance in a technical capability. 
Quite often, the economist does work with the inputs and/or 
outputs of a technological device, such as power consumption or 
tons of product per unit of time. These, of course, are techno-
logical forecasting data. 
Thus, we conclude that economists have been doing some tech-
nology forecasting, but this has been largely focused around tech-
nology in being, rather than the character and operation of new 
technological devices and materials. 7 
Emotional Reactions to the Notion of TF  
Because of their experience, hopes, or interests, some mod-
erate to highly charged attitudes have been encountered, e.g.: 
The professional scientist or engineer rejects forecasts that 
violate apparent scientific laws and his own hard won knowledge of 
limitations to technical progress. This is a very understandable 
reaction. However, history has a long, solid record of sensation 
seekers, be they politicians, consultants, inventors, union leaders, 
college professors, financial analysts, or social philosophizers. 
These popular speculations are often prophecies, hopes, fears, and 
propaganda. They usually are directed at the effects of values of 
a technical development. They rarely are based upon an explicit 
forecasting procedure, and neither their merits nor demerits should 
be charged to TF--but they are! 
Confusion is caused by the present and growing wave of "futur-
ist" writings, meetings, studies, and societies. These well-meaning 
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and sometimes brilliant, useful, appealing, or alarming views 
argue that-- 
a. man can, to an increasing degree, create the world 
he wants; therefore, he should study, choose, and 
act on desirable goals; 
b. technology is the key to solving man's problems; 
he must support and guide it; 
c. technology is the villain behaind man's problem 
so he must turn it back or at least slow it down. 
This type of futurist work includes thoughtful, social specu-
lation, "poetry," and even political propaganda about the need for 
goals, the choice of goals, or the best paths to these goals. Many 
futurists are amazingly uninformed and disinterested in forecasting 
technology (or economics, political forces, or social forces for 
that matter). They are, however, strong on speculating and pro-
phesizing about parts or all of the future. Most of the present 
futurist writings seem to based on personal or group opinion about 
cause, effect, and desirability--not on methodological fore-casting 
of anything. 8 
"technology is not the sole determinant of the future." Of 
course, it isn't, and TF doesn't pretend that it is. The goal is 
to develop understanding of TF in the same way that economic fore-
casting has acquired depth and usefulness. 
"Man does not know how to forecast technology." Wrong. Fore-
casting technology has had its start as this literature review will 
show. 
Nothing in the above discussion denies that opinions and specu-
lations may be more accurate than formal forecasting, nor is their 
usefulness denied as an early warning system or a framework for 
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societal planning. We should simply realize that prophecy and 
forecasting are two different things, and should be treated 
accordingly. 
LEVELS OF EMERGENCE AND IMPACT 
Much confusion and pointless criticism can be avoided by rec-
ognizing that a technology forecast may be addressed to any one 
or several levels of emergence and impact, and it should not be 
unthinkingly applied to other levels. At least seven levels are 
evident. They are illustrated in Exhibit 3 using a hypothetical 
example about a cancer cure. 9 
. Note that levels 1 through 4 are simply predictions of tech-
nology moving through different stages of technical achievement. 
Level 5 implies a prediction about adoption of the technology. 
Adoption, of course, will depend on all other competing technology, 
as well as its economic attractiveness, other economic conditions, 
social acceptability, etc. This is the level on which most econo-
mic forecasts about technology operate. 
Level 6 may or may not include the assumptions of level 5, de-
pending on whether it concerns micro or macro usage. However, it 
adds to technological prediction other predictions of the effect 
on human behavior and of the response of people and institutions. 
Level 7 implies a synthesis of forecasts about many attributes 
of future society plus some value judgments about the goals that 
could and will be supported by society. 
It should be clear that levels 5, 6, and 7 involve much more 
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than technology and probably should not be thought of simply as 
technology forecasts. It is misleading, with increasing loss 
of accuracy, to move into levels 5, 6, and 7 on the assumption 
that only technology is involved. 
The scientist or engineer is, perhaps, intuitively capable 
of some sound predictions on levels 2, 3, and possibly 4. How-
ever, he moves increasingly further from his area of expertise 
as he deliberately or unconsciously translates his technical pre-
dictions to level 5--economic growth. Managers and government 
officials often unwittingly encourage potential error by expect-
ing the technologist to tell them "how important" the new tech-
nology will become. The technical man then unwittingly steps 
into the quagmire of predicting total environmental interactions. 
Forecasts for levels 5, 6, and 7 involve a complex set of 
interactions about which very little is known. Traditionally, 
estimates of technical progress arose largely from analysis of 
factors in the technical and economic spheres. Today, much tech-
nology progress is controlled by events and trends in other en-
vironments--the political, social, and ecologic. We do not have 
an explicit, disciplined procedure for forecasting these inter-
actions. Systems Dynamics, in the manner of the Limits to Growth  
study, proposes to link these interactions. 10 Notice that that 
procedure scarcely deals with social forces, political forces, 
attitudes, and values, although it is far more "integrative" than 
any other forecasting concepts. 
This discussion of the multidimensional environment and 
its interactions with technological progress may be discourag-
ing to the would-be forecaster. From the optimistic side it 
offers at least one help. The forecaster should realize that 
any forecast based on a single environment must be regarded 
with a great deal of caution. 
Second, the forecaster must be alert to influential events 
arising in one of these nontraditional environments. A develop-
ment in the social sphere, for instance, may rapidly alter the 
desirability of the given technology. 
Perhaps the grasp of this condition can encourage the dis-
tribution of academic efforts more wisely in the search for a 
greater forecasting ability. Is the ultimate refinement of eco-
nometric models the best use of the outstanding intellectual 
skills of economists? Is it possible that analysts have reached 
a point of diminishing returns in some economic analysis and that 
they should devote more attention to amassing data and concepts 
in ecology, in sociology, and in the assessment of political for-
ces? 
There is another class of false impression that needs correc-
tion: the impression that elegent methodology assures certainty.' 
It does not. Indeed, it may mislead the analyst by the very beauty 
of its structure and the apparent precision of its numbers. 
The third caution is the idea that a technological forecast 
must have great precision to be useful. This generally is not so. 
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In 1940 it was not necessary to forecast that a plane would go 
1,200 mph in 1954. It was only necessary to perceive that speeds 
above Mach 1 were likely in the next decade. From this, manage-
ment and R & D planners could anticipate the type of research on 
fuels, materials, structures, airflow, power plants, navigation, 
fire control systems, airline operations, etc., that would have 
to be done. 
A fourth fale impression is that. those interested in techno-
logy forecasting surely are advocates of more technology. This is 
no more true than assuming that the labor economist specializing 
in unemployment statistics is "for" unemployment. Proper TF work 
is based upon an attitude of inquiry. Advocacy can follow the 
forecast but should not lead it. 
THE USES OF TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING IN 1974 
As a result of the growing forecasting literature, the spread 
of TF courses (particularly post university short courses for indus-
try) and the number of highly publicized, dramatic techno-economic 
events since 1970, TF is spreading rapidly into long range planning 
groups. The traumas of the energy crisis, the environmental prob-
lems, the troubles of Rolls Royce (jet engines), Dupont (Corfam) 
GE and RCA (computers), Lockheed (Tri Star), and the Concorde situa-
tion on one hand, while the dramatic success of Xerox, IBM, Texas ' 
Instruments, etc., on the other, along with fantastic advances in 
electronics, chemicals, medical matters, etc., has sharpened insti-
tutional interest in TF throughout the world. The demand for TF 
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education continues to grow. At least three consulting firms 
have mushroomed in response to this demand from industry and 
government agencies. An analysis of the hundreds of examples 
in the TF literature discussed in the next section shows that 
RF is being used for the purposes tabulated in Exhibit 5. 
Examples can be found scattered throughout references in the 
footnotes. 
One can sum up the general impact of a TF program in these 
general terms: 
A TF program helps in the planning and management of techno-
logical efforts because it forces explicit consideration of the 
technological future by management, by functional departments, 
and by technical personnel. That consideration is based upon 
methods of reasoning that can be analyzed, tested, challenged 
and refined, in contrast to opinion, tradition, and superficial 
assumptions. 
It has also been found that a TF program leads to a better 
understanding of the forces that drive or control technology in 
one's field. It encourages the forecaster and forecast user to 
consider interactions between technology and societal changes. 
Finally, the activity demands that forecast participants and 
users think beyond their day-to-day activity--something which 
managers regularly demand and rarely get! 
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EXHIBIT 5 
USES OF TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING 
AS SEEN IN CURRENT TF LITERATURE 
1. Identify needs and opportunities. 
2. Identify problems and threats. 
3. Clarify implications & necessary immediate actions. 
4. Set design goals for products. 
5. Open the long range speculative future (legitimizing 
imagination). 
6. Establish relationship to competitors technology. 
7. Establish timing, scale and nature of facilities. 
8. Establish the time at which new product design 
specifications will be needed. 
9. Estimate rate of takeover or penetration and demand 
implications. 
10. Identify new possibilities in products & processes. 
11. Analyze competitive technology approach to achieving 
a given capability. 
12. Detect technical shifts in the firm's activities. 
13. Provide a basis for understanding and reflection. 
14. Guide to the distribution of research resources. 
15. Guide to new research equipment and skill requirements. 
16. Explore limiting or influential factors. 
17. To communicate technological situations to the organization. 
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SECTION 3: TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING LITERATURE 
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE INNOVATION PROCESS 
To grasp the past impact and potential influence of TF liter-
ature we must first classify the types of writings that are some-
times included under the "TF" label. These writings vary not only 
in objectives and methodology, but they have shifted over time. 
Given the definition of TF in Section 1 we must reject the 
prophecies, fancies, serious speculations, amusing stories and 
visionary imaginings about technology and society which extend 
from the earliest records by man into the present day. Whether 
correct or incorrect, they do not rest on reproducible logic and 
data, and one has no way of examining the validity of assumptions 
and reasoning. Commencing in the late 1700's and appearing strongly 
by the early 1900's, scientific and engineering knowledge of the 
day often, but by no means always, becomes part of the basis for 
the predictions. The "intuition" or subjective experience and sub-
conscious feelings of the technical expert are the basis for the 
forecast. In the 1920's and 30's the first glimmerings of fore-
casting technology by some sort of explicitly expressed logic begin 
to appear. The chart in Exhibit 6 will help to demonstrate the con-
fusing mix of technique and purpose, all of which are still going 
on simultaneously today! 
It should be apparent that examples of all these types of state-
ments about the future have been, at times, (a) labeled as "techno-
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have not been influential in creating attitudes and changing 
actions; and (c) have proved to be correct and incorrect descrip-
tions of the technical future that actually emerged. We are left 
with a muddled collection of prophecies that were right or wrong 
for no expressed reason; expert opinions right and wrong for many 
reasons; and carefully constructed forecasts that have proved to 
be brilliantly accurate or far off the mark. And examples of all  
of them, right and wrong, have occasionally been very influential! 
Thus, even though there is little technical basis in their pre-
dictive writings, the fiction of men such as Jules Verne, H. G. 
Wells, Aldous Huxley and George Orwell has inspired intense and 
popular interest in technological development as well as deep con-
cern about technology's impact. Here we see technical speculation  
that has been influential, although resting largely on imagination  
about technology. 
Literally thousands of "expert opinions", in which accomplished 
technical men predicted developments with little or limited expla-
nation of rationale, often have been very influential, whether right 
or wrong. For example, radio came to life as it did because an 18-
year old Italian university student, Marconi, was inspired when he 
read this 1892 prediction by the British physicist William Crookes: 
Here is unfolded to us a new and astonishing world, 
one which is hard to conceive should contain no possibil-
ities of transmitting and receiving intelligence. 
Rays of light will not pierce through a wall, nor 
as we know only too well, through a London fog. But the 
electrical vibrations of a yard or more in wavelength . . 
will easily pierce such mediums, which to them will be 
transparent. Here, then, is revealed the bewildering 
possibility of telegraphy without wires, posts, cables 
or any of our present costly appliances. 
This is no mere dream of a visionary philosopher. 
All the requisites needed to bring it within grasp of 
daily life are well within the possibilities of dis-
covery, and are so reasonable and so clearly in the 
path of researches which are now being actively pro-
secuted in every capital of Europe that we may any 
day expect to hear that they have emerged from the 
realms of speculation to those of sober facts. 1 
This exemplifies an "expert opinion" technology forecast, 
based upon knowledge of the technological principles. The fore-
cast was correct, and it did influence technological progress. 
Contrast this with another "expert opinion" forecast in 1950 
by Norbert Wiener, the famous M.I.T. mathematician. In writing 
about "cybernetics" (meaning control and communication in the 
animal and the machine) he foresaw the impact of control devices 
and computers on the factory--- 
. . . I should give a rough estimate that it will take 
the new tools ten to twenty years to come into their own. 
A war would change all this overnight 	. . 
Under these circumstances the period of about two 
years which it took for radar to get onto the battle-
field with a high degree of effectiveness is scarcely 
likely to be exceeded by the period of evolution of the 
automatic factory . . . Thus a new war will almost in-
evitably see the automatic age in full swing within 
less than five years . . . 
. . . Let us remember that the automatic machine, 
whatever we think of any feelings it may have or not 
have, is the precise economic equivalent of slave labor. 
Any labor which competes with slave labor must 
accept the economic conditions of slave labor. It is 
perfectly clear that this will produce an unemployment 
situation, in comparison with which the present reces-
sion and even the depression of the thirties will seem 
a pleasant joke. 
This apparently logical forecast has been proven to be very wrong 
in timing and degree of impact. This quotation was associated with 
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the automation furor of the mid 1950's. It was cited hundreds 
of times in speeches and writings by union leaders (especially in 
the UAW-CIO 1954-55 bargaining campaigns). It was also repeat-
edly used by management, labor economists, sociologists, and the 
general press. Yet 25 years later, manufacturing labor has not been 
wiped out, the automatic factory is not a widespread reality, and 
a depression has not yet been caused by automatic controls des-
pite two wars (including the longest war in our history). Here, 
then, is an erroneous forecast that was very influential in wage  
negotiations, job classifications, and rate setting. 
Another expert opinion forecast typifies influence through a 
different sort of forecast-- the conditional forecast. When Einstein 
wrote his famous letter to President Roosevelt in 1942. he pre-
dicted, in effect, that "it is possible to achieve a certain tech-
nical capability if the nation will support it". This was a fore-
cast based upon deep scientific understanding, given virtually no  
publicity, yet incredibly influential in changing not only techni-
cal effort, but the course of world history. 
Because of this muddled mix of what is a technological forecast, 
who made it, how was it developed, and what was its purpose, many 
of criticisms have been leveled at "TF" with justification. 
Types of Prediction  
Technical Prophecy. The earliest literature of this type is 
found largely in legends and religious writings characterized by 
soothsaying, entertainment, speculation, moralizing. There is little 
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scientific reasoning behind them. Serious thinking about the 
technical future is evidenced in Roger Bacon's statements (1256-
1266) about the possibilities of submarines, flying machines and 
talking and reasoning automata. The utopias of Francis Bacon 
include mention of new technology, but without much technical sub-
stances. Leonardo Da Vinci presents some brilliant technological 
forecasts that were based upon technical insight. It is note-
worth that Da Vinci simply described technical possibilities with-
out specifying timing or impact, while many of the utopists were 
concerned with the impact on mankind and society. 
Utopian fiction and utopian essays categorize the next emer-
gent literature of future-oriented, quasi-technology predictions. 
These writings can be defined as the deliberate consideration of 
the social impact of future technological developments without a 
tightly reasoned technical logic. In some cases, the predictors 
do give a technical basis for their speculation, but their techni-
cal rationale is of limited depth and breadth. Often it is simply 
a guess, an opinion, or a hope by an imaginative man; who chooses 
to speculate about the use and impact of technology in the future. 
Motives for these writings very from sheer entertainment and 
thoughtful speculation to social comment and criticism, and even 
philsophical views of man's fate. They embrace expressions of 
hope and despair in technology. This literature begins with the 
French publicists of the mid-1700's, and includes the utopists of 
France such as Turgot, Condorcet, Mercier. In England, Francis 
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Bacon became the first utopist to visualize science employed to 
improve man's future. His New Atlantis, 1622, was the forerunner 
of a long string of utopian essays and novels. By the mid-1800's 
many more utopias had been published, including the German Johann 
K. Friederich, who seemed to have been inspired by the age of 
steam; and Emilier Souvestre, who in 1845 wrote a satiric criticism 
of a world in which steam and electric machines did the work and 
thinking. 
It is apparent that prophecy is gradually being replaced (but 
only in part). 
Technical Speculation (Beginning in the Early 1800's). This 
term includes the predictions of persons who have solid technical 
competence in some field, but are speculating about the technical 
future without a strong data base or very explicit system of logic. 
Quite often, the topic of speculation lies outside the field of 
the predictor's technical discipline and the writings often relate 
to the impact of technology rather than its technical attributes. 
Science Fiction and Fiction about Future Social Conditions  
includes many predictions about technical possibilities and the im-
pact, consequences and social reaction to technology. The works 
may be fanciful or serious. Motivations behind such writings in- 
clude entertainment, satire, thoughtful speculation, and social con-
cern. Some science fiction predictions have been astonishingly 
accurate, and many of these have been based upon a sound extension 
of technical knowledge. 
Some utopian fiction about society and technology has become 
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recognized as outstanding literature, and has been highly influ-
ential in affecting societal attitudes. Three outstanding exam-
ples are Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward, Aldous Huxley's Brave  
New World, and George Orwell's 1984. 
The foregoing types of literature have been admirably surveyed 
in The Tale of the Future, From Start to 1961, by I. F. Clarke. 
This bibliography annotates nine hundred British books (no articles) 
on the future. Clarke has since published a series of papers in 
Futures reviewing forecasting since 1763. His, "The First Fore-
cast of The Future," begins in the June 1969 number and Clarke's 
papers still appear in almost every number of that journal. Clarke 
does not critically examine the methodology employed over the years. 
However, his writings are a revelation in showing the enormous 
amount of technical prophecy and speculation in British literature. 
The first serious student of methods of technical prediction 
is S. Collum Gilfillan. As early as 1911 he proposed (unpublished) 
the study of successful predictors with view to learning their 
methodology. He continued these studies to the late 1960's and pro-
vides us with by far the most comprehensive survey of technology 
forecasting activity from 1750 to 1967. His summary chapter, "A 
Sociologist Looks at Technical Prediction", is a masterpiece with 
almost a hundred references. It appears in the first U.S. book on 
technology forecasting. 3 
Expert Technical Opinion. The most logical source and common 
method of TF since the late 1800's has been the opinion of technical 
experts. Such opinions have been presented for several reasons. 
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Sometimes the prediction motivated by the imagination, concern or 
interest of the individual technical expert. In the early 1900's 
and just prior to World War II, we find that many journalists in-
terviewed and/or publishers encouraged accomplished scientists, 
inventors, academicians, and engineers to provide articles and 
books on future technology and its impact. Professional societies 
have also been the platform for many predictions by men of science 
and engineering. For instance, in 1922 Marconi was honored at a 
joint meeting of the Institute of Radio Engineers and the Insti-
tute of Electrical Engineers in New York. In his acceptance speech 
he proposed that radio waves be used to detect the presence and 
bearing of a ship in bad weather. Taylor and Young, from the Naval 
Research Laboratories, took their first steps toward the development 
of Radar following this inspiration. The output of such predictive 
proposals continues to this day. It has been intensified and mul-
tiplied through the proliferation of professional societies, trade 
associations, and their journals, as well as the trade press. A 
common motive seems to have been a hopefully useful review of pos-
sibilities and needs in "the next x years in the field of 	 
Formal Technical Committees. One of the characteristics of 
of governments is to convene groups of scientists and engineers to 
consider technological proposals and possibilities, as well as social 
situations and technical responses. It has been argued that each 
major advance in aerospace came about because the U.S. government 
convened a highly skilled and eminent committee to examine an issue 
and propose a certain techical advance, such as the ICBM or the 
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establishment of NASA. 
Many dozen of such committees of experts have been convened 
to help government agencies, firms, trade associations, and other 
institutions consider technical advances, impacts, and choices. 
These committee reports, are in fact technical forecasts, but are 
rarely labled as such. It is important to realize that these re-
ports (a) embody elements of TF, (b) that until, say, the late 
1960's, have not been labled or thought of as "technology fore-
casts", and (c) often have been highly influential in leading the 
decision makers to move in certain technological directions. 
The Emergence of Formal Technology Forecasts. The concept 
of explicit technological forecasting designed as an aid to plan-
ning and decision-making by major institutions apparently begins 
in 1937. The National Resources Committee of the Department of 
Interior, through their Science Committee, established a Subcom-
mittee on Technology. The Subcommittee was headed by Dr. William 
F. Ogburn, the distinguished sociologist who was then undoubtedly 
the nations' intellectual leader in concern for the study of tech-
nology as a force affecting the structure and welfare of society. 
Their 388 page report was published in June, 1937, under the title 
Technological Trends and National Policy. Secretary Ickes' letter 
of transmittal to the President states that the report was "the 
first major attempt to show the kinds of new inventions which may 
affect living and working conditions in American in the next 10 
to 25 years". 4 
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The objective behind the report was not to encourage techno-
logy or identify new technical opportunities to society, but to 
indicate potential problems associated with the use of the coming 
inventions and to suggest national policies that would permit ad-
justment "with the least possible social suffering and loss". 
The Subcommittee stressed that their concern was not so much with 
technology as with planning directed at the social effects of  
using that technology. Hence, Part I of the report dealt with so-
cial aspects of technology, especially resistance to technological 
change, unemployment, and productivity. A very brief, Part II 
covered "Science and Technology", and Part III consisted of nine 
sections reviewing individual fields such as agriculture, communi-
cations, and power. 
Only one chapter in Part I dealt specifically with methods  
of forecasting. Here S. C. Gilfillan discussed, "The Prediction 
of Inventions", and argued that we could learn how to predict bet-
ter by examining the records of past predictors, noting their 
methods, areas of success and failure, and deducing some useful in-
sights for the forecaster. This Gilfillan did with many references. 
His principal conclusion was that the combined efforts of technical 
men and social scientists need to be united to critique, refine 
and develop better systems of prediction. As specific suggestions 
for TF methods he argued that-- 
(a) Inventions form trends, hence allow extrapolation. 
(b) Inventions take decades to emerge. The median time from 
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conception to commercial success being 33 years for 19 inventions 
introduced between 1888 and 1913. Therefore, he argued that one 
can predict social effects for "inventions already born". This 
was a clear forerunner of our present concept of forecasting by 
monitoring. 
(c) Inventions have "abundant and clear causes" and we-
should be able to predict from "this wide, causitive base" . . 
"And this we have not learned to do scientifically". In 1974 we 
are applying some techniques such as relevance trees, mission flow 
analysis, various types of market studies, and scenarios to iden-
tify needs, possibilities and relative importance. This is his 
"causitive" notion embodied in TF. 
Gilfillan rejected "optimism", "utopian prophesying" and 
"wishful thinking" as being highly misleading. He stressed at 
great length the need to look at technical alternatives for meet-
ing a social need, because many studies showed that functionlly 
equivalent inventions emerged to satisfy such needs. 
Thus, Gilfillan in 1937 gave us the nucleus of the concept 
of systematic technology forecasting. He recognized the need to 
build a data base, the use of trend extrapolation, the principle 
of monitoring and principle of normative (goal-oriented) fore-
casting. 
Since the basic purpose of this federal report was to assist 
in developing national policy to ameliorate the impact of new tech-
nology, what were the findings? Eleven conclusions about inven- 
tions, technology and unemployment were presented. Some significant 
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items were . . . 
. . . that planning agencies commence studies of certain in-
ventions that were seen to have major social effects. These 
Included the mechanical cotton picker, air conditioning equipment, 
plastics, the photo-electric cell, artificial cotton and woolen-
like fibers, synthetic rubber, pre-fabricated houses, television, 
facsimile transmission, the automobile trailer, gasoline produced 
from coal, steep-flight aircraft and tray agriculture. (A most 
interesting list, thought provoking in the different timings and 
impacts as we are experiencing them in 1974. 
. . . that a joint committee representing various government 
agencies be set up to follow and study the potential impact of 
new technology on unemployment, with dissemination of this advice 
to industry and labor. (At the President's White House Conference 
on Automation in 1960, Walter Ruether made this same plea, but it 
still has not been implemented.) 
. . . that federal agencies should continuously study "trends 
of science and invention" and possible effects thereof as they affect 
the work of the departments and agencies. 
. . . that the patent system be reviewed to better adapt it to 
changing conditions. 
. . . that there be a study on the feasibility of collecting 
data on inventions and discoveries with goal of gathering informa-
tion on the more socially significant items in one place. 
. . . that there must be "a permanent over-all planning board" 
--a "National Resources Board"--to bring the interaction of coming 
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technology and social structure (as well as other factors) before 
the myriad of federal, state, county and city special planning 
groups. 
Finally that "there is usually opportunity to anticipate its 
(an invention's) impact on society since it never comes instan-
taneously without signals". In other words, that some technology 
forecasting is feasible. 
What was the impact of these recommendations? Apparently, 
the report had very little effect. Only Recommendation 4 on re-
vising the patent system has been implemented (but, we believe, 
not for quite the purpose implied in the study). 
Recommendation 3 is observed quite widely and rigorously by 
the Department of Defense, and to some extent by Agriculture and 
a bit by Labor. Here and there it appears in some agencies such 
as the Bureau of Mines and the FAA. However, by and large there 
is little continuous study and planning for future technology in 
most of our Government Departments. Despite the very vigorous 
and imaginative efforts of Dr. Herbert Holloman as Assistant Secre-
tary for Research and Development in the Department of Commerce 
in the late 1960's, this type of effort never came to life in that 
department. 
Recommendation 6 is now coming into being, but only in a very 
limited way, in the Office of Technology Assessment just established 
in November 1973. 
Recommendation 2 has been pursued spasmodically by special 
studies and commissions on automation, generally in or through the 
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Department of Labor. No advisory service on potential impact has 
been established. 
The vision of Gilfillan and Ogburn arguing the need for 
technology forecasting for policy purposes was not translated into 
action at that time, and is only partially implemented today in 
fragmented form throughout the U.S. government. 
TF AS A GUIDE TO MANAGEMENT 
The first major organizational effort to forecast technology 
so as to better guide management decisions was conducted by the 
U.S. Army Air Force in 1945. The forecast was the result of the 
vision of Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air 
Forces. 	In 1944, he asked Dr. Theodore Von Karman to form the 
Scientific Advisory Group to give the Air Force scientific guid-
ance in planning their research and development in the 20 years 
ahead. Arnold's letter of instructions to Von Karman is superb 
in envisioning the role of technology forecasting, and is shown 
as Exhibit 7. 
The Scientific Advisory Group was established on December 1, 
1944, and Von Karman set about selecting permanent staff and part 
time consultants. The team left in May, 1945, for Germany to 
study first hand German research and development on high speed 
aerodynamics and power. On their return Von Karman wrote a report, 
"Where We Stand", which became the first of 13 studies making up 
the series, Towards New Horizons. 5 A team then went to Japan in 
September 1945, and on their return the rest of the series of 
reports was written. One recommendation was that a permanent 
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EXHIBIT 7 
THE FIRST KNOWN REQUEST FOR TF 
AS AN AID TO MANAGEMENT IN A MAJOR ORGANIZATION 
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES 
WASHINGTON 
7 November 1944 
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. VAN KARMAN: 
Subject: AAF Long Range Development Program 
1. I believe the security of the United States of American 
will continue to rest in part in developments instituted by our 
educational and professional scientists. I am anxious that Air 
forces postwar and next-war research and development programs be 
placed on a sound and continuing basis. In addition, I am de-
sirous that these programs be in such form and contain such well 
thought out, long range thinking that, in addition to guaranteeing 
the security of our nation and serving as a guide for the next 10-
2.0 year period, that the recommended programs can be used as a 
basis for adequate Congressional appropriations. 
2. To assist you and your associates in our current con-
cepts of war, may I review our principles. The object of total 
war is to destroy the enemy's will to resist, thereby enabling 
us to force our will on him. The attainment of war's objective 
divides itself into three phases: political, strategic and tac-
tical. Political action is directed against resources, and tacti-
cal action against his armed forces. Strategical and tactical 
actions are our main concern and are governed by the principles 
of objective, surprise, simplicity, mass, offensive, movement, 
economy of forces, cooperation and security. 
3. I believe it is axiomatic that: 
a. We as a nation are now one of the predominant powers. 
b. We will no doubt have potential enemies that will 
constitute a continuing threat to the nation. 
c. While major wars will continue to be fought principally 
between the 30th and 60th parallels, north, global war must be con-
templated. 
d. Our prewar research and evelopment has often been 
inferior to our enemies. 
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e. Offensive, not defensive, weapons win wars. Counter-
measures are of secondary importance. 
f. Our country will not support a large standing army. 
g. Peacetime economy requirements indicate that, while 
the AAF now receives 43% of current War Department appropriations, 
this allotment or this proportion may not continue. 
h. Obsolete equipment, now available in large quanti-
ties, may stalemate development and give Congress a false sense 
of security. 
i. While our scientists do not necessarily have the 
questionable advantage of basic military training, conversely our 
AAF officers cannot by necessity be professional scientists. 
j. Human-sighted (and perhaps radar or television as-
sisted) weapons have more potential efficiency and flexibility 
than mechanically assisted weapons. 
k. It is a fundamental principle of American democracy 
that personnel casualities are distasteful. We will continue to 
fight mechical rather than manpower wars. 
1. As yet we have not overcome the problems of great 
distances, weather and darkness. 
m. More potent explosives, supersonic speed, greater 
mass offensive efficiency, increased weapon flexibility and con-
trol, are requirements. 
n. The present trend toward terror weapons such as 
buzz bombs, phosphorous and napalm may further continue toward gas 
and bacteriological warfare. 
4. The possibility of future major wars cannot be over-
looked. We, as a nation, may not always have friendly major 
powers or great oceanic distances as barriers. Likewise, I pre-
sume methods of stopping aircraft power plants may soon be avail-
able to our enemies. Is it not now possible to determine if ano-
ther totally different weapon will replace the airplane? Are 
manless remote-controlled radar or television assisted precision 
military rockets or multiple purpose seekers a possibility? Is 
atomic propulsion a thought for consideration in future warfare? 
5. Except perhaps to review current techniques and research 
trends, I am asking you and your associates to divorce yourselves 
from the present war in order to investigate all the possibilities 
and desirabilities for postwar and future war's development as res-
pects the AAF. Upon completion of your studies, please then give 
me a report or guide for recommended future AAF research and de-
velopment programs. May I ask that your final report also include 
recommendations to the following questions: 
a. What assistance should we give or ask from our edu-
cational and commercial scientific organizations during peacetime? 
b. Is the time approaching when all our scientists and 
their organizations must give a small portion of their time and 
resources to assist in avoiding future national peril and winning 
the next war? 
c. What are the best methods of instituting the pilot 
production of required nonrevenue equipments of no commercial 
value developed excelusively for the postwar period? 
d. What proportion of available money should be allo-
cated to research and development? 
6. 	Pending completion of your final report, may I ask that 
you give me a short monthly written progress report. Meanwhile, 
I have specifically directed the AC/AS, OC&R (General Wilson) to 
be responsible for your direct administrative and staff needs. 
Also, as I have already told you, I welcome you and your associates 
into my Headquarters. May I again say that the services of the AAF 
are at your disposal to assist in solving these difficult problems. 
412 
/s/ H. H. Arnold 
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scientific advisory group be established. In June 1946, a per-
manent Scientific Advisory Board of 30 members met for the first 
time, and continues to advise the Air Chief of Staff to this day. 
Towards New Horizons was initially classified, and only one 
study of parts of this report has been available to the public. 
The doctoral thesis of Thomas J. O'Connor identifies developments 
in three areas--missiles, jet engines, and jet aircraft. 6 O'Connor 
found that the recommendations generally were followed, although 
it was the Army Ordnance, not the Air Force that pursued missile 
development. The WAC Corporal missile and the Nike missile mate-
rialized through this forecast. 
The recommendation to fund an ICBM in 1945-1950 was not fol-
lowed, partly because of funding conditions and partly because of 
Air Force attitudes. Research on sweptback and detla winged craft 
was pursued and produced useful results. Work on tailless air-
craft and flying wings was recommended, pursued, but not fruitful. 
The Arnold Engineering Center was established as a result of the 
forecast effort in Toward New Horizons. 
What TF methods were used? This is not very explicit in the 
study. Two modes of prediction seem dominant. First was the rea-
soned explanation of significant technical needs, of technical pos- 
sibilities and progress, and the tradeoffs that favored one line 
of development over another. It was a kind of goal-oriented, data-
and-opinion based forecast. The other mode was simply "expert 
opinion" without a specified data base or mode of reasoning. Some 
of these results were quite wrong. For instance, Von Karman said 
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that pilots would utilize the "prone position in very fast inter- 
, ceptors", and his forecast that atomic power would first be ap-
plied to propulsion of aircraft rather than stationary power plants 
was dead wrong. O'Connor concluded that the committee's philosophy 
was basically, "try everything". Yet they overlooked satellites. 
Nevertheless, the significance of this forecasting effort lies 
in the attempt to systematically examine the technological future 
and relate possibilities and realities to the goals of a major or-
ganization. The effort had major impact on the Air Force, but 
because of secrecy requirements it had virtually no impact on the  
methodology of TF or even on the concept of formal technology fore-
casting. 
THE EMERGENCE OF FORMAL TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING PROGRAMS 
After the Von Karman technology forecasting studies, concern 
for technology accelerated in the military establishment because 
of international relations. It became painfully obvious that the 
Cold War was a fact of political life, and that the growth of tech-
nical capabilities in nuclear weapons, communications systems, air-
planes and ballistic and guided missles, among other things, was a 
certainty. The sophistication and cost of new weapons systems abso-
lutely demanded better technical planning. 
The National Research Council had been making studies (forecasts) 
prior to World War II, which predicted many scientific advances, 
although they missed such things as atomic energy, radar, jet propul 
sion and antibiotics. After the Von Karman effort, many forecasting 
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studies were launched. Project Lexington, made in 1948 for the 
Air Force, resulted in the Mariner class of merchant vessels and 
the atomic depth charge; Project Charles in the establishment of 
Lincoln Laboratories at M.I.T. The Lamp Lighter report led to 
the building of the DEW line, and a 1953 study led to the decision 
to build the ICBM. 
In 1955 the U.S. Army produced a one-time, "Technical Capa-
bilities Forecast", through each of its technical services. An 
official document, "Technical Capabilities Forecast, FY 59-70" 
was produced in 1957 by the Army Ordnance Corps. The report out-
lined ideas for military devices deemed feasible. It was widely 
circulated and suggestions solicited. Responses were compiled in 
a document, "Vast and Half-Vast Ideas", and circulated throughout 
Ordnance Corps laboratories in hopes that it would stimulate more 
ideas. In 1960 the Army's Chief of Research and Development or- 
dered each technical service to prepare a long range technological 
forecast and this policy continued annually until 1963. Under 
reorganization of the technical services the Army Material Command 
took over responsibility of preparing an annual, "Long Range Tech-
nological Forecast", and this continues. 
An Important Change in TF Usage. The character of Army TF 
changed significantly throughout this decade. Initially, the fore-
casts predicted types of military devices and dates of availability. 
However, the forecasters and tactical planners did not always en-
vision the same needs, nor did the technology predicted produce a 
a militarily balanced system. Also, the tactical planners did not 
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anticipate technical possibilities that could affect military 
tactics. Therefore, by 1967, the Army had begun parallel inte-
gration of forecasting and planning. Their TF reports now 
stressed, "what we could do if we wish", and operational planning 
documents provided, "what we would like to do". A system of inter-
change and iteration of these two types of studies merged into the 
Army's final research and development plans. Their system of plan-
ning then led to preparation of three TF volumes, which were up- 
dated every two years. Volume I covered "Scientific Opportunities", 
volume 2--"Technological Capabilities" and volume 3--"Advanced Sys-
tems Concepts". 7 The combined result has heavily influenced Army 
R & D work. Methodology used include expert opinion, monitoring  
of world wide technical developments, special studies in depth by 
technical experts, and trend extrapolation. 
THE RECOGNITION OF TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING METHODOLOGY 
TF methodology has its roots in the work of early anthropolo-
gists, historians, and sociologists. In 1877 Lewis H. Morgan wrote 
of the "egometrical acceleration" of human progress. In The Educa  
tion of Henry Adams there is repeated recognition and emphasis on 
the exponential growth of energy and power. 8 
Here is the recognition of exponential technical progress. The 
first attempt to quantify principles of social change (including 
measures of the impact of certain technologies such as speed of 
transport, range of missles, etc.) were presented in 1931 by the 
sociologist, Hornell Hart, in The Technique of Social Progress.
9 
Here we find two TF concepts formalized (1) the identification of 
technical parameters relevant to the purpose of the forecast and 
(2) the use of time series of these parameters and their extrapo-
lation. Many citations and charts of the accelerating character 
of social culture (meaning patterns of behavior not refinement 
in education and manners) are given in "Acceleration in Social 
Change", a chapter by Hornell Hart available in two books) -0 
However, I cannot find that the TF efforts of these sociologists 
had any effect in encouraging or delaying innovation. This very 
perceptive work did not spread into engineering and science educa-
tion, or into technical planning for the government or industry. 
Indeed, even most of their own colleagues have abandoned this 
field of study and are amazingly ignorant of their work. A re-
cent comprehensive sociology bibliography directed at social fore-
casting identifies hundreds of forecasting publications with soc- 
ial implications, yet completely omits reference to the first great 
government TF effort inspired and directed by the sociologists; 
and neglects most of the key works of early TF students who were 
sociologists. 11 
The economists have long recognized the interaction of techno-
logy and economics. A landmark paper by Siegel appeared in 1953. 12 
In the last 20 years or so there has been growing interest and con-
cern among economists over the economics of research and development 
and technological innovation. 	This type of activity is seen to 
create the technological base through which economic growth will 
emerge. Very careful and thorough economic scholars have attempted 
to develop the relationship of R & D expenditures to technological 
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innovation on national and industry levels. The work of Edwin 
Mansfield is probably the leading effort in this respect, and 
many others are making important contributions. 13 The difficulty 
of such economic work related to technological innovation lies 
in two aspects (1) the macro-aspects of the economic data and (2) 
in the ambiguity and imperfect reflection of technical activity 
in economic data. 
Case histories show that some major technological innova-
tions have been brought into being for very little money. To 
illustrate, consider the following three types of problems with 
economic data: Beginning in 1934-35 Carlson brought the principle 
of xerography through the stages of innovation including design 
concept, patent, laboratory demonstration and crude model (imcom-
plete) of an office copier for roughly $3,000.00 and about 2,000 
hours of spare time! This was the basis of a business grossing 
nearly $2 billion in 1973. Battelle and Haloid (later Xerox Cor-
poration) carried out further R & D and commercialization of xero-
graphy from 1946 to "first profits" in 1953 for an expenditure of 
perhaps two million dollars--a very small expenditure for an enor-
mously profitable innovation. 
Second, the correct economic data cannot be ascertained with-
out exhaustive research and adjustment of accounting records be-
cause Xerox chose to include engineering expenses for the design 
and construction of the production equipment along with the conven-
tional "research and development" expenditures. This is contrary 
to the practice of the majority of firms, I believe. Therefore, 
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Xerox's "R, D, and E" (research, development and engineering) 
figures are inconsistent with much other industry data. Third, 
Xerox since 1960 or so has clearly demonstrated that R & D expen-
ditures do not necessarily produce innovation. They have spent 
many millions on basic and applied research aimed at producing 
major new innovations, but are frank to admit (privately, at 
least) that they have had no success to date. They have, of 
course, done a superb job of product refinement and product line 
development with xerographic copying. Nevertheless, no great new 
area of innovation has yet resulted from the millions they have 
spent on R & D aimed at other subjects. Finally, their financial 
success in xerography is due very heavily to their mode of charg-
ing for the technology. An analysis of three modes of selling 
(outright sale of machines, leasing by the month, and a lease 
varying with usage basically a per copy charge) showed that in 
the first five years of marketing the Model 914 office copier 
their "usage" concept produced roughly two times the net income 
that outright selling would have produced ($660 million vs. $330 
million) without even considering income flow from depreciation 
and residual use in leased equipment. 
This example is provided only to demonstrate that economic 
data on R & D activities and technological innovation is a very 
limited forecasting tool. Economic data does not predict the tech-
nical attributes of future technology, and we cannot expect econo-
mic forecasting to serve this aspect of technology studies. 14 
THE EMERGENCE OF TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING METHODOLOGY 
About 1959-60, Ralph C. Lenz, Jr. a civilian with the Air 
Force Systems Command, adapted his Sloan school thesis to an 
Air Force monograph, "Technological Forecasting". This booklet 
rapidly disseminated throughout the military services and some 
contractor firms. A second edition was distributed in 1962. 15 
Lenz's document summed up the state of the art and added some 
insights of his own. Basically, he proposed six TF methods: 
1. Extrapolation of technological trends. 
2. Growth analogies--in which it is assumed that a new 
technology grows analogous to biological growth. 
3. Trend correlation--then defined as a casual impact of 
one variable on another. 
4. Interdependent relationships--in which the trend of one 
parameter depends upon the relationship of a number of parameters 
whose trends must be examined collectively. 
5. Trend characteristics--in which one examines the projec-
tions of a trend and their possible interactions with "barriers". 
6. Dynamic Forecasting--in which a model in the manner of 
Forrester's industrial dynamics is made to represent a future 
technology situation. 
Independently, I launched a course at Harvard Business School 
in 1960 on "Technological Innovation". This led to a search for 
methods of forecasting technological progress in a manner that 
would be useful to the manager. Early TF materials were reproduced 
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in Harvard Business School case files as "cases" and "notes" in 
1960-62, and were based heavily on Gilfillan and Lenz. One new 
concept was formalized in this course--the concept of forecast-
ing by monitoring. 
Monitoring is based on the fact that the process of techno-
logical innovation takes time measured in decades, and that "sig-
nals" of coming technology were evident long before they had 
societal impact. Forecasting by monitoring was the basis of an 
exercise on predicting the coming of the missile of a replacement 
for the bomber. All available TF items were published in the 
textbook, Research, Development, and Technological Innovation. 16 
This 1964 text apparently was the first effort at the teaching 
of methods of technology forecasting to business (and engineer-
ing) students. The text also reprinted a basic chapter summing 
up technical prediction by Gilfillan. Perhaps a dozen companies 
contacted me about the use of these methods in their work, but no 
results are known. The influence of this textbook was merely a 
small stimulus to the teaching of technological innovation; and 
it did introduce TF teaching material at perhaps 30 or 40 business 
schools and a few engineering schools. 
THE BEGINNINGS OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN TF 
A separate development arose in the early 60's. Member nations 
in O.E.C.D. had, in the 1950's given strong support to basic re-
search through their respective ministers of science. Investment 
in basic research was generally applauded in act of faith. Science 
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was assumed to be the route to economic growth. O.E.C.D.'s Com-
mittee for Science Policy, therefore, supported many international 
studies of basic research, science, technology and economic inter-
actions. Through the early 1960's the titles of their publications 
shows a gradually increasing awareness that support of science was 
not producing all the economic benefits hoped for. As a result, 
their studies shifted to examine technological innovation more 
closely. The O.E.C.D. Secretariat and their staff carefully inves-
tigated the literature of invention and innovation. This led to 
European contacts with some American managers and a few academi-
cians who had been concentrating on the "innovation" aspect of 
technology, rather than the "basic research" theme. 
Out of this perception and concern the O.E.C.D. engaged Eric 
Jantsch as a consultant. His assignment was to prepare a summary 
of the state of the art of technological forecasting. 
From October, 1965 to May, 1966, Jantsch visited 12 O.E.C.D. 
countries and Israel. He made approximately 250 contacts and 
additionally evaluated 400 literature references. From this he 
completed a manuscript in August, 1966, which was published as a 
paperback report by O.E.C.D., (Paris, 1967) as, Technological Fore-
casting in Perspective. This monumental survey had great impact. 
Despite a pitiful promotional effort by O.E.C.D., the demand for 
the volume forced two printings of over 8,000 copies. The book 
was widely studied and reviewed with various degrees of understand-
ing, enthusiasm, and criticism. One significant point lay outside 
the great merits of the book. Namely, the reaction was comprehen-
sive demonstration of world wide hunger for and experimentation 
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with ways of thinking vigorously about the technological future. 
Jantsch's findings were three: 17 
1. TF emerged as a management discipline (note not an engi-
neering or science discipline!) around 1960. It had shifted from 
the "informed opinion" approach of the mid-1940's to systematic 
evaluation. TF had been adopted increasingly by military, re-
search institutes and industry since the late 1950's. 
2. "The value of technological forecasting has been proved" 
--not only by accuracy but by usefulness in defining long range 
strategies. 
3. TF was "not yet a science, but an art", with gradually 
evolving techniques, and was undergoing accelerated development 
as he wrote. Jantsch identified more than 100 versions of tech-
niques under some 20 approaches. 
He estimated that 500 to 600 medium and large sized American 
firms had established a TF function as part of their operations, 
and that they spent approximately $50 million for in-house exter-
nally--about 1% of their R & D expenditures. 
Jantsch had to reach these conclusions through a tenuous set 
of assumptions, and many Americans doubted that 500 U.S. firms had 
"established a TF function". 
At that time, however, there was no doubt that since WW II 
thousands of individuals in science, engineering, and management 
functions in industry and government had been conducting TF studies 
at times, whether or not they were so identified. The military 
underwrote numerous major contracts for long range technical planning 
with RAND Corporation, Boeing, Lockheed, Honeywell, RCA, GE's 
TEMPO, North American Aviation, and many other firms from the 
mid-1950's on, and these involved thousands of investigators who 
were, in reality, doing TF work. 
In addition to a superb international survey of TF activity, 
Jantsch provided a highly useful summary and annotated biblio-
graphy of TF literature and related studies. His book was such 
an excellent reference source that in itself it became the major 
literature landmark. 
The first U.S. book on methods of TF appeared in February, 
1968. Technological Forecasting for Industry and Government, was 
the edited and rewritten proceedings of the first conference for 
industry on methods of TF, based on items by 23 authors from in- 
dustry, government, consulting and academia. 18  In the Preface  
the editor argued that "expert opinion was an unsatisfactory basis 
on which to make decisions about technology, as evidenced by many 
past errors." TF should "rest upon an explicit set of quantita-
tive relationships and stated assumptions". The book had several 
impacts. First, it presented a "how-to-do-it" slant that encour-
aged industrialists to try TF methods; and second, the wide circu-
lation here and abroad added to general awareness that a common 
interest in TF was growing in society. The book was the fore-
runner of a series of books on TF. 
In July, 1968, the University of Bradford (UK) held a National 
Conference on Technological Forecasting. Papers provided the basis 
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for Technological Forecasting and Corporate Strategy. 19 
In June, 1968, the University of Strathclyde conducted a 
European conference on Technological Forecasting at Glasgow. 
Proceedings appeared in 1969 book, Technological Forecasting. 2° 
Robert Ayers produced the first book on TF methodology authored 
by a single writer: Technological Forecasting and Long Range Plan-
ning. 21 The American Management Association Methodologies which 
appeared in 1969. 22 Technological Forecasting--A Practical  
Approach by Marvin Cetron was a 1969 book noteworthy especially 
for including criticism of TF by Professor Edward Roberts of 
M.I.T. 23 In 1971 a multi-authored volume edited by Marvin Cetron 
and Christine Ralph: Industrial Applications of Technological  
Forecasting appeared. 24 This book included results of an impor-
tant survey on TF in industry. 
In 1973 Bright and Schoeman edited, A Guide to Practical Tech-
nological Forecasting.
25 This volume presented major papers from 
some 15 industrial short courses in TF, conducted between 1967 and 
1972 and attended by more than a thousand industrial and government 
officials from over 20 countries. These present the range of indus-
trial applications in the late 1960's and the addition of several 
new techniques for TF. Among the important new ideas is (1) the 
first proposal for systematically predicting social resistance to 
new technology, (2) a proposal for computer generation of future 
scenarios (3) a history of morphological analysis (the study of 
technological form) and (4) perhaps, most important of all, the 
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proposal and demonstration that technology forecasting must in-
clude consideration of interfaces with other environments; fore-
casting of political forces, ecological interactions, and value 
changes. 
A fascinating volume appeared in 1972. In Technological  
Forecasting For Decisionmaking, Lt. Col. Joseph Martino surveyed 
technology forecasting and presented theory and practice, with 
many interesting historical examples and highlights. 26 
The foregoing books were extremely high priced, and none was 
well adapted to teaching. Therefore, in 1972 the first book of 
TF exercises was published. Bright's, Brief Introduction to Tech-
nology Forecasting, Concepts and Exercises, was designed as a 
paperback teaching manual. 27 Within 15 months it was adopted for 
forecasting teaching in more than 100 courses in universities and 
colleges here and abroad. 
The field of TF has been and is being rapidly improved by the 
contributions of three new professional journals. In 1968 the 
British journal of forecasting and planning, Futures, was launched 
by Iliffe (England). The American Elvesier Publishing Company pro-
duced the first number of what is now The Journal of Technological  
Forecasting and Social Change in 1969, and the Society for Long 
Range Planning (England) introduced in 1968 a journal frequently 
touching on technology forecasting, Long Range Planning. 
One of the most important activities now influencing the field 
is The World Future Society. Their journal, The Futurist, has en-
couraged forecasting studies by focusing the interest of over 12,000 
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people on future oriented topics. However, less than 10 percent 
of their journal content deals with technology forecasting. Most 
of the publication is directed at social speculation. 
SEMI-POPULAR TECHNOLOGICAL PREDICTIONS 
Ever since the late 1800's there has been a stream of serious 
and semi-popular writings about the future and its interaction with 
technology, but not about methods of forecasting. This enormous 
literature cannot be reviewed here, but we cite a few recent exam-
ples to recognize and identify its significance. In 1967, The 
Year 2000 by Kahn and Wiener captured imagination by its wide rang-
ing set of predictions, woven into an image of possible scenarios. 28 
This book created enormous attention around the idea of "surprise-
free" futures. The Art of Conjecture (1962) by de Jouvenal sug-
gested a framework for conjecture about the socio-political 
future. 29 
The Challenge of Man's Future (1954) by Brown typifies the 
books that survey man's total situation, outline pitfalls, problems, 
and possibilities, and suggest certain interactions with technology 
and possible futures. 30 
The Next Hundred Years (1936) by Furnas reviews technical de-
velopments in a dozen fields and discusses their impact. 31 In the 
late 1960's the author reviewed his own predictions as having been 
so conservative as to be amusing. 
Future Shock by Toffler (1970) typifies the journalistic 
approach to the future. The author strings together a great many 
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concerns about the future and makes his predictions on the col-
lected opinions that are available in the press. 32 The result 
is readable, highly appealing, and equally superficial. Never-
theless, it is given enormous publicity. An annotated biblio-
graphy of some 250 items can be found in The Sociology of The  
Future. 33 
In addition, there are hundreds of government studies, 
industry studies, and industrial research efforts about future 
conditions with respect to national resources. Many of these 
border on or involve future technology. By and large, the only 
forecasting techniques are trend extrapolations based on various 
assumptions. However, dynamic modeling of resources and societal 
interactions is spreading rapidly. 
SUMMARY 
In a broad sense, interest for systematic TF began in the 
1920's with the sociologists, who were concerned about the impact 
of technology on society. Since the mid-1950's the sociologists 
as a whole have dropped their leadership in the development of 
technology forecasting methods and with minor exceptions their 
writings on the technological future are largely speculative, des-
criptive, or essays of alarms and issues. 
From the early 1950's the activity and leadership is almost 
solely in the military, but their work is not widely distributed. 
In the mid-1960's the business schools pick up the subject 
of TF, with the aim of providing better information for managerial 
decisions about technological choices in industry and government. 
The work of industrialists, government analysts in the U.S.A., 
O.E.C.D., some European government agencies and certain consulting 
firms such as the Institute for the Future, The Futures Group, 
Forecasting International, Battelle Memorial Institute and The 
management departments in a few universities begin to merge to 
create an organized body of knowledge. New journals and profes-
sional societies support the development of professional com-
petence and methodology. 
It is especially noteworthy that neither engineering or 
science departments in universities have done much to teach, 
write or develop the topic. However, the managers of research 
and development in industry and government continue to be deeply 
interested and are strong in their support and applications of 
TF techniques to their problems. 
THE INFLUENCE OF TF ON TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
From the literature and educational activity by decision mak-
ing groups in society, it is evident that TF is becoming more influ-
ential in guiding industry and government support. The case of 
Whirlpool Corporation is an outstanding example in which TF has 
produced major product changes and anticipatory actions by a firm, 
and one not engaged in "high technology". 34 
Present activities suggest that the diffusion of understanding 
and interest will continue. TF will become more influential. Its 
importance will lie in forcing the subject of technology into 
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explicit consideration about the future. NSF's actions on TF 
research can become an important element for change. 
SECTION 4: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TF RESEARCH 
From an examination of the techniques described in and briefly 
summarized in Appendix 1, we can identify important research needs. 
The principal needs for improving intuitive forecasting are: 
1. To examine past Delphi studies for causes of accuracy and 
error with view to improving the method. 
2. To improve the application of expertise to issues. 
3. To explore ways other than Delphi technique for getting 
more wisdom out of the mind of man. Possibly techniques based 
upon Hegelian philosophy, as suggested by Mason, might have merit. 
4. The nominal group technique and variations thereof have 
not been used very much in TF work. Apparently, the technique 
is almost unknown and unapplied in technology forecasting. It 
should be studied. 
Trend Extrapolation. There are major shortcomings in the use 
of TF trend extrapolation. Here are the needs: 
5. Most serious of all is lack of a national technological 
data base. Until data bases in hundreds of technologies are col-
lected we cannot do very much with trend extrapolation. The 
National Science Foundation should consider how and where these 
national data bases should be assembled. They should encourage 
the collection of the myriad of technical data now buried in 
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catalogs, trade associations, professional societies and special 
studies. The building of this national technical data base (pos-
sibly at the Bureau of Standards or at the Library of Congress) 
is a prime and promising task. 
To demonstrate the significance of this need, one need only 
to reflect on the quality of forecasting if there were no strong 
data bases in economics, demography, agriculture, and meteorology. 
6. Theory or at least an explicit rationale and procedure 
on how to select significant technical parameters. 
7. A theory and procedure on how to combine parameters that 
reflect design tradeoffs and societal tradeoffs (acceptability). 
8. A systematic approach to analyzing the limits of a trend 
extrapolation. 
9. Studies to improve curve fitting to technical data trend 
extrapolations. 
Structural Analysis and Normative Forecasting--Prime needs are: 
10. The decision theorists should be encouraged to apply their 
skills to goal oriented methodologies. We especially need to link 
the definition of goals to the establishment of technical programs. 
11. The link between policy making and forecasting should be 
improved. Procedures for relating policies, plans and forecasts 
need to be developed. 
12. We need much better understanding of how to establish 
socially desirable and acceptable tradeoffs between technology, 
social conditions, economics and the environment. The unbalanced 
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excesses growing out of the well-meaning Environment Protection 
Agency proposals exemplify the need for greater understanding of 
system interrelationships, as well as wiser national and inter-
national goal setting procedures. 
Monitoring--This procedure suggest the following research: 
13. As a nation, our governmental posture to technological 
development and the use of technology to serve social needs has 
been largely reactive rather than anticipatory. The U.S. gov-
ernment should establish a procedure to monitor possible signals 
of potentially significant technological developments and social 
changes requiring technological responses. 
A system should be devised to feed the resulting analysis 
to the Nation's political leaders and to the scientific estab-
lishment, with recommendations for actions that will anticipate 
problems and minimize them. Such a system would have picked up 
the potential energy crisis (as was done by many individuals and 
organizations) and would have presented the evidence to national 
leaders from a convincing and authoritative platform (as was not 
done until too late). The monitoring of signals should be a 
major responsibility of the National Science Foundation. Just as 
the Weather Bureau warns of significant changes in the weather, 
so NSF should warn the nation of impending technological storms. 
14. Historical studies should be undertaken to clarify how 
signals could have been identified and followed. From this analy-
sis, better monitoring procedures might be established. 
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Dynamic Modeling--The violent criticism directed at the 
Limits to Growth study should not be allowed to obscure the basic 
importance of this technique. Our complex society interacts in 
many non-linear modes, involving technology, economics, social 
change, ecology and politics. We badly need research to: 
15. Improve the models. 
16. Develop relevant data and transfer coefficients. 
17. Structure the equations governing relationships in parts 
of the system. 
18. Improve the interpretation and exploration of alterna-
tives. 
19. The mathematical modeling of complex relationships is 
only one type of simulation. Research should be undertaken in an 
attempt to identify social response to new technology. By antici-
pating human reactions we might hope to forestall or minimize 
some problems, and to improve the quality of what is made available 
to society. Possibly the Office of Technology Assessment should 
undertake some such experiments, as well as NSF. 
Cross Impact Analysis-- 
20. Further research should be undertaken to improve our under-
standing of how varieties of possible changes will impact upon each 
other and upon social response. This work is kind of "point" analy-
sis of dynamic modeling. No doubt the two should be coupled in 
research. 
Predicting Scientific Developments--Only one method of predict-
ing some types of scientific developments has been proposed, and 
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the test was very limited. 
21. Research and experiments should be conducted to see if 
scientific progress can be identified and predicted to any extent. 
22. Experiments should be designed to see if and how the 
awareness of coming scientific knowledge could improve technolo-
gical innovation and social adaptation. 
Study of Errors in Past Forecasts--One way to improve fore-
casting is to determine why past forecasts were wrong. 
23. By considering the nature of these oversights or mistakes, 
one could, theoretically, make sure that he did not fall into the 
same trap. It should be possible to design forecasting procedures 
that would at least minimize the number of such errors.
1
' 2 
Developing and Disseminating Knowledge—Technology forecast-
ing will not be useful unless we disseminate the techniques to 
industry and government, and feed the results to planners and 
policy makers. Therefore, we should: 
24. Encourage academic research on TF, and the teaching of 
TF courses in engineering, business, and certain liberal arts areas 
such as sociology and political science. NSF should sponsor a 
national symposium on TF with view to training and inspiring more 
competent educators to apply their respective disciplinary skills 
to TF. 
25. Encourage the development of special TF courses for indus-
try and government officials, so that the systematic use of TF 
will become standard practice. 
26. Encourage use of special TF studies as part of great 
national issues such as energy, population, ecological conditions, 
etc. 
TF as a National Early Warning System-- 
27. The recommendations of the 1937 study on Technological  
Trends should be reviewed and modified appropriately to serve 
the anticipatory planning needs of the national policy makers and 
operating heads of departments and agencies. 
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APPENDIX I 
REVIEW OF TF METHODS: CRITIQUE AND RESPONSE 
TF methodology today can be classified in perhaps half a 
dozen categories; and these are briefly reviewed below, with com-
ments and cautions. 
Intuitive Forecasting  
The improvement of expert opinion has been the goal of much 
TF research, notably the efforts of Helmer, Dalkey, Enzer, Gordon, 
Turoff, and their colleagues. 
The Delphi Technique. In the arly 1960's RAND researchers 
Helmer, Dalkey, and their colleagues introduced the method to 
industry. It was intended to improve the use of expert opinion 
through polling, under conditions intended to minimize the inter-
personal basis in committees. These points were anonymity, sta-
tistical display of collective predictions, and feedback of rea-
soning. 
Delphi technique rapidly swept throughout the world. By 1974, 
more than a thousand or so Delphi studies had been conducted by 
firms, government agencies, trade associations, and consultants. 
These ranged from little internal one-department panels to a 
Japanese nationwide study involving 4,000 predictions. The com-
ments that follow obviously do not apply to every Delphi study. 
Experience suggests that Delphi technique appears to be easy but, 
in fact, it is exceedingly difficult to do well. 
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-A four-round Delphi with more than, say, twenty predictions 
becomes so wearisome and time consuming that participation and 
thought fall off rapidly. 
-Many Delphi results are presented as though they were the 
work of experts. In fact, they are not. They become collections 
of opinions of persons who have little or no expertise on the 
precise technical-economic issues raised. The technique thus may 
mesmerize the forecaster and the forecast user into believing 
that collections of opinions provide valid technological predic-
tions. The stress on achieving "consensus" is overdone. Some 
writings imply that consensus means "truth" or "correctness", 
and seem to suggest that the better the consensus the better the 
forecast. This is unproven. In fact, one important value of 
the statistical display lies in providing the forecast user a pic-
ture of the degree of unanimity and the range of opinion. This 
display may be extremely useful additional information. 
Other problems are: How does one obtain true experts on each 
topic? Pre-selection of specialized panels has been tried by 
TRW and others. The unhappy fact is that any pre-selection pro-
cess may unwittingly exclude the very interdisciplinary wisdom 
that was sought. Self-rating (sometimes with appropriate weight-
ing) as to degree of expertise on each question has been tried. 
Another approach is to have a second independent panel repeat the 
Delphi study and compare the results. 
Unambiguous predictions. Many Delphi predictions prove to 




assumptions. The use of qualitative terms like "common use" or 
"widely accepted" typify this error. The multiple prediction 
is another source of error as in "when will electric cars pow-
ered by fuel cells be common for suburban use?" Broad and im-
precise definitions also confuse experts. Careful design of 
predictions and pre-testing hopefully can prevent this error. 
Tediousness. Length must be kept down and repetitions 
reduced. The mini-Delphi of two rounds followed by a conference, 
has been found helpful. 
Other Possibilities for Improving Expert Opinion. Interest 
in the Delphi technique has tended to obscure the basic issue: 
By what techniques of inquiry can we get improved information 
out of the minds of knowledgeable people? 
The Dialectical Approach is based on the philosophical con-
cepts of Hegel. The dialectical approach calls for making a 
forecast and then proposing an extreme opposite or counter-fore-
cast. Both forecast positions are then exposed to the strongest 
possible critical argument. The only known industrial example is 
described by Richard 0. Mason in "A Dialectical Approach to Stra-
tegic Planning," Management Science, April 1969. A model for a 
dialectical approach was proposed by Ian I. Mitroff in "A Communi-
cation Model of Dialectical Inquiring Systems--A Strategy for Stra-
tegic Planning," Management Science, June 1971. 
A Psycho-Heuristic Approach. A psycho-heuristic concept has 
been suggested by Warren Duff in an unpublished talk to The Southern 
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Sociological Society in 1971. His idea is to have the forecaster 
make extremely rigorous and critical inquiries of experts in or-
der to elicit sound reasoning to support their forecasts. Obvi-
ously, the forecaster must be a technical expert himself in order 
to ask penetrating and comprehensive questions and to evaluate 
the validity of answers. This technique borders on the Delphi 
concept in that the experts do not confront each other. Theo-
retically, the study director would force the experts to deal 
with a far more rigorous feedback of reasoning. 
A mild version of concept involves querying experts on the 
elements of a basically Pert-like network of research and develop-
ment tasks. This was applied by Vanston to predict the emergence 
of nuclear fusion power under various funding conditions. It has 
great promise. 
TREND EXTRAPOLATION 
Trend extrapolation (also called exploratory forecasting) 
rests on the assumption that technical attributes generally advance 
in a relatively orderly manner over time, exhibiting patterns of 
behavior that form fairly well-behaved trends. Therefore, by 
choosing appropriate parameters one can develop their past time 
series and extend them in some manner to predict a future condi-
tion or estimate the rate of change. Such projections forecast 
the status of the measured attributes and so identify future levels 
of technical performance and functional capability. These projec-
tions suggest coming possibilities, potential conflicts, supporting 
439 
iv 
requirements, unacceptable anomalies, and the need for actions 
and responses on technology-oriented devices and procedures. 
The forecaster recognizes, of course, that the projections must 
be studied to identify potential limits and forces for change. 
It must be stressed that engineers and scientists have used 
trend extrapolation for almost 200 years for planning and fore-
casting. The essential difference with today's practice is that 
historically they did not use the term "TF"; there was no for-
malization of the process of TF, and there was no attempt to re-
fine the trend extrapolation techniques and data base. 
It is generally believed that these technical data time 
series on arithmetic scales produce S-curves, reflecting a slow 
start, exponential growth, then a leveling off against some limit 
produced by nature of man. No comprehensive research has been 
done to prove the universality of this assumption, but almost all 
data so far plotted show a surprising amount of confirmation. The 
foregoing S-curve phenomenon comment refers solely to the achieve-
ment of technical capabilities. It does not necessarily apply to  
the degree of that capability used by society, which is governed 
by more than mere availability. This orderly and apparently expo-
nential nature of technical progress may be explained, perhaps, 
through reviewing the process of technological innovation below. 
New technology emerges from an idea, through a struggle to 
achieve the first crude results, followed by rapid advances as 
understanding grows and more man-hours, equipment, and funds are 




of effectiveness or a technological barrier is reached. 
The technology emerges slowly because initially few people 
are involved, basic scientific knowledge must be gained, and engi-
neering obstacles need to be cleared away. There may be lack of 
scientific and technical understanding, and it may take time to 
overcome conventional wisdom and erroneous assumptions about the 
phenomena involved. Funding of the research effort and lack of 
experimental equipment may also hold back progress. 
The advance eventually begins to accelerate because of the 
rapid commitment of more technical effort and funds once under-
standing and proof of concept are attained. Then efforts are 
directed not only to improving the key technical knowledge, but 
to refining all the facets of technological execution. The spur 
of competition also inspires rapid improvement through bold new 
goals and unique combinations of design concepts. 
Exponential change is further encouraged by the tendency of 
technicians and managers to set new goals in terms of percentage 
improvement over present practice. The pattern of action and res-
ponse between competitors in military hardware also encourages this 
accelerating advance. Technical progress in a given device usually 
is the result of accretion of dozens, if not hundreds, of refine-
ments in the component technologies. This accretion leads to ex-
ponential gains as well. 
Finally, the technical advances level off. This may be because 
of exhaustion of technical opportunities for further advance. Per-
haps a point of diminishing returns in cost, effort, and usefulness 
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is reached, or some basic limit in nature bars progress. At 
times, there are limits formally imposed by society or informally 
affected by the climate of the times. 
Why should this technical progress be relatively orderly? 
It is because advances in technology, particularly technology 
that is employed by society, is a compromise among technological 
possibilities, economics, social conditions, management psychol-
ogy, skills, resources of the producing group, alternative pos-
sibilities and interests, and the reactions of users. This com- 
plex mix of offsetting factors seems to moderate great discontin-
uities and to encourage relatively orderly evolution. While many 
advances may appear as discontinuities at the moment, in hind-
sight they are seen as part of an exponential curve or Gompertz 
curve. 
Pros and Cons of Trend Extrapolation. Trend extrapolation 
has been heavily criticized by some academicians, including some 
management scientists, sociologists and "futurists". 1 Arguments 
are listed below with possible counterarguments following each. 2 
Simplistic "eyeball" curve fitting in the manner of much TF work  
today is naive; therefore, it is invalid or useless. 
-Naive or not, the facts are that most technological trends 
have been quite orderly. 
-Mathematical elegance in curve fitting is of dubious value 
in many instances because of the crudeness of the data and 
lack of statistical studies of the phenomena involved. 
-Useful guidance usually comes from consideration of the 
vii 
443 
approximate conditions forecasted, not from the prediction 
of a precise number and date. 
Extending trend lines several decades or centuries leads to ridi-
culous relationships. 
-True enough, so we should not do this. Trend extrapolation 
loses validity over time. It is a guide to the next five, 
ten, and occasionally twenty years, not to the next century. 
=The determination of limits and the manner ,of approaching 
those limits is a major part of the forecaster's task. No 
one advocates blind, limitless extrapolation. 
There is no proof that past forces will continue to support the  
trend, so extrapolations are intellectually and philosophically  
unacceptable. 
-On the contrary, the burden of proof is on the disbeliever. 
The past trend is historical fact. It resulted from a com-
plex interaction of forces. It is up to the critic (and the 
forecaster!) to demonstrate what forces will change, when 
they will affect the projection, and by how much. 
-What reasons are there to assume that the present is a point 
of major discontinuity? If this cannot be established, the 
trend is our best guide to the near future. 
We can be certain that future technology will be modified by new  
controls, attitudes, value systems, and societal choices. 
...A very plausible argument. It applies especially to the tech-
nology that is adopted by society, but probably not as strongly 
as to the achievement of new technical capabilities. Even so, 
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the argument applies only to some technology developments 
and not to all technical work. 
Society is fractionated. Technological activity is inter-
national and the technological choices of one nation do not 
necessarily control technology elsewhere. The SST is a case 
in point. It is by no means proven that the control of a 
technology in one nation seriously alters the orderly nature 
of technical advance, except for a few items under inter-
national control. 
CRITERIA FOR SELECTING AND USING 
TECHNOLOGICAL PARAMETERS 
These few general considerations about parameters are fur-
ther supplemented in the discussion of trend extrapolation con-
cepts that follows later. 
Single parameters rarely encompass all the important attri-
butes of a device or material. Therefore, each situation must be 
examined to determine the critical parameters. In most cases, pa-
rameters relevant to performance of the device, including its key 
parts, materials, and subsystems, and to characteristics that the 
user desires should be studied. Parameters relevent to related 
technical and scientific knowledge and even such things as labora-
tory equipment and measuring devices may be significant in the 
forecast. 
Because of design and operating trade-offs, the parameters or 
attributes that reveal the full functional capability desired by 
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the user and the compromises inherent in design and operation are 
needed. This usually requires the construction of compound pa-
rameters. It may be quite different to quantify and/or to obtain 
historical data on some attributes that are important. Parameters 
must be applicable to all technical approaches that could provide 
the capability or service performed by the technology, or the re-
sulting forecast may mislead by omitting an important technical 
alternative. 
There must be an adequate historical data base, or the fore-
cast cannot relate to a trend. With too brief a data base, the 
forecaster is in the naive position of extrapolating from a point. 
This error will be found in an astonishing number of speculative 
technical papers and even official forecasts of government agen-
cies. 
Data must be taken from comparable situations. In particu-
lar, data from experimental work usually should not be intermixed 
with data from operationally available technology. 
TYPES OF TREND EXTRAPOLATIONS 
TF literature identifies these types of technological trend 
extrapolations. Examples of each can be found throughout refer-
ences in Section 3. 
Single Parameter  
Hypothesis: Time series data of a technical attribute that 
refelcts a significant aspect of the technology or its application 




then extrapolated in some manner to predict its future state. 
Potential Use: The extrapolation helps to identify the 
likely degree of change in that attribute at future times. 
Implications then can be considered, and need for further inves-
tigations or actions are indicated. 
Cautions: (1) A single parameter often fails to clarify the 
design trade-offs that are taking place between several attri-
butes; (2) one or a few parameters usually are insufficient to 
describe all the important changes taking place in a complex tech-
nological device, such as an airplane, an oil refinery, or a com-
puter; and (3) no trend goes on unchanged forever--the influential 
factors must be considered in making the extrapolation. 
Compound Parameter  
Hypothesis: Combinations of parameters can be developed so 
that the data will reflect the basic, interrelated changes in the 
device or service (e.g. power per unit of weight or space; com-
puter operations per dollar). Trends of such factors reflect the 
technological-economic trade-offs taking place within the device. 
Potential Use: Same as previous type. They also may have 
more relevance to the user because they describe a total service 
or condition pertinent to the application of the device. 
Cautions: (1) More than one compound parameter may be needed, 
and (2) the compound parameter may still be incomplete and may not 
fully reflect all the important aspects. 
Leading Indicators or Precursors  
Hypothesis: Time series data of a single or compound techno-
logical attribute (or other phenomenon) that seems to lead the 
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technology in question can be used to forecast a future state 
(e.g., improved accuracy of measurement might lead to improved 
accuracy of machine tool performance). 
Potential Use: The rate of change or performance of the 
precursor and its relationship to the technology under study pro-
vide bases for a prediction of future capability. 
Cautions. Past relationship between the precursor and the 
subject technology may not hold for many reasons. For example, 
different forces may be driving the two phenomena, or certain 
factors may limit the one parameter but not the other. 
Envelope Curves  
Hypothesis: A fundamental capability that society desires 
continues to advance by support of a succession of increasingly 
effective technologies. As the S-curves of earlier technologies 
begin to fall off, a new technology emerges to maintain progress 
of the fundamental capability. A curve approximately tangent to 
the tops of the S-curves describes an "envelope" of anticipated 
change. No definitive theory for drawing or projecting the enve-
ope curve has been suggested, and only one piece of research has 
been done. 3 
Potential Use: S-curves and their envelope curve, even 
though rougly drawn, suggest the coming of technological change. 
The S-curves display the growth inability of a given technology 
to support the advance predicted by the envelope curve. Examina- 
tion raises questions about the decline and emergence of particular 
technologies and resulting market impacts. 
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Cautions: The fact that a given technology no longer sup-
ports the envelope curve does not mean either immediate or 
ultimate economic demise. Many technologies remain effective 
in certain sectors of society. 
Step Functions  
Hypothesis: Different industries show patterns of behavior 
in the scale and timing of technological changes that they intro-
duced into products and facilities, especially as these factors 
relate to total demand. These patterns are responses to such 
forces as markets, prices, costs, size of investments, technolog-
ical considerations, new technology as well as intra-industry 
relationships, socio-political restraints, and even industry 
tradition. 4 
Potential Use: By developing these patterns one can estimate 
the scale and timing of new technology introductions. Impact on 
the market, prices, and the supplier-customer competitive res-
ponse cycle may become more clear. An individual form could then 
make wiser decisions for its own timing and scale of technical 
facilities through profitability analyses based on various cost-
price responses. The technique also is especially useful for stu-
dies of intercountry technical competition and economic competi-
tion based upon technical facilities. 
Cautions: (1) The existence of such patterns must first be 
established for the particular industry; (2) the future stability 
of relationships that created these patterns must be carefully 
considered;(3) there eventually will be limitations to the 
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progressive increased in scale of facilities; (4) new technology 
and socio-political events can abruptly alter these patterns; and 
(5) automation,miniaturization,and technological "learning" may 
occur and so rapidly improve capacity and output as to invali-
date the projections at times. 
Technological Progress Function  
Hypothesis: The technological progress function assumes 
that a technical parameter improves with cumulative numbers of 
units produced in the manner exhibited by unit cost and manufac- 
turing time in learning curve theory. Where technological devices 
are not necessarily produced uniformly over time, a different 
curve results than from plotting time-related data. 5 
The equation: 
. b 
Ti = a(1) , where 
Ti = technical parameter, characteristic of the ith unit; 
i = cumulative unit number; 
b = rate of progress, presumably dependent on environmental 
considerations such as technical effort measured by 
rates and levels of investment and man-years; and 
a = a constant. 
Possible justification may lie in the fact that R & D effort 
often is proportional to production activity and resulting sales 
income on which R & D budgets are based. Also, technical progress 
is often the accretion of hundreds of minor improvements, which are 
"learned" and applied over repetitions of production. 
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Potential Use: The function provides a basis for technol-
ogy predictions against growth of technology production or usage 
instead of time. This basis might be far more appropriate to 
some technical developments. 
Cautions: Same as for other trend extrapolation techniques. 
The assumption that technical improvement is related to cumula-
tive production may not apply to the particular case. 
Substitution Theory (Fisher-Pry)  
Hypothesis: If a new technology begins to replace an exist-
ing technology without a major change in function, it will tend 
to go to completion, and the time and amount of substitution can 
be predicted according to a hyperbolic tanget function based on 
the average annual rate of displacement. The substitution formula 
is explained in Cetron and Ralph. 6 
Potential Use: Predictions of amount and timing of substi-
tution of new technology provide bases for estimates of future 
market size, production capacity, and supporting activities as 
well as data for planning phase-out of old technology. Substitu-
tion rates in one field or country also might prove to be pre-
cursors of substitution rate elsewhere. 
Cautions: (1) Accuracy of predictions based on the first 5 
to 10 percent of displacement may be very poor; forecasts based 
on 20 to 25 percent displacement data seem to be highly acurate; 
(2) units of measurement must be carefully chosen to avoid dis-
tortion; e.g., the substitution of plastics for steel in automo-




measure; (3) it has not been explained how and why this displace-
ment theory differs from conventional market product displacement 
theory; and (4) the very long time spans involved mean that the 
new technology will be subject to many environmental changes, 
including competitive technology; and presumably this reduces 
Blackman has argued that this formula is too mechanistic and 
is unrelated to the forces that cause substitution. He prefers 
Mansfield's approach as being sounder. 
Analogies  
Hypothesis: A new technology may emerge in a manner, pattern, 
and/or rate of change analogous to some predecessor technology or 
existing natural or social phenomena. One variation is "growth" 
analogy, which assumes that a technology is analogous to biolog-
ical activity and "grows" toward a natural limit in the same man-
ner. Another variation is to assume analogy to closely related 
prior technology. 
Potential Use: The analogy provides a pattern that may be a 
useful guide to a future limited condition. The very evident ta-
pering off of growth has a salutary effect when compared to blind 
extrapolation of present rates of change. 
Cautions: Is the analogy really valid? Consider past socio-
economic conditions as well as different uses and needs for the 
future technology. 
Correlation Analysis  
Hypothesis: A technological device changes through a blend 
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of many factors of performance, construction, cost, and social 
usage. Therefore, historical data on the important interrelated 
parameters should be developed and plotted. Trial extrapolations 
are then made to test relationships and so to determine the most 
likely future state or direction. The basic notion is to search 
for consistency and logical relationships. 
Potential Use: By clarifying the interrelationship of ele-
ments of the technology, correlation analysis may be used to 
detect the way the factors will influence each other as the tech-
nology evolves. It reveals the sensitivity of technological 
development to future changes in each element and thus suggests 
the likely trade-offs. 
Cautions: This is obviously a complex study that requires 
very careful consideration of underlying forces that causes changes 
in each parameter. 
Normative (Goal-Oriented) Forecasting  
This approach to technological prediction rests on the assump-
tion that new technology materializes to fill needs or goals. There-
fore, an examination of future needs should reveal major technology 
that is desirable and probably will be developed in the future. 
For instance, when President Kennedy announced a program to put man 
on the moon by 1970, many technical goals were implicit in the 
effort--guidance, life support systems, power storage systems, ma-
terials of higher heat resistance, etc. A critical review of this 
set of future needs could have provided what was, in effect, a fore-
cast of technology. The current definition of energy goals by the 
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Federal government, as well as the funding allocation is another 
base for goal-oriented forecasting. The emission standards of 
the Environmental Protection Agency, with their detailed speci-
fications and time standards provide an even more precise fore-
cast. 
This type of forecasting may be better described as struc-
tural analysis, and whether this is forecasting or planning is 
also a question. However, it is obvious that the practice of 
developing technology to meet defined future needs is a growing 
factor in the U.S. and world society. Thus, normative forecast-
ing not only has a place in the prediction process, but that 
place is getting stronger. Methodology in this approach ranges 
from nothing but a protagonist's view of the future (often rest-
ing largely on his own value system) to highly structured rea-
soning procedures. 
Structural analysis has distinct advantages. It orders and 
systematizes one's thinking. It forces completeness. It attempts 
to quantify each bit of reasoning. On the other hand, anything 
not included in the structure will be omitted. It is rigid and 
so may be misleading. It may give a false impression of validity 
through the very elegance and quantification of the approach. 
Varieties of goal-oriented structural and environmental anal-
ysis concepts include morphological analysis, mission flow analysis  




Morphological Analysis. A matrix of all theoretically con-
ceivable combinations of technological approaches and configura-
tions is constructed and then inspected to identify untried com-
binations. Hopefully, some of these may be promising. The 
technique's use is increasing. A few industrial practitioners 
believe that it has major value in encouraging creativity in 
technical and managerial thinking. The technique has been studied 
and perhaps used more extensively in England than the U.S. It is 
a much older technique than generally appreciated. 7 
Relevance Trees. Institutional objectives, then missions, 
tasks, sub-tasks, systems, subsystems, and hardware in turn are 
identified as levels of the tree. Criteria and their weights are 
set at each level to support the branch above it. Duplication of 
systems and hardware will appear on lowest levels. A summation 
of their relevance numbers across any level will indicate the rel-
ative values of various technologies at that level. 
One benefit lies in forcing critical evaluation and defini-
tion of alternatives and "relevance" at each level. Obviously, 
"relevance" must be considered against some agreed-upon future 
state or set of conditions (a scenario). Also, the analyst must 
first establish an "objective" against which relevance can be con-
sidered. This objective must be clear, minimize confusion of 
terms, and be acceptable to the decision makers. Each level of 
the tree must be "closed" (i.e., contain all possible items to 





Mission Flow Analysis. Alternative policies and alternative 
responses and the supporting technology needed for each possible 
major future development or event are stated. Then by applying 
probabilities and value, one hopes to identify the most useful 
technology for the future. This is extremely complex and costly, 
and only a few government-oriented studies exist. It differs 
importantly from relevance trees in that it begins by recognizing 
different ways of performing a mission, rather than simply eval-
uating technology alone. 9 
Monitoring  
All studies of technological innovation confirm that the 
process of technological innovation takes time, and usually time 
measured in decades. Most technological innovations are visible 
in society long before they are widely available or applied on a 
scale having substantial impact. Since new technology emerges 
from idea into physical reality and then is applied and adopted 
at some gradual rate rather than instantaneously, it follows that 
it may be possible to monitor this progress. Then one could pre-
dict character and impact (to some extent) and with some lead 
time. 10  Exhibit 4, listing levels of emergence and impact, sug-
gests where to search for signals. 
Phenomena and events outside of technology often trigger the 
development of new technological capabilities or the adoption of 
technology; or they may alter the relevance of a given technologi-




occur outside of technology and "monitoring" must be extended 
to include these non-technical environments. Exhibit 2 shows 
one proposal for relating technology and its environmental inter-
actions. Monitoring must be done in each area. 
Monitoring is based upon assessing events in being. It 
includes activities: 
1. Searching the environment for signals that may be fore-
runners of significant technological change; 
2. Identifying possible alternative consequences if these 
signals are not spurious and if the trends that they suggest 
continue; 
3. Choosing those parameters, policies, events, and decisions 
that should be followed in order to verify the true speed and di-
rection of technology and the effects of employing that technology; 
and 
4. Presenting the data from the foregoing steps in a timely 
and appropriate manner for management's use in decisions about 
the organization's reaction. 
Monitoring includes much more than simply "scanning" tradi-
tional library reference lists. The essence is evaluation and 
continuous review. Monitoring, philsophically speaking, is the 
acceptance of uncertainty as to meaning and rate of change of 
developments. The forecaster "runs scared"--he tries to stay 
ahead of developments and their implications--and presents his 
conclusion relatively late. His contribution lies in providing 
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early warning and in remaining open-minded about possible sig-
nificance. Monitoring includes search, consideration of alter-
native possibilities and their effects, selection of critical 
parameters for observation, and a conclusion based on systhesis 
of progress and implications. Types of signals of potential 
technological change are listed in references, and an industrial 
example is given by Davis. 11  
One further dilemma of monitoring is that there are so many 
apparent signals that information collection, sorting and evaluat-
ing can overwhelm the forecaster. The "noise" in the environment 
tends to obscure meaning. The only answer to this is that even-
tually the true signals, and the meaning of the signals, will 
emerge. Hopefully, the forecaster has gained a little lead time. 
Simulation  
Forecasting by analyzing the behavior of models has tremen-
dous intellectual appeal. Technologists have long used physical 
models to predict technical behavior--ship models, airplane wind 
tunnel tests, small scale river flow test basins, etc. Mathema-
tical models to study the behavior of complex systems are well 
established in operations research literature, systems dynamics, 
and economics. The idea of using dynamic models to predict future 
technological conditions has been proposed for at least ten years, 
but there are very few examples of such technology forecasts in 
print. 12 The only industrial firm application that has been pub- 
lished is by Blackman. 13 More probably exist in monographs, govern-
ment reports and consulting reports. 
458 
Undoubtedly the landmark effort on a major scale is the 
famous Limits to Growth study in which systems dynamics has been 
applied to predict possible future conditions (including some 
technology aspects) on a global scale.
14 
A further volume, 
Toward Global Equilibrium: Collected Papers, expands the con-
cept. 15 The study has been violently attacked for many reasons; 
and the criticisms would provide a list of several pages. A 
typical short critique is in Science, 16 and a detailed, scholarly 
critique was published in two issues of Futures. 17 Criticism 
seems to include these points: 
1. The model is imperfect therefore, it is useless. 
2. There is inadequate research data to substantiate many 
of the equations and coefficients. 
3. The equations and coefficients used are wrong. 
4. The mathematics is based on deterministic models when it 
should be based on probabalistic models. 
5. There are not adequate allowance for man's ingenuity in 
creating new resources. 
6. There are mathematical errors which invalidate the 
conclusions reached in the study. 
To this Meadows, et. al., reply that - 
1. Imperfect models are not necessarily useless. 
2. More research on basic data is needed, but anyone can 
change the data and equations to suit his predictions 
and see what happens. That is, after all, the purpose 
of the model. 
Evidence is all around us that the pessimistic conclusions of 
the Meadows study are right in principle. It is apparent that we 
are on the brink of "limits" in energy consumption using present 
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resources in the present manner. Furthermore, food shortages 
are beginning to appear on a world wide scale. 
Regardless of one's opinion on this study, it has provoked 
worldwide efforts to improve and expand the application of dyna-
mic models to socio-technical systems. Studies have been launched 
in many European countries, some U.S. regions, and in Japan, South 
Africa, and elsewhere. These studies will become increasingly 
influential in setting national and international policies. 
Predicting Social Response to Technology Through Simulation--
An imaginative procedure for predicting the behavior of complex 
technological systems has been tried by the Institute for the 
Future. 18 Their technique is called "simulation gaming", and it 
attempts to suggest how people and institutions will respond to 
technical (and other) possibilities in the future. It can be 
understood by analogy to physical models. Suppose one created a 
situation (a "game") involving representative types of people and 
institutions and then introduced the proposed technology or socio-
economic developments into this environment. Perhaps the response 
of participants will indicate how these social systems will react 
to these future changes. 
One major research experiment attempt was conducted for the 
state of Connecticut. No claims are made for forecasting precision, 
but the experimenters concluded that simulation gaming was a very 
useful device to inform participants about issues and data, to 
improve communications, and to become more sensitive to aspects of 
the future. 
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Perhaps a study of the predictive potential of war games, 
where there are almost one hundred years of experience, might 
clarify usefulness and possibilities. Simulation gaming by cor-
porations and government agencies might help the firm anticipate 
intracompany and industry behavior to potential events. The con-
cept deserves further experimentation. 
Cross-impact Analysis  
Future events interact to influence the probability, timing, 
and impact with other events. By examining these interactions 
one can develop, according to protagonists, a scenario or descrip-
tion of the future. At least the forecasts will be more internally 
consistent. Cross-impact analysis is done by assuming that a given 
prediction is correct, i.e., "comes true". The forecaster then con-
siders how the occurrence of that event would affect the probability 
and timing of other predicted events. Using each prediction as 
"true" in turn, a matrix of predictions and their interactions can 
be systematically explored. Some events obviously will accelerate 
or inhibit the materialization of other predictions, and impacts 
will vary. Some predictions will appear to become very tenuous or 
very certain, and timing may be advanced or delayed. 
Cross-impact analysis attempts to do what is implied in all 
forecasting--to provide a prediction of future conditions based 
on allowance for all the interacting forces that will shape that 
future. Cross-impact analysis requires consideration of those 
interactions. Even in its simplest form it improves the internal 
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consistency of a set of forecasts and clarifies underlying assump-
tions. It exposes gross errors and inconsistencies. 
A more sophisticated approach is proposed by researchers at 
the Institute for the Future. They suggest that initial probabil-
ities should be applied to each event. By mathematically develop-
ing the potential interactions in terms of mode, strength, and 
timing and through use of a randomly selected predicted event as 
"true", the matrix can be explored on the computer to determine 
shifts in probabilities and impacts, and eventually a stable con-
dition--a scenarios--should result. 19 
Cautions: Cross-impact analysis cannot allow for any future 
event or condition not included in the matrix. Using one fore-
cast at a time as "true" is clearly erroneous, since the future 
results from the interactions of a number of events, some simultan-
eous and others at irregular intervals. These events, coming in 
clusters, often must create a very different impact on other future 
events than the impact from events taken individually. Finally, 
the "probability" manipulations proposed are of dubious validity, 
since the impact of any one event on another surely does not fol-
low the same mathematical relationship of time and force in every 
instance. 
Nevertheless, the cross impact principle has great merit in 
forcing systematic and rigorous consideration of interrelationships. 
Since 1970 extensive efforts have been made to refine the cross-




obtain both scenarios and better forecasts. 20 In particular, it 
is argued that cross-impact analysis will refine and improve the 
Delphi forecasts themselves, as well as increase the perception 
and depth of understanding of interactive relationships between 
future trends and events. A cross-impact game technique has been 
proposed for this purpose. 21 
Scenarios. The use of scenarios, meaning descriptions of 
possible futures, is growing rapidly as a planning tool. The 
scenarios itself may be the result of a forecast, but it is not a 
forecasting technique. Almost nothing has been done on methodology  
for developing scenarios. Therefore, we shall omit discussing them 
in this paper. 
OTHER FORECASTING CONCEPTS 
Forecasting by Exclusion. It might be possible to improve 
prediction by systematically excluding unlikely developments. By 
defining "forbidden regions", one might narrow and better describe 
the domain of the more probable. Occasionally, one finds this 
concept applied in engineering and scientific studies, as the 
boundaries or limits of performance are shown. However, no system-
atic application to technology forecasting is now known to the 
author. 
Learning from Past Errors. One of the most promising improve-
ments for TF is to study past forecasts and learn from them. This 
idea was suggested by Gilfillan, although he proposed to study past 
forecasts to identify reasons for success. From 1969 to 1971 Bright 
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studied dozens of past forecasts to find the reasons for error, 
with the belief that if reasons for past errors could be identi-
fied, it should be possible to improve forecasting by avoiding 
these errors in the future. 22 The findings are thought provoking, 
and offer several points worth mentioning here. Major errors 
occurred because of: 
(a) Failure to search the early stages of the process of 
technological innovation and so to detect the coming of technology 
that was clearly underway. 
(b) Failure to search widely--particularly, in other nations--
for new technology underway. 
(c) Totally inadequate perception of the influence of non-
technical developments on technology--notably population growth, 
increased affluence, and changes in laws. 
(d) Inability or unwillingness to examine the rate of past 
change in technical parameters and to consider the implications of 
the exponential progress clearly indicated in that data. 
(e) Lack of appreciation of the interactive nature of tech-
nological developments on each other. 
However, the sample of forecasts studied is far too limited, 
and critical review of many more recent forecasts is needed to 
improve understanding of causes of error. Gordon and colleagues 
examined the first published Delphi study to check its accuracy 
five years later. 23 One interesting conclusion was that in many 
instances the predictions were so fuzzy that it was hard to say 
whether or not the forecast had materialized! Gordon, too, argues 
that studies of past forecasts are vital to improve forecasting. 
THE DESIGN OF TF STUDIES 
Which Methods for Which Purposes? 
Designing the TF study for information is only part of the 
design problem. Good design must be related to the communication 
and learning needs of the situation. Here are possible uses as 
drawn from various TF examples in industry and government in recent 
years. 
Delphi Techniques. Variations of Delphi technique are aimed 
first at improving the quality of expert opinion and then at pre-
senting the collective conclusions of experts in a more meaningful 
way. TF Delphi studies have been used to: 
1. Legitimize imagination throughout a group and direct atten-
tion to the long range future. 
2. To acquire ideas and speculations beyond the normal bounds 
and resources of the firm. 
3. To provide a starting point for in-depth TF studies of 
potentially significant issues. 
4. To explore the implications of a prediction developed 
through other means. 
5. To detect signals of possible changes that ought to be 
monitored because of their potential impact. 
Technological Trend Analysis--Trend studies are useful: 
1. To determine the rate, direction, and timing of key aspects 
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of a technology. 
2. To compare rates of technological advance between 
technologies. 
3. For sensitivity analysis of alternative changes in tech-
nological elements. 
4. As a vehicle for studying factors that will influence 
the limits of a technical trend. 
Monitoring Systems: 
1. Survey the environment for signals of developments that 
may affect technology. 
2. To track a faint but potentially important possibility. 
3. To determine direction and timing of technological progress. 
4. To determine the true impact or response of a technologi-
cal development. 
5. To determine when a threshold of significance has been 
reached. 
Cross Impact Analysis--Cross impact has been used: 
1. To assure that forecasts are internally consistent. 
2. To improve understanding of interactions. 
3. To develop and refine scenarios of possible futures. 
4. To encourage interdisciplinary and interfunctional consid-
eration of future possibilities. 
Structural Analysis (Goal-Oriented Techniques)--Methods that 
identify the technology needed to serve future goals have been used 
to: 
1. Compare present activities of the firm to those that will 
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be needed to meet a future situation. 
2. Organize thinking so as to display alternatives and 
assure consideration of each element of complex issues. 
3. As a means of developing understanding and agreement on 
goals and the distribution of effort. 
4. To weigh and quantify elements of the decision. 
Simulation--Dynamic models enable one to simulate different 
conditions so as to - 
1. Gain understanding of the behavior of complex, multi-
factor, non-linear systems. 
2. To study non-linear interactions over time. 
3. To examine the sensitivity of a complex system to 
changes in variables. 
Scenarios. Although not forecasting techniques in themselves, 
alternative possible futures can be used-- 
1. To analyze the implications of a wide variety of uncer-
tainties in the future. 
2. As a basis for a monitoring plan. 
3. To identify the need for information and studies in depth. 
4. To develop the need for policy decisions. 
5. To encourage flexibility in long range planning. 
6. To help prepare the firm for contingencies. 
7. To sensitize people to the character and influence of 
possible changes. 
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TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Simon Kuznets 
I. 	Technological Innovation: Definition and Phases 
Technological innovation is defined here as application of a 
new element in material technology, i.e. in man's knowledge and 
capacity to manipulate the natural environment for human ends. 
Since human ends, and means to attain them, are diverse, we focus 
our discussion by limiting it to material technology as related 
to production of economic goods. The new element may be an inven-
tion, or a discovery of previously unknown properties of nature, 
directly usable for economic production. Application may be just 
sufficient to test economic promise; but we deal here with innova-
tions that had a perceptible economic impact, i.e. with application 
on a fairly wide scale. Finally, we distinguish material technology 
from what may be called social technology, i.e. the capacity of men 
to organize for various social purposes, economic production among 
them. Obviously, both social and technological innovations can, 
independently of each other, contribute to economic product. But, 
as will be argued below, such independent contributions of the capa-
city to control nature and of the capacity to organize society are 
possible only within narrow limits. 
The new element in a technological innovation may yield several 
types of economic contribution, and of widely different magnitude. 
Dr. Kuznets, Nobel laureate in economics, is a professor emeritus , 
 at Harvard University. 
476 
477 
In economic analysis, innovations can be classified in various ways. 
Those that yield new consumer goods, in which the basic choices are 
made by entrepreneurs (private or public). Those that are cost-
reducing for established goods (producer or consumer) can be dis-
tinguished from those that yield new products (producer or consumer). 
The typology can be further complicated by identifying the sector 
of production most directly affected and by recognizing the social 
adjustments required to exploit the economic contribution of spe-
cific innovations. A cost-reducing innovation will have a different 
effect in an industry with product of low long-term income and price 
elasticity of demand than in a sector producing goods of high demand 
elasticity. A process innovation that raises appreciably the scale 
of the productive unit (plant) requires individual and social adjust-
ments different from an innovation that does not affect the scale of 
production. Innovations can be cost-reducing, but relatively more 
capital-saving or more labor-saving. The above classifications dis-
tinguish innovations by type of economic contribution, by their ef-
fects rather than by their causes or sources (the latter are touched 
upon briefly in a later section); but even this typology is incom-
plete, and could hardly be exhaustive. The purpose of these brief 
comments is to suggest the pervasive effects of technological inno-
vations on different industries, different population groups, differ-
ent requirements for social change. Yet such pervasiveness is com-
bined with unequal impact on the different production sectors: at 
any given time innovations tend to be concentrated in a few sectors, 
and the identities of the latter change over the long stretches of 
historical time. 
In addition to diversity in type, the diversity in size of 
the economic contribution made by the technological innovations 
should be stressed. The literature in the field commonly distin-
guishes between "major" inventions and routine, "improvement" inven-
tions, 1 and one would expect that major inventions would lead to 
major innovations, and minor inventions and improvements to minor 
innovations. But the distinction is a rough one, complicated by 
difficulties in defining the unit of innovation properly. Should 
a single innovation be associated with a single invention or a 
single useful discovery? If so, how does one treat the thousands 
of inventions (patented) that never reach the application stage; 
or that having reached it, prove commercial failures: or make a 
useful but quite minor contribution? How does one treat the major 
inventions that, in the course of application, generate a host of 
subsidiary minor inventions, and make a revolutionary contribution 
to economic production? Can one usefully employ a unit that covers, 
on the one hand, an invention that improves the method of produc-
ing toothpicks and, on the other, a basic innovation like that of 
James Watt that made for the first feasible and economical steam 
engine? 
The answers to these questions depend partly on existing tools 
and knowledge in the field, partly on the purpose of the analysis 
for which a unit of technological innovation is defined. Given the 
extreme difficulty of measuring the specific contribution of a tech-
nological innovation, we cannot hope to calibrate innovations by 
their magnitude, within the wide range that measurement would pro-
bably reveal. Nor can we assume a supply of even rough data on 
innovations that have never reached the commercial stage; or having 
reached it, had only a minor success. And, in a discussion of the 
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role of technological innovations in economic growth, we must de-
fine the relevant unit of technological innovation much more spe-
cifically than if the field of study were more broadly defined. 
We limit our discussion below to successful technological innova-
tions, and to those that may be considered major--in the sense of 
representing a marked advance and substantial economic contribu-
tion. We thus exclude both unsuccessful attempts at innovation, 
and minor improvements and innovations. It is only for relatively 
major innovations that we have some qualitative and quantitative 
information. It is only for them that we can observe the inter-
play of technological and social factors in the relatively long 
process of cumulative contribution to economic product and eco-
nomic growth. This limitation follows a common practice in the 
field; although the persisting scarcity of quantitative measures 
for various innovations necessarily means that current classifica-
tions are partly arbitrary and it is difficult to secure a base for 
improving them .2 
Three comments with respect to this choice of major innova-
tions as the basic unit are relevant here, comments that apply also 
to the lists of major innovations discussed and analysed in the lit-
erature. First, a successful major innovation is defined as major 
because it makes a perceptible economic contribution; and, if it 
involves a substantial departure from existing practices, is applied 
because it has proven economically successful. Aborted or unsuc-
cessful innovations must, by definition, be minor--in terms of inputs 
into them and of effects produced. Second, a major innovation, 
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whether or not associated with a major invention, ordinarily in-
volves a host of minor inventions and improvements; in the course 
of application and diffusion, it usually provides opportunities 
for gains from subsidiary inventions, improvements, and the very 
process of learning. This implies that minor inventions and 
improvements that are part and parcel of the major technological 
innovations are included in analysis and measurement. Only such 
minor inventions and improvements as are not associated with, 
and are not a part of, a major technological innovation, are omit-
ted. Third, while the designation "major" implies a minimum-size 
contribution to economic growth and often implicitly a minimum-size 
addition to technological knowledge, the unit employed here is 
intermediate--between minor inventions and improvements, on the one 
hand, and large groups of major inventions-innovations closely 
related to some basic and widespread contribution, on the other. If 
the definition excludes a minor innovation such as the modification 
of a plow sulky (for which numerous U.S.'patents were issued the 
nineteenth century), it does include introduction of the condenser 
(and such related changes as the air pump and cylinder closure) in 
Watt's stationary engine--separately from the development of high 
pressure stationary steam engines, and from the use of such engines 
in railroad transport. The interdependence of even major technolog-
ical innovations, their coherence into large technologically and 
economically revolutionary entities (grouped around a single source 
of industrial power, or a single source of power for communication, 
or a single industrial material, or a single mechanical manufacturing 
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function) is of key importance in analyzing the role of technolo-
gical innovations in economic growth. 
A major technological innovation implies a substantial new 
element in technology, and an opportunity for a sustained, sub-
stantial contribution to economic product. This means a system-
atic succession of distinct phases, in which the emergence of one 
phase depends upon the completion of the preceding one. These 
phases constitute the life cycle of an innovation; and while they 
are only roughly defined in the literature, they may be combined 
into a suggestive sequence. 
This sequence begins with an open-end, pre-conception phase--
in which existing scientific and technological elements can, in 
retrospect, be seen as having supplied indispensable ingredients for 
the new technological conception underlying an innovation. The con-
tribution to technological preparedness, not the emergence of demand, 
is stressed: the demand, eventually satisfied by the innovation may  
have emerged during, or even before, the pre-conception phase and 
stimulated the search for a solution; or it may have always been pre-
sent (e.g. the demand for easier long-range transport or communica-
tion, or for labor-saving processes). Without the scientific and 
technological pre-conditions, the demand might never be satisfied--at 
least as effectively as by the innovation. This phase is open-ended 
because the process of scientific and technological advance is con-
tinuous and it is difficult to establish the break-through basic to 
the innovation. For example, the scientific bases of electrical 
innovations were laid down in the early nineteenth century, but they 
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did not give rise to innovations until late in the century; and 
even then one may ask whether they are conditioned by still earlier 
knowledge. In practice, the decision to limit the backward exten-
tion of this phase is usually pragmatic. It is assumed that if the 
period is long, the net contribution of earlier developments to a 
much later specific technological conception embodied in the inno-
vation cannot be large. 
The first complete phase that follows is that between the 
conception of the technological innovation as a feasible task and 
the date of its initial, clearly successful, application (what 
the NSF study of "Interactions...", cited in footnote 2, calls 
the "innovative" phase, and what we designate for convenience, the 
initial application, or IA, phase). Frank Lynn subdivided this 
phase into the incubation and the commercial periods, setting the 
former between the date when "technical feasibility of an innova-
tion is established" and the date "when its commercial potential 
becomes evident and efforts are made to convert it into a commer- 
cial product" (p. 11-38). 3  More elaborate subdivisions are dis-
cussed In Mansfield and others. 4 In general, it is difficult to 
date the initial conception of the innovation, as distinct from 
development to successful initial application; and while the period 
from conception to first successful commercial application averages 
about twenty years in the Lynn sample, the variance is extremely 
wide and associated largely with the incubation period. This is 
only to be expected, for the dating depends upon identifying an 
adequate perception and judgment of technological feasibility and 
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economic promise; and only rarely is firm evidence available for 
such perceptions and judgments. 
The completion of the IA phase implies, given the successful 
initial application of the major innovation, that there will be 
diffusion from the pioneer to other producers--as well as improve-
ment, as the use of the new element in technology becomes more wide-
spread. The beginning of this diffusion (D) phase is set by the 
date at which the first successful application is completed. To 
diagnose the termination of the D phase, however, requires that a 
limit be set, at which the diffusion process is completed. In the 
literature, the limit is narrowed for practical, and often analyt-
ical, reasons. Thus, the analysis usually deals with diffusion in 
use in a single country, not in the world at large. If the world 
were used, the diffusion phase of hardly any modern technological 
innovation would even approach the half-way mark. Furthermore, if 
the major innovation is strictly and narrowly defined, it helps to 
set limits to the diffusion process. The practice is justified if 
innovations A and B, defined narrowly, are, in fact, sufficiently 
different so that the latter is not merely an imitation (thus, in 
"Interactions...", hybrid small grains and Green revolutionary 
wheat were classified as innovations distinct from that of the ear-
lier hybrid corn, not as diffusion of the underlying hybridization 
process that began with corn). However, difficulties persist in 
defining the limit to the diffusion process of a major innovation. 
They arise partly from the improvement component of innovation and 
diffusion. 
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Consider the simple cases in the United States of diffusion 
of narrowly specific machines or processes among the economic units 
that could employ them as substitutes for older machines or pro-
cesses (summarized in Mansfield, Economics...., pp. 114-119). The 
rate of diffusion is measured as the change in the percent of U.S. 
firms introducing the new machines, or in the percent of total acre-
age of corn planted to hybrid seed. The process is completed when 
the percentages reach 100, i.e. when all firms in the industry have 
introduced the new machines, or when all acreage has been planted 
with new seed. However, the diffusion of the innovation, as far 
as economic contribution is concerned, may be, even at this 100 
percent point, far from complete. The new machines, representing a 
recent innovation, are being continually improved, possibly well 
beyond the point when the 100 percent level is reached, and the 
same is true of hybrid seed-. The likelihood is that in all such 
cases the rate of improvement, even beyond the 100 percent mark, 
will be, at least for a while, greater than that in those sectors 
of the economy that have not been blessed with recent innovations. 
Hence, even in these cases the diffusion process is much longer 
than that suggested by the measures (which averaged about 20 years). 
The case is even stronger for large unit-cost consumer durables. 
Even if we could set some absolute limit to the number of cars, or 
refrigerators, or television sets, per family in a country, diffu-
sion would not be completed when this number is reached, since sub- 
stantial quality and cost improvements in the new product would still 
be possible. This would mean further diffusion in the sense of a 
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continued spread of the contribution of the innovation. Unless 
we assume that the net contribution of an innovation, stemming 
either from quality or cost changes, is fixed when the first suc-
cessful application is completed--an untenable assumption--diffu- 
sion is a function not only of the first successful break-through, 
but also of the improvements that follows; and may extend well 
beyond the diffusion in mere numbers. 
Conceptually, the D phase is completed when some approximate 
upper limit in numbers (per unit of the universe of users) and some 
lower limit in the yield of further improvements (quality or cost) 
are reached, indicating that innovation effects have been exhausted. 
These upper limits on numbers and lower limits on improvements would 
ideally have to be determined for each innovation. A clear case of 
termination of the diffusion phase is one in which a later innova-
tion, yielding products and processes that sharply compete with the 
older innovation, closes off drastically the economic grounds for 
further spread of numbers or further improvements of the older pro-
duct. But in other cases, the closure by obsolescence, introduced 
by competitive pressure of technological progress, is not as clear. 
The only reasonable observation at this point is that the diffusion 
phase of major innovations is fairly long; and that further study 
is needed to distinguish important sub-phases within it, since the 
early periods of the phase may well witness much higher rates of 
diffusion and improvement than the later periods. Moreover, the 
pattern of movement within the long diffusion phase may differ among 
types of innovation, particularly between innovations yielding new 
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specific producer goods, the broader innovations relating to power 
and materials, and innovations bearing on consumer goods that may 
affect long-term location and consumption patterns. 
The completion of the diffusion phase means, in a sense, the 
end of a technological innovation as an innovation. But an iden-
tifiable component in the economy, usually of substantial magnitude 
and often far larger than originally expected, remains--and can be 
associated with the specific innovation. The subsequent develop-
ment of this component may, in another sense, be viewed as the next 
phase in the life of a given technological innovation. This phase 
may give rise to some major economic and social problems; and may 
be affected not only by policies adopted during the period, but also 
by policies acted upon in the earlier phases. A change in the dif-
fusion phase may postpone and mitigate the problems of the follow-
ing phase, which, for obvious reasons, may be designated as that of 
slowdown and obsolescence (SO). It is thus necessary to stress the 
inevitability of the (SO) phase in its eventual emergence in the his-
tory of any specific technological innovation. 
The course of economic change in the SO phase of an innovation 
differs widely, depending upon the nature of the original innovation 
and the patterns of technological progress elsewhere. To illustrate, 
in the case of canals and steamboats on internal waterways, the com-
petitive pressure of steam railroads, a later innovation, caused a 
sharp contraction not only of growth rates but also of absolute vol-
umes of activity. A similar pattern is seen, in recent decades, in 
the use of steam railroads as passenger and to some extent as freight 
carriers. Innovations in the textile and older industries caused a 
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marked slowdown, but no absolute contraction. Steel output, a 
major innovation that is close to one hundred years old, is still 
rising. But whether reflected in a sharp contraction of volume, 
or in a slowdown in the rate of technological improvement, diffu-
sion, and growth, the SO phase raises major problems of adjustment 
--to change in growth potentials, to displacement of previously 
effectively employed resources, to general loss of position within 
the economic and social structure. For some innovations, this 
phase is complete, in the sense that the obsolescence results in 
contraction of absolute volumes to minimum or negligible levels. 
For others it remains open-ended--if the end is defined as rela-
tively complete displacement--despite the fact that its pace of 
growth is far lower than in the preceding phases, and far lower 
than those of more recent innovations in the same or other fields. 
Some aspects of the rough phasing of the life cycle of a major 
technological innovation will be touched upon in later discussion. 
But at this point, three general comments are relevant. First, the 
time spans are long: about twenty years for the initial application 
phase, and much more than twenty years for the properly defined 
phase of diffusion. Thus, even if we disregard here the less deter-
minate time spans of the phases of pre-conception and of slowdown 
and obsolescence, the periods are of half century or longer. The 
spans are long not merely because of the time required to solve the 
purely technological problems in breaking through to an effective 
invention and resolving the difficulties in development, prototype 
production, etc., but also because of the time required to make the 
complementary and other organizational and social adjustments that 
would assure adequate diffusion and economic success. It is in the 
interplay of technological advance and organizational, economic, 
and social adjustments that the crucial feature of the innovation, 
the application of a new technological element, lies. 
Second, the duration of the life cycle of an innovation is 
partly a function of its magnitude, for both the technological task 
and the process of social adjustment are the more formidable, the 
greater the departure from established technological practices and 
the greater the potential diffusion of the innovation. This makes 
it all the more important to emphasize that even major innovations 
come in large, coherent groups; and that for both a firm and an 
economy, the analysis of the innovation process and of the contribu-
tion of innovation to economic growth must take account of this 
clustering pattern. For such clusters or groups, the interplay of 
technological, economic, and social factors covers long periods, and 
contains multiple inputs and feedbacks among the various aspects. 
Well over a century elapsed between the time when the first steam 
engines were shown to constitute a major technological advance and 
the time when diffusion of steam power was reasonably complete (from 
the 1770's to well beyond mid-nineteenth century, in the developed  
countries of the world). The time span was much shorter for narrower 
and more specialized innovations like the zipper, and even the sew-
ing machine. 
Finally, while the definition of phases and the classification 
of periods within the life cycle of a major technological innovation 
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are crude and subject to revision with further study, the concept 
of the sequence of distinct phases and of a life cycle pattern 
seems crucial in the analysis of the contribution of the innovation 
process to economic and social change. Phase distinction is essen-
tial to the study of the emergence, diffusion, and obsolescence of 
an innovation, in view of the duration, complexity, and cumulative 
changeability of the process. And any consideration of policy 
intervention into the process must be oriented, in the first in-
stance, to significant phases. Obviously, policies relating to 
pre-conception conditions would differ from those applying to the 
incubation sub-phase: and the latter would differ from those rele- 
vant to the development and initial successful application sub-phase; 
and so on along the sequence. Furthermore, consideration of all 
the phases, including the expected phase of slowdown and obsoles-
cence, is important in that policies affecting one phase, would also 
have some consequences for the next phase. Thus, prevention of mon-
opolistic ossification in the diffusion phase might yield obvious 
benefits in both prolonging diffusion and alleviating, in the later 
stage, the effects of obsolescence. 
II. 	Contribution to Economic Growth  
By economic growth we mean a long-term rise in the capacity to 
supply economic goods, capacity defined within a specified social 
context and supply evaluated in terms of costs and returns to the 
human carriers. The growth of a firm, an industry, or a country is 
subject to constraint by basic rules of social and economic organiza-
tion. And in the evaluation of such growth, the augmented flow of 
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goods must be offset by all the costs impinging on men as producers 
and consumers. The observation is particularly important in dis-
cussing the contribution of technological innovations to economic 
growth, because the innovations involve changes in the rules of 
economic and social organization; and may carry with them costs 
and returns that do not appear in the conventional economic calculus. 
We shall discuss the contribution of technological innovation as 
suggested by the long stretch of modern growth in the developed mar-
ket economies, since late eighteenth century--omitting the diffi-
cult problems of the peculiar role of technological innovations in 
the growth of dictatorially planned economies of the Communist type. 
One, apparently simple, way of gauging the contribution of 
technological innovations to a country's economic growth is to iden-
tify both new final products (as final products are defined in na-
tional economic accounting) and the new processes or tools that 
affected significantly the costs and supply of older final products; 
and then to calculate the country's final output that is accounted 
for by the "new" components. The identification of "new" would 
require knowledge of the date when the innovation was introduced; and 
specification of the period back within which the product or process 
was to have been introduced to count as "new." Definitions of that 
period, and judgments of the effect of the new tools or processes 
on the economic base of an old final product (like corn), may dif-
fer. But experimenting with periods of different duration might, in 
itself, prove interesting: it might indicate the variation in the 
proportion of "new" with the changing duration of the backward exten-
sion. And the attempt to ascertain the specific contribution of 
new technology to old final products would yield insights of its 
own. 
Of course, such a count of "new" components, and the propor-
tion of aggregate national product for which they account, would, 
if practicable, suggest only the gross contribution of technologi-
cal innovation. It would not reveal the loss involved in the obso-
lescence of older products and techniques, and the additional costs 
sustained in introducing the technological innovations (compared 
with undisturbed continuance of old ways). This point will be dis-
cussed at length later. Here we should note that the identifica-
tion of new final products and new production tools and processes 
may be extremely useful in revealing the effect of technological 
innovation on patterns of work and life, and implicitly patterns of 
social organization. If by new we mean innovations introduced dur-
ing the last century (i.e. back to 1873), removal of these new com-
ponents would leave the country without electric power, telephones, 
automobiles, airplanes, movies, radio, and television--let alone 
the major transformations in educational and medical services, re-
flecting the new components within them. Nor would we have highly 
organized large plants, automatic controls, computers, and the inno-
vations in the biological processes. The list could easily be ex-
tended by scholars more familiar with technological innovations of 
the last century; and would be sufficiently impressive even for the 
last half century. 
Two broad comments are suggested by this new-components iden-
tifying approach. First, it reveals the large contribution of modern 
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technological innovations in the way of new consumer products--as 
distinct from modification of methods of producing old and estab-
lished products. Consequently, not only conditions of work, but 
also conditions of life in general, have been widely affected; and 
the present generation uses, and is surrounded by, consumer goods 
quite different from those of the preceding generation. By identi-
fying these new products, as well as the old that they replaced, 
we secure an insight into the nature of the change, which cannot 
be conveyed by the anonymity-imposing calculations of inputs and 
outputs weighted by market prices in the national economic accounts 
or in the analysis based upon them. Thus, the replacement of can-
dles or oil lamps by electric illumination within the households 
had consequences over and above the large reduction in cost per 
illumination unit--some positive, in making population less depen-
dent upon nature and its illumination; others negative, in making 
them more dependent on a single source of power, and the danger of 
breakdowns. The result was not merely an economic gain in dollars 
and cents, but a change in the quality of the good and in the cor-
ollaries of its wide adoption by households. A similar statement 
can be made regarding the new production processes--which required 
different patterns of work. And this means that in addition to the 
quantitative gap in economic levels among succeeding generations of 
consumers and workers, there is a qualitative gap of obvious rele-
vance to the problem of measurement and analysis. 
Second, since "new" components displace old, whether in con-
sumer goods or in producers tools and processes, the older options 
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disappear. By and large, the process becomes irreversible, parti-
cularly since prolonged success and diffusion of the new component 
removes, for a long period, incentives for further improvement in 
the old, displaced component. Consequently, technological innova-
tions may not mean a much wider choice, either for the consumer or 
the producer. Unless a consumer is exceptionally powerful, in eco-
nomic and social terms, he is free to choose only what the majority 
of consumers choose (and thus create an economic base for an effec-
tive technological innovation). A consumer who prefers candles for 
illumination may find it difficult to get an adequate supply of good 
quality today; and the same may be true of a consumer desiring "nat-
ural" ice, or other types of old-fashioned consumer products (not 
to mention the less developed countries, which would find it diffi-
cult to secure an older technology, most suitable to their factor 
proportions). The disappearance of the old options is a result of 
various constraints that are typical of modern technology. These 
and other corollaries must be taken into account in a quantitative 
approach to the estimation of the net contribution of technological 
innovations to economic growth--which must be net, since the meas-
ures of economic growth are also based on the net balance of output 
over input of relevant production factors. 
A major technological innovation often requires, for its effi-
cient channeling, a scale of production, a stock of fixed capital, 
continuity of operation and hence of work, and a relation between 
the human and other factors of production, that are quite different 
from those characterizing the earlier technology. The amount of 
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fixed capital, the impersonal character of the operating firm, and 
the personal relations within the firm, needed to operate a steam 
railroad are vastly different from those of the horse and carriage 
transport of earlier times. The needs of the modern petroleum re-
fining firm and of a tractor producing plant are far different from 
those of the hay and feed, and horse farm, of the past. This means 
that older patterns of organization of production must be modified--
with consequent changes in conditions of participation of men as 
workers, entrepreneurs, or capital owners. Indeed, much of the dif-
fusion phase of a major innovation can be described in terms of a 
gradual crystallization of the institutional conditions for increas-
ingly efficient application, even allowing for minor sub-inventions 
and technical improvements. The inflexible demands of a technologi-
cal innovation may involve quite new characteristics of organization 
of the productive plant and firm, new methods of recruitment of labor 
force, new conditions for participation of management and of capital 
owners--in short, a variety of innovations in organizational and 
social technology. The variety of such innovations is quite exten-
sive--ranging from new legal devices associated with the modern cor-
poration and other modern organizations, to basic shifts in the allo-
cation of jobs among the labor force, to shifts in recognized power 
relations among the various groups involved in industries affected 
by technological innovations, with consequent contervailing pressures, 
Some of the changes just noted are part and parcel of the tech-
nological innovation proper--because many new inventions, tools, and 
products would not be feasible unless there is a change in scale. 
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Steam power could not be used economically in minor doses, and the 
increasing advantage of high pressure engines meant a minimum scale 
of operation that far exceeded that prevailing in the past; and 
this is true of the innovations in metallurgy and in the fabrica-
tion of standardized products. But if large-scale had to be intro- 
duced, and if, in controlling large charges of power, fixed capital, 
the envelope, had to be massive, the older type of firm unit, an 
individual or family-entrepreneur owner, could not be preserved. 
This meant also the legal and institutional changes that brought the 
modern corporation with its separation of ownership from management; 
the impersonal character of its organization; and the contrast in 
power between individual workers and the firm unit, until the workers 
could find strength in the modern labor union. Thus, a direct thread 
of connection runs from the major technological innovations, with 
their scale and other constraints, to a variety of organizational and 
institutional changes. One major problem in measuring the net con-
tribution of a technological innovation to economic growth lies in 
identifying the indispensable social and institutional changes; dis-
tinguishing them from other concomitants that were largely discre-
tionary; and measuring the magnitude of the former, in terms of the 
costs or returns that may have been involved. 
If through their effects on scale and character of the produc-
tion process, technological innovations changed the conditions of 
work, the latter, in turn, brought about changes in patterns of life 
required to meet them. If new production processes require scales of 
output that make urban centers indispensable, migration from the 
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countryside and a shift from country to city patterns of living 
were called for. If the scale of production meant that employee 
status would become a dominant feature of the labor force (instead 
of small-scale entrepreneurship or work on own account) and re-
cruitment would be largely based on overtly tested skills and qual-
ities, the whole life cycle phase of preparation for a job, of the 
current and next generation, would be affected. Such preparation 
is clearly a large part of a pattern of consumption and living, 
consumption as now defined in the national economic accounts and 
in much of our analysis. And the combination of what might be 
called production-requirements-of-work-participation, with an ex-
isting scale of consumer wants and priorities, may create imbal-
ances that, in turn, would be resolved by technological innovations 
in consumer goods--which, once made, would further affect patterns 
of living. Thus the desire to combine participation in work in the 
high employment-and-income-potential fields of new technology--which 
meant working in cities--with living in the more pleasant rural-like 
surroundings (the desire enhanced by shorter working hours, leaving 
more time for leisure) had several consequences. It induced the 
spread of commuting; created a wide demand for automobiles; led to 
the development of dormitory suburbs; and had other positive and 
negative consequences. To be sure, the urbanization-compelling 
change in production scale, necessitated by technological innovations 
was only one factor in the combination. Yet it made an important 
contribution, and this contribution to changes in patterns of con-
sumption and life should be included in evaluating the net yield of 
497 
technological innovations. 
The organizational changes and those in conditions of work 
and living, just noted, were what might be called complementary 
adjustments, in the sense that they were needed and some indis- 
pensably, for effective channeling of the technological innovation. 
But the latter may have had also other, negative, impacts: on the 
capital and labor resources engaged in the old technology being 
displaced by the new; and on natural resources, taken here to in-
clude all major environmental aspects of nature. We comment briefly 
on these dislocative effects. 6 Regardless of the rate of adjustment 
of displaced labor and capital to other opportunities, the displace-
ment and readjustment costs must be debited to the particular tech-
nological innovation that is their source. And the impact on nat-
ural resources, either by way of enrichment or depletion, must also 
be taken into account--even though such an impact may not appear 
directly in the firm or national calculation of costs and returns. 
At present, neither the deterioration of the environment and the 
depletion of natural resources, nor the enrichment of these re-
sources by discoveries and additions to our technological knowledge 
(except to the extent of actual input of labor and reproducible cap-
ital) enter the calculations in the national economic accounts. 
It follows that the net economic yield of a given technological 
innovation (or of a group of them) must involve not only a comparison 
of the economic value of output and input as conventionally measured, 
but also an evaluation of the required changes in conditions of work 
and life, both the complementary and the dislocative adjustments. 
Obviously, the specific contributions of a given technological 
innovation under the various heads distinguished--let alone their 
combination into a single measure of net yield--cannot be easily 
ascertained; and the difficulties are enormous. Yet it is useful 
to know what a full evaluation of the return from a technological 
innovation involves; and the discussion suggests a few general 
observations on the evaluation, first, of individual innovations, 
and then of their combined flow in the course of economic growth. 
In evaluating the contribution of a single, or coherent group 
of technological innovations, the phases over the long sequence 
seem particularly important. The nature and magnitude of the con-
ventional and non-conventional costs and returns would vary greatly 
in the several phases. The relation of output to input would dif-
fer markedly between the IA phase, when the break-through occurs 
but when the total realized contribution is probably far short of 
the accumulated inputs or costs, and the D phase, when the effects 
of mass spread of the innovation are realized. Likewise, the re- 
quirements, with whatever costs and returns they signify, would have 
to be met in the early stages in the life-cycle of an innovation--if 
the latter is to realize its potential. The competitive impact on 
older components rendered obsolescent by the innovation, presumably 
moderate at the beginning, would become acute as the innovation dif-
fuses to large market magnitudes, but might cease with the re-absorp-
tion of the displaced labor and capital long before the diffusion of 
the innovation is completed. However, some negative externalities, 
in the way of pollution or impairment of the environment, hardly 
perceptible in the earlier and middle stages of the life cycle, might 
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become increasingly pressing as the innovation reaches the later 
sub-phases of the diffusion process and constitutes an increasingly 
massive component within production processes and the pattern of 
life of the country's population. Such variation in the nature and 
magnitude of costs and returns among the successive phases and sub-
phases, would mean a corresponding variation in the magnitude and 
sources of the net contribution to a country's economy. The great-
est contribution might well come, not in the early stages of an 
innovation's life cycle, despite rapid increases in productivity; 
but later, when the innovation has reached large volumes, relative 
to countrywide product, but is still growing at substantially higher 
rates than the older sectors. Sustained study of the life cycle of 
technological innovations is still in the future; and when the re-
sults accumulate, the definitions and structure of the sequence of 
inputs and outputs may have to be revised. 
In an evaluation of the type discussed in the preceding para-
graph, two questions arise--in addition to that of combining meas-
urable conventional inputs and outputs with the non-conventional 
ones so difficult to measure. How far back do we trace the contrib-
uting inputs? How far forward do we trace the possible indirect 
outputs? The first question is associated with our earlier comments 
on the open-end pre-conception phase in the life of an innovation. 
Difficult as it is to set a stopping date in the backward extension 
in the search for the sources of a given innovation, it is even more 
difficult to identify the antededents so as to estimate the costs 
that should be debited as an input appropriate to the given innova-
tion. Likewise, if, as will be argued below, a major innovation, 
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in its spread, provides opportunities and pressures not only for 
related innovations but also for new tools, insights, and puzzles 
for scientific study, and leads to further advance of science, how 
far forward should we trace such effects so as to measure the out-
put attributable to them? Given the nature of the questions, the 
answers must be pragmatic, depending largely upon a judgment of 
the yield, in the way of additional debitable costs and creditable 
returns, of the pursuit of further andecedents and more indirect 
consequences. And the problems are aggravated when we shift to 
the flow of technological innovations in their aggregate contribu-
tion to a country's economic growth. 
Finally, given the long life cycle of a major innovation (and 
even longer spans for coherent clusters of them), the novel and 
unforeseen in the new element of technology, the changing inter-
play with the required social innovations and adjustments, and the 
dependence of a single major innovation in the longer run on the 
unfolding of the cluster of which it is a part, it is difficult to 
discern the eventual shape and estimate the magnitude of an inno-
vation in its positive and negative aspects. The projection and 
prognostication may become increasingly successful as, with the 
passage of time and development, the broad contours of the innova-
tion emerge more clearly. But history is full of cases in which 
even the inventors and the initial entrepreneurs had only a dim 
notion of the eventual nature and magnitude of the innovation that 
they were successfully promoting. And there are many cases in which 
experts and active workers in science and technology were blind to 
501 
the implications and consequences of research and inventive efforts 
in which they were engaged. To be sure, such errors in prognosis 
are much larger for the major technological innovations, and par-
ticularly the clusters of these, than for the minor inventions and 
improvements that can be diagnosed and projected more successfully, 
once their market value has been tested. But it is the major inno- 
vations and clusters of them that substantially change, both directly 
and through the opportunities that they provide for minor improve-
ments, a country's capacity for higher levels of economic performance 
and higher rates of economic growth. Here again the forward evalua-
tion of a major technological innovation will be improved only as 
further studies of inputs and outputs during the successive phases 
in the long life cycle yield better understanding of the social and 
technological interplays in the sequence. 
When we consider the contribution of the whole flow of techno-
logical innovations to the country's product and economic growth, 
the questions raised in connection with the evaluation of a single 
innovation assumed different aspects and parameters. The require-
ment to trace the inputs and outputs attributable to a specific  
innovation is no longer operative, but the task of evaluating total 
inputs and outputs, conventional and non-conventional , remains. 
And the questions concerning distant antecedents and the more indi-
rect consequences, now emerge as part of the problem of allowing 
for a time lag between all contributing inputs and all resulting 
outputs. The aggregation of several innovations means that new, 
recent, and older innovations enter the current flow, adding their 
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contributions in different phases of their life cycles. The life 
cycle pattern of a single innovation disappears, and is replaced 
by a potentially more stable and continuous pattern of the abso-
lute or proportional contributions of all technological innova-
tions, major and minor, to the growing product of a country's eco-
nomy. But this aggregate net contribution, and the underlying 
inputs and outputs, may be subject to a swing, with a much longer 
duration and a much narrower proportional amplitude than that of 
a life cycle of a single innovation or a group of them. This swing 
might be observed if in a pioneer or early follower country, the 
pace of growth accelerates with the initiation or adoption of a 
broad new technology and then slows down as later follower countries 
enter the process and reduce the comparative advantage of the pio-
neer or early follower. 
Current aggregative analysis has benefited from the great addi-
tions to national economic accounts data in recent decades, and de-
veloped as an empirical counterpart to theoretical structure of 
the economics of allocation of resources, production, and pricing. 
The comparisons of the combined growth rates of inputs with those 
of output derived in this analysis leave a positive residual, which 
is due, largely if not entirely, to the contribution of technologi-
cal change. This is a net contribution, since all the relevant 
inputs have presumably been accounted for and since the total out- 
put is presumably complete and unduplicated. Even on the assumption 
of total inclusion of both inputs and outputs, the residual may re-
flect factors other than technological change, e.g. improvements in 
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the quality of human resources (not due to any inputs) or trends 
in natural or political conditions having little to do with tech-
nology. But it is reasonable to assume that technological change 
is an important, perhaps the dominant, component in this unac-
counted-for residual. 
Several groups of problems have emerged in the development 
of this approach: of inclusiveness of the inputs involved in the 
production process, with particular reference to possible invest- 
ments in human capital (now treated as consumption in conventional 
accounting); to the depletion of natural resources, now not cov-
ered; and to the changes in patterns of life and consumption im-
posed by the new technology that do not represent pure consumption. 
There is further a problem as to how the inputs are to be combined 
to derive the proper magnitude of the growth of total inputs, with 
reference to effects of scale and non-lineraties in the relations. 
Then there is the question whether the coverage of output is inclu-
sive, either with respect to some positive items (e.g. the value of 
increased leisure) or to negative items (e.g. pollution and general 
impairment of the environment). Different solutions to these three 
groups of problems--inputs, weighting, and outputs--would mean dif-
ferences in the magnitude and pattern of the unaccounted-for resid-
ual. And for the remaining residual there would still be the fourth 
problem, viz. how to distinguish the contribution of technological 
innovations from that of other factors (positive and negative). An 
enormous literature has grown up in recent decades on the first 
three groups of questions, in a field of national income and produc-
tivity that has had a long history going back to the foundation of 
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the discipline. 7 Although it cannot be summarized effectively here, 
some comments on the recent trends, and on the problems, at least 
as one investigator sees them, may be appropriate. 
If labor inputs are measured in hours, with allowance for age 
and sex composition of the labor force; if the net stock of repro-
ducible capital is used to gauge capital inputs; and if labor and 
capital are weighted by the rough proportions of labor and capital 
shares in total factor income, factor inputs can be estimated. The 
results, for a number of developed countries over long growth peri-
ods, are clear: the combined factor inputs account for a small frac-
tion of per capita product, leaving a large unaccounted-for residual. 
This residual, well over three-quarters of the growth in per capita 
product, is presumably due largely to underlying technological inno-
vations, which permit larger outputs with unchanged amounts of labor 
and reproducible capital. The inclusion of land, or similar stocks 
of non-reproducible resources, would only raise the proportion of 
the residual in the growth of per capita product. Revision of the 
inputs, or of the weights for combining them, or of the output, 
would have to be large, and mostly in the direction of raising the 
growth rate of input and decreasing that of output, in order to ac-
count for the unaccounted-for residual. 
The recent efforts at amplification and revision of the produc-
tivity calculations, and the implicit revisions of input and out-
put, give the impression of two tendencies. The first is to re-clas-
sify some consumption items as pre-requisites of higher productivity, 
either as investment of human capital, or as changes in consumption 
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required by the new technology and yet representing no additional 
consumer welfare. The second is a bias, in considering the social 
and other adjustments to technological innovation, toward emphasiz-
ing the negative or problem aspects and neglecting the positive 
aspects (also excluded from conventional measurement). This is 
an individual observer's reaction; and can only be illustrated, not 
proven. Yet one should start with a natural suspicion. If aggre-
gative analysis and the underlying theory yield a residual in the 
form of unexplained total factor productivity, it is a natural 
inclination to reduce the residual by ad hoc reclassifications of 
older components, before considering whether the underlying analyt-
ical system should be revised to permit integration of a novel ele-
ment, such as technological innovation, so far exogenous to the 
analysis. Also, if with rapid growth, as conventionally measured, 
there are associated discomforts and negative aspects, it is a 
natural inclination to concentrate on them and introduce them as 
improper omission, without allowing at the same time for the omis-
sion of positive elements. 
The reaction just expressed is not to condemn critical consid-
eration of the content of inputs and outputs in conventional economic 
account. Consumption, as now defined, should be critically examined 
and any capital investment or hidden cost identified and excluded; 
outputs should be examined and both the positive and the negative 
by-products included. The argument is rather for a broader view of 
the issues. Thus, if formal education is found to have increased 
and to be positively associated with incomes of individuals, informal 
506 
education, on the job or through some apprentice system, may have 
declined in relative proportion. Can we say with assurance that 
fewer years were spent on education (formal and informal) by a 
farmer in medieval times than by a farmer in modern times? Or can 
we say that the gross capital stock, including land, per farmer, 
was much lower in medieval than in modern times--and sufficiently 
so as to explain the vast differential in agricultural productivity 
between the two epochs? Similar questions can be asked concerning 
a medieval craftsman, who presumably went through over eleven years 
of training as apprentice and journeyman, as compared with a modern 
blue-collar worker. To be sure, the former's capital endowment was 
lower than that of a modern industrial worker, but the difference 
would hardly account, in conventional economic terms, for the immense 
difference in productivity. We put these questions to suggest that 
it is not education, and not material capital as such, but accession 
of useful knowledge and its innovative application that is crucial; 
and the indispensable inputs in modern education, to use one compo-
nent in which the consumption element can be quite large, may not, 
on a per capita basis, much exceed that in earlier times. 
Similar questions can be asked about the changes in conditions 
of life and negative externalities. Assuming that we find urbaniza-
tion raising the cost of living as compared with that in the country-
side, can we also assume that there was no consumer preference for 
the cities that warranted greater outlays without allowing for roman-
tic notions about the countryside (in its "pure" form, unameliorated 
by proximity of cities)? If we find pollution and other forms of de-
pletion of the environment resulting from some components of economic 
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growth, do we also recognize the enormous positive effects of 
modern technology on health and longevity (not included now as 
positive components in conventional economic accounting)? If we 
identify the pressures of modern life an a negative externality, 
do we also recognize the enormous increase in leisure made possible 
by the advanced technology underlying modern economic growth? 
To be sure, emphasis on neglected negative by-products is a 
useful goad to reform and change; and much of analysis in the eco-
nomic and social literature is aimed at diagnosing and remedying 
problems, not at a balanced presentation. But if we are to con-
sider the net contribution of technological innovations to econo-
mic growth, it is a balanced view, including both positive and 
negative aspects, that we must seek. Attaining such a balance is 
difficult because measurable items, like the components of inputs 
and outputs conventionally defined, cannot be readily combined 
with evaluation of major changes - in conditions of life, work, and 
in organizational structure of society and man. For this reason, 
it is all too easy to advance a selected, yet unbalanced view--with 
resulting controversies for which there is no simple resolution. 
Under the circumstances, no fully acceptable measure of the 
net contribution of technological innovations to modern economic 
growth is at hand. However, it is possible to attempt a variety of 
experimental adjustments to current conventional measures, in which 
additional costs and returns are estimated, along the lines illus-
trated by the recent Nordhaus-Tobin Study. 8 Further work in the 
same direction will at least enhance our appreciation of the mag-
nitudes involved, and may limit the range of discussion and 
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disagreement in the field. But for our purposes, a simple summary 
of the contribution of technological innovations to modern economic 
growth can be suggested. First, technological innovations produced 
a thoroughgoing transformation of conditions of work and of life, 
while increasing enormously the volume of final goods and changing 
substantially some of their characteristics. Indeed, the novel 
elements in modern economic growth, that distinguish it qualita-
tively from the past, are largely due to technological innovations 
and adjustments to them. Second, mass application of technologi-
cal innovations had, inevitably, some negative consequences. All 
material technology is disturbance of the natural ecological bal-
ance; all technological innovations also have elements of the un-
expected, some negative; and, given the complex sequential inter-
play of technological and social innovations, timely prevention of 
these negative consequences is unlikely. The current critical 
reaction to economic growth and technological innovation is a nat-
ural response to the negative consequences, the adjustment or amel-
ioration of which has been delayed. Third, while it is difficult 
to reduce the contribution to a single quantitative estimate, net 
of all the costs involved in conventional inputs, non-conventional 
requirements, and negative by-products, one cannot avoid the con-
clusion that the net contribution of technological innovations 
must have been positive and large. The nearest definition of eco-
nomic product, flow goods to households omitting any components 
that may be suspect as hidden capital goods, (e.g. technical educa-
tion) and allowing for offsets to additional costs or discomforts 
509 
of living imposed by technology, would still show a rapid increase 
per head, against fewer working hours. This increase cannot be at 
the expense of capital stock in the aggregate, even including nat-
ural resources (which has in fact grown on a per capita basis). The 
finding suggested by aggregative economic measures is amply sup-
ported by related measures of health, longevity, nutrition, supply 
of mechanical energy, and of a variety of consumer goods, on per 
capita basis, for the economically developed countries. Such great 
increase can be only due largely to the application of new know-
ledge, technological innovations and their social complemnntarities. 
That the net contribution is large also explains the pressure 
and striving, against obstacles, for the useful application of new 
knowledge. Inference of a negative or minor contribution would 
mean that innovating societies were foolishly misled, time after 
time, as to the ultimate consequences of the innovations that they 
encouraged. To be sure, given the organization of the modern world, 
societies were compelled to modernize and adopt technological inno-
vations, if they were to retain independence. But judged by current 
experience, this element of compulsion was of secondary importance. 
The basic datum is that the modernizing societies wanted modern eco-
nomic growth, and the technological innovations that were its sub-
stance. 
Underlying the broad conclusion above is the assumption of a 
social consensus within modern society, favorable to economic growth. 
The net contribution of technology to economic growth would have been 
evaluated quite differently by early Christian ascetics, who consid-
ered only a minimum supply of economic goods needed. That group's 
510 
estimate of economic growth and product would be far smaller than 
our conventional one; and its judgment of the effect of technolog-
ical innovation would be negative, for its contribution to econo-
mic goods would be viewed as unnecessary and its influence on holy 
life pernicious. And a similar judgment might prevail in a society 
that puts a low valuation on material welfare. Some groups, even 
within modern society, may deviate from the dominant notions, in 
their judgment of the value of material welfare in the specific 
forms contributed by modern technology; or in their appraisal of 
effects of modern technology on capital stock, viewed broadly as 
capacity for desirable growth in the future. But if we consider 
the effective consensus of a modern society, through its succes-
sive generations, the estimate of the net contribution of technolo-
gical innovation is clearly positive and high; and likely to remain 
so with better balancing of conventional and non-conventional costs 
and returns. 
III. Contribution of Economic Growth to Technological Innovation 
The discussion above centered on the contribution of technolo-
gical innovations to economic growth, and stressed their dominant 
role in the increase of per capita product, and in the major trans-
formation in conditions of work and of life, and in the institutional 
structure of modern societies. But the association is two-direct-
tional: economic growth contributes to a greater flow of technologi-
cal innovation. The combination of a contribution of growth to 
further innovation with the contribution of past innovations to 
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growth, forms a continuous and self-reinforcing mechanism--subject 
to limits, but sustainable by continuous feedback between growth 
and technological change. In this section we comment on the con-
tribution of growth to the flow of technology, the latter again 
largely viewed as the flow of major innovations. 
In its IA phase, a major technological innovation is initi-
ated by a fairly clear perception of a need, requiring some new 
element of technology, and of the capacity to supply this element 
effectively. It is marked by a sub-phase in which the technologi-
cal task posed is worked out. It terminates with the first econom-
ically successful application. The ingredients, which constitute 
different proportions throughout the IA phase, are technological 
knowledge servicing inventive capacity, an overt or potentially 
large need or demand, and entrepreneurial ability to mobilize and 
manage the economic resources involved. It is in the diffusion 
phase that many of the necessary social and institutional adjust-
ments are made, a host of minor improvements and inventions emerge, 
and other effects assume substantial magnitudes, with their specific 
characteristics more fully revealed. In dealing with the contribu-
tion of economic growth to the enhanced flow of major technological 
innovations, we shall be concerned with the impact of the former 
on additions to knowledge in the pre-conception phase, and on the 
supply of technological capacity, perception of need, and supply 
of entrepreneurial talent in the IA phase--not with the diffusion 
phase. 
The initial argument in discussing the effects of economic 
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growth on further technological innovation may be put simply. If 
modern economic growth is due, in good part, to the productivity-
raising effects of technological innovation, and if the societies 
involved recognize this connection and consider its results desir-
able, they will presumably use resources, augmented by past growth, 
to induce further technological innovation. The societies will 
base these uses on several judgments. Given ever present large or 
potential demand for more goods, they will consider the value of 
enhancing the stock of basic knowledge and thus the broader tech-
nological base from which inventions and improvements can be made. 
They will judge the value of increasing the supply, and strength- . 
ening the motivation, of would-be inventors and discoverers. They 
will weigh the value of stimulating the supply and facilitating the 
emergence of necessary entrepreneurship. Both the pioneer and fol-
lower countries in modern technology and modern economic growth 
would certainly be disposed toward such uses of resources; the lat-
ter after modifying the technological innovations to suit their own 
resource endowment, and then attempting to pioneer in new fields to 
catch up with or surpass the leader. Assuming that such uses of 
resources by modern societies, and the policies adopted, are well 
conceived, the resulting enhancement of the rate of additions to the 
stock of useful knowledge, to inventive capacity, to entreprenurial 
talent should, all other conditions being equal, augment the flow of 
further innovations. 
This two-way connection between the contributions of techno-
logical innovation and economic growth is obvious enough. All socie-
ties that recognize a high positive yield of any given use of 
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resources ordinarily attempt to employ part of the proceeds to 
enhance such advantageous uses. And the literature of economic 
history, and of history of science and technology, is full of 
references to attempts by modern societies, since the seventeenth 
century, to further the growth of natural sciences and useful arts. 
They have encouraged academies and scientific organizations, estab-
lished new universities for the natural sciences, rewarded inven-
tors with prizes and patents, and instituted a host of measures 
based on a recognition of the connection between economic growth 
and the widening application of a growing stock of useful know-
ledge to production problems. There has been a long evolution in 
the social recognition of this connection between the technological 
innovations and economic growth, and in the changing institutional 
and ideological framework that conditioned social attitudes to sci-
ence, technology, and innovations. But the practical problems of 
optimal selection of means of enhancing further technological inno-
vation aside, the linkage between the growth-promoting experience 
of past innovations and the innovation-promoting consequences of 
past growth, is quite obvious in modern societies. 
A related general argument would stress the effect of accumu-
lated experience, and institutional innovations, through which 
modern economic growth may stimulate further technological innova-
tions. The experience with past innovations has presumably yielded 
new ways of handling not only the organizational problems involved 
in the movement from conception to first successful application, but 
also those involved in the development of basic science and its 
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connections with applied science. Hence, all other conditions 
being equal, the experience-yield of technological innovation-based 
economic growth should facilitate a greater flow of further techno- 
logical innovations in the future. If the obstacles to such further 
innovation that may also be the result of past economic growth are 
not increasing, the conclusion is another general argument for ex-
pecting that economic growth will enhance the further flow of tech-
nological innovation--even apart from the greater volume of resources 
for that purpose and the public policy designed for that end. 
But modern economic growth influences further technological 
innovation in other ways. A somewhat less obvious, but crucial con-
nection, is indicated by the major role that wide application of 
new technology plays in yielding a variety of tested knowledge and 
new tools not previously available, relating to the particular 
aspect of nature that underlies the new technology. Modern science, 
characteristically, has always been stimulated by new data and new 
tools. If we recognize that applications of new technology (or of 
old in new combinations) provide science with new data, new tools, 
and new puzzles; that, in response to these stimuli, science may 
generate new discoveries and new insights; and that, on the basis 
of the latter, new technological opportunities relevant to poten-
tially large demands may be glimpsed, to be realized in new inven-
tions and technological innovations--we observe a connection between 
past technological changes in their introduction and diffusion in 
economic growth, and a flow of new technological innovations. That 
this later flow is likely to be at a greater rate than the earlier 
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does not follow directly from the preceding argument. But it 
would follow if we argue further that, in modern economic growth, 
cumulative advance of applied technology means a greater flow of 
new data, new tools, and new puzzles--and thus a greater stimulus 
to the advance of science, and to the related further advances in 
invention and technological innovation. 
In view of the importance of scientific knowledge in modern 
technology and some tendency in the literature to draw a sharp 
line of division between science and technology, assuming separate 
lines of cumulation in the two, it may be useful to restate the 
argument just advanced. 9 The argument consists of the following 
theses. First, modern science, in its attention to data and puz-
zles yielded by practical production problems is distinctive; and 
a connection may be drawn between the observation of production 
practices and some major scientific discoveries. To cite an early 
illustration: observation of the limited capacity of pumps led 
(in the seventeenth century) to the discovery of the earth's atmos-
phere ard its pressure. Second, whatever science discovers or gen-
eralizes about, and it does so about tested aspects of behavior of 
nature, is grist to the mill of technology, for the latter is es-
sentially manipulation of the forces of nature for man's purposes. 
Hence, no matter how variable the gap in time may be between scien-
tific discovery and technological application, the greater know-
ledge about behavior of nature will eventually be found relevant 
to some practical application. Third, once successful application 
in the form of a major technological innovation is made, it is usually 
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found that the knowledge of the process and material involved in 
the earlier science discovery is incomplete from the technological 
standpoint, although no additional knowledge was needed in estab-
lishing the original discovery or finding. Fourth, such additional 
knowledge, and new tools made economically possible through mass 
application of the innovation, may, and usually do, provide new data, 
new insights, new puzzles. Thus, the use of the Savery and particu-
larly Newcomen atmospheric engines, a technological application of 
the discovery of the atmosphere in the preceding century, led to 
the basic improvements by Watt, which replaced the atmospheric with 
a true steam engine. The development of the latter to a high pres- 
sure type and the observation of increased efficiency at higher pres-
sures led to puzzles, which in their scientific resolution yielded 
the thermodynamics branch of modern physics (with its laws of con-
servation of energy, and of entropy). A similar learning process 
in the course of mass application can be illustrated in other fields 
by the Edison effect, or the discovery of the way short rays are 
transmitted via the ionosphere--with obvious stimuli for modern phy-
sics and astronomy. Fifth, the further advance of science provides 
bases for new technologies; and so the chain continues to mass appli-
cations, more data, more tools, more puzzles, and so on. 
The argument above is not in contradiction with the observation 
of differences in characteristics between scientists and technolo-
gists; or with the historical fact that some countries, like the 
United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, made 
no great contributions to basic science and yet were leaders in 
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invention and technological advance; while others, like France, 
were much greater contributors to basic science than to new tech-
nology. The differences in the approach to problems between sci-
entists and technologist-inventors, and the corresponding differ-
ences in their personal characteristics and backgrounds, are, if 
anything, in partial support of the proposition above that mass 
application results in much new knowledge. Apparently the setting 
of the problem in basic science often does not require fully tested 
knowledge about technologically important characteristics--even 
though the latter, when established, do provide food for further 
scientific thought. Thus Hertz, establishing the existence of 
short rays, in accordance with the prediction of Maxwell's theory, 
was not induced to inquire precisely how these rays were trans-
mitted through space. Nor is the difference in national identity 
of the :Locus of advance in basic science and in technology sur-
prising:: given the transnational character of science, any nation 
that is capable of understanding it can build on it; and the new 
technology, even if it is based on new science, may well be more 
easily developed in a country other than the pioneer in the scien-
tific advance. The same difference may occur between the locus of 
technological advance and of science based on the knowledge-yield 
of the former; thermodynamics was formulated in France (by Carnot), 
in Germany(by Clausius), and only partly in England (by Joule and 
Kelvin)--and yet England was the major developer of the steam engine. 
The argument is simply that in the development of modern technology, 
the common base of the economic growth of developed countries, an 
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important feedback relation exists between development of science 
and technology and economic growth, and between economic growth 
and further development of science and technological innovation. 
The argument holds on an international scale, with allowance for 
time lags and for differences in national locus between the sev-
eral links in the connection. 
The hypothesis just advanced bears also upon the question 
whether, with enlargement of. scale, the activity yielding additions 
to new knowledge and new technology is subject to diminishing or 
increasing returns. Evidence is available showing that modern 
societies devote an increasing proportion of their resources to aug-
menting the supply of scientists and technologists. The growth in 
numbers, and in level of advanced training, of scientists, engi-
neers, and high level technologists--the group capable of adding 
both to the growth of natural science and to the flow of inventions, 
improvements, and other ways of advancing material technology has 
been rapid. Indeed, this growth has been greater than that of 
almost any other occupation (except that directly connected with a 
completely new branch of production, e.g. computer specialists). 
If these augmented talents were engaged, in increasing density, in a 
circumscribed field of science or technology, diminishing returns 
could be expected. But scientific discovery moves from one field 
to another, and it is induced to shift its focus and sometimes 
revise its theoretical structure by an accumulation of new data, new 
tools, or new puzzles provided by the unexpected lessons of mass 
application of major technological innovations, themselves perhaps 
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resulting from an earlier scientific advance. Invention and inno-
vation also tend to move from sector to sector, not only because 
of stimuli from the new scientific discoveries but also because of 
of the exhaustion of cost-reducing opportunities and of demand res-
ponsiveness in sectors in which technological innovations of earlier 
days had time to diffuse widely. The richer promises are elsewhere 
and are often provided by new types of demand connected with changed 
conditions of life and work. These points, relating to the need or 
demand component in the triad involved in major technological inno-
vation, are discussed below; but here, in dealing with the rate of 
return to an increased supply of providers of new knowledge and new 
technology, we note the tendency, and inducement, to shift from one 
field to another. This shift should help to avoid diminishing re-
turns that could be expected with increasing supplies in a narrowly 
circumscribed field of science or technology. 
The answer to the question of the dynamics of returns (dimin-
ishing, constant, increasing) to increased supply of participants 
in the process of adding to basic and applied knowledge and to tech-
nological advance, and to a greatly increased flow of material re-
source input into the tasks, depends partly upon the tests one would 
apply. The impression is one of great acceleration in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries in the rate of discoveries in natural 
sciences, in the marked multiplication of disciplines and cross-dis-
ciplines, and in the flow of major technological innovations. Fur-
thermore, the greater density of the network of science and modern 
technology provides more favorable conditions for the generation of 
new ideas and inventions more rapidly. The closer relation between 
science and technology, reflected in the technological breakthroughs 
by scientists addressing themselves to technological tasks, can be 
illustrated by the development of nylon and of the transistor. But 
all these are impressions, and no proper measure of output and input, 
particularly of the former, are available. Such data as counts of 
scientific papers, or lists of major discoveries, inventions, or 
patents, are all limited by the wide diversity in the magnitude of 
the unit and the difficulty of interpreting a consensus on "major" 
in terms of a narrow range of magnitude. Such measures as numbers 
of persons engaged, with adequate levels of training, and even of 
material resources input, run into difficulties because of possible 
variance in selectivity and innate capacity of the people involved--
surely an important aspect in a production process in which creativ-
ity is a major component. 
No firm answer can, therefore, be given. Still a moderate 
statement can be made: despite the large increase in the supply of 
people and resources to the knowledge-augmenting and technology-en-
hancing activities, diminishing returns, if present, did not prevent 
the continuance of a vigorous rate of flow of discoveries, inven-
tions, and technological innovations. This observation applies in 
the international field of modern science and technology--not nec-
essarily to any one country. As already indicated, in some coun-
tries the flow of technological innovations did accelerate with 
entry into modern economic growth; in others, the rate of technolo-
gical innovation, compared with earlier phases of their economic 
growth in modern times, may have declined•. 
521 
What are the effects of modern economic growth on further tech-
nological innovation, in so far as demand for its products and sup-
ply of requisite entrepreneurship are concerned? An initial exam-
ination of this question suggests several impeding effects. As 
already noted, reduction in costs of a final consumer goods, through 
preceding innovation, may be such that even marked cuts through fur-
ther innovation may not be expected to stimulate greater demand. 
Thus the need, or market for, further innovations may be damped by 
effects of past growth. Or, second, economic growth based on past 
technological innovations and resulting in marked enlargement of 
the scale of the plant and the firm, may make for entrepreneurship 
more conservative with respect to further innovations--particularly 
if the industries are oligopolistic or monopolistic. Finally, 
modern economic growth, in market economies, has resulted in a sub-
stantiaL rise in the share of the governmental, public sector in 
total p roduct and resources; and the responsiveness of the public 
entrepreneur to further technological innovations may be more lim-
ited than that of entrepreneurs in the private sector. The three 
observations just made cover wide and complex topics, on which sub-
stantial literature exists. We merely offer a few comments to 
stress that, as usual, the process even of modern growth has not 
only self-sustaining but also self-curbing elements. 
To illustrate the first observation, consider the case of cot-
ton textiles. The technological innovations, which extended from 
mechanization of spinning in the 1770's to mechanization of weaving 
in the 1830's (the two most labor-consuming operations), combined 
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with various auxiliary and complementary innovations, resulted in 
the conversion of cotton textiles from what was a high-priced lux-
ury to a low-unit-price, mass-use commodity. Once the new technology 
of producing cotton textiles was established and improved, further 
technological innovations could reduce the low cost further--and 
particularly provide some competitive advantage to the pioneering 
firms. But, by and large, opportunities for substantial gains from 
further technological innovations, in that field, were substantially 
narrowed; and were certainly much narrower than opportunities for 
technological advance and innovation in other fields, in which cur-
rent technology and the high costs of final product left much room 
for gain from an innovation. This did not mean that technological 
advance in the light textiles industry ceased. But much of it came 
as diffusion of technological change in other fields (e.g. automa-
tic controls over the spindles and looms) or in the form of differ-
ent textile products, such as rayon and later nylon. There was no 
pressure for further major technological innovations within the cot-
ton-textile industry proper. 
Several aspects of this illustration deserve note, because it 
typifies the slowing down of incentives to further innovation in 
industries that reach technological maturity within a given frame-
work of current technology. First, the loss of incentives to inno-
vate was relative, not absolute--in the sense that potential returns 
from further innovation became more promising in other sectors. Thus, 
assuming a stock of uncommitted resources, inventive and capital, 
seeking promising opportunities, the comparative advantages of using 
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it in the mature industry would be far lower than in the past when 
it was growing. Second, relevant technological innovations that 
do occur, may originate elsewhere and be introduced into the indus-
try; or may provide a base for the production of a different pro-
duct, serving the same purpose, thus setting up a new, different, 
and competing industry. Third, the relevant innovations that occur 
at this stage are not usually managed by the entrepreneurial talent 
within the mature industry. The developers of rayon and nylon were 
not the entrepreneurs in the cotton textile industry. With the lat-
ter reaching maturity, and lack of great potential returns from 
technological innovations within the old technological framework, 
the successful entrepreneurs might seek other sources of greater 
returns--either in the protected markets of the colonies, or by 
raising the protective barriers of the large domestic market, or by 
shifting the industry to regions with appreciably lower labor costs 
and easier labor supply. The last statement illustrates an impor-
tant point. Maturity of an industry generally means large economic 
magnitudes, and the power to exert political pressure within the 
economy or to exploit differentials in supplies of productive fac-
tors. These powers are not operative, or are of lesser importance, 
in the early phases of major rapid technological changes within a 
new industry. 
As already indicated, economic growth means large scale of 
plant and firm, with the structure of fixed costs and marginal 
returns leading to monopoly or oligopoly in many modern industries 
and public regulation of some. What are the consequences for 
entrepreneurial response to invention and innovation? As Maclaurin 
indicated (see p. 251 of the volume cited in footnote 9 above), in 
a truly competitive industry there would be no research, for there 
would be only windfall profits; and returns from an innovation could 
be derived by a pioneer only if protected by a patent (or secret), 
i.e. by monopolistic power. And it is true that a large scale firm 
and even monopoly provide opportunities for internal research (e.g. 
DuPont work on nylon) that are not available to smaller and compet-
itively pressed units. But in the case of monopoly, or even oligop-
oly, technological innovation can be slowed down by absence of com-
petitive pressure. Monopolistic concerns, unlike others, can delay 
innovation even when its technological and long-term economic fea-
sibility is established. Such a delay, while avoiding the destruc-
tive effects on capital and labor in uses that would be displaced, 
does represent a slowing down in the rate of technological innova-
tion. Finally, the rigid rules under which the regulated public 
utilities must operate may well inhibit the kind of adventurous 
entrepreneurship that is often required for particular types of 
innovation, or at least inhibit it more than in industries not sub-
ject to this special type of regulation. 
The comments above should have been put in the form of ques-
tions, for no clear answer can be provided here. But one may sug-
gest a similarity to the effects of slowing down of demand for a 
consumer good that is the product of past innovations. In the lat-
ter case we observed that a loss of incentives for further innova-
tion in the given, "mature", field, results in the focus of vigorous 
technological innovation shifting to another field. This may be true 
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also in the slowing down of technological innovation in a given 
field because of the existence of a monopoly or oligopoly in it. 
Unless they are strictly regulated, the dominance of the large con-
cerns in a given field need not prevent them from technological 
innovation and from research and development outlays in other, 
 possibly (but not necessarily) related field. The two sets of cases 
are parallel in the sense that relaxation of pressure for technolog-
ical innovation--either because of slowing of demand, or because of 
attainment of a relatively protected position--may retard the flow 
of technological innovation in a specific field. But with resources 
available for innovation, the focus may shift, with accelerated 
growth following in another field. One may still ask whether this 
combination of retardation due to dominance in a given field, per-
haps before the maximum reduction of real costs through technologi-
cal innovation has been reached, with a shift of resources for inno-
vation to another field, is an optimal outcome. Policy remedies 
would depend upon the answer. But the answer would involve difficult 
comparisons of lost or delayed opportunities in one field with accel-
erated opportunities in others. 
The growth in the share of government--in product, labor force, 
capital--in the market economies in the course of modern economic 
growth was due to several factors. Urbanization created situations 
in which certain basic services to urban population--in much greater 
volume than required by the more thinly spread rural population--had 
to be provided by the public sector rather than sold on the market 
(police, sanitation, health, etc.). Certain types of capital invest-
ment, which could not be handled by, or entrusted to, the private 
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sector, had to be taken over by government (highways, port facil-
ities, and in many countries the railroads, shipping, and airlines, 
atomic energy, space exploration). Education and health services, 
not geared to the paying capacity of the recipients, were an ever-
growing responsibility of government in a modern society. Finally, 
the participation of developed countries in acute armed conflicts 
meant devotion of large material resources to defense. The ques-
tion posed here is whether an increasing proportion of resources 
in the public sector, without the profit motive and without compet-
itive pressures for efficiency, has not meant a lack of stimuli for 
significant technological advance. In that sense development in 
the market economies might have narrowed the area for further tech-
nological advance. 
The question is strictly relevant only to the civilian part 
of the government sector. One may assume that international com- 
petition and tension provide sufficient pressure so that the incen-
tive for technological innovation in weaponry and other components 
of defense production has not diminished; and is probably not infe-
rior to the competitive pressures within the private sector. And 
the evidence on the major technological breakthroughs, associated 
with the war and defense industries, some of large value for civil-
ian production in the longer run, is impressive. It is hardly an 
accident that World War I accelerated the spread of the internal 
combustion engine in automobile and airplane transportation; or 
that World War II is associated with the development of atomic power, 
radar communications, electronic controls and computers, and the 
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space industry. Two sets of questions may still be raised concern-
ing the war and defense related industries. The first is as to the 
level of efficiency, in the absence of cost controls and economic 
pressures as great as those in the private sector. The second is 
in regard to the net contribution of an advance in military fields 
to technological innovations relevant to peace type production and 
needs. We are in no position to examine the first set of questions, 
which would involve detailed quantitative analysis under properly 
set control conditions. The second should be examined in the light 
of the fact that defense purposes emphasize technology of transport, 
communication, power, and strength of materials--all areas of tech-
nology potentially and directly relevant to civilian use. One last 
point: it is distinctive, and indispensably typical, of modern eco-
nomic growth that the developed countries are ready to devote large 
material resources to defense purposes, substituting the material 
for human resources as much as possible. And this explains the 
extremely high technological level sought under the competitive 
pressures of international strain among the developed countries 
(The pressure would not be as great in the strain between developed 
and less developed countries). 
The question about the effect of the increasing share of gov-
ernment on incentives for further technological change relates more 
properly to the civilian components of government product. The 
answer would involve an examination of the functioning of the civ-
ilian government, and the inducements to technological entrepreneur-
ship that are provided. One would also have to examine both the 
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relatively limited segments of the public non-military activities 
that are specifically directed at basic and technological research 
--as a common service to society; and those that encourage higher 
education, a prerequisite for much of research and technological 
advance. The question is raised to indicate its relevance in the 
wider field of inquiry that would deal with feedback effects of 
economic growth, stemming largely from past technological innova-
tions, on further flow of the latter. 
In discussing the effects of economic growth on further tech-
nological innovation, we stressed the positive feedback of what 
might be broadly called learning aspects of economic growth--learn-
ing about benefits of past innovations as a rationale for more 
resources and better policy to encourage them, learning by experi-
ence better ways of generating and successfully channeling techno-
logical innovations, and, particularly important, learning from the 
new data, new tools, new puzzles generated in the mass application 
of innovations. In contrast, in dealing with the effects via de-
mand and entrepreneurial responses, we tended to stress only the 
inhibiting ones. However, we also indicated that the common res-
ponse in the private sector to such limiting consequences of eco-
nomic growth on further technological innovation was a shift in 
focus. Even in the public sector, within the non-military component, 
there has been a movement toward greater technological innovation 
in fields in which the new technology, either because of its dangers 
or because of its greater social rather than private return, had to 
be handled by the government (as with atomic energy, space explora-
tion, or geophysical research). 
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In connection with shifts of technological innovation to new 
fields of consumer demand, we have already noted that economic 
growth did have some effects that constituted a positive feedback. 
But we should add a further note about several aspects of economic 
growth that constitute positive contributions to further technolog-
ical innovation of the type that yields new consumer goods. Thus, 
for one thing, the concentration of population in urban centers, 
one of the corollaries of modern economic growth, exposed consumers 
to a demonstration effect not found in the countryside. Also, the 
anonymity in the cities, contrasted with personal knowledge and 
status identification in the more settled society of the country-
side, permitted consumer choices uninhibited by traditional status 
restraints. Furthermore, the availability within modern cities 
(and eventually in the countryside) of sources of industrial power 
for consumer purposes encouraged the invention of new consumer goods 
that would use such power. A clear illustration is the prolifera-
tion of new consumer durable goods dependent upon a continuous sup-
ply of electric power, originally provided almost exclusively for 
illumination purposes. Thus, the shortages of domestic labor, asso-
ciated with cessation of migration from the countryside, created a 
demand for substitutes for cooking, cleaning, washing, and similar 
purposes. This demand that might otherwise have been met (and was 
partly met) by development of commercial cooking and baking, com-
mercial laundries, commercial cleaning establishments, etc., stimu-
lated technological innovation which supplied fractional electric 
power equipment for many domestic services (and later even for 
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recreation devices, ranging from the gramophone, to the radio, to 
television). Finally, one should note that it was part and parcel 
of the social and ideological corollaries of modern economic growth 
that material welfare was assigned a high priority; and that con-
sequently the consumer was quite responsive in recognizing the ad-
vantages of a new consumer good when it emerged in the course of a 
technological innovation. Demand was thus created by supply with-
out a substantial lag; and often with a speed far exceeding the 
expectations of the innovators. 
IV. 	Concluding Comments  
This paper dealt with relations between technological innovation 
and modern economic growth, against the background of the historical 
experience of non-Communist developed countries. By technological 
innovation we mean application of new elements in material techno-
logy, i.e. in the knowledge and capacity to manipulate nature for 
human ends--more specifically here, for economic production. By 
economic growth we mean the sustained rise in the supply and diver-
sity of economic goods to the population, under acceptable rules of 
social and economic organization. In view of the wide scope of the 
subject, the difficulties in establishing quantitative weights, and 
the limitations of space and competence, the discussion was perforce 
too brief; and at some points only raised questions, or merely noted 
a particular aspect of the problem. Far from attempting to represent 
an adequate summary of the state of our knowledge as found in the 
literature, the discussion was limited to reflections by an observer 
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who has worked on quantitative aspects of modern economic growth, 
while entertaining a strong interest in the contributions of tech-
nology to it. 
Given the brevity and uneven character of the discussion, a 
detailed summary is hardly necessary. But it might help to list 
the major observations. 
(1) Technological innovation played a key role in the rise 
of product and productivity in modern economic growth; and also 
induced major transformations of conditions of work and life. 
(2) These transformations were required to channel new tech-
nology effectively, and meant organizational changes in the earlier 
institutions that governed production. The resulting changes in 
conditions of work for the active participants were a major element 
in changing conditions of life. Thus, technological innovations 
required innovations in social structure and even in prevailing 
attitudes. They also required adjustment to resulting displacement 
of resources in earlier, and obsolete, uses. 
(3) A major technological innovation, i.e. one with percepti-
ble economic impact, involves a sequence of phases stretching over 
a long life cycle. It takes time to pass from the perception of a 
new technological possibility to economic mass production, requiring 
economic and social changes; and to reach the period of slowdown and 
obsolescence. 	Of the four phases suggested--pre-conception, initial 
application (IA), diffusion (D), and slowdown and obsolescence (SO), 
the IA and D phases alone account, on the average, for half a century. 
The phase sequence, the differences in input-output relations in the 
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different phases, and the phase differences in the interplays 
between the technological, economic, and social adjustments, bear 
clearly upon analysis, policy consideration, and prognosis. 
(4) The clustering of even major technological innovations 
into groups of related changes (stemming from exploitation of one 
source of power, or from a new industrial material, or from the 
interrelation of functions within a production process), combined 
with the interplay between innovations and the social and institu-
tional adjustments to them, lengthens the sequence of distinctive 
phases and adds to their complexity. 
(5) The focus of technological innovations shifts over time 
from one sector of the economy to another, and creates new sectors. 
Their immediate impact is always unequal among sectors, and hence 
among social groups in the economy. This inequality of impact is 
itself a social and economic problem that requires adjustments. 
(6) Because of the combination of conventional economic in-
puts with required changes in conditions of work and life, and 
because of the combination of conventional economic outputs with 
possible non-conventional by-products of technologically-induced 
economic growth, and adequate quantitative guage of the net contri-
bution of technological innovations to economic growth is still to 
be established. Current measures of total factor productivity, 
while possibly reflecting largely technological changes, are either 
limited to conventional input and output; or involve a variety of 
ad hoc, and not fully tested, assumptions as bases for inclusion of 
non-conventional inputs or by-products. 
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.(7) Such a net measure may not be of much value, since a var-
iety of elements, in both inputs and outputs, is needed to give 
meaning to the comparison. Yet the search for such a net measure 
helps to focus the analysis. Provisionally, one may justifiably 
argue that the social valuation of technologically-facilitated, 
modern, economic growth is high and positive; with the critical 
reactions reflecting responses to temporary lags in adjustment. 
(8) Technologically-induced economic growth, having been 
attained, may be seen to stimulate further technological innovation. 
Society is stimulated through the learning of past benefits, and 
the effort made to allocate more resources and provide more favor-
able institutional conditions for further innovation. Past experi-
ence with technological innovations may make for better ways to 
develop successful innovations in the future. A particularly im-
portant stimulus is the learning, through mass application of 
recent new technology, yielding new data, new tools, new insights 
and puzzles to natural science, and helping to widen the base pro-
vided by the latter to further technological breakthroughs and 
innovations. 
(9) Economic growth hastens the maturity of the older fields 
by slowing down growth of final demand for their products. It may 
also affect the conditions for responsive innovative entrepreneur-
ship in the established and modernized fields because of the large 
scale of the firm, and possible dominance of a few in an oligopo-
listic or monopolistic situation. Furthermore, the rise in the 
share of the public sector is a factor, since in its non-military 
areas it may not be very responsive to technological innovation. 
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The slowing down of the older sectors, once modernized through tech-
nological innovation, helps to shift the focus of innovation to 
other sectors. And these shifts to new sources of power, new mate-
rials, new types of producer equipment, and, in an important way, 
new types of consumer goods, help to maintain a high or increasing 
pace of technological innovation; and a high or increasing pace of 
economic growth. 
We conclude the paper with brief, tentative impressions of 
the current state of the field, in so far as it bears on the study 
of economic consequences and origins of technological innovation; 
and even more tentative suggestions regarding directions of fur-
ther work. 
The importance of both science and technological innovation 
for modern economic growth must have become apparent by the middle 
of the nineteenth century (if not earlier), when the development of 
steam power and its application to railroads, besides other less 
important technological innovations, were seen to provide new bases 
for rapid growth and transformation of modern societies. The poli-
cies of some governments in planting technological institutes and 
otherwise encouraging science and technology testify to this recog-
nition. Yet, in both the Classical and (implicitly) the Marxian 
schools within the economic discipline, technological progress was 
viewed as a feeble barrier to the expected exhaustion of natural, 
non-reproducible resources (acting via pressure on profits and cap-
ital accumulation, and via limitation on reduction of labor inputs 
into required means of subsistence). The failure of the resulting 
long-term prognoses of both schools, apparent by the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, only resulted in extruding the subject 
of economic growth (and the related topic of technology) from the 
accepted corpus of the discipline. Economics concentrated on the 
problems of limited means of various ends, within a short-term 
framework in which technology, institutions, tastes of consumers, 
were all supposed to be given, i.e. fixed. With few exceptions, 
of which Schumpeter's monographs just before World War I were most 
conspicuous, the problems of economic growth were neglected, until 
their re-introduction largely after World War II. And the short-
term orientation of the economic discipline led to a neglect of 
empirical and quantitative work on long-term trends and macro-quan-
tities. Such work was kept partly alive in the concern with bus-
iness cycles and then revived, with impressively explosive growth, 
in the late 1930's, and again largely after World War II. 
The explanation of these past trends in the treatment of pro-
blems of economic growth, and the associated problems of technolo-
gical change, is less important here than the consequence for the 
field of our interest. The consequence was obviously a failure to 
accumulate economic data relevant to the effects and origins of 
technological innovation and a limited stock of analytical studies, 
most of them recent. In particular, there has been no attempt to 
link technology to the basic output-and input-statistics of the 
developed countries. Sub-classifications relating output, labor 
force, capital, etc. to technological innovation are missing from 
our aggregate measures. The number of economists engaged in the 
study of technological aspects of economic growth has been, and is, 
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quite small. Even the studies in economic history that would pro-
vide systematic accounts of the emergence, development, and phasing 
in the spread of innovations (single, or in clusters) are few. If 
there is now a really serious concern with the contributions and 
sources of technological innovation, with the prospects of specific 
policy action in the field, then obviously much systematic work 
must be initiated on the quantitative aspects of the problem, and 
implicitly on the analytical formulations that would be needed for, 
and then modified by, such quantitative analysis. 
In this development of further quantitative work, linkages with 
the already accumulated and established measures, countrywide or 
industry wide, would be particularly important. The possibility of 
distinguishing with total output, labor force, capital, etc. of 
the country or of an industry, components associated with recent, 
not so recent, and much older technology, would add immensely to 
the quantitative base for the study of the interrelations between 
technological innovation and modern economic growth. A more sys-
tematic analysis of the accumulated experience with research and 
development outlays and of the costs of innovations would be pos-
sible. And systematic historical accounts of the emergence and 
spread of clusters of major innovations should be encouraged. Such 
an account of the spread of steam, or of electric power, or of the 
automobile, each of which meant a major addition to the productive 
capacity of modern societies, major transformations of conditions 
of work and life, and much social innovation in the process of 
adjustment, would illustrate the complex interrelations and the 
sequential phases involved. 
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The list could easily be expanded, and runs the danger of con-
veying, unwarrantedly, an impression of careful selection and 
testing. These are only ad hoc suggestions, can be no more than 
that, and are hardly worth multiplication. The main burden of these 
comments was to stress the long neglect of the field, and the con-
sequences for the current state of our knowledge. The illuminating 
and intriguing monographs of the handful of economists who have 
worked on technological innovation are only a beginning. A more 
sustained volume of systematic quantitative analysis, closely linked 
to the flow of basic data, and of monographic work on the complex 
interrelations susceptible of historical study, would add to our 
understanding, perspective, and to the stock of empirical findings 
need for adequate analysis and policy consideration. 
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